Mookerjee, J.:— This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit to declare the invalidity of the decree in a mortgage suit in so far as such decree affects land situated beyond the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court, on the ground that leave under clause 12 could not have been granted and the decree was consequently to that extent made without jurisdiction. The question raised is of first impression, and the facts material for its determination are not in controversy.
On the 30th August, 1907, certain persons who may be called the Mookerjees and their trustee, one Bhattacharjya (represented by defendants Nos. 4-9 in the present litigation), executed a simple mortgage in favour of Banerjee (defendant No. 3), to secure the repayment of a loan of Rs. 25,000, which was charged upon a share of lots Santoshpur and Mandalika, Patni Mahals in sub-district Howrah within the district of Hooghly. On the 13th December 1907, Banerjee executed a mortgage in favour of the Khettrys (represented by defendants Nos. 1 and 2) to secure a loan of Rs. 20,000. The properties conveyed and assured by this mortgage included a share of two parcels of land in the town of Calcutta as also the interest of Banerjee as mortgagee under the document of the 30th August, 1907. On the 23rd September, 1911, the patni taluk Mandalika was released and absolutely discharged from the mortgage of the 30th August, 1907, upon payment of Rs. 10,000 by the original mortgagors and with the concurrence of all the parties interested. On the 25th November 1912, the Khettrys instituted a suit (No. 1083 of 1912) on the Original Side of this Court to enforce their security of the 13th December, 1907, against Banerjee, the Mookerjees and Bhattacharjya. It is necessary to observe that the suit was brought by the Khettrys not only against their mortgagor Banerjee but also against the mortgagors of Banerjee under the transaction of the 30th August, 1907. The reason for this was that the Khettrys sought, not merely to enforce their security against their mortgagor Banerjee and to cut off his equity of redemption under the mortgage of the 13th December, 1907, but also to enforce the mortgage held by Banerjee against the Mookerjees and Bhattacharjya under the deed of the 30th August, 1907; this relief they claimed under their derivative title from Banerjee who had granted a mortgage of his interest as mortgagee. The suit was thus in essence a composite suit wherein two distinct reliefs were claimed by the Khettrys, namely, first, to enforce a right of sale of Calcutta properties under the mortgage of the 13th December, 1907, and, secondly, to enforce a right of sale of moffusil properties under the mortgage of the 30th August, 1907. The Khettrys, accordingly, prayed for and obtained leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent on the assumption that the clause was applicable. The suit was decreed ex parte on the 2nd September, 1914, and the preliminary decree then passed was made absolute on the 24th August, 1917. Meanwhile, the plaintiff De had purchased the right, title and interest of the Mookerjees and Bhattacharjya at an execution sale on the 20th Jane, 1916, and on the 29th July, 1918, he instituted the present suit to impeach the validity of the decree in the suit of the Khettrys in so far as it affected land beyond the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. Justice Greaves has held that the Court was competent to grant leave under clause 12 and that the decree was consequently made with jurisdiction.
It is now well settled by decisions in all the Indian High Courts that a sub-mortgagee is entitled to bring a suit against his mortgagor and to realise the dues on his mortgage by sale or foreclosure: Ram Shankar Lal v. Ganesh Prasad , Muthu Vijia Raghunatha Ramachandra Vacha Mahali Thurai v. Venkatachallam Chetti , Narayan Vithal Maval v. Ganoji and Bansi Lal Bhagat v. Durga Prasad . It is also open to a sub-mortgagee, but by no means obligatory on him, to frame his suit in such a way as not only to enforce his rights under his own mortgage, but to enforce the original mortgage against the mortgagor of his mortgagor: Zaki Hasan v. Deo Nath Sahai . A sub-mortgagee may thus be content to cut off the equity of redemption of his mortgagor, or he may, at his choice, by a suit properly framed, cut off the equity of redemption not merely of his mortgagor but also of the mortgagor of his mortgagor. This he is able to accomplish by reason of his derivative title. Where a mortgagee transfers his interest by way of a mortgage, his mortgagee, that is, the sub-mortgagee, takes it subject to the original mortgagor's right to redeem; consequently, the sub-mortgagee who holds a fragment of the interest of the mortgagee may achieve what the mortgagee might have obtained, namely, to cut off the equity of redemption of the original mortgagor. The form of the decree to be made in such a suit, where two-fold relief is claimed by the sub-mortgagee against his mortgagor and the mortgagor of that mortgagor is set out in Seton on Judgments (1912) page 2009 (Derivative Mortgagee v. Mortgagee and Mortgagor) and the Code of Civil Procedure, Appendix D, form 9. No difficulty arises in a suit of this description when the properties included in the original mortgage as also the additional properties, if any, comprised in the mortgage by the mortgagee are situated within the same jurisdiction. Where, however, as here the properties comprised in the original mortgage are situated in the moffusil and the additional property included in the security granted by the mortgagee is situated in the town of Calcutta, an important question of some nicety arises. The original contract of mortgage plainly contemplates a suit in the moffusil Court for its enforcement. Is the mortgagee, by the grant of a sub-mortgage along with a mortgage of property in the town of Calcutta, entitled to have the forum altered in relation to the enforcement of the original mortgage? We are clearly of opinion that the answer should be in the negative. As between the mortgagee and the sub-mortgagee a suit to enforce the security may fittingly be instituted on the Original Side of this Court; this is in conformity with the intention of the parties as indicated by the inclusion of the Calcutta property in the mortgage. If, however, the sub-mortgagee is not content with relief against his mortgagor alone and claims to have a remedy against the mortgagor of his mortgagor, the situation becomes entirely changed. As he can claim this relief only by virtue of title derived from his own mortgagor in respect of the moffusil property, he can do neither more or less than what his mortgagor could have done towards the original mortgagor. The original mortgagor, as we have seen, could have been sued by his mortgagee in respect of liabilities arising out of the mortgage transaction, only in the moffusil Court. The mortgagee, by granting a mortgage to a third person, of his interest as mortgagee and by including in that document a property in Calcutta cannot be permitted to prejudice the position of his mortgagor and to render him liable to be sued in a Court never contemplated by the parties at the time of the mortgage contract. We are of opinion that this view is consistent with a plain reading of clause 12 of the Letters Patent which, so far as it is material for our present purpose, provides as follows:
“The said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, shall be empowered to receive, try and determine suits of every description, if in the case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property shall be situated or, in all other cases, if cause of action shall have arisen either wholly, or, in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of the said High Court.”
In the case before us, the Khettrys as derivative mortgagees from Banerjee, could enforce the security of the 30th August, 1907, against the Mookerjees and Bhattacharjya, just as Banerjee himself might have done, in the moffusil Court. The Khettrys might also, as the mortgagees of Banerjee, have sued him alone on the Original Side of this Court and barred his equity of redemption. But the Khettrys plainly could not be allowed, by the inclusion of two claims in one suit against two sets of persons in respect of properties situated, as regards one set in the moffusil alone, to make the composite suit against both sets of defendants maintainable on the Original Side of this Court. The decisions in Matigara Coal Co., Ltd. v. Shragers, Ltd. and Sarat Chandra Roy Chowdhry v. M.M Nahapiet are of no avail to the Khettrys; they merely show that where some of the mortgaged properties included in the mortgage deed are Within and some without the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Court, the Court has jurisdiction to grant leave to sue and to entertain a suit on the mortgage in respect of all the properties including those situated beyond the local limits. This principle might be of assistance to the Khettrys in a suit by them against Banerjee alone on the mortgage of the 13th December, 1907, which included properties in the town of Calcutta as also mortgagee interest in property in the moffusil. But there is no foundation for the argument that the suit as framed could properly be treated as one to enforce a cause of action which had arisen partly within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction; the contention is fallacious, as the causes of action under the mortgage of the 30th August, 1907, and 13th December, 1907, were distinct and affected different sets of individuals, of whom one set held properties situated entirely in the moffusil. We do not think it would be right to strain the language of clause 12 of the Letters Patent with a view to cover a case of this description. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the Court was not competent to grant leave under that clause, and the decree, in so far as it affects properties in the moffusil, must be deemed made without jurisdiction [cf. the judgment of Lord Moulton in Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhuri v. Hari Dasi Debi ].
As a last resort, it was faintly argued on behalf of the respondent that the objection as to jurisdiction might and should have been raised in the original suit, and as it was not be raised, the rule of constructive res judicata should be applied, in other words, that the parties should be placed in the same position as if the point had been raised, contested and determined in favour of the Khettrys. There is obviously no foundation for this contention. It is an elementary principle that where a Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action in which an order is made, such order is wholly void, for jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of parties and no waiver or acquiescence on their part can make up for the lack or defect of jurisdiction. If any authority were needed to support this proposition, reference might be made to the recent decisions in Rajlakshmi Dasee v. Katyayani Dasee , Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh and Ramjit Misser v. Remador Singh where the earlier cases will be found reviewed. But if the decision of the Court is void for want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it cannot operate as res judicata; in order that adjudgment may be conclusive between the parties, the essential pre-requisite is that it should be the judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. In this case, as already stated, the question of jurisdiction was neither raised nor decided the position might have been different if the question had been raised and decided, for where a Court judicially considers and adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction and decides that the facts exist which are necessary to give it jurisdiction over the case, the decision is conclusive till it is set aside in an appropriate proceeding. But where there has been no such adjudication, the decree remains a decree without jurisdiction and cannot operate as res judicata.
The result is that this appeal is allowed and the preliminary decree in suit No. 1083 of 1912 passed on the 2nd September, 1914, the decree absolute made on the 24th August, 1917, and all subsequent orders made on the basis thereof must be set aside. The consequence will be that suit No. 1083 of 1912 will stand revived at the stage when leave under clause 12 was granted. The Khettrys as plaintiffs in that suit will be at liberty to amend their plaint if they so desire and in such manner as they may be advised; if the suit is limited as a suit to enforce the mortgage of the 13th December, 1907, against Banerjee, it will be tried on the merits. The appellant is entitled, to his costs both here and in the Court below including the costs of the order made on the 7th August, 1918.
Fletcher, J.:— I agree.
O.M
Appeal allowed.
Attorney for the appellant: H.C Ghose.
Attorney for the respondents: J.K Dutt.