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  • Section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act
  • Section 52 of the Probate and Administration Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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  • Section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act
  • Section 52 of the Probate and Administration Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an application under Section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act for revocation of the probate of the Will of Raj Chandra (Raj Chand) Chowdhury.

The material facts, as stated in the opinion, are:

  • Raj Chandra made a Will dated 8 July 1896 bequeathing all his properties to his nephews Kailash and Tara Prasanna; he died four days later.
  • He left a widow, Dayamayi, and a daughter, Nrityamayi. Nrityamayi had two sons: Behary Lal (then an adult) and Kunja Lal (then a minor and the present petitioner).
  • On 2 October 1896 Kailash and Tara Prasanna applied for probate. Notices and special citations were issued to the widow, the daughter, and Behary Lal.
  • On 3 March 1897 the widow represented to the Court that a compromise had been effected with the applicants for probate and, as guardian on behalf of the minor Kunja Lal, prayed that the compromise be sanctioned; no formal order was passed on that petition.
  • On 10 March 1897 petitions of compromise were filed and the Court made an order recording that a compromise had been effected, that petitions were read, that the case of the objector was dismissed in accordance with the compromise petition and that the case was ex parte and sent to the third Subordinate Judge for enquiry and report.
  • The third Subordinate Judge recorded evidence on behalf of the applicants for probate, concluded that the Will had been proved and recommended to the District Judge that probate be granted.
  • On 22 March (year implicit from context) the District Judge formally granted probate of the Will.
  • On 3 December 1907 the petitioner (Kunja Lal) filed the present application for revocation of the probate, alleging the Will was not genuine and that the compromise was collusive, fraudulent and seriously injurious to him. The District Judge rejected that application on grounds of acquiescence (4–5 years) and estoppel. The petitioner appealed to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the District Judge acted irregularly (by delegating to the third Subordinate Judge) in a manner that would vitiate the probate — i.e., whether that alleged irregularity is a ground for revocation.
  2. Whether the petitioner, Kunja Lal, must in law be deemed to have been a party to the probate proceedings and the compromise, and therefore bound by them.
  3. Whether, even if Kunja Lal was not a party to the prior proceedings, his delay and acquiescence after attaining majority preclude him from successfully seeking revocation of probate.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Petitioner, Kunja Lal) — Arguments as presented in the opinion

  • The probate ought to be revoked because the District Judge acted irregularly by sending the case to the third Subordinate Judge to exercise the powers of a District delegate for enquiry and report.
  • The Will was not genuine.
  • The compromise was collusive, fraudulent and seriously injurious to the petitioner.

Respondent / Court Below — Positions recorded in the opinion

  • The District Judge rejected the revocation application on the grounds that the petitioner had for four or five years acquiesced in the disposal of the property according to the terms of the Will and the compromise.
  • The District Judge also relied on the principle of estoppel as a basis for refusing revocation.
  • The Court below (and this Court to some extent) accepted that the District Judge's delegation was not ultra vires; Section 52 of the Probate and Administration Act was held to contain by implication a warrant for such delegation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hoffman v. Norris, 2 Phillim 230 (Note) Cited among authorities establishing that probate proceedings are quasi-in-rem and binding on privies; also cited in connection with acquiescence as a bar to later challenge. Used to support the general rule that persons cognizant of proceedings who had an opportunity to intervene but did not are bound; and to show that delay/acquiescence can debar a party.
Newell v. Weeks, 2 Phillim 224 Supports the same quasi-in-rem / privies principle: those cognizant and having an opportunity to intervene who choose not to do so are bound. Relied upon for the proposition that a probate in solemn form binds privies who could have intervened.
Duffy v. Brady Milward (Irish) Cited among authorities on the binding effect of probate proceedings on privies. Presented as part of the body of authority establishing the quasi-in-rem character of probate causes.
Ratcliffe v. Barnes, 2 Sw. & Tr. 486 Listed with other authorities on the same principle (binding effect of probate proceedings). Used to show longstanding authority for the rule that probate proceedings bind privies.
Wytcherley v. Andrews, L.R. 2 P. & D. 327 Expressly quoted for the principle that a person knowing what was passing and content to stand by is bound by the result; and that compromises bind only those who make them. The Court quoted the decision to explain why persons who stand by and allow others to conduct the litigation in their interest are bound, and to distinguish those who were not parties to the compromise.
Nistariny Debya v. Brahmamayi Debya, 18 C. 45 Cited as authority among cases on binding effect of probate proceedings. Included in the cluster of authorities buttressing the quasi-in-rem doctrine.
Rebells v. Rebells, 2 C.W.N. 100 Another authority on probate proceedings binding privies. Part of the precedent foundation for the Court's discussion of who is bound by probate orders.
Young v. Holloways (1895) L.R.P. 87 Holds that a person who was cognizant of proceedings but who did not possess an interest at the time (and thus could not have intervened) is nevertheless entitled to apply for revocation later. Used to illustrate an exception to the rule that cognizant persons are bound: absence of an interest at the relevant time precludes being bound.
In re Bhuggobati v. Prasannamayi Dasi, 27 C. 927 Cited in connection with the principle in Young v. Holloways and the question of entitlement to apply for revocation. Reinforces the proposition that lack of interest at the time of prior proceedings may allow later revocation applications.
Nicol v. Askew, 2 Moore's P.C.C. 88 Leading authority that where probate is granted in common form by consent as a result of a compromise, it cannot afterwards be revoked except on proof of fraud or circumvention. The Court relied on Nicol v. Askew to establish that a probate granted by compromise is conclusive unless the clearest proof of fraud or circumvention is shown.
Norman v. Strains, L.R. 6 P.D. 219 Explains judicial reluctance to bind infants to the consequences of a compromise made by adults in a probate cause without knowing all circumstances. Applied to the facts to support the conclusion that because no formal order had been made sanctioning the compromise on behalf of the minor, the minor could not be deemed a party and thus was not automatically concluded by it.
Evans v. Saunders, 30 L.J.P.M. & A. 184 States that terms of a compromise cannot always be embodied as a rule of court in probate, though they may be enforced by an action. Used to explain limits on the Court of probate's ability to make compromise terms a rule of court and the availability of an action to enforce such terms.
Harvey v. Allen, 1 Sw. & Tr. 151 Cited among authorities to show the established position regarding probate by compromise. Part of the precedent base supporting the principle that probate by compromise is binding absent fraud.
Roadnight v. Carter, 3 Sw. & Tr. 421 Cited for both the binding nature of probate by compromise and for limits on embodying compromise terms into court orders. Referred to when explaining both the conclusiveness of probate by consent and the means of enforcing compromise terms.
Carrit v. Christian, L.R. 2 P. & D. 181 Included among authorities on probate and compromise (and on enforceability of compromise terms). Used as supporting authority for the Court's exposition of how compromises operate in probate practice.
Warmingham v. Norman (Irish R.), 1 Ch. 272 Cited among authorities on probate by compromise. Part of the body of cases that show the historical rule on probate and compromise.
Monmohini Guha v. Banga Chandra Dass, 31 C. 357 Cited as an example of local (Indian) authority on probate compromise. Referenced to show that the principle that compromise can result in common-form probate has been applied in local jurisprudence.
Hammond v. Hammond (Irish R.), 8 Eq. 322 Cited concerning the enforceability of compromise terms and limits on probate court orders. Included among authorities indicating that the Court of probate cannot always make compromise terms a rule of court.
Mohan v. Broughton (1900) L.R. Prob. 56 Cited for the proposition that acquiescence or delay after coming of age can debar an infant (on coming of age) from seeking revocation. Applied to support the conclusion that long acquiescence and subsequent acts relying on the compromise may prevent the petitioner from now contesting the Will.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured way, addressing the procedural objection first and then the substantive question of whether the petitioner was bound by the earlier compromise and probate.

  1. Delegation objection:
    • The petitioner contended that the probate should be revoked because the District Judge acted irregularly in sending the case to the third Subordinate Judge to exercise the District Judge's powers of enquiry and report.
    • The Court rejected that contention. It held that Section 52 of the Probate and Administration Act contains, by implication, ample warrant for delegation (the opinion states this by reference to the statute), and in any event it was conceded that the District Judge did not act ultra vires in adopting the procedure.
  2. Who is bound by the compromise/probate:
    • Having disposed of the delegation argument, the Court identified the central legal question as whether the petitioner, Kunja Lal, must in law be deemed to have been a party to the probate proceedings and the compromise.
    • The Court reviewed established authorities showing that proceedings in a Court of probate are quasi-in-rem and that a probate granted in solemn form binds not only parties who appeared or were cited but also privies: persons cognizant of the proceedings who had an opportunity to intervene and chose not to do so. (Authorities cited included Wytcherley v. Andrews, Hoffman v. Norris, Newell v. Weeks and others.)
    • At the same time the Court noted recognized exceptions: a person who, though cognizant, did not possess any interest at the time of the prior proceedings and therefore could not have intervened may later apply for revocation (illustrated by Young v. Holloways and related authorities).
    • The Court also reiterated the established rule that where probate is granted in common form pursuant to compromise, the probate is conclusive and cannot be revoked except on proof of fraud or circumvention (Nicol v. Askew and other authorities).
  3. Infants and compromises:
    • The Court observed the special rule that a probate court will not lightly bind infants to the terms of a compromise made by adults; Norman v. Strains was cited for the proposition that the Court cannot confidently bind infants without full knowledge of circumstances and without a formal sanction in court.
    • Given that no formal order was made on the petition of Nrityamayi asking the Court to sanction the compromise on behalf of the minor Kunja Lal, the Court considered that the minor could not be deemed to have been a party to the former proceedings and therefore was not automatically concluded by them.
  4. Acquiescence and delay:
    • Even though an infant who was not bound may apply after attaining majority for revocation of a probate obtained by consent, the Court noted that such a right may be lost by acquiescence and long delay or by subsequent ratification of the disposition of the Will.
    • The opinion found that Kunja Lal attained majority in 1901 or 1902 but did not apply until November 1907. Since majority, he and his brother had been managing the property received under the compromise and enjoying the profits; additionally, in 1903 they had instituted a suit in respect of the property in which they relied upon the compromise as the basis of title.
    • On these facts, and relying on authorities (including Mohan v. Broughton and Hoffman v. Norris), the Court held that Kunja Lal was debarred by acquiescence and delay from now contesting the Will.
  5. Conclusion of analysis:
    • Balancing these points, the Court concluded that even if Kunja Lal was not technically a party to the earlier proceedings (because he was a minor and there was no formal court order binding him), his post-majority conduct and long delay amounted to acquiescence which precluded successful revocation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of the Court below was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed. (The opinion records the succinct conclusion: "The judgment of the Court below must, therefore, be affirmed, and this appeal dismissed.")

Implications (direct effects on the parties):

  • The petition for revocation filed by Kunja Lal is unsuccessful; the probate granted by the District Judge remains in force.
  • The Court found Kunja Lal to be debarred from contesting the Will on the basis of acquiescence and delay, given his conduct after attaining majority (management of the property and reliance on the compromise in litigation).
  • No order as to costs was made (the opinion notes no costs order because the respondent did not appear).

The opinion applies and discusses established authorities concerning probate, compromise, the binding effect of proceedings on privies, the position of infants, and the effect of acquiescence. The Court did not purport to lay down a new legal precedent; it applied pre-existing principles to the facts of this case.

    Kunja Lal Chowdhury v. Kailash Chandra Chowdhury

    1. This appeal arises out of an application under Section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act for revocation of the probate of the Will of one Raj Chand Chowdhury. The facts are shortly these:--There were two brothers Keshav Chandra Chowdhury and Raj Chandra Chowdhury. Keshav had two sons, Kailash and Tara Prasanna. Raj Chandra, the alleged testator, made a Will on the 8th July 1896 whereby he bequeathed all his properties to his nephews, Kailash and Tara Prasanna. He died four days afterwards leaving behind him a widow, Dayamayi and a daughter, Nrityamayi. Nrityamayi, who is still alive, has two sons, Behary Lal Chowdhury and Kunja Lal Chowdury. On the 2nd October 1896, Kailash and Tara Prasanna applied for probate of the Will; whereupon, besides the usual notices, special citations were issued to the widow and daughter of the testator, as also to Behary Lal who was then adult. On the 3rd March 1897, the widow represented to the Court that a compromise had been effected with the applicants for probate and as guardian on behalf of Kunja Lal who was then a minor, she prayed that the compromise be sanctioned. No formal order, however, was passed on that petition. On the 10th March, the petitions of compromise were filed by both parties, where-upon the Court passed the following order: Compromise has been effected, petitions of this day of both sides and petitions of Nrityamayi and her sons read. The case of the objector, therefore, dismissed in accordance with the compromise petition. The case is ex parte and now goes to third Subordinate Judge for enquiry and report." The third Subordinate Judge accordingly recorded the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the applicants for probate, and being of opinion that the Will had been proved, forwarded the records to the District Judge with a recommendation that the probate might be granted. On the 22nd March, the District Judge formally granted probate of the Will. On the 3rd December 1907, the petitioner filed the present application for revocation of the probate on the ground that the Will was not genuine, and that the compromise was collusive, fraudulent and seriously injurious to him. The District Judge had rejected the application on the ground that the petitioner had for 4 or 5 years acquiesced in the disposal of the property according to the terms of the Will and the compromise and also on the ground of estoppel. From this order the petitioner has appealed to this Court.

    2. It has been contended on his behalf that the probate ought to be revoked because, it is said, that the District Judge acted irregularly in sending down the case to the third Subordinate Judge, who exercised the powers of a District delegate for enquiry and report. I am of opinion that the contention is untenable. Section 52 of the Probate and Administration Act contains by implication ample warrant for the delegation, only partial in this case, of his functions by the District Judge to his delegate. But quite apart from this, it is conceded that the District Judge did not act ultra vires in adopting the procedure he did. Therefore, if the petitioner was a party to the probate proceedings and the compromise, he is bound by the terms of the compromise which authorised the applicants to take out probate in the common or non-contentious form and it is not open to him now to turn round and ask for revocation of the probate on the ground that there was irregularity in the procedure followed in granting it. If he was not a party and is not so bound, he is entitled to have probate revoked, whether there were defects in the procedure or not.

    3. Therefore, the real question for determination is whether the petitioner, Kunja Lal, must in law be deemed to have been a party to the probate proceedings and the compromise.

    4. It is a fundamental rule of law that proceedings in a Court of probate are proceedings quasi-in-rem, and that a probate granted in solemn form is binding not only on the parties who have appeared or have been formally cited but also on privies, i.e., persons who being cognizant of the proceedings and having an opportunity to intervene have chosen not to do so. See Hoffman v. Norris 2 Phillim 230 (Note); Newell v. Weeks 2 Phillim 224; Duffy v. Brady Milward (Irish) 582 Ratcliffe v. Barnes 2 Sw. & Tr. 486 : 31 L.J.P. 61 : 8 Jur. (N.S.) 313 : 6 L.T.

    658 Wytcherley v. Andrews L.R. 2 P. & D. 327 : 40 L.J.P. 57 : 23 L.T. 134 : 19 W.R. 1015 Nistariny Debya v. Brahmamayi Debya 18 C. 45; Rebells v. Rebells 2 C.W.N. 100.

    5. "If a person knowing what was passing", said Lord Penzance in Wytcherley v. Andrews L.R. 2 P. & D. 327 : 40 L.J.P. 57 : 23 L.T. 134 : 19 W.R. 1015, was content to stand by and see his battle fought by some body else in the same interest, he should be bound by the result, and shall not be allowed to re-open the case" the reason for the rule, as stated by Sir John Nicoll in Newel v. Weeks 2 Phillim 224, being that if he had been dissatisfied he might have intervened at any stage of the proceedings. It was accordingly held in Young v. Holloways (1895) L.R.P. 87 : 64 L.J.P. 55 : 11 R. 596 : 72 L.T. 118 : 43 W.R. 429 that though the applicant for revocation of the probate was cognizant of the proceedings in which probate was granted and had assisted the plaintiff in the previous proceedings, yet as he did not possess any interest in the subject-matter at the time of the pendency of the previous proceedings, and could not have intervened therein, he was entitled to apply for revocation. See also In re Bhuggobati v. Prasannamayi Dasi 27 C. 927 : 4 C.W.N. 757.

    6. It may also betaken as settled law, one that has been established by a long line of authorities, and indeed recognized by the Privy Council as far back as 1837, that in a contentious proceeding, probate may be granted in common form in consequence of a compromise between the disputants, resulting in the withdrawal of opposition, and that it cannot afterwards be revoked except on proof of fraud or circumvention practised either upon the Court or upon the parties. Nicol v. Askew 2 Moore's P.C.C. 88; Norman v. Strains L.R. 6 P.D. 219 : 50 L.J.P. 39 : 45 L.T. 191 : 39 W.R. 744; Evans v. Saunders 30 L.J.P.M. & A. 184; Harvey v. Allen 1 Sw. & Tr. 151; Roadnight v. Carter 3 Sw. & Tr. 421; Carrit v. Christian L.R. 2 P. & D. 181 : 24 L.T. 236; Warmingham v. Norman Irish R. 1 Ch. 272; Monmohini Guha v. Banga Chandra Dass 31 C. 357 : 8 C.W.N. 197; Wytcherley v. Andrews L.R. 2 P. & D. 327 : 40 L.J.P. 57 : 25 L.T. 134 : 19 W.R. 1015. In the leading case of Nicol v. Askew 2 Moore's P.C.C. 88, where probate of a testamentary paper in the nature of a codicil had been granted in common form by consent in consequence of an arrangement between the parties, and afterwards one of them applied for revocation of the probate on the allegation that the conditions on which such consent had been given had not been complied with, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed thus: Unless fraud or circumvention in obtaining the probate was satisfactorily proved, the admission of the paper to probate was conclusive: that though it might be true as urged by the respondents, that the proof would not have been allowed to be made but upon the conditions of the parties concurring in the arrangement for the division of the property, yet that as they were all connusant of their interests and acted deliberately and advisedly, and without fraud, the circumstance of the agreement not being carried out as some of the parties contemplated, was no ground for varying a decree of the Court of probate, which could only be reversed upon the clearest proof of fraud and circumvention in procuring it."

    7. When a probate is granted in common form by reason of a compromise between the parties, the terms of the compromise cannot be embodied in the order or, as is sometimes expressed, made a rule of Court, for the reason that a Court of probate cannot in many instances enforce the terms, Evans v. Saunders 30 L.J.P.M.

    & A. 184 Roadnight v. Carter 3 Sw. & Tr. 421; Carrit v. Christian L.R. 2 P. & D. 181 : 24 L.T. 236; Hammond v. Hammond Ir. R. 8 Eq. 322; but they may, however, be enforced by an action if they are otherwise unobjectionable.

    8. But though a probate obtained in common form as the result of a compromise is binding upon the parties to the compromise, it is not binding upon those who are not parties to it, even though they may have been cognizant of the former proceedings. A bargain, as pointed out by Lord Penzance in Wytcherley v. Andrews L.R. 2 P. & D. 327 : 40 L.J.P. 57 : 25 L.T. 134 : 19 W.R. 1015, only binds those by whom they are made. Persons, who are willing to stand by while a contest is going, are bound by the decision of the Court, but they are not compelled to abide by a compromise when no decision in fact has been come to by the Court.

    9. When the terms of the compromise are agreed to by the parties who are sui juris, the Court of probate will not make an order binding the infants to the terms of the compromise. In Norman v. Strains L.R. 6 P.D. 219 : 50 L.J.P. 39 : 45 L.T. 191 : 39 W.R. 744, Sir James Hannen said: I am extremely unwilling, without knowing the circumstances, to bind infants to the consequences of a compromise which is entered into by the parties to a probate cause before me. I have really no means of forming any judgment upon the wisdom or prudence of the compromise. My duty is to determine whether or not a particular Will is the Will of the deceased person; but to enable me to say whether there were good grounds upon which counsel came to the conclusion that it would be prudent to make a compromise, it would be necessary that I should be informed of the facts of the case." Having regard to the fact that the Court made no order on the petition of Nrityamayi, asking the Court on behalf of the minor Kunja Lal to sanction the compromise, I am inclined to think that the minor cannot be deemed to have been a party to the former proceedings, and, hence he is not concluded by them.

    10. But though an infant has a right in such cases to apply, after he comes of age, for revocation of a probate obtained by consent, yet he may be debarred by acquiescence and delay for a long time or by subsequent ratification of the disposition of the Will from putting the executor to the proof of the Will in solemn form or from contesting its genuineness. Sea Hoffman v. Norris 2 Phillim 230 (Note); Mohan v. Broughton (1900) L.R. Prob. 56 : 69 L.J.P. 20 : 82 L.T. 29 : 48 W.R. 371.

    11. The present petitioner Kunja Lal attained his majority in 1901 or 1902 and he did not make the present application until November 1907. Since attaining majority he and his brother have been managing the property they received under the compromise and enjoying the profits thereof. Besides it appears that in 1903 he and his brother instituted a suit in connection with the property against a tenant and in their plaint in that suit they relied upon the compromise as the basis of their title to the land. The petitioner is, in my opinion, debarred by acquiescence and delay from now contesting the Will.

    12. The judgment of the Court below must, therefore, be affirmed, and this appeal dismissed. No order as to costs is made as the respondent does not appear.

    Sharf-ud-din, J.

    13. I concur.

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    Comments

    Kunja Lal Chowdhury v. Kailash Chandra Chowdhury
    (Aug 24, 1910)