Satish Chandra, J.:— This appeal arises out of consolidation proceedings. The respondents filed an objection under Sec. 9, Consolidation of Holdings Act claiming to be the co-sharers in the sirdari holding in dispute. The appellant contested the claim. According to him, he was the exclusive sirdar of the plots in dispute. The Consolidation Officer held that Bhurey alone was entitled to be recorded as Sirdar. He dismissed the objections filed by the respondents. On appeal the findings were reversed by the Settlement Officer. He directed that the names of all the parties be recorded as co-sharers. The matter was taken to the Deputy Director in revision. He allowed the revision and restored the order of the Consolidation Officer. Aggrieved, the respondents filed a writ petition and succeeded. The learned single Judge quashed the order of the Deputy Director and sent back the case to him for decision afresh. This time ??? has come up in appeal.
2. It appears that one Chuttan was recorded as Sirdar of the plots in dispute. The appellant Bhurey on 8-11-1956 filed a suit for declaration that he was the sole sirdar of the plots in dispute and that the revenue records be corrected accordingly. The suit was filed in the civil court. On 22-12-1956 the plaintiff Bhurey and defendant Chuttan filed a compromise in which the claim of plaintiff Bhurey was admitted. On 14-1-1957 the Civil Court passed a decree in terms of the compromise.
3. Thereafter Chuttan appears to have died and in his place the names of Ilahi Baksh and Ali Baksh were mutated in the revenue papers. Bhurey made an application for mutation of his name on the basis of the compromise decree. In these proceedings Ilahi Baksh and Ali Baksh appear to have filed an application on 29-8-1957 giving their consent to the mutation of Bhurey. They verified this application on 17-12-1957. Thereafter the Tehsildar passed an order of mutation in favour of the appellant on 4-8-1958. It may be stated that the present respondents who are the sons of Ilahi Baksh filed an objection to the mutation of the name of Bhurey but that was dismissed.
4. Thereafter consolidation proceedings commenced and the question whether Bhurey alone was the sirdar of the plots in dispute was agitated before the consolidation authorities.
5. On 8-11-1956 when the civil suit was filed, a suit for declaration under Sec. 229-B was exclusively cognizable by a revenue court. The suit filed by Bhurey was for declaration of title. It expressed the grievance that the revenue papers be corrected. It is evident that the suit involved correction of revenue records, that is to say it expressed a grievance against the authorities maintaining the revenue records.
6. Section 229-B(3) applies to a suit for declaration of a bhumidhar or a sirdar against the State Government and Gaon ??? a suit against the land-holder simpliciter. Dealing with this provision a Division Bench of this Court reported in Parsottam v. Narottam . ??? held that the legal position appears to be that where a plaintiff has a grievance against the village records which are maintained by the State Government and Gaon Sabha the suit will lie in revenue court under Sec. 229-B and any other person who disputes the plaintiff's title shall also be impleaded as a defendant; but if the village records support the claim of the plaintiff, the suit will not lie under Sec. 229-B but will be cognizable by a civil court in case the plaintiff's right is disputed by a third person. Here the revenue records did not support the claim of the plaintiff. On the basis of this authority the suit was cognizable by the revenue court under Sec. 229-B.
7. Further Sec 331 Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act bars the civil court from taking cognizance of any suit mentioned in column 3 of the II Schedule or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. Here the suit was for declaration simpliciter which is a suit mentioned in column 3 of the II Schedule. Moreover, since it expresses a grievance against the maintenance of the revenue records it was clearly a suit in respect of which relief could have been obtained under Sec. 229-B in a suit filed in the revenue court. Thus Sec. 331 barred the suit filed by the appellant on 8-11-1956. From this point of view the compromise decree was totally without jurisdiction. On this aspect learned counsel for the appellant relied on Sec. (1-A) added to Sec. 331 by the U.P Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969. This section is on line; similar to Sec. 21, C.P.C It precludes an appellate or revisional court from entertaining a suit for proceedings with respect to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Dealing with this provision a Full Bench of this Court in Thakur Dhvan Singh v. Indrapal Singh . Civil Revision No. 111 of 1971 decided on 22-12-1972. held:—
“In our opinion this provision applies to an objection taken in the same proceeding but in an appellate or revisional court. It governs objections to the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the same case. It does not apply where an objection to the jurisdiction of a court to try a suit is taken in some subsequent proceeding where the decision in the previous suit is relied upon. In the present case the objection was that the previous partition suit was decided by the civil court without jurisdiction. This objection is being taken in a subsequent suit. Sub-sec. (1-A) is not applicable.”
8. The position is that the civil court decree was without jurisdiction and as such it was void.
9. For the appellant it was urged that since the decree passed by the civil court was based on compromise it will operate as an estoppel and not as res judicata. Reliance was placed upon Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State Of Orissa . ???. It was held in that case that a judgment by consent or default is as effective estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. This is the consequence of a judgment delivered by a court having jurisdiction. But if the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit its judgment will not operate as res judicata. Similarly a judgment given by such a court by consent or default will not operate at all because it is a void decision. It is well settled that there is no estoppel against a statute. Here Sec. 331 debarred the civil court from entertaining a suit of this kind. The effect of this provision cannot be circumvented upon the doctrine of estoppel.
10. Learned counsel relied upon Sec. 96(3), C.P.C The provision takes away right of appeal from a consent decree. The depriveation of the right of appeal against a consent decree, in our opinion, has no relevance to the question whether such a decree operates at all, being passed by a court without jurisdiction. Since a party cannot be estopped from relying upon a statutory prohibition the non-appealability of the decree will not render it valid. Sec. 96(3), in our opinion, gives no assistance to the appellant.
11. It was urged that the admission of Chuttan in the application for compromise decree would bind him. The proceedings in the civil court in a suit which was not entertainable are all void. In the plaint no tangible source of title was pleaded. The so called admission by Chuttan would be in substance a transfer of his slrdari rights to the plaintiff. Such transfers are prohibited and made void by Sec. 166 Zamindari Abolition Act. The Admission being in violation of a mandatory statutory provision, was unenforceable.
12. Reliance was also placed upon an admission of the predecessors of the respondents in the mutation proceedings. It is well established that any consent or admission made in mutation proceedings has no relevance in regular title proceedings. Consequently, the alleged admission of Ilahi Baksh or Ali Baksh is not admissible in the present title proceedings. The Deputy Director was in error in spelling out an exclusive title in Bhurey on the basis of these admissions.
13. For the appellant it was urged that the appellant was in exclusive possession and, therefore, he acquired title by adverse possession. No such plea was raised at any stage of the case. This is a mixed question of law and fact which cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. The stray observation that the appellant may have been in possession did not amount to a finding that he had been in exclusive possession by ousting the other co-sharers since the plea was not taken in that form the same cannot be spelled out from stray observations.
14. The learned single Judge after quashing the judgment of the Deputy Director has sent back the case to him for ??? no necessity of remanding the case because nothing is left to be decided.
15. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The judgment of the learned single Judge is modified. The direction remanding the case back to the Deputy Director for decision afresh is quashed. In view of the divided success the parties will bear their own costs.
Appeal partly allowed.