Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (the owners, represented by Mr. Hyam and Mr. Jones) sued the defendants, the Bengal Stone Co. Ltd., for an account in respect of building transactions undertaken by the defendants under an agreement dated 21 January 1909. Under that agreement the defendants were to erect two sets of premises (Park Street and Bow Bazar Street). Payment was to be made by the owners for materials at actual cost plus charges and for labour at actual cost; the contract also provided for remuneration for supervision and a sum equal to ten percent on the aggregate of specified items. The buildings were completed but not within the contracted time. One of the premises had been mortgaged to the defendants to secure a sum ultimately agreed at Rs. 2,50,000.

The action was primarily for an account. At trial two principal issues arose: (1) whether there had been an account stated between the parties (a defence raised by the defendants), and (2) whether a letter dated 22 August 1911 (in which the plaintiffs acknowledged potential liability and agreed to forgo certain delay claims) had been obtained by coercion (a claim made by the plaintiffs). The trial consumed 16 days. The learned Judge below found there had not been an account stated and that the 22 August 1911 letter was not obtained by coercion. On appeal, Sanderson, C.J. and Mookerjee, J. considered these matters and additional points about labour rates, charges for steam-plants, and costs; ultimately the decree was varied.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there had been an account stated between the plaintiffs and the defendants such as to bar the plaintiffs from obtaining an account in this action.
  2. Whether the letter of 22 August 1911 was obtained from the plaintiffs by coercion within the meaning of Section 15 of the Contract Act (and hence whether their consent was not free under Section 14).
  3. Whether the defendants were bound by labour rates specified in a letter dated 22 December 1908 (i.e., whether those rates formed part of the contract of 21 January 1909).
  4. Whether the defendants were entitled to charge Rs. 150 per steam-plant per month for the period the plants were working on site.
  5. How the costs of the suit and of the appeal should be allocated between the parties, including the taxation of costs for Mr. Jones (a solicitor appearing for the plaintiffs).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs sought an account of the building transactions undertaken by the defendants under the 21 January 1909 agreement.
  • They contended that the letter of 22 August 1911 had been obtained by coercion and therefore their consent in that letter was not free.
  • They argued (as a less central point) that the defendants were bound to charge labour at the rates specified in a letter dated 22 December 1908.
  • Implicitly, they challenged the defendants' claimed entitlement to certain charges (including the aggregate of bills said by the defendants to exceed Rs. 2,50,000).

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants contended there had been an account stated between the parties and therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to an account in the action.
  • They denied that the 22 August 1911 letter was obtained by coercion and relied on the contractual and factual circumstances of reconveyance and payment negotiations to justify their position.
  • The defendants asserted that their total bills might exceed Rs. 2,50,000 and conditioned reconveyance of the equity of redemption on payment of sums in excess of the mortgage amount.
  • They maintained their entitlement to charge Rs. 150 per steam-plant per month for the period the plants worked on site; the learned Judge below accepted that claim as a matter of fact.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
London Scottish Benefit Society v. Ghorley Describes the rule for taxing costs when a solicitor appears in person: the solicitor is entitled to the same costs as if he had employed a solicitor, subject to the restriction that costs which are rendered unnecessary by his acting personally (e.g., the costs of instructing or attending himself) cannot be recovered. The court directed the Taxing Officer to tax the costs of Mr. Jones (a solicitor who acted in the proceedings) according to the principle laid down in this case: Mr. Jones is entitled to the same costs as if he had employed a solicitor except for items rendered unnecessary by his personal conduct.
Tolputt v. Mole Affirmed the rule in London Scottish Benefit Society v. Ghorley regarding taxation of a solicitor's costs when appearing in person. The court referred to this case as an affirmation of the London Scottish rule and applied that principle in directing the Taxing Officer how to tax Mr. Jones's costs.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the principal issues in light of the facts found by the learned Judge and the relevant legal provisions.

  1. Account stated: The learned Judge had found there was not an account stated. The Court reviewed the Judge's judgment and the facts relied upon and agreed that, even assuming the facts stated by the learned Judge, there was not an account stated between the parties. Consequently the plaintiffs were not barred from seeking an account.
  2. Coercion and the 22 August 1911 letter: The Court analyzed coercion under Sections 13–15 of the Contract Act. It set out:
    • Section 13 (consent defined) and Section 14 (when consent is free, including subsection (1) coercion as defined in Section 15).
    • Section 15's two parts: (a) committing or threatening to commit acts forbidden by the Penal Code; and (b) unlawfully detaining or threatening to detain any property with the intention of causing a person to enter into an agreement.
    The Court observed the first part (Penal Code acts) was not relied upon. The plaintiffs' case turned on the second part—alleged unlawful detention or threat to detain the equity of redemption to compel agreement. The Court considered the facts: the defendants had refused to reconvey the equity of redemption except upon payment of sums they claimed were due (more than the mortgage), and negotiations included proposals such as a promissory note and payment of brokerage. The Court concluded that such a refusal to convey except on terms did not amount to "unlawfully detaining, or threatening to detain, any property" within S.15. The Court noted that while English duress law was historically limited to duress of the person, the Indian legislature extended coercion to detaining property; nevertheless, in the Court's view, the facts here did not fall within S.15. Accordingly, the Court held the letter was not obtained by coercion.
  3. Labour rates (22 December 1908 letter) vs. later contract (21 January 1909): The Court held that the contract dated 21 January 1909, which contained a clause specifying that owners should pay the actual cost of all labour employed by the contractors in erecting and completing the buildings, governed labour charges. The earlier letter of 22 December 1908 was not incorporated into the later contract; if the parties had intended incorporation, the contract would have included express words to that effect. The learned Judge's finding that the defendants were not bound by the rates in the December 1908 letter was upheld.
  4. Steam-plant charges: The learned Judge had accepted the defendants' version and held they were entitled to charge Rs. 150 per plant per month for the actual period the steam-plants worked on site. The Court reviewed the evidence and found there was sufficient evidence to support this factual conclusion and declined to interfere.
  5. Reference for account: Given the primary disputes and the limited factual questions remaining, the Court held the matter should be referred for an account to the Official Referee (or some other agreed person) to take the account expeditiously. The Court agreed with the learned Judge's form of order directing the reference.
  6. Costs: The learned Judge had ordered the defendant Company to pay the plaintiffs' costs of the suit up to and including the decree. The Court held that this was incorrect because the issue of coercion was a distinct issue on which the defendants succeeded. The Court explained the ordinary rule that a party who succeeds on a particular issue gets the costs of that issue unless good cause exists to deprive him of those costs or the issues are so interwoven that separation is impossible. Finding no good cause to deprive the defendants of costs on the coercion issue, the Court nevertheless acknowledged the practical difficulty for the Taxing Officer in separating costs after a protracted 16-day trial. To achieve substantial justice, the Court directed that one-third of the costs of the suit be allocated to the coercion issue (to be borne by the plaintiffs and thus awarded to the defendants) and two-thirds to the other issues (awarded to the plaintiffs). As to the appeal, each party was to bear their own costs. Costs of the reference were left to the discretion of the Official Referee. Finally, the Court directed the Taxing Officer to tax Mr. Jones's costs according to the principle in London Scottish Benefit Society v. Ghorley and Tolputt v. Mole, and ordered the appeal paper-book costs to be equally divided between the parties.

Holding and Implications

Decree varied.

Holding (direct outcomes):

  • The Court affirmed the learned Judge's findings that there was not an account stated between the parties and that the 22 August 1911 letter was not obtained by coercion.
  • The Court held that the 21 January 1909 contract governed labour charges and that the defendant was not bound by rates stated in the earlier 22 December 1908 letter.
  • The factual finding that the defendants were entitled to charge Rs. 150 per steam-plant per month was upheld.
  • The matter was ordered to be referred to the Official Referee (or another agreed person) for an account.
  • Costs of the trial were reallocated: the plaintiffs recover two-thirds of the costs of the suit and the defendants recover one-third (reflecting defendants' success on the distinct coercion issue). Each party bears their own costs of the appeal. Costs of the reference are at the Official Referee's discretion. The Taxing Officer is to tax Mr. Jones's costs according to the cited solicitor-in-person authorities; the paper-book costs of the appeal are to be equally divided.

Implications: The decision directly affects the parties by (1) directing a reference for a detailed account, (2) varying the decree on costs to apportion one-third of trial costs to the defendants for their success on the coercion issue and two-thirds to the plaintiffs for other issues, and (3) prescribing how Mr. Jones's costs should be taxed. The opinion does not purport to announce a new legal precedent beyond applying established principles (including the cited authorities on taxation of a solicitor's costs).

    Bengal Stone Co. Ltd. v. Joseph Issac Joseph Hyam

    Sanderson, C.J:— This was an action brought by the plaintiffs for an account in respect of certain building transactions which were undertaken by the defendants for the plaintiffs, Mr. Hyam and Mr. Jones. Those building transactions were undertaken in pursuance of an agreement dated 21st January 1909. It is not necessary for me for the purpose of this case to deal in any detail, with the terms of that agreement. It is sufficient for me to state that the defendants, the Bengal Stone Co. Ltd., were to erect two sets of premises, one in Park Street, and the other in Bow Bazar Street, and that they were not to be liable to spend on all accounts more than a specified sum of money, and the method of payment was that

    “the owners (the plaintiffs in this case) should pay the Stone Company (the defendants) for all materials the actual cost price thereof plus all charges and expenses actually paid or incurred by the Stone Company in collecting and placing the same on site and also the actual cost of all labour employed by the contractors in or about the erection of the buildings and of completing and equipping the same in terms of the agreement.”

    2. There were provisions for the remuneration of their services in respect of supervision and other matters, and then the payment of a sum equal to ten per cent on the aggregate amount of all the items specified in the said clause of the agreement was provided for. The buildings were completed although not within the specified time. There was also a provision in the agreement that a mortgage should be given by the owners of one of the premises to secure a sum of money which was eventually agreed upon, Rs. 2,50,000. Now, this action was brought, as I have said, primarily for an account. When it came on for trial, there were really two main questions: first, the point raised by the defendants, that there had been an account stated between the plaintiffs and the defendants, and that consequently the plaintiffs were not entitled to an account; and, secondly, the point raised by the plaintiffs that a certain letter which was dated 22nd August 1911 was obtained from the plaintiffs by the coercion of the defendants. That was a letter in these terms:

    “In consideration of the Bengal Stone Co. Ltd., this day reconveying and releasing the premises Nos. 294 and 295, Bow Bazar Street, mortgaged by us to the Bengal Stone Co., Ltd., we hereby admit and acknowledge that the said reconveyance and release only relates to the said premises Nos. 294 and 295, Bow Bazar Street, and we hereby undertake to pay the said Bengal Stone Co., Ltd., not later than 31st December 1911, any sum which may hereafter be found to be due from us to the said Bengal Stone Co., Ltd., under or in connexion with the agreement dated 21st January 1909 and made between the said Bengal Stone Co., Ltd., of the one part and ourselves of the other part. We hereby also agree to forgo any and all claims that we may have had or have against you in respect of delays in completion of the buildings at Park Street and Bow Bazar Street and will only make such corrections in your bills and accounts as we may find to be erroneously or excessively charged. All other items, of the contract agreement dated 21st January 1909 to be considered as in force.”

    3. Now, those were the two main issues that were to be tried by the learned Judge, and I must say I am distressed to think that this action took no less than 16 days in trial. In my view it should have been obvious, unless the learned Judge was satisfied that there had been an account stated between the parties, that there must be a reference for the purpose of an account to be taken between the parties, and how the case which (with the exception of one or two subsidiary matters the facts relating to which lay in a small compass) was limited to these two questions: first, whether there had been an account stated; and secondly, whether the letter of 22nd August 1911 which had been obtained by coercion could have taken 16 days for trial, is certainly beyond my comprehension. Now, with regard to the first point, the learned Judge has found that there was not an account stated. We have heard the arguments on the one side as well as on the other, we have read the learned Judge's judgment, and the facts to which he referred, and have heard the facts put forward by the learned counsel for the defendants and I think, even assuming the facts which he has stated, that there was not all account stated between the parties: and, for this reason we did not think it necessary for him to go through the evidence as he had offered to do. With regard to the other point, we agree with the learned Judge that the letter of 22nd August 1911 was not obtained by coercion. The section upon which this matter depends is Section 15 of the Contract Act. In order to understand that section, it is necessary to refer to Ss. 13 and 14. S. 13 says:

    “Two or more persons are said to consent when they, agree upon the same thing in the same sense.”

    4. Section 14 says:

    “Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by—(1) coercion, as defined in S. 15, or (2) undue influence, as defined in S. 16, or (3) fraud, as defined in S. 17, or (4) misrepresentation, as defined in S. 18, or (5) mistake, subject to the provisions of Ss. 20, 21 and 22.”

    5. The only sub-section of S. 14, which can be said to apply to this case is sub-section (1), namely, “Coercion, as defined in S. 15.” S. 15 says:

    “Coercion is the committing, or threatening, to commit, any act forbidden by the Penal Cade, or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement.

    6. It is admitted that the present case does not coma within the meaning of the first part of that section, namely the committing, or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code.”

    7. But it is said that what happened in this case, to which I will refer more in detail, directly brings the matter within the words:

    “unlawfully detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement.”

    8. What happened in this case was this: shortly stated, Mr. Hyam and Mr. Jones had mortgaged this property at Bow Bazar Street to the defendants for Rs. 2,50,000. Mr. Hyam was anxious—Mr. Jones was away and Mr. Hyam was acting on behalf of Mr. Jones—to sell the premises, and apparently he got a purchaser, but he was not a very willing purchaser, and it was necessary for his to get the equity of redemption conveyed to him by the mortgagees. There was a discussion first of all as to whether Mr. Hyam would give a promissory note—I ought to have said that the defendants were alleging that the total of their bills would amount to a considerable sum, above Rs. 2,50,000. He was willing to give the promissory note. Then an arrangement was come to whereby Mr. Hyam agreed to pay oyer the balance of the purchase-money, after deducting the amount which would be required for the first mortgage of the property, and also a sum of Rs. 4,000 as brokerage. It would leave about Rs. 2,80,000 and he agreed to pay over that. Now, he alleges that discussion amounted to

    “a threatening to detain any property to the prejudice of any person with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement.”

    9. The property which Mr. Hyam, the learned counsel who argued the case on behalf of the respondents, relied upon was the equity of redemption; and, he said that the defendants threatened to detain the equity of redemption and there was an “unlawful detaining or threatening to detain,” inasmuch as the defendants were refusing to convey the equity of redemption unless they were paid more than the sum secured by the mortgage. In my judgment, that was not unlawfully detaining or threatening to detain any property, within the meaning of S. 15. With regard to the law of duress in England, it is well known that was limited, and no doubt for very good reasons limited, to the duress of person: and I may quote the following passage which I find stated in a convenient form at p. 351’ of the 3rd Edn. of Leake on Contract:

    “Duress may also consist of threats of personal violence. But the fear must concern the safety of the person of a man; and not his house or goods, because he may recover the same, or damages to the value, without any corporal hurt. Again, if the fear do concern the person, yet it must not be a vain fear, but such as may befall a constant man. Fear of imprisonment is sufficient, for the law has special regard to the safety and liberty of a man,”

    10. (that is a quotation from Co. Lit. 2536). Apparently, when the legislature was considering this matter for the purpose of applying the law to India, they thought it right to extend it and not to limit the law of coercien to a coercion of a man's person but extended it beyond the law of England to unlawfully detaining or threatening to detain any property. I ask myself, can it ever have been intended to apply it to such a transaction as has occurred in this case? Can it be said that when a person who has refused to convey the equity of redemption except on certain terms has unlawfully detained or threatened to detain any property within the meaning of Section 15 of the Contract Act. Having regard to the ordinary meaning of the English language, I have no hesitation in saying that the refusal to convey the equity of redemption, except on certain terms, did not come within the meaning of S. 15. I think that the learned Judge was right in saying that what took place in this case did not amount to coercion. Therefore, I think that the plaintiffs' cross-objection upon the question of coercion fails. Then Mr. Hyam for the plaintiffs raised two other points which I may describe as less important points. The first one was that the learned Judge was wrong in finding that the defendants were not bound to charge the rates of labour which were specified by the letter of 22nd December 1908. I think that the learned Judge was right. That letter, as I have said, was written on 22nd December 1908, and the contract was not made until 21st January 1909. I have read the clause which relates to the rate of labour I read it again to make my meaning clear.

    “The owners should pay also the actual cost of all labour emplyed by the contractors in of about the erection of the buildings and of completing and equipping the same in terms of this agreement.”

    11. In my judgment that is a clause with governs this matter, inasmuch as it was made subsequently to 22nd December 1908; I do not think it is possible for us to say that it was implied that the rates of labour specified in the letter of 22nd December were to be incorporated in the contract. If it had been so intended, one would have expected the contract to contain some such words as these

    “that the owners should pay also the actual cost of all labour, having regard to the rates of labour which had been agreed upon between the parties on 22nd December 1908.”

    12. The other point was that the learned Judge misunderstood the evidence with regard to the steam-plant. What he says is this:

    “In respect of the steam-plants I accept the version put forward by the defendant Company, and I hold that they are entitled to charge the plaintiffs Rs. 150 per plant per month for the actual period during which the steam-plants were working on the sites”

    13. We have been referred to the evidence. In my judgment there was sufficient evidence on which the learned Judge could arrive at that conclusion, and I see no reason for interfering with his decision upon a question of fact in that respect. That disposes of the main points that were raised in this appeal. As I have already said, it must have been obvious from the beginning of the case, as it was obvious from the beginning of the appeal, that the matter must ultimately go to reference: and the result is that the matter must now go to the Official Referee, unless the parties agree upon some other person who can take an account quicker and more expeditiously: and, after considering the arguments on both sides, I think that the learned Judge was right in the form of the order by which he directed it. It has been read by Mr. Buckland at my request, and I do not propose to read it again. I do not think that the form of the order as to the account ought to be interfered with at all. Then comes the question of costs. The learned Judge made an order as to the costs in these terms:

    “It is further ordered and decreed the defendant Company do pay to the plaintiffs their costs of this suit up to and including this decree to be taxed by the Taxing Officer of this Court under the heading ‘Class 2 ordinary causes’.”

    14. In my judgment that was not a correct direction as regards the costs. There was a clear and distinct issue raised by the plaintiffs that the letter of 22nd December 1911 had been obtained by the coercion of the defendants. The learned Judge has not given any direction as to the costs of that issue: and, although the plaintiffs failed upon that issue, he has given the plaintiffs the costs of the whole trial of the action. Now, it is quite true that this Court is most averse to interfere with the discretion of a learned Judge upon the question of costa. But the discretion of the learned Judge upon the question of costs has to be exercised judicially, and the ordinary rule is that a party who succeeds upon a particular issue gets the costs of that issue, unless there is a good cause for depriving him of the costs of that issue and unless the issues in the case are so closely connected that they cannot be separated one from the other. That is not the case here: it was a quite clear and distinct issue in this case, quite apart from the rest of the case. I have asked myself what good cause there was for depriving the defendants of the costs of that issue. I find none. Therefore I think the learned Judge was not right in the exercise of his discretion in depriving the defendants of the costs of that issue without a good cause. In my judgment, the defendants out to have the costs of the issue relating to the question whether the letter of 22nd August 1911 was obtained by coercion. But it would be difficult in view of the protracted nature of the trial, as pointed out by Mr. Hyam, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, for the Taxing Officer at this stage, without going into the matter at length and putting the parties to a considerable expense, to come to a satisfactory conclusion as to what costs should be allocated to the issue of coercion, and I think we shall be doing substantial justice if we direct that one-third of the costs of this suit ought to be allocated to the issue of coercion and two-thirds of the costs ought to be allocated to the other issues.

    15. Therefore as regards the costs of the suit, I think the plaintiff ought to have two-thirds of the costs of the suit and the defendants ought to have one-third; and, the costs ought to be taxed upon that basis, for the reason that the defendants have succeeded on the issue of coercion and the plaintiffs have succeeded upon the issue whether there was an account stated. As regards the costs of this appeal, I think that each party ought to heir his own costs, for the reason that the plaintiffs have failed in part and the defendants have also failed in part and both the defendants and the plaintiffs have succeeded to soma extent. As regards the costs of the reference those costs will be in the discretion of the Official Referee or the person who takes the reference. As regards the last point taken by Mr. Buckland on behalf of the defendants, mainly that there ought to be a special direction as regards the costs of Mr. Jones, the point is this: It appears that Mr. Jones is a solicitor, and that at one time he was in partnership with Mr. Mitter, carrying on business under the name of Jones & Co.; Mr. Mitter died early in these proceedings, it is said before the affidavit of documents was put in. Therefore substantially we may say that Mr. Jones was acting as solicitor in this case on behalf of the plaintiffs. The question is whether we ought to give a direction to the Taxing Officer to tax the costs upon the principle of the rule which is laid down in the case of London Scottish Benefit Society v. Ghorley (1). That was an action brought against the solicitors for money not accounted for. The learned Judge, Sir William Brett, Master of the Rolls, said this:

    “It is true however to say that the costs of a solicitor appearing in person must be taxed differently from those of an ordinary litigant appearing by a solicitor. The unsuccessful adversary of a solicitor appearing in person cannot be charged for what does not exist; he cannot be charged for the solicitor consulting himself or instructing himself or attending upon himself. The true rule seems to be that when a solicitor brings or defends an action in person, he is entitled to the sane costs as an ordinary litigant appearing in person, subject to this restriction: that no coats which are really unnecessary can be recovered. Of this kind are the costs of instructions and attendances.”

    16. The report says “an ordinary litigant appearing in person,” which is a mistake as appears from the title of “errata” and should “read by an ordinary litigant appearing by a solicitor.” The rule laid down by this case and affirmed in Tolputt v. Mole (2) is that the solicitor is entitled to the same costs as if he had employed a solicitor, except in respect of items which the fact of his acting directly rendered unnecessary. We propose to give a direction to the Taxing Officer that he should tax the costs of Mr. Jones upon the principle laid down in that case. We think that the costs of the paper-book in the appeal should be equally divided between the parties in this case.

    Mookerjee, J.:— I agree.

    V.B/R.K

    17. Decree varied.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Bengal Stone Co. Ltd. v. Joseph Issac Joseph Hyam
    (Jan 16, 1917)