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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. n3(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Act XVIII of 1960) hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Cl. (2) of S. 9 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956 (Act 24 of 1956),
  • DELHI AND AJMER RENT CONTROL ACT
  • S. 50 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958.
  • S. 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
  • S. 9(2) of the Fair Rent Act (Act 24 of 1956)
  • Madras Rent Control Act, 15 of 1946.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. n3(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Act XVIII of 1960) hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Cl. (2) of S. 9 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956 (Act 24 of 1956),
  • DELHI AND AJMER RENT CONTROL ACT
  • S. 50 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958.
  • S. 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
  • S. 9(2) of the Fair Rent Act (Act 24 of 1956)
  • Madras Rent Control Act, 15 of 1946.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a revision petition preferred by the respondent-tenant in H.R.C.O.P. No. 50 of 1978 (on the file of the Rent Controller, Additional District Munsif, Tirupattur) challenging the correctness and legality of the judgment in C.M.A. No. 3 of 1980 (on the file of the Appellate Authority, Subordinate Judge, Tirupattur) which dismissed the tenant's appeal.

The sequence of events is as follows: the landlord (the respondent in the revision) filed I.A. No. 100 of 1979 seeking permission from the Rent Controller to amend the H.R.C. petition to correct the door number of the premises from 57 to 56. The tenant opposed that application. The Rent Controller allowed the amendment application. The tenant then preferred C.M.A. No. 3 of 1980 to the Appellate Authority, which dismissed the appeal as not maintainable and observed that the appropriate remedy was to file a revision against the Rent Controller's order. The present revision is directed against that judgment of the Appellate Authority.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the word "order" in S. 23(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 includes interlocutory or procedural orders passed by the Rent Controller (i.e., whether an interlocutory order such as correction of a door number is appealable).
  2. Whether the appellate authority correctly dismissed C.M.A. No. 3 of 1980 as not maintainable in respect of the Rent Controller's interlocutory order permitting the correction of the door number.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Mr. Vijayaraghavan, counsel for the petitioner (tenant), contended that S. 23(1)(b) of the Act permits any person aggrieved by an "order" passed by the Rent Controller to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Authority within the prescribed time.
  • The petitioner argued that the term "order" in that sub-section is broad enough to include every order passed in Rent Control proceedings, irrespective of its nature, and therefore would include interlocutory orders disposing of procedural matters (such as amendment of a petition to correct a door number).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Komarasami Gounden, In re (1951 M.W.N. 227 = 64 L.W. 730) Quasi-judicial tribunals (Rent Controller/Appellate Tribunal) have an inherent power to set right inadvertent mistakes so long as amendment does not amount to a review of adjudication. Cited to support that tribunals exercising judicial functions can correct mistakes (e.g., amend door numbers) by inherent power; forms part of the basis for treating amendments as within tribunal competence.
Natarajan v. State of Madras (MANU/TN/0432/1959; I.L.R. 1960 Mad. 449 = 73 L.W. 113) Tribunals, while exercising judicial functions, possess inherent powers to review judgments where due cause is shown. Used to reinforce the proposition that Rent Controller and Appellate Authority (quasi-judicial bodies) have inherent powers to set right inadvertent mistakes while proceedings are alive.
D. Kantian v. Southern Roadways and another (93 L.W. 199 = 1979-2 M.L.J. 145) Tribunals charged with adjudicating rights and liabilities inherently possess the power to permit amendments of pleadings where appropriate; amendments are an indispensable adjunct to their jurisdiction. Quotations from this decision were used to show that amendments to pleadings/petitions are inherent to tribunals and should be permitted while proceedings remain alive.
Santhanam Iyer v. Somasundara Vanniyar (MANU/TN/0045/1958; I.L.R. 1958 Mad. 827 = 71 L.W. 381) The expression "every decision" in a comparable rent statute refers only to final determinations of rights and does not include interlocutory orders. Cited to support the proposition that wide language in appeal provisions should be read as excluding purely interlocutory procedural orders that do not decide rights or liabilities.
Peria Maria Goundan v. Ramaswami Gounden (1962-1-M.L.J. 106 = 74 L.W. 485) Reiterated that words like "every decision" denote final decisions and do not include interlocutory orders such as preliminary rulings on maintainability. Used to strengthen the view that interlocutory orders are not appealable and that an aggrieved party must wait for a final order to raise the objection on appeal.
Thangavelu v. Arumugam Pandithan (1962-2-M.L.J. 24) Supports the same principle as Peria Maria Goundan and Santhanam Iyer regarding interlocutory orders not being appealable. Referenced as further authority for the same proposition concerning interlocutory orders.
Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand (MANU/SC/0053/1966; A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 799 = 1967 S.C.R. 810) The Supreme Court held that broadly worded appeal provisions do not include interlocutory orders which are merely procedural and do not affect rights or liabilities; such interlocutory orders are not appealable unless they affect rights/liabilities. Relied upon as primary Supreme Court authority to hold that an order refusing issuance of a commission (procedural) was not appealable and that aggrieved parties can raise such errors on appeal against the final order.
Bant Singh Gill v. Shanti Devi & Others (1969-1-S.C.J. 370) Confirmed that findings on preliminary issues (which do not decide rights/liabilities finally) are not "orders" for the purpose of appeal provisions; error can be raised on appeal from final decision. Adopted to show that preliminary rulings (e.g., on abatement/maintainability) are not appealable and that the correct remedy is to raise the point on appeal from the final decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by observing that the term "order" is not defined in the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, and noted the statutory framework giving the Rent Controller substantive powers under various sections (Ss.10, 14–17) and the right of appeal under S.23 and revision under S.25. The central analytical question was whether the word "order" in S.23(1)(b) should be read broadly enough to include interlocutory or procedural orders passed during pendency of Rent Control proceedings.

The opinion distinguishes between (a) interlocutory orders that regulate procedure and assist the parties during the pending proceedings (examples: summoning witnesses, discovery, production/inspection of documents, issuing commissions, fixing dates, admissibility or relevancy rulings, correction of mistakes such as door numbers) and (b) orders that finally affect rights or liabilities of the parties. The court emphasized that many interlocutory orders are merely steps toward final adjudication and do not decide rights or liabilities.

The court surveyed a line of authority (both High Court and Supreme Court decisions) holding that tribunal-like authorities possess an inherent power to correct inadvertent mistakes and to permit amendments while proceedings remain alive, but that wide language in appeal provisions (e.g., "every order" or "every decision") has been construed to exclude ordinary interlocutory procedural orders that do not finally affect rights or liabilities. The Supreme Court's decisions (notably Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand and Bant Singh Gill) were applied to demonstrate that allowing appeals from every interlocutory order would cause harassment, delay and protracted litigation; instead, aggrieved parties can raise objections to interlocutory rulings as grounds in an appeal from the final order.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that the amendment permitted by the Rent Controller in I.A. No. 100 of 1979 (correction of the door number from 57 to 56) was a procedural correction made to rectify inadvertence and did not alter the rights or liabilities of the parties. Accordingly, it was not an appealable order within the meaning of S.23(1)(b). The appellate authority's dismissal of C.M.A. No. 3 of 1980 as not maintainable was therefore correct on that ground, although the appellate authority's statement that the petitioner could file a revision against the interlocutory order was held to be incorrect.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The revision petition is dismissed.

The court held specifically that the order passed by the Rent Controller in I.A. No. 100 of 1979 in H.R.C.O.P. No. 50 of 1978 (permitting correction of the door number) is not an appealable order under S.23(1)(b) of the Act. Consequently, the appellate authority was correct in dismissing C.M.A. No. 3 of 1980 as not maintainable. The appellate authority's remark that the petitioner could file a revision against the interlocutory order was erroneous.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the tenant's revision petition is dismissed. The petitioner (tenant) remains free to raise objections to the Rent Controller's interlocutory order by canvassing them in an appeal against the final order in the main proceedings.
  • Scope and precedent: the decision follows and applies existing authorities constraining the meaning of broadly worded appeal provisions so as not to encompass routine interlocutory procedural orders. The opinion applies established principles rather than announcing a novel rule; it clarifies that interlocutory corrections of inadvertent mistakes (such as door-number corrections) that do not affect rights or liabilities are not appealable under S.23(1)(b).

End of summary. All content above is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not introduce facts or reasoning beyond the text of that opinion.

    Chinnaraju Naidu v. Bavani Bai

    ORDER

    S.R. Pandian, J.

    1. The respondent-tenant in H.R.C.O.P. No. 50 of 1978 on the file of the Rent Controller (Additional District Munsif) of Tirupattur has directed this revision petition questioning the correctness and legality of the judgment made in C.M.A. No. 3 of 1980 on the file of the appellate to authority (Subordinate Judge, Tirupattur) dismissing the appeal. The brief facts of the case which led to this revision petition can be stated thus: The landlord, the respondent herein, filed I.A. No. 100 of 1979, seeking the permission of the Rent Controller to amend the H.R.C. petition by correcting the door number of the petition mentioned premises as 56 from the wrongly mentioned door No. 57. This prayer was opposed by the tenant. The learned Rent Controller allowed the application and permitted the landlord to have the door number corrected as 56 as prayed for.

    2. Aggrieved by that other, the tenant preferred C.M.A. No. 3 of 1980 before the Appellate Authority, who dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal is not maintainable either in law or on facts and observing that the remedy open to the petitioner was to file a revision against the impugned order of the Rent Controller. Now, this revision is preferred against the abovesaid judgment in the C.M.A.

    3. Mr. Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, would vehemently contend that the judgment of the Appellate Authority is unsustainable since S. n3(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Act XVIII of 1960) hereinafter referred to as the Act) enables any person aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Controller to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Authority having jurisdiction within the prescribed time. According to the learned counsel, the word 'Order' used in the said sub-section is wide enough to include every order, whatever be its nature, passed in the Rent Control proceedings and consequently, it would include even an order passed while disposing of interlocutory matters. Therefore, the only question that arises for my consideration is whether the word 'order', used in S. 23(1)(b) would include all kinds of orders passed while disposing of interlocutory applications.

    4. The word 'order' is not defined in the Act. Ss. 10, 14, 15, 16and 17of the Act give powers to the Rent Controller to pass order for eviction of tenants, for recovery of possession by the landlord for repairs or for reconstruction, for reoccupation of the building by the tenant (i) after repair, or (ii) if the building is not demolished by the landlord despite his obtaining an order under S. 14(1)(b) and for restraining the landlord from interfering with the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. Now S.23of the Act empowers the Appellate Authority to hear an appeal preferred by any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Controller. Under S.25, the High Court is given the power of revision on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the Appellate Authority to satisfy itself as to the regularity of the proceedings under the Act or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein.

    5. As stated supra, the very object of S. 23is to give a right of appeal to any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Controller, which affects his right of liability. Can it be said that the word 'order' occurring in S. 23(1)(b)is, in the context of that section, wide enough to include interlocutory orders which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights and liabilities of the parties? In a pending proceeding the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production, inspection of documents, issue of commission for the examination of witnesses inspection of premises fixing a date for hearing and the admissibility of a document, the relevancy of a question and to set right mistakes such as correction of door numbers etc., made by inadvertence, so long as the amendment does not amount to a review of the adjudication already made. These interlocutory orders are only steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceedings. They regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties.

    6. In the present case, the amendment sought for relates only to the correction of the door number of the petition mentioned premises. Admittedly, the petitioner is one of the tenants under the respondent, residing in door No. 56 belonging to the respondent. Therefore, both the tenant and the landlord should be deemed to have known to which property the proceeding relates. Obviously, by inadvertence the respondent has given the door number as 57 instead of as 56. Therefore, the correction of the door number has become necessary and there is nothing wrong in seeking such a direction.

    7. A similar question arose before the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. in Komarasami Gounden, In re, 1951 M.W.N. 227=64 L.W. 730. In that case, there was an application for eviction of the revision petitioner from the premises of which he was in occupation. The petitioner failed in both the courts. In execution of the order of eviction, it turned out that the premises of which the petitioner was admittedly in occupation and which admittedly belonged to the landlord was given a wrong door number. So the landlord filed an application for amendment of the description of the property by correcting the door number. The Appellate Tribunal directed an amendment of the petition, the order of the lower court and the order of the appellate Tribunal. An application was taken out before the High Court by the petitioner to quash the order directing the amendment. The main contention was that the application for amendment made under S.151, C.P.C. was not sustainable, since S.151, C.P.C. did not apply and that the landlord should hive approached the Rent Controller and not the appellate Tribunal, for amendment Rajamannar C.J. speaking for the Bench, while answering that contention, states thus:

    We see no substance in either of these contentions. It may be that S.151, C.P.C. by itself does not apply to proceedings wider the Madras Rent Control Act, 15 of 1946. But, we are of opinion that a quasi judicial tribunal like the Rent Controller or the Appellate Tribunal has an inherent power to set right mistakes made by inadvertence so long as the amendment does not amount to a review of the adjudication already made.

    8. Another Bench of this Court consisting of Ramaswami and Anantanarayanan, JJ. in Natarajan v. State of Madras MANU/TN/0432/1959 : I.L.R. 1960 Mad. 449 =73 L.W. 113 has ruled that in order to render justice, the Tribunals, so long as they exercise judicial functions, should be held to possess inherent powers to review their judgments where due cause is shown. From the above two decisions it is made clear that even though S. 151, C.P.C. by itself does not apply to proceedings under the Act, the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority under the Act, both being quasi-judicial tribunals, have inherent powers to set right mistakes made by inadvertence, so long as the orders passed in the interlocutory applications do not finally affect the right or liability of any party. It would be fitting at this juncture to quote the view expressed by Balasubrahmanyan, J. in D. Kantian v. Southern Roadways and another 93 L.W. 199=1979-2 M.L.J. 145. The learned Judge, while examining the power of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to permit the amendment of pleadings has stated thus :--

    The power to grant amendment of the pleadings must, in my judgment, be regarded as inherent in all Tribunals or authorities which are charged by the law with the duty of enquiring into rights and liabilities of parties and or of adjudicating on their claims or disputes. Where pleadings play an important part in legal proceedings before Tribunals and other authorities, and where they afford the basis for evidence to be called at the enquiry, the power to amend must be necessarily attributed as an indispensable adjunct to their jurisdiction. Pleadings, after all, are matters of composition by literate people. Error cannot be completely avoided from any human endeavour, much less in matters of writing or drafting. Tribunals or other professional advisers are by no means to be regarded as perfectionists, nor their pleadings as always error-proof; Amendment of pleading in claims applications must be as common and frequent if not more as in pleadings in civil suits.

    For all the above reasons, I have no doubt in mind that the Accidents Claims Tribunals have power to order amendments to claims. They have the opportunity and the means of exercising this power so long as the claim proceedings before them are still alive, and there is still something for the amendment to operate upon.

    As pointed out in the above decision, the commission of an error unwittingly made in the pleadings has to be rectified by an amendment when the party concerned takes out an application for the purpose. The Tribunal, in exercise of its inherent power, so long as the proceeding before it is alive, has to consider such a request and order the amendment to be carried out if it is warranted in the interests of justice. If every order passed on an interlocutory application, which in no way finally affects the right or liability of any party and which is purely procedural in character, is permitted to be appealed against, then the litigation will become a long drawn out affair causing unnecessary prolonged delay in the disposal of the rent control cases. In fact, S. 23(1)(b) of the Act postulates that the person aggrieved by 'an order' passed by the Controller may prefer an appeal. But, the section does not read that an appeal would lie against 'every-order' passed by the Controller.

    9. In Santhanam Iyer v. Somasundara Vanniyar MANU/TN/0045/1958 : I.L.R. 1958 Mad. 827=71 L.W. 381, a question arose whether the expression 'every decision' used in Cl. (2) of S. 9 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956 (Act 24 of 1956), from which an appeal would lie within the time prescribed, to the Rent Tribunal means and includes decisions on an interlocutory application as well. Somasundaram, J., observed thus--

    After giving a careful and anxious consideration to this Question, it seems to me that this expression 'every decision' used in Cl. (2) refers only to the final determination of the rights of parties in the two classes of cases mentioned in Cl. (1) I do not think, however wide the interpretation of the expression 'every decision' may be, that will include any order passed on an interlocutory application. It seems to me that it has reference only to the final determination or the rights of parties on the application made before the Rent Controller either for fixation of fair rent or for deciding any dispute arising under this Act.

    10. Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was, in Peria Maria Goundan v. Ramaswami Gounden 1962-1-M.L.J. 106=74 L.W. 485, following the above decision in Santhanam v. Somasundara MANU/TN/0045/1958 : I.L.R. 1958 Mad. 827=71 L.W. 381, reiterated the same principle, saying that the words 'every decision' occurring in S. 9(2) of the Fair Rent Act (Act 24 of 1956) could only mean a final decision and it could not include interlocutory orders such as the determination of a preliminary point by the Rent Court, and that the aggrieved party to such a case must wait till the application was finally disposed of and then file an appeal against the final decision in the case. See also Thangavelu v. Arumugam Pandithan 1962-2-M.L.J. 24.

    11. A question similar to the one on hand was considered by the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand MANU/SC/0053/1966 : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 799=1967 S.C.R. 810. In that case, the landlord made an application to the Controller for eviction of the tenant-appellant on the ground that he bona fide required the premises for his occupation. The tenant filed an application alleging that the accommodation in premises No. 17, Alipur Road, where the landlord was residing, consisted of more than three rooms and consequently the landlord did not bona fide require the premises, and prayed for the issue of a commission to inspect the abovesaid premises and prepare plan. The Controller rejected the plea. As against this order of rejection, the tenant filed an appeal to the Tribunal, which held that no appeal lay from the abovesaid order of the Controller under S. 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and on this finding, dismissed the appeal. The High Court also agreed with the decision of the Tribunal. The tenant preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court by special leave. A question arose in that appeal whether an appeal lay to the Tribunal under S. 38(1) of the Act from the order of the Controller, rejecting the application of the tenant seeking the issuance of a commission. S. 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 reads thus--

    An appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller made under this Act to the Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter referred to us the Tribunal) consisting of one person only to be appointed by the Central Government by notification in the official gazette.

    The Supreme Court, while examining the contention of the appellant tenant, with reference to S. 38(3) of the said Act, held as follows--

    In the context of S. 38(1), the words 'every order of the Controller made under this Act, though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders under Ss. 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examination of witnesses inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication of their case in the pending proceeding ; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The Legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeal from such procedural orders. It is open to any party to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding. Subject to the aforesaid limitation, an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal from every order passed by the Controller under the Act. Even an interlocutory order passed under S. 37(2) is an order passed under the Act and is subject to appeal under S. 38(1) provided it affects some rights or liability of any party. Thus, an order of the Rent Controller refusing to set aside an ex parte order is subject to appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal.

    Having thus observed, the Supreme Court held that the issue of a commission was only a step for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case and the order of the Controller refusing to issue a commission by inspection and preparation of a plan of the premises was a mere procedural order not affecting any right or liability of the appellant and consequently dismissed the appeal, however, affording an opportunity to the party aggrieved by the final order to be passed in the proceedings, to canvass his grievance by way of an appeal.

    12. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cited decision was reiterated and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Bant Singh Gill v. Shanti Devi & Others 1969-1-S.C.J. 370. In that case, a suit was filed for ejectment by the landlord against a tenant under the provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act of 1962, on the ground of failure to pay the rent. The appellant tenant filed an application raising a preliminary issue about the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the suit had abated by virtue of S. 50 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958. The Rent Controller dismissed that application and proceeded with the trial of the suit. Against that order, the tenant filed an appeal before the District Court, and on its being dismissed on the ground that no appeal would lie against such an order, a further revision was filed before the High Court of Punjab, which appeal also failed. It was as against the order of the High Court, the tenant took up the matter to the Supreme Court. While considering the legality of the order appealed against, the Supreme Court ruled thus--

    If the decision had been in favour of the appellant and the suit had not been dismissed, no doubt there would have been a final order in the suit having the effect of a decree On the other hand if, as in the present case, it is held that the suit had not abated and its trial is to continue, there is no final order deciding the rights or liabilities of the parties to the suit. The rights and liabilities have yet to be decided after full trial has been gone through. The decision by the court is only in the nature of a finding on a preliminary issue on which would depend the maintainability of the suit. Such a finding cannot be held to be an order for purpose of S. 34 of the Act of 1952, and consequently, no appeal against such an order would be maintainable. It was indicated by this Court in the case of the Central Bank of India Ltd. MANU/SC/0053/1966 : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 799 that, in such a case, it is open to the appellant to canvass the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in the order in appeal from the final order passed in the proceedings for eviction. In the present case also, therefore, it is clearly open to the appellant to raise the plea of abatement of the suit, if and when he files an appeal against a decree for eviction passed by the trial court.

    Thus, it is seen from the above ruling of the Supreme Court in Bant Singh Gill's case 1969-1-S.C.J. 370 that even an order rejecting an application questioning the maintainability of the suit on the ground of abatement, was held to be not a final order deciding the rights and liabilities of the parties to the suit and as such no appeal would be maintainable against such an order. Afortiorari therefore, an order in an interlocutory application permitting the landlord to correct the door number of the premises in question, which is only procedural in character, cannot be said to be a final order coming within the definition of 'an order' occurring in S. 23(1)(b) of the Act. The purpose of putting a bar on the powers of appeal or revision, as the case may be, in relation to any interlocutory order passed in proceedings like the Rent Control matters, which is not a final order affecting the right and liability of any party is to bring about an expeditious final disposal of the case lest it would give room for a long drawn affair delaying the disposal of such cases.

    13. The quintessence of the above discussion, in the light of the observations made in the various decisions referred to above, is to the effect that all interlocutory orders passed during the proceedings under the Act cannot be said to be orders coming within the meaning of S. 23(1)(b) of the Act, but only the orders which affect the rights and liabilities of the parties, in the sense that they become final orders though passed on interlocutory applications, such as refusing to set aside ex parte orders, etc., are appealable. However, it is open to the parties to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceedings.

    14. In the result, I hold that the order passed by the Rent Controller in I.A. 100 of 1979 in H.R.C.O.P. 50 of 1978 is not an appealable order and consequently the order of the appellate authority dismissing C.M. A.3 of 1980 as not maintainable is quite correct, though the observation made by it that the petitioner could file a revision against the said interlocutory order is erroneous. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. It is open to the petitioner to canvass the correctness of the order of the Rent Controller in I.A. 100 of 1979 also if he is aggrieved by it and file an appeal against the final order in the main proceeding.

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    Chinnaraju Naidu v. Bavani Bai
    (Mar 24, 1981)