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  • Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act. The Transfer of Property Act
  • provisions of Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act.
  • Cl. (g) of S. 108 of the transfer of Property Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • S. 108 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • provisions of S. 69 of the Contract Act.
  • S. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • S. 91 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act.
  • S. 69 of the Contract Act,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Acts
  • Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act. The Transfer of Property Act
  • provisions of Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act.
  • Cl. (g) of S. 108 of the transfer of Property Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • S. 108 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • provisions of S. 69 of the Contract Act.
  • S. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • S. 91 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act.
  • S. 69 of the Contract Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns a dispute arising from a simple mortgage of a leasehold (mulgeni) interest originally held by Venku Shetty, who mortgaged that interest to brothers Appanna Rai and Kantha Rai in 1892 for Rs. 500. Venku Shetty subsequently sold his interest to Kantha Rai (2 December 1910). As purchaser, Kantha Rai's purchase satisfied his own half of the mortgage and rendered him liable for the other half (Rs. 250) to Appanna Rai. Kantha Rai granted a permanent sub-mulgeni (lease) to the plaintiff and Muthaya Manai on 3 December 1910. Kantha Rai later sold his interest to the 1st defendant (the appellant) on 4 January 1912. Manai's interest came ultimately to the plaintiff, making the plaintiff the sole sub-mulgenidar.

Appanna Rai sued for recovery of half the mortgage amount in O.S. No. 23 of 1912. The mortgagor Venku Shetty, purchaser Kantha Rai and the 1st defendant (purchaser from Kantha Rai) were impleaded, but the sub-mulgenidar (the plaintiff) and Manai were not. In execution the court initially ordered the sale to be subject to the plaintiff's sub-mulgeni right, but on the appellant's appeal the District Court ordered that the sale be free of the plaintiff's sub-mulgeni right. To avoid losing possession and to stop the advertised sale, the plaintiff paid the mortgage amount claimed under the decree into court on 24 January 1923 and stopped the sale.

The plaintiff then sued the 1st defendant (appellant) and defendants 2–4 (legal representatives of Kantha Rai) for recovery of that payment. The District Munsif held the plaintiff to be a mere volunteer (relying on Ss. 69 of the Contract Act) and dismissed the suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge reversed as regards the appellant, holding the plaintiff not a volunteer, finding benefit to have passed to the appellant, and awarding the plaintiff a decree against the appellant while dismissing the suit against respondents 2–4. The 1st defendant appealed to this Court in second appeal; counsel limited arguments to two principal points concerning the appellant's liability and the extent of any liability.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the 1st defendant-appellant (the transferee of Kantha Rai's interest) is liable to the plaintiff for the mortgage amount paid by the plaintiff to protect his sub-mulgeni right, given that the appellant purchased the equity of redemption from Kantha Rai.
  2. If the 1st defendant is liable, whether his liability is limited to a proportionate share measured by the relative values of his interest and the plaintiff's interest (i.e., entitlement only to contribution rather than full recovery).
  3. Whether the plaintiff's payment was a voluntary payment (which would bar recovery), or whether it fell within recognized statutory or equitable rights permitting recovery (e.g., under Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act or specific provisions of the Transfer of Property Act such as Ss. 108 and 109).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended he was only a purchaser of the equity of redemption from Kantha Rai (who himself had purchased from the mortgagor) and therefore not liable for the full mortgage amount paid by the plaintiff.
  • The appellant relied on the sale deed (Ex. III) which expressly mentioned only Rs. 276-4-0 as payable on the mortgage, arguing that he was not liable beyond that amount.
  • He argued, alternatively, that if he were liable, his liability should be limited to a relative/proportionate share corresponding to the relative value of his interest vis-à-vis the plaintiff's interest (i.e., contribution only).

Defendants 2–4 (Representatives of Kantha Rai) and Other Defences

  • The representatives of Kantha Rai contended that Kantha Rai was not personally liable for the mortgage debt despite his purchase of the mortgaged property, and that Kantha Rai's assets were not liable to the plaintiff.
  • It was contended generally for the defendants that the plaintiff was a mere volunteer and so not entitled to recover the payment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smith v. Dinonath Mookerjee Case concerned government revenue payable by superior landlord and payment by putnidar; considered under Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act in that report. The Court observed this case dealt with government revenue and was dealt with under Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act; the Transfer of Property Act was not mentioned there and it was not cited as a direct authority for the present situation.
Bama Sundari Dasi v. Adhar Chunder Sarkar Payment by plaintiff to save property from a rent sale; recovery held permissible under general provisions of Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act. The Court noted this decision was governed by Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act rather than by Cl. (g) of S.108 of the Transfer of Property Act, and therefore not directly on point under the Transfer of Property Act provisions invoked in the present case.
Musammat Faiya Zunnisa & others v. Rai Bajrang Bahadur Singh & another Case of land revenue payable by lessors under a permanent lease; lessees paid and were held entitled to recover. The Court observed that while the facts fell under Cl. (g) of S.108, the reported decision relied on S.69 (Contract Act); the present Court used it to show overlap but relied primarily on the Transfer of Property Act provisions for the case at hand.
Yogambal Boyee Ammani Ammal v. Naina Pillai Markayar Payment in circumstances not of lessor and lessee; regarded as falling under Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act. The Court treated this case as not analogous because it was not a lessor-lessee situation and therefore of limited guidance for the present Transfer of Property Act analysis.
Bepin Behari Sarnokar v. Kalidas Chatterjee (Opposite Party) Under-tenant paid amount of a decree for rent (plus 5% under S. 310 CPC); held payment after sale was not within "bound by law to pay" in S.69 of Contract Act. The Court observed that, because the payment in that case was after sale completion and there was no court sale issue in this case, that precedent affords little guidance for the present facts.
Stuart v. Joy Principle that a plaintiff's election to pursue one remedy (e.g., suing the transferee) is final and precludes subsequently charging the lessor on the same covenant. The Court relied on this authority in concluding that once the plaintiff elected to proceed against the transferee (the appellant) he could not thereafter turn and charge the lessor (representatives of Kantha Rai); the election is final.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the dispute primarily as one governed by the specific provisions of the Transfer of Property Act applicable to leases rather than solely by the general contract provisions (Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act). The key steps in the Court's analysis were:

  1. Characterisation of parties and rights: the mortgaged interest was Venku's mulgeni right; Kantha Rai became owner of the equity of redemption by purchase and then granted a permanent lease (sub-mulgeni) to the plaintiff. The plaintiff therefore had an interest in the right to redeem under S.91 of the Transfer of Property Act and was a necessary party to the mortgage suit.
  2. Identification of the statutory provisions applicable: the Court relied on S.108 (clauses (c) and (g)) and S.109 of the Transfer of Property Act. S.108(c) creates a covenant for quiet enjoyment enforceable by the transferee of a lessee's interest; S.108(g) permits a lessee to make payments which the lessor is bound to make and then deduct or recover them; S.109 makes a transferee of the lessor (the appellant) subject to the liabilities of the lessor if the lessee so elects.
  3. Application to Kantha Rai: the sale deed (Ex. I) contained an undertaking by Kantha Rai to pay the whole mortgage debt out of the purchase money; Kantha Rai had therefore undertaken an obligation which, when neglected, was recoverable against the property. Under Cl. (g) of S.108 the plaintiff-lessee was entitled to make the payment and recover it from Kantha Rai.
  4. Application to the appellant (transferee of Kantha Rai): under S.109 the appellant, as transferee of the lessor's interest, would be subject to the lessor's liabilities relating to the property if the lessee so elected. The lessee's election to treat the appellant as liable was evidenced by bringing suit against him. The appellant's reliance on Ex. III (which specified Rs. 276-4-0 as payable) did not amount to a contractual limitation excluding the appellant from liabilities arising under S.109; the deed merely mentioned the amount the parties then believed sufficient and did not clearly express an intent to limit liability for any excess.
  5. Rejection of voluntariness and contribution arguments: the Court observed that voluntariness was not pressed before it. The Court found that the plaintiff's payment was not voluntary because his possession was threatened by an order obtained at the appellant's instance to sell free of the plaintiff's rights, and in any event S.69 of the Contract Act could apply when the lessee has an interest in making the payment to protect possession. The Court also rejected the contention that this was a case of proportional contribution between separate properties; rather, it was a case where the lessee was entitled to demand protection of his interests and full recovery from the party liable to the lessee.
  6. Election and finality: having elected to proceed against the transferee (the appellant), the plaintiff was precluded from then seeking recovery against the lessor (Kantha Rai's representatives). The Court relied on the principle exemplified in Stuart v. Joy to hold that the plaintiff's election to sue the transferee was final.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Court affirmed that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount he paid to protect his sub-mulgeni right from the 1st defendant-appellant, the transferee of Kantha Rai. The plaintiff's suit against respondents 2–4 (Kantha Rai's representatives) cannot be maintained after his election to proceed against the appellant.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: the appellant (the transferee of Kantha Rai) is liable to the plaintiff for the mortgage amount paid by the plaintiff to protect his leasehold interest; the plaintiff's action against respondents 2–4 was properly dismissed because the plaintiff elected to proceed against the transferee.
  • No broader precedent beyond application of existing statutory provisions: the Court grounded its decision on the Transfer of Property Act (notably Ss. 108 and 109) and principles about election of remedies, rather than creating a new legal doctrine. The Court emphasized that the specific provisions of the Transfer of Property Act governing leases were the appropriate basis for deciding the rights between lessor, lessee and transferee rather than relying solely on general Contract Act provisions.
  • Costs: the appeal was dismissed with costs in favour of the plaintiff.
N. R. R. — Appeal dismissed.

    Ishwara Shetty . v. Ramappa Shetty And Others

    JUDGMENT

    The first defendant is the appellant in this Court. The following facts are material. One Venku Shetty was the mulgenidar of some immoveable property. He mortgaged his interest in the same to Appanna Rai and Kantha Rai, two brothers, for Rs. 500, on a simple mortgage dated 4th May 1892. Venku Shetty sold his interest to one of the mortgagees Kantha Rai on 2nd December 1910. Thus Kantha Rai having become himself the owner of the mortgagor's interest, his own half interest in the mortgage was satisfied by the purchase and he became liable to pay the other half Rs. 250 and interest thereon to the other mortgagee Appanna Rai. Immediately after the purchase, Kantha Rai, granted a sub-mulgeni to the plaintiff and one Muthaya Manai on 3rd December 1910. On 4th January 1912 Kantha Rai sold his interest to the 1st defendant, appellant. Manai's interest was subsequently acquired by the plaintiff who is therefore the only person entitled to the sub-mulgeni right. Soon after the creation of the sub-mulgeni, the other mortgagee Appanna Rai brought his suit for recovery of half the mortgage amount. To this suit, O. S. No. 23 of 1912 Venku Shetty, the original mortgagor and Kantha Rai the purchaser from him and the 1st defendant the purchaser from Kantha Rai were impleaded but not the sub-mulgenidar, the plaintiff, and Manai. In execution the mortgaged property was brought to sale and the Court on the then plaintiff's application ordered the sale subject to the plaintiff's sub-mulgeni right which was not represented in the suit. But the present appellant objected and appealed to the District Court which ordered that the sale should take place free of the plaintiff's sub-mulgeni right. The result of this order, if carried out, was that the plaintiff's sub-mulgeni right would be sold in execution of the decree to which he was not a party and his interest in the property would be converted into a right to receive surplus sale proceeds, if any. He would, no doubt, have the right of proceeding by separate suit to redeem the mortgage ignoring the sale and the decree by which he was not bound. This would involve expense and trouble and risk of losing possession pending the proceedings. Therefore, when the property was advertised for sale the plaintiff paid the amount due under the mortgage decree O. S. No. 23 of 1912, on 24th January 1923 and had the sale stopped. Then he brought this suit against the 1st defendant appellant and defendants 2 to 4 the legal representatives of Kantha Rai, for recovery of the money. Both sets of defendants denied liability. The 1st defendant's plea was that he had become the purchaser from Kantha Rai under a deed, Ex. III which expressly mentioned only Rs. 276-4-0 as payable on the mortgage. He contended that he was not liable to pay more and that as he had bought the mulgeni right subject to the plaintiff's sub-mulgeni, both he and the plaintiff were liable to contribute to the mortgage. The 3rd defendant's legal representatives contended that Kantha Rai was also not personally liable for the mortgage debt although he had taken the mortgaged property on sale after the mortgage and that Kantha Rai's assets are not liable. It was also contended for the defendants that plaintiff was not entitled to recover anything as he was a mere volunteer. The District Munsif upheld the contention that the plaintiff was a mere volunteer and that he was not entitled to recover anything as he did not satisfy the conditions of S. 69 of the Contract Act and although he worked out the figures which the plaintiff and the 1st defendant would have to contribute in case the plaintiff was entitled to contribution, he dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff was a mere volunteer.

    In appeal the learned Subordinate Judge of South Kanara held that the District Munsif had misunderstood the legal rights of the parties. After stating the facts he held that the plaintiff was not a volunteer because, though according to the learned Subordinate Judge, he was not entitled to redeem the mortgage as he was only a sub-lessee under the mulgenidar, still the plaintiff had a right to protect his sub-mulgeni right in the property which was endangered by the impending Court sale and the 1st defendant had in fact the benefit of the payment by the appellant and he thought that the conditions required by Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act were satisfied. Having so held against the theory of voluntary payment the learned Subordinate Judge also rejected the theory of the plaintiff's right being only to contribution. He held that it was not a case of two separate properties subject to the same mortgage where the mortgage has been discharged by the sale of one of them, that the appellant is only a lessee and that he is entitled to recover the whole amount paid by him. He therefore reversed the decree of the first Court and gave the plaintiff a decree as prayed for against the appellant but dismissed the suit as against the respondents 2 to 4 the representatives of Kantha Rai.

    In Second Appeal, the learned Advocate has not tried to uphold the defence based upon the alleged voluntary character of the payment. The arguments have been directed only to two points. The 1st defendant-appellant is not liable for the amount paid by the plaintiff as he was only a purchaser of the equity of redemption from Kantha Rai who himself was a purchaser from the mortgagor and entitled to half the mortgage amount. Secondly, even if the 1st defendant is liable he is only liable to pay to the extent of a relative value of his interest to the plaintiff's interest.

    Much of the discussion in both the lower Courts and in this Court has been clouded by want of a clear perception of the legal relation between the parties, and it may be for this reason that Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act which are general provisions relating to all contracts have been prominently brought in when there are more specific provisions relating to leases in the Transfer of Property Act which govern the case. The mortgaged property was, no doubt, a leasehold interest, mulgeni. But that does not affect the question which arises as between the owners of the mortgaged property and the plaintiff, a permanent lessee, submulgeni, of that interest. In short, what has happened is that the owner having mortgaged his property by simple mortgage and subsequently sold the equity of redemption, the purchaser without paying the full amount of the mortgage gave a permanent lease of the property and afterwards sold his interest (reversion of the lease and equity of redemption of the mortgage) to the 1st defendant. The mortgagee sued to sell the property over the head both of the purchaser and the lessee, thus wiping out both their interests. The lessee has paid the mortgage amount to protect his possession and the question is whether he can recover either the whole of the money and, if only a portion, what portion, from his lessor or the present owner of the reversion. The case falls within the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act relating to leases.

    Before mentioning the provisions governing the case I might at once correct an error into which the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen where he says that the plaintiff respondent had no right to redeem the mortgage in question as he was only a sublessee and it was unnecessary to make him a party to the suit, O.S No. 23 of 1912. This is incorrect because under S. 91 of the Transfer of Property Act both before its recent amendment and after, any person (other than the mortgagee of the interest sought to be redeemed) who has any interest in, or charge upon, the property mortgaged or in or upon the right to redeem the same may redeem. Here, the property mortgaged was Venku's mulgeni right. Kantha Rai was the owner of the equity of redemption by his purchase from Venku and the plaintiff as the owner of a permanent lease from Kantha Rai had undoubtedly an interest in the right to redeem. Under O. 34, R. 1 Civil Procedure Code all persons having an interest in the right of redemption shall be joined as parties to any suit relating to the mortgage. The plaintiff was thus a necessary party to the mortgage suit and he would not have been bound by the sale proceedings. But it was the 1st defendant-appellant's act in appealing to the District Court and obtaining an order that the sale should be free of the plaintiff's rights which made it appear to the plaintiff—and was probably so intended—that unless the plaintiff paid the mortgage amount himself and avoided the sale he would be turned out of possession without a chance of redeeming the mortgage. This aspect of the matter, however, is not decisive to determine whether as between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant either or both should pay the amount paid to satisfy the mortgage.

    By S. 108 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act the lessor shall be deemed to contract with the lessee that, if the latter pays the rent reserved by the lease and performs the contracts binding on the lessee, he may hold the property during the time limited by the lease without interruption. By the second clause of this subsection the benefit of such contract may be enforced by the transferee of the lessee's interest. By clause (g) of that section if the lessor neglects to make any payment which he is bound to make, and which, if not made by him, is recoverable from the lessee or against the property, the lessee may make such payment himself, and deduct it with interest from the rent, or otherwise recover it from the lessor. By S. 109 if the lessor transfers the property leased, the transferee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights and if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property transferred. (I do not read the parts of the section now not material). Reading these sections together it is clear that the plaintiff as one of the original lessees and the transferee of the interest of the other lessee is entitled to the benefit of the covenant for quite enjoyment under clause (c). It is clear also that according to the terms of the plaintiff's lease the plaintiff was not bound as between himself and the lessor to make any payment towards the previous mortgage but that the lessor Kantha Rai has under the sale deed Ex. I, by himself undertaken to pay the whole of the mortgage debt out of the purchase money of Rs. 500. The lessor, therefore, when he neglected to pay the balance of the mortgage amount due, that is Rs. 250, and interest thereon, neglected to make a payment which he was bound to make and which if not made by him was recoverable against the property leased. In such a case, Cl. (g) of S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, clearly says that the lessee may make the payment himself and recover it from the lessor. So fas as Kantha Rai is concerned, the words of Cl. (g) appear to be clear that he must make good the mortgage amount which in default of payment by him was recoverable against the property.

    No Indian case applying this clause to the payment of mortgage amount which the lessor was liable to pay and which had to be paid by the lessee to save the property has been cited. The cases which have hitherto arisen are of Government assessment, ground rent or rates and taxes payable by the landlord, In Smith v. Dinonath Mookerjee (1), the case was of Government revenue payable by superior landlord who defaulted but paid by the putnidar. The case was dealt with under Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act. The Transfer of Property Act was not mentioned. In Bama Sundari Dasi v. Adhar Chunder Sarkar (2), the payment made by the plaintiff was of rent due to the landlord for the property of which the defendant was then in possession under an invalid alienation by the plaintiff's mother. The plaintiff, having paid the money to save the property from the rent sale, was held entitled to recover the money from the defendant. This was clearly a case not governed by Cl. (g) of S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act but by the general provisions of Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act. The case in Musammat Faiya zunnisa and others v. Rai Bajrang Bahadur Singh and another (3), was one of land revenue payable by the lessors under a permanent lease. The lessors having defaulted to pay, the lessees paid and were held entitled to recover. This was clearly a case under Cl. (g) of S. 108, but the decision was based upon the general provisions of S. 69 of the Contract Act. The case in Yogambal Boyee Ammani Ammal v. Naina Pillai Markayar (4), was not one of the lessor and lessee and was rightly regarded as falling precisely under Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act. The case in Bepin Behari Sarnokar…Plaintiff, v. Kalidas Chatterjee…Defendant, Opposite Party. (5), arose between a tenant and an under-tenant of certain non-agricultural land. The payment by the under-tenant of the amount of a decree for rent plus five per cent under S. 310 (a) Civil Procedure Code, was held not to come within the words “bound by law to pay” in S. 69 of the Contract Act, because the payment by the under-tenant was made after the sale had been completed. The learned Judges said that it would be difficult to say that after the sale in execution has been completed the amount which the applicant paid into Court was money which the judgment-debtor was bound by law to pay. No reference was made to the Transfer of Property Act and having regard to the ground on which the decision was based it seems not to afford any guidance for this case because there was no Court sale in this case. In Woodfall's Landlord and Tenant (22nd Edition) page 877 it is stated that the “usual qualified covenant for quiet enjoyment is likewise broken by an eviction, molestation or disturbance of the lessee by persons claiming under a prior mortgage for a long term granted by the trustees of a settlement with the concurrence of the defendant who joined therein and covenanted for the payment of the mortgage money and for title etc.” This is as near an authority as I have been able to get for the situation which has arisen in this case that where the lessee is threatened with disturbance or eviction by the act of the prior mortgagee, for payment of which debt the lessor has made himself liable by covenanting with some third party such as the mortgagee or his own vendor of the leased premises, that threat amounts to a breach of covenant for his enjoyment. If so, such a sum paid by the lessee to avoid eviction and disturbance must in reason be one which the lessor was bound to make. In my opinion, therefore, as against Kantha Rai the lessor who had undertaken by the sale deed to pay off the mortgage amount the plaintiff-lessee has a clear case.

    The question then is whether the plaintiff has any and what rights against the 1st defendant-appellant, the transferee from Kantha Rai. For this we must go to S. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. The appellant is simply the transferee of the lessor's interest in the premises. Against him the section says that if the lessee so elects the transferee shall be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property, which expression is taken to mean the burden of all covenants running with the land such as covenant for quiet enjoyment. It was said by Mr. Adiga for the appellant that there was a contract to the contrary in this case. He says that it is to be found in the stipulation in his sale deed, Ex. III, where the vendor Kantha Rai directs the purchaser, the appellant, to pay Rs. 276-4-0 to Appanna Rai the other mortgagee. But this does not amount, on a proper construction, to any contract limiting the appellant's liability to bear the burden of a covenant for quiet enjoyment. It only mentions the amount which the parties then thought sufficient to satisfy the bond. The idea of the vendor Kantha Rai being called upon to pay the excess amount if any, due to the mortgagee was probably never present to the minds of the parties and cannot be deduced from the language of the deed. That the lessee has elected to hold the appellant liable is clear from the fact that he has sued him. I therefore think that all the necessary conditions required by S. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act to make the appellant liable are satisfied.

    The only point which the appellant might have raised but did not raise, is a contention that there was at the time when the plaintiff paid the money into Court no physical disturbance of possession or eviction but only a threat of eviction. It cannot well lie in the mouth of the appellant to put forward this excuse seeing that it was at his instance and probably deliberately with the intention of compelling the plaintiff to pay what he was himself bound to pay that he appealed to the District Court and got an order for sale of the leasehold interest free from the plaintiff's sub-mulgeni right. It may also be pointed out that in any case S. 69 of the Contract Act applies because the plaintiff as submulgenidar had an interest in making the payment to protect his possession which was threatened and that the appellant was a person who was bound by law to make the payment. The first point raised by the appellant thus fails.

    The second point that the plaintiff is only entitled to contribution is misconceived. This is not a case of a mortgage of two distinct properties or interests in property concurrently liable to a mortgage to which they must proportionately contribute. But the case is one where as between the lessor and the lessee, the lessee is entitled to demand that his interests shall not be prejudiced by the enforcement of a prior mortgage which the lessor was bound to pay. No question of contribution arises at all.

    The only other question left is whether the appellant having been found liable and the plaintiff having elected to proceed against him, respondents 2 to 4, representatives of Kantha Rai, can also be held severally liable. On this the authorities are clear that the plaintiff having once made his election, it is final and the lessee cannot after treating the transferee as liable turn round and charge the lessor in respect of the covenant: see Stuart v. Joy .

    The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

    N. R. R.Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Ishwara Shetty . v. Ramappa Shetty And Others
    (Mar 29, 1934)