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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mukerji, J.; Greaves, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from an order of the Subordinate Judge of Mymensingh refusing to set aside a sale held in execution of a mortgage decree. The Appellant was one of the judgment-debtors subject to the decree. A preliminary decree was passed on 27 December 1922 and the final decree on 23 January 1923. The sale in execution took place on 15 March 1924, and the decree-holder was the auction-purchaser. The Appellant filed an application on 15 April 1924 purporting to proceed under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) and Rule 90 of Order 21 of the C.P.C.; a prior application on 7 January 1924 had been dismissed for non-prosecution on 8 February 1924.

The Appellant advanced objections to the execution and sale, and the Subordinate Judge refused to set aside the sale. The Appellant appealed. Although the Respondent contended that the 15 April 1924 application was filed one day after the 30-day limitation for applications under Order 21, Rule 90 (it should have been filed on 14 April 1924), the Subordinate Judge nonetheless dealt with the application on its merits and the appellate court also addressed the merits of the case.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application to set aside the sale in execution was maintainable under section 47 C.P.C. or Order 21, Rule 90 C.P.C., and whether the application was barred by the 30-day limitation applicable to Rule 90.
  2. Whether the executing court can go behind the decree in execution proceedings to inquire into the validity of the decree (specifically, whether a decree was ex parte because heirs of a deceased judgment-debtor were not substituted before the preliminary decree).
  3. Whether irregularities in publication or conducting of the sale rendered the sale void or the sale price inadequate such that the sale should be set aside.
  4. Whether notices of execution and sale proclamations were properly served on the guardian of minor judgment-debtors, and if not, whether such defect vitiates the sale.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The properties sold were not liable for the decree because they belonged to the Appellant's mother; the decree had been passed for the husband's debts and not the mother's debts.
  • The father had no legal necessity to mortgage the properties, so the properties of the Appellant (or his family) were not liable for the mortgage.
  • One judgment-debtor (Masturi Khatun) had died before the preliminary decree and her heirs were not substituted in time; therefore the decree was ex parte as against those heirs.
  • There was irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale (including alleged failure to serve proclamation and notices), leading to an inadequate sale price (decretal amount Rs. 20,258; sale price Rs. 15,435).
  • Notices of execution and sale proclamations were served on minor judgment-debtors and not on their guardian; the guardian ad litem appointed in the suit (Babu Debendra Prosad Roy) was not appointed in the execution proceedings and did not enter appearance, so service was improper.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The application under Order 21, Rule 90 was filed beyond the 30-day period from the sale date and no sufficient reasons were given to justify extension of the limitation.
  • The executing court's jurisdiction remained complete and the defects alleged (including non-substitution before the preliminary decree and service irregularities) do not permit the executing court to go behind the decree.
  • The evidence showed that the sale price was not inadequate: valuation evidence presented by the decree-holder supported the sale price and contradicted the Appellant's valuation evidence.
  • Evidence established that notices and proclamations had been duly and properly served despite the Appellant's bare negative assertions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Malkarjan v. Narhari Where a sale takes place after notice was wrongly served on a person who was not the legal representative of the judgment-debtors' estate, and the executing court erroneously treated that person as representative, the sale is not a nullity; irregularity does not invalidate the sale if the executing court's jurisdiction was complete throughout. The court relied on this authority to hold that service of notices on persons who were not formally appointed guardians in the execution proceedings was an irregularity that did not vitiate the sale.
Fani Bhusan Bhutan v. Surendra Nath Das Non-representation of an infant by a guardian in execution proceedings is not itself a sufficient ground for avoiding execution; this stands on a different footing from failure to observe Order 32 in suits by or against minors. The court cited this case to support the conclusion that lack of fresh appointment or appearance by the guardian in the execution proceedings did not automatically invalidate the execution or sale.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise analysis, addressing limitation and then the merits:

  • Limitation: The Respondent argued that the application under Order 21, Rule 90 was time-barred because it was filed one day late (filed 15 April 1924 whereas the last date was 14 April 1924). The learned Subordinate Judge had stated the application was filed on the last date, but the appellate court found it was a day late. Nevertheless, because the Subordinate Judge had dealt with the application on the merits and counsel argued the appeal on merits, the appellate court also addressed the substantive issues.
  • Going behind the decree: Regarding the contention that a judgment-debtor (Masturi Khatun) died before the preliminary decree and that her heirs were not substituted until shortly before the final decree, the court held that the executing court is not competent to go behind the decree and inquire into the validity of the decree itself. The final decree passed against the heirs was the decree being executed; if that decree was wrongly passed, that would be grounds to set aside the decree (by appropriate proceedings), but not a matter for the executing court to decide in execution proceedings under section 47 or Order 21, Rule 90.
  • Alleged irregularity in sale and inadequacy of price: The court examined valuation evidence. The decretal amount was Rs. 20,258 and sale price Rs. 15,435. The Subordinate Judge had found values for the properties (taluqs valued at Rs. 12,500 and khamar lands at Rs. 3,800, total not exceeding Rs. 16,300). The Appellant's own testimony and witnesses were found weak or inconsistent: the Appellant could not give clear evidence of value or income; one witness was a servant of the Appellant; another witness gave uncertain testimony about sale proclamations. Evidence on behalf of the decree-holder supported lower multipliers (taluqs at 25 times annual income) and average prices (khamar land ~Rs. 200 per kani). The Appellant's late-filed cadastral khatians were fragments and unhelpful. On this record the court concluded the Appellant failed to prove the sale was at an inadequate price.
  • Service on minors' guardian: The Appellant alleged notices of execution and sale proclamation were served on the minors rather than their guardian; the guardian ad litem had not been appointed afresh in execution or entered appearance. The guardian made a post-sale application which resulted only in an order that it be filed. The court treated this as an irregularity. Relying on Malkarjan v. Narhari and Fani Bhusan Bhutan v. Surendra Nath Das, the court held that such irregularity did not render the sale void or invalidate execution when the executing court's jurisdiction was complete.
  • Overall: Because the Appellant's factual and evidential attacks on the sale (value shortfall, irregular service, challenge to decree validity via execution proceedings) were not sustained on the record, the court found no sufficient basis to set aside the sale.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Appeal dismissed.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The application to set aside the sale in execution was refused; the sale stands.
  • The Appellant failed to show the sale was vitiated by procedural irregularity or that the sale price was inadequately low such as to require setting aside.
  • The judgment was dismissed with costs; the court assessed the hearing fee at three gold mohurs.

Broader implications:

This opinion applies existing authorities to hold that certain irregularities in execution (including imperfect service on guardians or technical non-appointment of guardians in execution proceedings) do not by themselves vitiate an execution sale when the executing court's jurisdiction was complete. The opinion does not state or announce any new legal principle beyond its application of cited precedents.

    Mateur Rasul Judgment-Debtor No. 2, v. Abdul Soid Decree-Holder, Auction-Purchaser And Ors.,

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    Mukerji, J.:— This appeal arises out of an order passed by the Subordinate Judge of Mymensingh refusing to set aside a sale held in execution of a mortgage decree. The Appellant was one of the judgment-debtors against whom the said decree was passed. A preliminary decree was passed on the 27th December 1922 and the final decree on the 23rd January 1923. The sale took place on the 15th March 1924, the decree-holder being the auction-purchaser at the sale. The application on which the order which forms the subject-matter of this appeal was passed was made by the Appellant on the 15th April 1924. The application purported to be one under sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also under Or. 21, r. 90 of the same Code. The objections that were put forward on behalf of the Appellant in the said application in order to bring it under sec. 47 were mainly to the effect that the properties were not liable for the decree inasmuch as they belonged to the mother of the Appellant and the decree had been passed not for the debts of the mother but for those of her husband; and that the father had no legal necessity to mortgage the properties and consequently the properties of the applicant were not liable for the mortgage. The same objection is also to be found in another application which was filed on behalf of the Appellant previously on the 7th January 1924 and which was dismissed for non-prosecution on the 8th February 1924. It appears also that this objection was raised in the suit itself and the decree was passed on deciding the same against the applicant. This objection is really one which can hardly be considered as falling under sec. 47, C.P.C, and the order that has been passed by the Subordinate Judge against which the present appeal has been preferred really comes under Or. 21, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That being so, the mere fact that in the application sec. 47 was mentioned would not enable the Appellant to save limitation if as a matter of fact the application was not filed within 30 days of the sale. The Respondent put forward a contention before us to the effect that the application was filed beyond 30 days from the date of the sale and that no reasons have been given by the Appellant such as would enable him to get an order extending the period of limitation provided for an application under that rule. The learned Subordinate Judge in his judgment states that the application for setting aside the sale was made on the last date of limitation. But looking at the dates on which the sale took place and the application was filed it will appear that it was filed a day too late. It should have been filed on the 14th April 1924, on which date, it appears, the Court was not closed and therefore as a matter of fact it was filed a day too late, and the application, therefore, should have been dismissed as not having been filed within time. As however it was not so dismissed hut was dealt with on the merits and as the learned vakil appearing on behalf of the Appellant has argued the appeal before us on the merits, I propose to deal with the case on its merits as well.

    The objections put forward on behalf of the Appellant are mainly three. The first is that before the preliminary decree was passed on the 27th December 1022 one of the judgment-debtors, namely, Masturi Khatun had died and that no substitution had been made of her heirs in her place before the said decree was passed and that it was only when the final decree was about to be passed on the 27th January 1923, that is to say, about sixteen months after the date of her death that her heirs were brought on the record. It is contended that the decree that was passed was ex parte having regard to the fact that the judgment-debtor's heirs were not brought on the record within the time allowed by law. In our opinion, this is not an objection which can be taken either on an application under sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure or in an application made under Or. 21, r. 90 of that Code. The executing Court is not competent to go behind the decree and enquire into the question, thereby in effect challenging the validity of the decree itself. The final decree that was passed was the decree that was the subject-matter of the execution proceedings and it was passed against the heirs of the deceased Masturi Khatun. If it had been wrongly passed against those heirs that may be a ground for setting aside the decree. But it is certainly not open to the executing Court to go into that question and to say as to whether the decree was validly passed against those heirs. That objection is not, therefore, at all tenable.

    The second ground put forward on behalf of the Appellant is that there was irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale and that in consequence of such irregularity the properties were sold at an inadequate price. The decretal amount was Rs. 20,258 and the properties were sold for Rs. 15,435. The learned Subordinate Judge has found upon the evidence that the properties consisted of some taluqs and some khamar lands and that the value of the taluqs would be Rs. 12,500 and that the khamar lands would be valued at Rs. 3,800. In his opinion the total value of the properties at the highest figure cannot exceed Rs. 16,300. The Appellant in these proceedings examined himself and two other witnesses in order to prove that the real value of the properties was much more than what was obtained at the sale. The Appellant himself was not in a position to give any clear evidence as to the value of these properties. He stated that the net income of the properties was Rs. 600 from which the suddar rent had got to be deducted and that such properties sell at 40 times the annual income. As to the khamar lands he stated that they were about 22 kanis in area of which about 19½ kanis were culturable lands. In cross-examination, however, he stated he was not able to state the value of any of the taluqs or their income nor was he in a position, to say what the profits of any particular taluq were but that his Sarkar knew all about it. This Sarkar was not examined as a witness in the case. Witness No. 2 for the Appellant states that there are 22 kanis of khamar land and that each kani sells for Rs. 700 or Rs. 800 and that the taluqs sell at 30 or 35 times their annual profits. He, however, is a man who is a servant of the Appellant. The only other witness examined in the case on behalf of the Appellant is witness No. 3 who states that he does not know if any sale proclamation had been served or if there had been any beating of the drums. He states that each kani of land sells for Rs. 600 to Rs. 700 and that the taluqs sell at 30 times their annual income. He states that he himself purchased a taluq at 32 times its annual income. As the learned Subordinate Judge has pointed out, it is well known that small properties are sold at much higher values proportionately than large ones. On behalf of the decree-holders several witnesses were examined and they prove that as a matter of fact taluqs are sold at 25 times their annual income and even upon the deposition of the Appellant the total income of his properties would not exceed Rs. 500 and, therefore, the value of the taluqs would be about Rs. 12,500. As to the khamar land, upon the evidence adduced on behalf of the decree-holder, it would appear that on an average the price is about Rs. 200 per kani. On behalf of the Appellant copies of some cadastral survey khatians were filed and it was only at the very last stage of the case that an application was made on his behalf for time to have them certified. This application was rejected and in our opinion rightly, rejected. Moreover what were filed were mere fragments and afford no real assistance to the Appellant.

    The position then is that the Appellant has failed to prove the value of the properties, while upon the evidence on the record it cannot be said that the price fetched at the sale was inadequate.

    Then as to the service of notices, beyond the negative evidence given by witness No. 3 examined on behalf of the Appellant to the effect that there was no publication of notices there was no other evidence on his side. On the other hand, the decree-holder has examined peons, a tahsildar, a drummer who took part in the service of the notices and three other persons who were present at the time when the proclamation and notice were served and upon their evidence it has been satisfactorily established that as a matter of fact the notice and the sale proclamation were duly and properly served. It is, therefore I not established that there was any irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale far less that there was any inadequacy in the price that was fetched at the sale, consequent upon any irregularity.

    The next ground taken on behalf of the Appellant is to the effect that the notices of execution in connection with the issuing of sale proclamation were served not upon the minors' guardian but were served upon the minor judgment-debtors. It is contended that Babu Debendra Prosad Roy who was appointed guardian ad litem of the minors in the suit was not appointed as such guardian in the execution proceedings and that inasmuch as there was no such appointment the service of notices on him cannot be said to have been proper service in the eye of law. It is true that there was no fresh order appointing a guardian for the minor judgment-debtors in the execution proceedings and it is also true that the guardian does not appear to have entered appearance in the course of such proceedings. It also appears that after the sale he made an application before the Court stating that lie was informed that the sale which had taken place was vitiated by irregularities and was fit to be set aside and be asked for permission for making an application to set aside the sale and that no order was passed upon his application beyond the order that it should be filed. This, however, only amounts to an irregularity. As has been laid down by the Judicial Committee in the case of Malkarjan v. Narhari , where a sale took place after the notice had been wrongly served upon a person who was not a legal representative of the judgment-debtors' estate and where the executing Court had erroneously decided that he was to be treated as such representative, the sale was not a nullity and should not be treated as invalid notwithstanding the irregularity, even though a material one, for the jurisdiction of the Court to execute the decree had been complete throughout. This irregularity cannot be taken to have vitiated the sale. As an authority for such a proposition reference may also be made to the case of Fani Bhusan Bhutan v. Surendra Nath Das , where it has been held that non-re-presentation of an infant by a guardian in execution proceedings is not itself a sufficient ground for avoiding an execution and that such matter stands on a different footing from a case where the provisions of Or. 32 of the Code have not been observed in a suit by or against minors.

    For these reasons we think that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

    We assess the hearing fee at three gold mohurs.

    Greaves, J.:— I agree.

    J.N.R
    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Mateur Rasul Judgment-Debtor No. 2, v. Abdul Soid Decree-Holder, Auction-Purchaser And Ors.,
    (Feb 25, 1925)