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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Richardson, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from long-running litigation between proprietors of a share of the village of Kalikapur (the plaintiffs) and the tenants occupying certain lands (the defendants). The plaint in the present suit was filed in 1910 claiming arrears of rent for parts of 1907 to 1910 (years 1314–1316 B.S. and part of 1317). At trial the plaintiffs' claim in respect of the lands now in dispute failed, but an Appellate Court judgment dated 10 June 1915 (pronounced by the District Judge) was in favour of the plaintiffs. On review that decree was modified on 26 January 1916, but the High Court subsequently set aside the judgment and decree on review, and the defendants (Nos. 1–4) appealed from the judgment of 10 June 1915.

The tenancy is old and originates in an 1876 compromise in which the tenants agreed to pay Re.1 per bigha per annum for certain chur (dry alluvial) lands, described as contiguous accretions to a 20-bigha karari belonging to a particular mal portion. Earlier and intervening litigation was conducted in 1894 (three rent suits) and there were subsequent judgments of the High Court (notably a judgment by Rampani and Pratt, JJ., dated 29 June 1900). The disputed area is mapped into plots A–G (Ka–Chha) for analysis; the present controversy is confined to plots labelled F and G.

Material factual events relevant to the dispute include:

  • Some plots (D and E, and possibly a part of G) were surrendered by the plaintiffs to Government and claimed by Government as reformations in situ of Government estates.
  • The plaintiffs later took a lease from Government for certain plots (in or about 1895) and acknowledged Government as proprietor for that period.
  • The defendants at times attorned to Government for plots D and E, and later to a third-party claimant, Girindra Pal (or his predecessor), who brought suit (instituted 27 August 1909) claiming title to a substantial part of F and G.
  • Prior High Court rulings had held that the defendants were, at least initially, put into possession of the whole chur with the plaintiffs' authority and would be estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act from denying the plaintiffs' title, but events subsequent to those rulings required fresh consideration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, notwithstanding earlier High Court pronouncements that the defendants were estopped (under Section 116 of the Evidence Act) from denying the plaintiffs' title, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover rent from the defendants in respect of plots F and G for periods after the plaintiffs had surrendered plots D and E to Government and after third-party claims (notably Girindra Pal's suit) were instituted.
  2. Whether the defendants could rely on the doctrine that a tenant may prove a subsequent cesser of the landlord's title (i.e., eviction by title paramount or equivalent events) to be freed from the estoppel imposed by Section 116.
  3. Whether the institution of Girindra Pal's suit (and/or acts of attornment by the defendants) amounted to an eviction by title paramount or its equivalent, thereby relieving the defendants of their obligation to pay rent to the plaintiffs for the relevant periods.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs relied principally on Section 116 of the Evidence Act: a tenant is estopped from denying his landlord's title during the tenancy. They argued that earlier High Court judgments concluded the question in their favour and that the defendants had been constructively let into possession by the plaintiffs (so the defendants were estopped).
  • In the earlier litigation the High Court (Rampani and Pratt, JJ.) had directed that the defendants were estopped from denying the plaintiffs' title as to plots D, E, F and G and remanded the matter for adjustment of rent accordingly.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants contended that subsequent events changed the legal position: the plaintiffs had surrendered plots D and E to Government and later that Government resumed possession, and the defendants attorned to Government in respect of those plots.
  • The defendants further relied on the contention that the plaintiffs' surrender and later disturbances of the defendants' possession (including the institution of Girindra Pal's suit claiming F and G) amounted to an eviction by title paramount (or its equivalent), enabling the defendants to prove a subsequent cesser of the plaintiffs' title and thus to deny the plaintiffs' right to recover rent for periods after that change.
  • The defendants pointed to payments made into Court under Section 149 of the Bengal Tenancy Act in earlier proceedings (made on the footing that rent was due to Government), and argued that such payments and attornments supported their position that their obligations to the plaintiffs had ceased for the periods in question.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rampani and Pratt, JJ., High Court judgment (29 June 1900) Held that where a chur is open to the tenant's cultivation and the landlord permits the defendant to take possession and cultivate without objection, the defendant is put into possession in a manner sufficient for Section 116 estoppel to operate; directed that defendants were estopped as to plots D, E, F and G. The court treated this judgment as the "first and governing judgment" establishing that the defendants had been constructively let into possession of the whole chur; but it distinguished that the High Court was speaking of the period before the plaintiffs' surrender of some plots to Government, leaving later events open to consideration.
Additional District Judge judgment (28 March 1903) Considered whether defendants had been put into possession "in the legal acceptation of the word"; concluded plaintiffs had not identified with sufficient precision the lands for which rent was claimed for certain plots. The Additional District Judge's view that the plaintiffs lacked precision was accepted in part by later High Court judges as the remand question limited to what rent was payable, but the judgment was treated as an intermediate step and its findings reviewed in context.
Harington and Pargater, JJ., High Court judgment (26 July 1905) Confined the remand to the question of "what was the rent payable by the defendants in respect of these particular lands" in light of the previous High Court judgment; addressed monies paid into Court under Section 149 Bengal Tenancy Act. The court relied on their interpretation to conclude plaintiffs were entitled to monies paid into Court (as Government made no claim), but noted that such monies did not cover plaintiffs' entire claim; this decision established that some rent had been recovered for parts of D and E but little for F and G.
Bud Scott v. Daniel (case) Authority referenced for the landlord's implied undertaking to secure quiet enjoyment to the tenant (linked to Section 108(c) of the Transfer of Property Act). The court cited this case in support of the principle that the landlord's undertaking to secure quiet enjoyment includes protection from disturbance by strangers claiming under title paramount; thus when plaintiffs surrendered land and Government resumed possession, plaintiffs' undertaking was breached.
Markham v. Paget (case) Also cited for the landlord's implied undertaking of quiet enjoyment. Used alongside Bud Scott v. Daniel to show that the landlord's duty includes protecting tenants against disturbances by persons with title paramount.
Serjent (Sargent) v. Nash English authority stating that while a tenant cannot deny his landlord's title at the beginning of the tenancy (estoppel), the tenant may prove that the landlord's title has determined subsequently. The court used this principle to explain that the estoppel of Section 116 refers to title at the beginning of the tenancy and does not preclude evidence of subsequent cesser; it supported the view that a tenant can rely on subsequent eviction by title paramount.
Hill v. Saunders Held that attornment in face of a threat of eviction by the heir was equivalent to an entry by the title-holder (i.e., equivalent to eviction by title paramount). Cited to support the proposition that a tenant's attornment to a person claiming title (or being forced to attorn to avoid eviction) may amount to an eviction by title paramount, allowing the tenant to treat the landlord's title as having ceased.
Grimwood v. Moss English authority on the equivalence of certain acts (suit, attornment) to entry or eviction. Used to bolster the line of English authority that proceedings or assertions by a person with title paramount can be equivalent to an actual entry and thereby free the tenant from the landlord's estoppel.
Jones v. Carter Authority followed in Sargent/Sarjent cases for the proposition that bringing an action of ejectment is equivalent to an entry for purposes of evicting a tenant. The court cited that line of cases to show that bringing an ejectment-type action is treated as equivalent to an entry by the true owner; by analogy Girindra Pal's suit could be treated as constituting the limit of plaintiffs' entitlement to rent.
Foa, Landlord and Tenant (4th Ed.) (treatise) Treatise passage cited: attornment to a person with title paramount or entering into a new arrangement under such person is equivalent to eviction and a fresh holding under the paramount title. The court relied on this doctrinal statement to explain the legal basis on which institution of a suit or attornment could amount to eviction by title paramount sufficient to overcome earlier estoppel.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by aligning the legal doctrines with the material facts and the sequence of events. The principal analytical steps were:

  1. Establish the starting point: previous High Court decisions (notably Rampani and Pratt, JJ.) had found that the defendants were constructively put into possession of the whole chur with the plaintiffs' authority, such that the doctrine of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act operated to prevent the defendants from denying the plaintiffs' title as it stood at the beginning of the tenancy.
  2. Observe that Section 116 estoppel is confined to the landlord's title at the beginning of the tenancy: the court reiterated the settled principle (supported by English authorities) that a tenant, though estopped as to the initial title, may prove that the landlord's title has subsequently determined (i.e., a subsequent cesser is allowable).
  3. Identify means by which a tenant may prove subsequent cesser: one such means is establishing an eviction by title paramount or its equivalent (for example, attornment to a third party claiming superior title, institution of suit by a person with paramount title, or actual entry by that person).
  4. Apply the landlord's implied duty of quiet enjoyment: because the plaintiffs had effectively induced the defendants into possession, the plaintiffs were correspondingly bound to secure the defendants' quiet enjoyment of those lands. The surrender of plots D and E to Government and subsequent Government resumption and lease events amounted to a breach of that undertaking (citing the Transfer of Property Act s.108(c) and authorities such as Bud Scott v. Daniel and Markham v. Paget).
  5. Examine subsequent events: the plaintiffs' surrender and the Government's subsequent actions—together with the institution of Girindra Pal's suit (27 August 1909), and the defendants' attornment and dealings with third parties (and payments into Court in earlier proceedings)—changed the position such that the defendants could no longer be expected to pay rent to the plaintiffs for periods after those events unless the plaintiffs could restore them to quiet enjoyment.
  6. Determine the legal effect of Girindra Pal's suit: drawing on English authorities and doctrinal commentary (Foa; Hill v. Saunders; Grimwood v. Moss; Jones v. Carter; Sargent v. Nash), the court concluded that the institution of Girindra Pal's suit constituted the "extreme limit" of the period during which the estoppel and the plaintiffs' undertaking operated for the purposes of recovering rent. In other words, the suit and the surrounding events were equivalent to an eviction by title paramount or brought the position to a point where defendants were justified in attorning to Girindra Pal and refusing further payment to the plaintiffs.
  7. Reach a remedial result on the facts: differing from the District Judge (who had concluded that eviction by title paramount had not yet occurred), the court concluded that in the circumstances the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover rent from the defendants for any period subsequent to the institution of Girindra Pal's suit. The court also observed the unsatisfactory and protracted nature of the litigation and indicated that the facts should be dealt with broadly to achieve substantial justice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The decree of the Court below is modified. The plaintiffs' suit is dismissed insofar as rent is claimed in respect of plots F and G for any period subsequent to the institution of Girindra Pal's suit (instituted 27 August 1909). The parties are to pay their own costs in respect of plots F and G throughout.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiffs cannot recover rent from the defendants in respect of plots F and G for the period after Girindra Pal instituted his suit; the defendants are relieved of that obligation for that subsequent period. Each party bears their own costs as to those plots.
  • Legal/principle implications: the court applied the established distinction that Section 116 estoppel binds the tenant only as to the landlord's title at the beginning of the tenancy and does not preclude evidence of a subsequent determination of that title. The court treated attornment and the institution of a suit by a person asserting title as capable of amounting to an eviction by title paramount sufficient to displace the earlier estoppel.
  • No indication was made that the court intended to lay down any novel legal doctrine; the opinion frames its conclusions by reference to existing statutes and English and Indian authorities and applies them to the particular factual matrix before the court.

Final note: Sanderson, C.J. concurred. The decree was accordingly modified as stated above.

    Ram Chandra Chatterji v. Pramatha Nath Chatterjee

    Richardson, J.:— This appeal is an incident in long and wearisome litigation between the parties. In the present case the plaint was filed in 1910. The claim was for arrears of rent of certain lands for the years 1314 to 1316 B.S and part of the year 1317 (part of 1907 to part of 1910). The claim so far as it related to the lands now in question failed in the trial Court but succeeded in the lower Appellate Court in virtue of a judgment pronounced by the District Judge on the 10th June, 1915. On review the learned Judge on the 26th January, 1916, modified his decree. But the judgment and decree on review were set aside by the High Court and then the present appeal was taken by the principal defendants (the defendants Nos. 1-4) from the judgment of 10th June, 1915.

    2. The appellant defendants (to whom I shall refer henceforth as the defendants) are admittedly the tenants of certain lands appertaining to the village of Kalikapur in the District of Burdwan. The plaintiffs are the proprietors of a 4½ annas share of that village. The tenancy is an old one. At its original creation, it comprised lands abutting on the River Bhagirathi. The river gradually receded to the north or west. The defendants followed the river and took possession of the chur, or dry alluviated land, as it formed. The complications which have ensued are labyrinthine. The case before us must be decided with reference to the facts found or admitted, which are properly open for our consideration in second appeal. There appears to have been litigation between the parties or their predecessors so far back as 1875 and in 1876 a compromise was arrived at whereby the tenants agreed to pay rent at the rate of Re. 1 par Bigha per annum for the chur lands that there are and those which shall in future form as contiguous accretions to the aforesaid karari 20 Bighas of land appertaining to the mal portion of the six annas share of the said mouzah Kallai (or Kalikapur).” It appears that the share of the plaintiffs or their predecessors was known as the six annas share. In any case it is not disputed that the compromise is binding on the parties according to its true effect.

    3. In 1894 there was further litigation. Suit No. 7 of that year was a rent suit instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants. It was tried along with two other rent suits against the defendants being suit Nos. 15 and 16 of the same year, instituted by co-sharers of the plaintiffs. In the course of those suits two judgments were delivered by the High Court The discussion before as turned largely on the effect of those judgments and the decision was ultimately arrived at.

    4. The above plan shows how the belt of land in the occupation of the defendants may be conveniently subdivided or plotted. The lettering follows that adopted by the District Judge in the judgment appealed from.

    A (or Ka) represents that part of the original holding in Kalikapur which has not been affected by the action of the river.

    B (or Kha) is the remainder of the original holding. After being washed away it reformed and is known as the krari chur comprising the 20 Bighas mentioned in the compromise of 1876.

    C (or Ga) is the original bed of the river.

    D (Gha) E (Una) represent lands which were formerly on the further or Nadia side of the river. F (Cha) & G (Chha)

    5. It is now disputed that plots D and E and possibly (a small part of plot G) were surrendered by the plaintiffs to the Government who claimed them as reformations in situ of certain Government estates. In this appeal the plaintiffs make no claim for rent in respect of these plots. As regards their right to rent in respect of plots A, B and C there is also no controversy. At this stage at any rate the dispute is confined to plots F and G.

    6. At the outset it is clear that the plain-tiffs are not in fact entitled to these plots, F and G, as an accretion to their lands in Kalikapur. Plot C may have accreted to those lands but F and G are separated from C by the intervening Government estates. Further, the fact is and must be that F and G are reformations in situ of estates which formerly lay on the Nadia side of the river. Speaking of the four plots D, E, F and G the District Judge says at the commencement of his judgment:

    “Further north are the reformed lands of the touzis under the Nuddea Collector-ate. The fact is not seriously denied and indeed every surveyor who has been to the spot has found that these are lands of the touzis under the Nuddea Gollectorate.”

    7. The plaintiffs therefore had to fall back on the principle formulated in Section 116 of the Evidence Act, that a tenant is estopped from denying his landlord's title and it was argued on their behalf that the question so raised was concluded against the defendants by the judgments of the High Court in the suits of 1894.

    8. Before going further it is desirable to say that the District Judge incidentally refers to suits brought in 1898 and 1902 by co-sharers of the plaintiffs against the defendants and that the judgments in those suits have not been placed before us.

    9. In the suits of 1894 plots E and F correspond to the present plots F and G and plots G and H to the present plots D and E. The case was argued before us on that footing, and in the judgment of the Additional District Judge, dated 28th March, 1903, to which some reference is made in the sequel plots E and F are described as lying to the north of plots G and H. For the sake of clearness therefore when quoting from the judgments in those suits, I shall alter the lettering so as to make it correspond with the present lettering.

    10. The first and governing judgment of the High Court was that of Rampani and Pratt, JJ., dated 29th June, 1900. The following passage was relied on:

    “In cases like the present, when the chur was lying open to the cultivation of the tenant and when in accordance with the plaintiff's permission the defendant took possession of that chur and cultivated it without any objection, obstacle or opposition, we think that it is not right that the Judge should say that this is not the manner in which a landlord should put a tenant in possession of any land who wants to take advantage of Section 116 of the Evidence Act. It seems to us that it is a sufficient way for a landlord to put a tenant into possession unless the tenant requires some further assistance which does not appear to have, been the case in the present instance.”

    11. Then the learned Judges continue:—

    “We there fore set aside the decision of the District Judge and remand the case to him for disposal of the question of the chur land in accordance with the above instructions, that is to say, bearing in mind that the defendants are estopped from denying the plaintiffs' title as to plots D, E, F and G.”

    12. The judgment does not end there but so far what the learned Judges decided was in effect that the plaintiffs had at least constructively let the defendants into possession of the whole chur. The defendants entered with the authority of the plaintiffs and there was nothing in the mode in which the defendants took possession to exclude the operation of the doctrine of estoppel.

    13. If I may say so, I agree but there still remains the question whether the decision so understood concludes the defendants in the present suit. A later passage in the judgment shows that the learned Judges were dealing with the period before plots D and E had been surrendered to the Government.

    14. After referring to a suggestion that a small portion of F and G had been taken possession of by the Government and leaving it open to the defendants to prove that they had been evicted therefrom by title paramount, the learned Judges proceeded:—

    “Then with regard to plots D and E, it has been similarly argued by the learned counsel for the defendant that in this case also there has been eviction by title paramount. We do not see that this is so. No doubt subsequently to the period for which rent is now claimed, the plaintiffs have taken a five years' lease from the Government and acknowledged the Government as proprietor. That was in 1895 or 1302, but they can certainly claim arrears of rent for the previous period and proceed with the present suits which are for arrears of rent for the years 1297 to 1300”.

    15. The learned Judges, therefore, had not to consider either the effect of the surrender itself or any of the events which have since followed.

    16. The suits went back to the lower Appellate Court and a further judgment (already referred to) was delivered by the Additional District Judge on the 28th March, 1903. The Judge, it is true, seems to have misunderstood the judgment of the High Court and to have considered himself at liberty to discuss again the question whether “the defendants had been put into possession of the lands…in the legal acceptation of the word.” His conclusion, however, was that even if the doctrine of estoppel applied, the plaintiffs were not entitled to rent in respect of plots D, E, F and G because they had not shown with sufficient precision the lands in those plots in respect of which rent was claimed.

    17. Thereupon, the plaintiffs again appealed to the High Court, The appeal came before Harington and Pargater, JJ. and judgment was delivered on the 26th July, 1905. Those learned Judges, as might have been expected, refrained from any further discussion of the question of estoppel. They confined themselves to pointing out that in view of the previous judgment of the High Court, the only question which the Additional District Judge had to consider on the remand was “what was the rent payable by the defendants in respect of these particular lands.’ They went on to deal with the opinion of the learned Judge that there was no evidence before him on which he could determine that question.

    18. It appeared that the defendants had paid certain monies into Court under the provisions of Section 149 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The payment was made on the footing that the rent was due to Government and Government not having made any claim—probably because in 1895 the Government had leased the lands they claimed to the plaintiffs—the learned Judges held that in the circumstances the plaintiffs were entitled to the monies in Court. Those monies did not cover the whole of the plaintiffs' claim. As the defendants alleged that the payment was made in respect of rent due to Government it may, in my opinion, be legitimately inferred as the learned Vakil for the defendants contended, that the payment was for rent due in respect of lands in plots D and E and perhaps a portion of plot G. As to the rest of the plaintiffs' claim, the learned Judges accepted the finding of the Court below. The result of the litigation, therefore, was that the plaintiffs obtained some rent for plots D and E but no rent at all for the greater part of plots F and G. Nothing however turns on that now.

    19. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that in the present suit no rent was paid in under S. 149, the defendants not admitting that any rent was due from them. In paragraph 7 of their written statement they stated that they held plots D and E as tenants of the Government by whom the plots had been resumed in 1908. In paragraph 10 they pleaded that they had already paid the rents of plots F and G to the persons therein named including Girindra Pal who were the “real maliks” of those plots, but no issue seems to have been framed in reference to that plea.

    20. As I have already intimated, there is nothing, in my opinion, in the previous judgments of this Court to preclude a consideration of the question now raised as to the effect of the admitted surrender by the plaintiffs of plots D and E and subsequent events. The circumstances have changed and the effect of the change is open to discussion. But the starting point must be that, as this Court decided, the defendants were inducted into possession of the whole chur by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs however are as much bound by the decision as the defendants. If the result was that the defendants were estopped from denying the right of the plaintiffs to lease the whole area to them, the plaintiffs in their turn were bound to secure the defendants in quiet enjoyment of the whole. The landlord's undertaking for quiet enjoyment by the tenant is implied from the relationship of landlord and tenant. [Section 108(c of the Transfer of Property Act); Bud Scott v. Daniel(1), Markham v. Paget(2) and the under; taking would include the protection of the tenant from disturbance by strangers claiming by title paramount.

    21. Moreover both in England and in India it is open to the tenant to prove a subsequent cesser of the landlord's title. Section 116 of the Evidence Act says that,

    “No tenant of immoveable property shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immoveable property.”

    22. The estoppel refers to the title at the beginning of the tenancy. So in England, “It is clear law that though a tenant cannot deny the title of his landlord to deal with the premises, he may prove that the title has determined.” Serjent v. Nash(3) per Collins, M.R

    23. And one way in which the tenant can show that the title has determined is by proving an eviction by title paramount or the equivalent of such an eviction.

    24. In the present case, the surrender by the plaintiffs of D and E did not at first make much difference because the plaintiffs took a lease of those plots from the Government and the defendants continued in possession under the plaintiffs. But when the Government resumed possession of those plots, there occurred both a breach by the plaintiffs of their undertaking for quiet enjoyment and an eviction by title paramount.

    25. No doubt the defendants appear to have acquiesced and to have protected themselves by attorning to the Government. Nevertheless the surrender made it difficult, if not impossible, for the defendants to maintain a title to F and G as tenants of the plaintiffs. The reason has already been stated. F and G could no longer be even plausibly held as accretions to Kalkapur.

    26. It was the plaintiffs, therefore, who by their own conduct disturbed the title of the defendants as their tenants and laid the defendants open to attack by third parties claiming the true title in F and G. It is not denied that the proprietary title has come in controversy in other litigation in which the plaintiffs have figured as parties. The difficulties of the defendants are apparent from the following passage is the District Judge's judgment.

    “The plaintiffs are unjustly accusing the defendants of colluding with other proprietors. Take the case of Girindra Pal. His predecessor asserted his right to the lands in F and G as appertaining to the Touzi No. 125 of the Nadia Collectorate. The defendants refused to pay rent to them or the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then brought the suit in 1894……. It appears that when after the High Court remand the Additional District Judge again dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on the ground that the defendants were not estopped, it was then that the defendants compromised the suit with Girindra Pal and came to an arrangement with him. The fact that they got very lenient terms is not very material. After the second decision of the High Court the defendants gave notice to Girindra Pal and refused to pay rent and Girindra Pal brought a suit making the plaintiffs parties. That suit has been decided by the Subordinate Judge in appeal in favour of Girindra Pal on all the important points. The Subordinate Judge, however, thought it necessary to remand the suit to have a local investigation made by a Commissioner. The plaintiffs have appealed to the High Court and there it is pending now.”

    27. Well, the learned vakil for the defendants informed us that since the District Judge wrote his judgment the suit has terminated in favour of Girindra Pal and the statement was not contradicted by the learned vakil on the other side. The District Judge held that things had not at that time reached a stage at which it could be said that an eviction by title paramount had occurred. That in the circumstances is a conclusion of law or of mixed law and fact. The conclusion was open to attack, and it was attacked in this appeal. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the circumstances somewhat closely to see whether it is well-founded.

    28. The District Judge speaks as if Girindra Pal's [suit the name is used as including Girindra Pal and his co-sharers] related to the whole of F and G. Girindra Pal claimed as the proprietor of a village named Chakandi appertaining to estate No. 125 of the Nadia District. We must take it at any rate on the arguments addressed to us that Chakandi covers a substantial part of F and G. The suit was instituted on the 27th August, 1909, against the present plaintiffs and defendants. The plaint referred to the suits of 1884 by the proprietors of Kalikapur against the defendants. It set out that in 1311 (1904) the present defendants accepted a lease of the land from Girindra Pal's predecessor [which may be the arrangement spoken of by the District Judge] and that in 1909. They gave notice to Girindra Pal that owing to the result of the suits of 1894 they would no longer pay him the rent due under the lease. Girindra Pal went on to say that neither he nor his predecessor was a party to the suits of 1894 and he ended by claiming a declaration that he was entitled to the land as appertaining to Chekandi and to the performance by the present defendants of their engagements with him.

    29. Written statements were filed by the present plaintiffs and other co-sharers in Kalikapur joining issue on the question of title. The present defendants also filed a written statement. They did not traverse the allegations made by Girindra but frankly stated in effect that they were prepared to accept as their landlords either Girindra Pal or the proprietor of Kalikapur whichever might prove successful.

    30. I ought also to mention that Girindra Pal having stated in his plaint that the defendants had carried out their obligations as his tenants up to the year 1315-1908, made no claim for mesne profits. Declaratory relief was sought on the footing that the present defendants were his tenants and that their possession was his possession.

    31. Now as to the period before institution of this suit it does not appear that the defendants gave notice to the plaintiffs of their attornment to Girindra Pal. On the contrary it would appear from the District Judge's judgment that they made certain payments to the plaintiffs during the interval between, the termination of the suits of 1894 and the institution of Girindra Pal's suit. Such payments would also be consistent with the notice which they subsequently gave to Girindra Pal.

    32. But it seems clear on a survey of the material facts that after the institution of Girindra Pal's suit, they could no longer be expected to pay rent to the plaintiffs unless and until the latter proved their ability to secure them in quiet enjoyment. In other words even if there was no previous entry by Girindra Pal the institution of the suit amounted in the circumstances to such an invasion or entry by title paramount as to set the defendants free to say that they must protect themselves, if necessary, from that date by attorning to Girindra Pal. They had already had to attorn to the Government for plots D and E.

    33. The question what amounts to an eviction by title paramount may present some difficulty and we are not referred to any Indian authority on the subject. In England the current of authority seems to favour the view that “it is not necessary for the tenant actually to go out of pos session, and that if, upon a claim being made by a person with title paramount, he consents by an attornment to such person to change the title under which he holds, or enters into a new arrangement for holding under him, this will be equivalent to an eviction and a fresh talking.” (Foa on Landlord and Tenant, 4th Edition, p. 169).

    34. In Hill v. Saunders(4) Holroyd, J. said “The plea discloses that which was equivalent to an entry by the heir, it states that the heir threatened to evict the defendant and that he was obliged to attorn, in order to prevent it” and Littledale, J. seems to have concurred with that observation. See also Grimwood v. Moss(5) and Sargent v. Nash where it was held following Jones v. Carter(6), that the bringing of an action of ejectment was equivalent to an entry. In those cases, it is true, the action was brought by the landlord to eject the tenant for breach of a covenant protected by a clause for reentry.

    35. But I do not see why that should make any difference. The owner of the true title certainly has a right of entry against a trespasser and his action or suit in ejectment is brought to enforce that right. Girindra Pal's suit was not in form a suit in ejectment because he assumed that he had already entered when the present defendants accepted a lease from him. That may be so as between him and the present plaintiffs or the present defendants as trespassers. But as between the plaintiffs and the defendants, what took place after the termination of the suits of 1894 has to be considered. The consideration arising from the giving of possession lasted (as between the plaintiffs and defendants) so long as the defendants held possession under the plaintiffs.

    36. On the whole, differing from the District Judge, I come to the conclusion that the institution of Girindra Pal's suit marks the extreme limit of that period and that the plaintiffs are not entitled to rent from the defendants for any subsequent period.

    37. The case, I may add, is not a satisfactory one to have to deal with. Such endless litigation as there has been about this char is hardly creditable to the parties concerned. If the fault is chiefly that of the plaintiffs the defendants are not altogether free from blame and the difficulty of dealing with complicated facts is enhanced by reason of the case coming before os eleven years after it was instituted. It is at least a case in which the facts should be broadly dealt with in the interests of substantial justice.

    38. The result is that the decree of the Court below will be modified and the plaintiff's suit, will be dismissed so far as rent is claimed in respect of plots F and G for any period subsequent to the institution of Girindra Pal's suit. The parties should pay their own costs in respect of plots F and G throughout.

    Sanderson, C.J:— I agree.

    39. Decree modified.

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    Ram Chandra Chatterji v. Pramatha Nath Chatterjee
    (Jun 17, 1921)