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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, Income Tax Act, Registration Act, Indian Succession Act, Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, Bengal Court of Wards Act,
  • provisions contained in secs. 25(3), 33, 34, 35 and 36 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act
  • Act, the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
  • sub-sec. (3) of sec. 80A of the Government of India Act, 1915-1919.Sec. 106 of this Act
  • Courts Act and the Indian Councils Act (24 and 25 Vict., c. 104 and 24 and 25 Vict.,
  • Government of India Act.The provisions of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act
  • Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, which repealed the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1861,
  • Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1871 and the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act,
  • provision of secs. 34 and 35 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935.The
  • sub-sec. (5) of sec. 29 applies.The provision of sec. 1, sub-sec. (3) that the Act
  • provisions of sec. 106 of the Government of India Act has by sec. 131(3)
  • sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act (Bengal Act VII of 1936)
  • Original Jurisdiction.Sec. 1 (2) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act
  • Courts Act, the Letters Patent and the Government of India Act, 1915
  • provisions of the Government of India Act itself and sec. 80A (4)
  • Act of Parliament.The Rules referred to in cl. (f) of sub-sec. (3)
  • Government of India (Consolidating) Act, 1915, but sec. 106
  • sec. 80A, sub-sec. (4) of the Government of India Act, 1915,
  • BENGAL AGRICULTURAL DEBTORS ACT
  • sec. 106 of the Government of India Act, 1915. Sanction
  • Indian Councils Acts and the High Courts Act of 1865
  • sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act of 1935,
  • secs. 34 and 35 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act,
  • provisions of the Government of India Act (1915-1919).
  • sub-sec. (3) of sec. 80A of the Government of India Act
  • sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1936.
  • sec. 80A of the Government of India Act, 1919.The
  • provisions of the Government of India Act, 1919,
  • sec. 80A (3) of the Government of India Act, 1919,
  • sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act,
  • Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935.Sub-sec. (2):
  • sec. 80A (4) of the Government of India Act, 1919,
  • sec. 8 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act
  • sec. 45A(1)(a) of the Government of India Act
  • sec. 71 of the Government of India, Act 1915
  • sec. 22 of the Indian Councils Act of 1861.
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • Courts Act of 1861 (24 and 25 Vict., Cap. 104)
  • sec. 80A (4) of the Government of India Act
  • Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913,
  • sec. 106 of the Government of India Act,
  • Government of India Act, 1915, sec. 106
  • Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act
  • Court (Jurisdiction Limits) Act, 1919,
  • Sec. 22 of the Indian Councils Act
  • Indian High Courts Act of 1861
  • Government of India Act, 1915.
  • Act of 1773 (13 Geo. III c. 63).
  • sec. 1, sub-sec. (2) the Act
  • N.W.P Civil Courts Act
  • Courts Act of 1861,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, Income Tax Act, Registration Act, Indian Succession Act, Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, Bengal Court of Wards Act,
  • provisions contained in secs. 25(3), 33, 34, 35 and 36 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act
  • Act, the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
  • sub-sec. (3) of sec. 80A of the Government of India Act, 1915-1919.Sec. 106 of this Act
  • Courts Act and the Indian Councils Act (24 and 25 Vict., c. 104 and 24 and 25 Vict.,
  • Government of India Act.The provisions of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act
  • Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, which repealed the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1861,
  • Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1871 and the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act,
  • provision of secs. 34 and 35 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935.The
  • sub-sec. (5) of sec. 29 applies.The provision of sec. 1, sub-sec. (3) that the Act
  • provisions of sec. 106 of the Government of India Act has by sec. 131(3)
  • sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act (Bengal Act VII of 1936)
  • Original Jurisdiction.Sec. 1 (2) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act
  • Courts Act, the Letters Patent and the Government of India Act, 1915
  • provisions of the Government of India Act itself and sec. 80A (4)
  • Act of Parliament.The Rules referred to in cl. (f) of sub-sec. (3)
  • Government of India (Consolidating) Act, 1915, but sec. 106
  • sec. 80A, sub-sec. (4) of the Government of India Act, 1915,
  • BENGAL AGRICULTURAL DEBTORS ACT
  • sec. 106 of the Government of India Act, 1915. Sanction
  • Indian Councils Acts and the High Courts Act of 1865
  • sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act of 1935,
  • secs. 34 and 35 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act,
  • provisions of the Government of India Act (1915-1919).
  • sub-sec. (3) of sec. 80A of the Government of India Act
  • sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1936.
  • sec. 80A of the Government of India Act, 1919.The
  • provisions of the Government of India Act, 1919,
  • sec. 80A (3) of the Government of India Act, 1919,
  • sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act,
  • Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935.Sub-sec. (2):
  • sec. 80A (4) of the Government of India Act, 1919,
  • sec. 8 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act
  • sec. 45A(1)(a) of the Government of India Act
  • sec. 71 of the Government of India, Act 1915
  • sec. 22 of the Indian Councils Act of 1861.
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • Courts Act of 1861 (24 and 25 Vict., Cap. 104)
  • sec. 80A (4) of the Government of India Act
  • Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913,
  • sec. 106 of the Government of India Act,
  • Government of India Act, 1915, sec. 106
  • Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act
  • Court (Jurisdiction Limits) Act, 1919,
  • Sec. 22 of the Indian Councils Act
  • Indian High Courts Act of 1861
  • Government of India Act, 1915.
  • Act of 1773 (13 Geo. III c. 63).
  • sec. 1, sub-sec. (2) the Act
  • N.W.P Civil Courts Act
  • Courts Act of 1861,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the refusal by Mr. Justice Panckridge (order dated 14 December 1937) to permit the sale of shares charged under a consent decree of the Calcutta High Court (Original Side) in Suit No. 1051 of 1935. The consent decree, dated 20 December 1935, awarded the plaintiffs (a registered firm of commission agents in Calcutta) Rs. 52,000 with interest and declared certain properties in Jalpaiguri (houses/shops and some company shares) charged for payment.

After default in payment, the Official Receiver was first appointed and later discharged; two private attorneys were then appointed as joint receivers with liberty to sell the charged shares (but not real property). The judgment-debtors applied, on or about 18 September 1937, under sec. 8 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act to a local Debt Arbitration (Settlement) Board in Jalpaiguri, and the Board sent the prescribed notice under sec. 34 to the High Court.

The joint receivers applied for directions to sell the shares; Mr. Justice Panckridge dismissed that application, holding that execution was barred by secs. 34 and 35 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935. The plaintiffs (decree-holders) appealed from that order. The fuller opinion records extended argument and multi-judge consideration of whether the Act and specifically secs. 33–36 (notably secs. 34 and 35) prevent the High Court from executing its own decrees, and whether the term “Civil Court” in the Act includes the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purposes of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act (secs. 33–36 in particular), the term “Civil Court” includes the High Court in its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction.
  2. Whether secs. 34 and 35 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act operate to stay or to bar the execution of a decree of the Calcutta High Court in the circumstances of this case (notice by a Debt Settlement Board having been given).
  3. Whether the provincial legislature (Bengal Legislature), even with the Governor-General's sanction under sec. 80A(3), could validly enact provisions (secs. 33–36) which affect or curtail powers of the High Court derived from Letters Patent and Acts of Parliament (i.e., whether those provisions are intra vires or ultra vires by reason of sec. 80A(4) of the Government of India Act and related constitutional restrictions).
  4. Ancillary: whether the Act applies in situations where the Original Side's ordinary territorial limits (the Calcutta Original jurisdiction area) were not among those specifically notified under sec. 1(3) for bringing the Act into force (i.e., the territorial effect/extraterritorial application of the Act where Debt Settlement Boards are established in other districts such as Jalpaiguri).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)

  • It was contended in the Court below that the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act had no application to the Original Side of the High Court because the ordinary Original jurisdiction area (the centre of Calcutta bounded by Circular Road and the Hooghly) had not been notified under sec. 1(3) as an area in which the Act had come into force.
  • The appellants asserted their entitlement to proceed with execution of their consent decree and to have the receivers sell the charged shares; the appeal seeks to set aside the lower court's order refusing those directions.

Respondent's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The respondents (judgment-debtors) relied on notice served by a Debt Settlement Board under sec. 34 and argued that, by virtue of secs. 34 and 35, proceedings and execution were stayed or barred pending disposal of the application before the Board.
  • It was argued on behalf of respondents that the Act’s provisions should apply so as to protect agricultural debtors and that the stay/abatement consequences contemplated by secs. 33–36 should be given effect.
  • The respondents also argued (and the point was argued before the court) that the High Court is not to be treated as a “Civil Court” within the meaning of the Act — or conversely, there was argument whether the words do or do not embrace the High Court; the opinion records argument on both sides of that definitional question.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balfour v. Malcolm Principle that the jurisdiction of superior courts (e.g., Supreme Courts) can only be taken away by positive and clear enactments. Quoted to support the proposition that if the legislature intended to deprive the High Court of jurisdiction or execution powers, it should do so in clear terms; used by Derbyshire, C.J. to prefer a construction avoiding interference with High Court powers.
Bhagwan Dayal Sahu v. Chandulal Agarwalla Decisional treatment (Appellate Side) on territorial/operational scope of the Agricultural Debtors Act (whether it applies where Boards not established for Calcutta). Cited as authority that the Act does not apply to an area in Bengal (Calcutta) where no Board was established; Lort-Williams expressly disagreed with that decision; the issue is discussed by multiple judges.
Ghulam Nizamuddin v. Akhtar Hussain Khan Observation (by Bennet, J.) that provincial legislature may, with previous sanction, pass laws affecting High Court jurisdiction (obiter). Referred to and treated as obiter by Lort-Williams and others; the court rejected the view as unsound and based on a fallacy for present purposes.
Rex v. Moreley Older authorities cited for the broader point that removal of superior court jurisdiction must be clear; part of the authorities cited on the rule of narrow construction. Invoked by Mitter, J. and others as part of the background authorities supporting the proposition that curtailment of superior court jurisdiction should be by clear words or necessary implication.
Attorney-General v. Mayor and Corporation of Dublin Statement endorsing that jurisdiction of superior courts cannot be taken away except by express words or necessary implication. Quoted by Mitter, J. to reinforce the principle of requiring clear statutory language before concluding that superior court powers have been ousted.
Jacobs v. Brett Observation that statutes which take away jurisdiction of a superior court must be clear; may operate by necessary implication but must be clear. Used by Mitter, J. as supporting authority for the principle guiding interpretation of the Act as to ouster of High Court jurisdiction.
Dale's case Authority on status and legal force of rules and orders made under statutory procedure (whether such rules become effectively part of the statute when laid before Parliament and not objected to). Mitter, J. cited the case in discussing whether Devolution Rules (made under sec. 45A / sec. 129A procedure) may, by parliamentary processing, possess statutory authority; used in a limited discussion about rule-making and their relation to the Act.
Institute of Patent Agents v. Joseph Lockwood (Joseph Lockwood's case) Authorities and opinions concerning whether rules made under statutory procedure can be treated as forming part of the statute and the weight to be attached to such rules. Cited in the debate over the status and effect of Devolution Rules under the Government of India legislation; the opinion refers to different views in that case when treating effect of Devolution Rules.
Kumar Punyendra Narayan Deb v. Kumar Jogendra Narayan Deb Reference on the operation of sec. 80A(4) (that provincial legislatures cannot make laws affecting Acts of Parliament). Referred to by Mitter and other judges in support of the proposition that sec. 80A(4) restricts provincial power to affect Acts of Parliament and thus limits provincial ability to curtail High Court powers.
Kent County Council, Ex parte (referred) Authority invoked on presumption that legislatures act intra vires and on interpretive presumption to avoid construing an Act as ultra vires if a sensible alternative exists. Referred to by Bartley, J. to support the interpretive approach favouring construction that keeps the Act within the provincial legislature's competence where possible.
Secretary of State v. Moment Cited as an authority on the nature of procedural stays and distinguishing internal procedural stays from external fetters on jurisdiction. Mitter, J. invoked the distinction to show sec. 34 of the Act is not merely a rule of procedure analogous to sec. 10 CPC, but an external bar affecting jurisdiction/execution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The multi-member bench addressed three principal lines of reasoning that recur through the judgments: (i) statutory construction of the words “Civil Court” in the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act; (ii) the territorial operation of the Act and the effect of notices issued by Boards established in notified districts; and (iii) constitutional limits on provincial legislative power to affect jurisdiction and powers of the High Court derived from Letters Patent and Acts of Parliament (notably sec. 106 of the Government of India Act and sec. 80A(4)).

Key analytical steps adopted by the Court (collective and by several judges):

  1. Interpretation of scope/territorial operation:
    • It was observed that sec. 1(2) of the Act declares it extends to the whole of Bengal, while sec. 1(3) provides that the Act shall come into force in such areas on such dates as the Local Government may notify (which relates to establishment of Boards under sec. 3).
    • Several judges (including Derbyshire, Lort-Williams and Mitter) accepted that where Boards are established in local areas (e.g., Jalpaiguri) the statutory machinery becomes operative and notices from those Boards (sec. 34 notices) are effective as to the debts within the Board's process; the Act was directed to relieve agricultural debtors and was intended to apply to debts of debtors resident in areas where Boards are set up.
  2. Construction of the phrase “Civil Court”:
    • Two competing constructions were considered: (A) “Civil Court” includes the High Court (i.e., all civil tribunals capable of hearing money claims, including superior courts); or (B) “Civil Courts” denotes the class of inferior civil tribunals subordinate to the High Court (District Judge, Additional District Judge, Subordinate Judge, Munsif), as understood in local statutes and the Letters Patent.
    • Derbyshire, C.J., Lort-Williams and Bartley, J. favoured interpreting “Civil Courts” as excluding the High Court (on the basis of context, capitalization, the Letters Patent distinguishing Civil Courts from High Court, and the constitutional constraint that provincial legislature should not oust High Court jurisdiction by provincial enactment). They emphasised that the statute should be read, where possible, so as not to conflict with Acts of Parliament or to impair High Court powers.
    • Mitter, J. and Nasim Ali, J. analysed the Act's scheme and observed that many provisions (secs. 18(1) proviso, 22(5), 33–36) suggest the legislature intended the Board to have comprehensive jurisdiction over debts of agriculturists, and that the phrase could be read as including a Superior Court. Mitter held that the language (secs. 33–36) operates to curtail execution and treat decrees as abated or nullified in certain circumstances — but concluded the impugned sections are ultra vires to the extent they purport to affect the High Court.
  3. Constitutional competence and ultra vires considerations:
    • All members of the bench engaged with whether the Bengal Legislature could validly pass provisions (secs. 33–36) that in effect restrict the execution powers of the High Court. The Court reviewed the historical source of the High Court's jurisdiction (Regulating Act 1773, High Courts Act of 1861, Letters Patent, and sec. 106 of the Government of India Act) and concluded that High Court powers are underpinned by Acts of Parliament.
    • The judges relied on sec. 80A(4) of the Government of India Act (as explained in the opinions) which provides that a provincial (local) legislature “has not power to make any law affecting any Act of Parliament.” The Court held that provisions of the Provincial Act which purport to affect powers vested in the High Court by Acts of Parliament are beyond the competence of the provincial legislature (i.e., ultra vires).
    • While Mitter and others examined the effect and force of Devolution Rules (made under sec. 45A / sec. 129A procedures) and cited authorities about whether rules can obtain statutory force, the prevailing approach in the judgments was that statutory provisions that would “affect” Acts of Parliament cannot be sustained simply because rule-making or prior sanction occurred; the constitutional limitation in sec. 80A(4) controls.
  4. Application to the present facts and relief granted:
    • Given the interpretive and constitutional analysis, the majority reasoning led to one of two routes to allow the appeal: (A) construe “Civil Courts” not to include the High Court so that secs. 33–36 do not affect the High Court's power to execute its decrees; or (B) if the phrase were read to include the High Court, to hold that the Act provisions as applied to the High Court are ultra vires the provincial legislature because they impermissibly affect Acts of Parliament.
    • On either basis the order of Mr. Justice Panckridge dismissing the receivers' application to sell the charged shares was set aside and the plaintiffs' summons (of 30 November 1937) was granted in terms by the Court. Costs were awarded to the appellant, both here and below.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed and the order of the Court below (Mr. Justice Panckridge) was set aside; an order was made in terms of the appellants' summons of 30 November 1937. The decree-holders (appellants) were entitled to proceed with the relief sought in that summons and were awarded costs here and below.

Implications (as stated or reasonably deduced from the Opinion)

  • Direct effect on the parties: The lower court's declaration that execution was barred by secs. 34 and 35 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act was reversed; the receivers were entitled to proceed in accordance with the order made on appeal (in terms of the November 30th summons) and the appellants received costs.
  • Interpretive/constitutional consequence recorded by the Court: The bench concluded (by interpretive analysis and constitutional constraint) that the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act cannot be construed to curtail the High Court's jurisdiction and execution powers derived from Acts of Parliament (and, accordingly, where an interpretation would lead to such a result the words should be read so as to avoid that effect). To the extent the Act purports to affect the High Court's powers, those provisions are ultra vires the provincial legislature under sec. 80A(4) and related constitutional provisions — or, alternatively, the words “Civil Courts” are to be read as referring to the class of subordinate civil tribunals and not to the High Court.
  • No sweeping new principle beyond the construction and constitutional conclusion was declared: the decision resolves the present controversy by (a) interpreting the Act so as not to affect High Court powers where possible and (b) holding provisions ultra vires to the extent they do affect Acts of Parliament. The court noted that administration and possible amendment of the provincial Act is a matter for the Government (i.e., the legislature/government), not the Court.

Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the information contained in the provided opinion. Where the opinion supplies multiple lines of reasoning among several judges, this summary reports the main rationales and the common result reached in the judgment text.

    Narsinghdas Tansukdas v. Chogemull

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    Derbyshire, C.J:— This is an appeal from a decision of Mr. Justice Panckridge given on December 14th, 1937, whereby he held that part of a consent decree of this High Court was barred from execution by reason of the provision of secs. 34 and 35 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935.

    The decree in question was in Suit No. 1051 of 1935 and was dated December 20th, 1935; it provided for the payment of Rs. 52,000 with interest in certain instalments and the charging of certain properties set out in the schedule for the payment of the said decretal amount.

    The Plaintiffs are a registered firm carrying on a business as Commission Agents at No. 9, Armenian Street, Calcutta. The Defendants are members of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara School and are said to be carrying on a coparcenary business in piece-goods at Jalpaiguri, Bengal, under the name and style of Sewlal Momraj Agarwala. Chogemull is described as the karta of the said Hindu family.

    The Plaintiffs supplied the Defendants with piece-goods from time to time and also lent them money on hundls bearing interest at 12 per cent, per annum. The moneys owing were to be paid by the Defendants to the Plain, tiffs at No. 9, Armenian Street, Calcutta. On August 7th, 1934, accounts between the parties were adjusted and stated in writing in the Plaintiffs' books and signed by the Defendants. The amount so stated as owing was Rs. 72,435-13-6 p. On May 28th, 1935, the Plaintiffs' claim with interest amounted to Rs. 80,491-13-9 p. In paragraph 5 of the plaint in the original suit it was stated:

    “That the Plaintiffs' cause of action arose partly within and partly without the limits of the jurisdiction of the Original Side of the High Court in Calcutta.

    The Plaintiffs crave leave to institute the suit in Calcutta High Court under clause 12 of the Letters Patent.”

    Such leave was granted.

    On December 20th, 1935, a decree was passed by the Calcutta High Court (Original Side) in favour of the Plaintiffs against the Defendants for the sum of Rs. 52,000 with interest at 6¾ per cent, per annum from the date of the decree until realisation.

    The decree was by consent. In a schedule annexed to the terms of settlement and forming part of the decree certain properties were mentioned as being charged with the payment of the decretal amount. The properties comprise lands and buildings in Jalpaiguri and some shares in certain companies. All the properties mentioned are situate in the town of Jalpaiguri and are houses or shops with land; none of them are described as agricultural. It is further stated in the decree that the Plaintiffs are entitled to take out execution against the properties charged and sell the same without the necessity of a separate suit and that the Plaintiffs have the right to have a receiver appointed on notice to the Defendants.

    There was default on the Defendants' part in carrying out the terms of the decree and on August 30th, 1937, the Official Receiver of the High Court was appointed Receiver of the properties above mentioned, including the shares.

    On September 9th, 1937, in order to save the expenses of the Official Receiver, by an order of the Court the Official Receiver was discharged and two attorneys Messrs R.C Deb and J.N Sharma were appointed joint Receivers of the properties charged in place of the Official Receiver with liberty to sell the said shares (but not the real property) and pay the proceeds of the sale to the Plaintiffs or their attorneys in satisfaction of the decree.

    On or about September 18th, 1937, the Defendants applied under sec. 8 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act to the Sannyashi Kata Debt Arbitration Board, situate in the District of Jalpaiguri, for settlement of their debts in accordance with the provisions of that Act. On that date a notice, pursuant to the Rules framed under the Act, was sent by the Chairman of the Sannyashi Kata Debt Arbitration Board to the Original Side of this Court as follows:

    “It is submitted that I notify under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act of 1935, that a petition, particulars of debt under sec. 8 of the said Act has been received by this Board. A debt has been mentioned therein as due by Chogmull Agarwalla and Eishorilal Agarwalla, sons of late Momraj Agarwalla and Bhojraj Agarwalla, caste Vaisya of Sannyashi Kata and in respect of the said debt Suit Ho. 1051 of 1935 is pending in your Court between Harsingdas Tansukdas a registered firm (carrying on business as Commission Agents, Caste Oswal, of No. 9 Armenian Street, Calcutta and the above parties.”

    This notice was received by the High Court on September 21st, 1937 and copies of it were sent by the Registrar, Original Side, to the attorneys of both parties on September 29th, 1937.

    On November 8th, 1937, the Defendants' solicitors wrote to the Plaintiffs' solicitors, informing them of the application to the Debt Settlement Board and further stating;

    “In the ciroumstances, under sec. 84 of the said Act all, proceedings herein are stayed until the disposal of the application before the Board.”

    On December 14th, 1937, there was an application before Mr. Justice Panckridge by the joint Receivers for directions to sell the shares above mentioned, but Mr. Justice Panckridge made the order, now appealed from, dismissing the application, declaring that it was barred by secs. 34 and 35 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935.

    Apparently after September 18th, 1937, there was some difficulty in the proceedings before the Sannyashi Kata Debt Arbitration Board which has not been clearly explained to us and about June 3rd, 1938, fresh proceedings under the Debt Settlement Act were begun by the Defendants before the Debt Arbitration Board in the Jalpaiguri Sadar District.

    On June 3rd, 1938, another notice, similar in terms to the one set out above, was sent to the Registrar of this Court by the Jalpaiguri Sadar Special Debt Arbitration Board and was received by this Court on June 6th, 1938.

    It was admitted before Mr. Justice Panckridge and before us that at the time of the making of the order now appealed from, there was before the Court a proper notice to the Court under the Act.

    It will be proper at this stage to set out the relevant provisions of the Act in question which was passed by the Government of Bengal before the Government of India Act of 1935 came into operation.

    The preamble states:

    “Whereas it is expedient to provide for the relief of indebtedness of agricultural debtors and to amend the law governing the relations between agricultural debtors and their creditors;

    And whereas the previous sanction of the Governor-General has been obtained under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 80A of the Government of India Act to the passing of this Act.

    It is hereby enacted etc….”

    “Sec. 1 (1): This Act may be called the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935.

    Sub-sec. (2): It extends to the whole of Bengal.

    Sub-sec. (3): It shall come into force in such areas on such dates as the Local Government may by notification, direct.”

    It may be stated here that the Government directed that the Act should come into force on July 3rd, 1936, in certain Districts including Jalpaiguri.

    Nothing is said in the Order-in-Council about extending it to Calcutta.

    Sec. 2 defines “agriculture” in sub-see. (1).

    Sub-sec. (8) defines “debt” as being all liabilities of a debtor in cash or in kind, secured or unsecured, whether payable under a decree or order of a Civil Court or otherwise and whether payable presently or in future. Certain exceptions are made which are not relevant here.

    Sub-sec. (9) provides that a “debtor” means a debtor whose primary means of livelihood is agricultural and who

    “(a) is a raiyat or an under-raiyat, or

    (b) cultivates land himself or by members of his family or by hired labourers or by adhidars, barghadars or bhagdars: and includes a group of persons who join in making an application under the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 9.”

    Sub-sec. (13) provides that a “settlement” includes an amicable settlement and a settlement or adjustment made by an order of a Board.

    Sec. 8(1) provides that:

    “A debtor may make an application for the settlement of his debts to a Board established for the local area within which he ordinarily resides within five years after the first Board is established under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 for that local area.”

    Sec. 11 provides for the statement of certain particulars, including the debts and their histories in the application made by the debtor for a settlement.

    Sec. 12 states the procedure to be adopted by the Board.

    Sec. 14 provides for the discovery of documents.

    Sec. 16 gives the Board power to require the attendance of persons and the production of documents and to receive evidence.

    Sec. 18 gives power to the Board to decide whether debts exist and their amount and in sub-sec. (4) provides that:

    “the decision of the Board in this respect shall not be questioned in any Civil Court or in any manner other than that provided in this Act.”

    Sec. 19 deals with the settlement of debts.

    Sec. 20 provides that the Board shall decide whether a person is a debtor or not.

    Sec. 22 gives the Board power to adjust an insolvent debtor's debts.

    Sec. 25 gives the Board power to make an “award” as to the debts owing and the manner in which these should be paid and states in sub-sec. (3) that from the date of the signing of the award under sub-sec. (2) it shall, in supersession of all previous decisions in a Civil Court in respect of the debts mentioned in it, be binding on the debtor and his creditors and the successors-in-interest of such debtor and creditors.

    Sec. 28 provides in sub-sec. (i) that if the debtor fails to pay any amount payable under the award, such amount shall be recoverable as a public demand (under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act) on application made within the prescribed period by a creditor to whom the amount is due.

    Sec. 29 provides chiefly for the distribution of the sale proceeds where a Certificate-Officer has sold the property of a debtor under sec. 28.

    Sec. 33 provides:

    “Except as provided in this Act, no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain a suit, application or proceeding against the debtor in respect of

    (a) any debt included in an application under sec. 8 or in a statement under-sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13, proceedings in connection with which are pending before a Board; or

    (b) any debt for which any amount is payable under an award, except in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 29.”

    Sec. 34 provides:

    “When an application under sec. 8 or a statement under sub sec. (1) of sec. 13 includes any debt in respect of which a suit or other proceeding is pending before a Civil or Revenue Court, the Board shall give notice thereof to such Court in the prescribed manner and thereupon the suit or proceeding shall be stayed until the Board has either dismissed the application in respect of such debt or made an award thereon and if the Board includes any part of such debt under cl. (d) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 25 in the award or the Board decides that the debt does not exist, the suit or proceeding shall abate so far as it relates to such debt.”

    Sec. 35 provides:

    “Notwithstanding anything contained in any Act no decree of a Civil Court or Certificate under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, shall be executed (i) for the recovery of a debt included in an application under sec. 8 or in a statement under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13, until

    (a) the application has been dismissed by the Board in respect of such debt; or

    (b) an award in which such debt is included has ceased to subsist under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 29;

    (ii) except as provided in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 29 for the recovery of arrears of rent which became due from a debtor after the date of an application under sec. 8 in respect of his debts, unless notice of such decree or certificate has been given to the Board in the prescribed manner and three months have elapsed since such notice was given;

    (iii) for the recovery of a debt incurred by a debtor after _the date of an application under sec. 8 in respect of his debts, until all the amounts pay able under the award have been paid or such award has ceased to subsist under sub-sec. 5 of sec. 29.

    Sec. 36 provides:

    “Notwithstanding anything contained in any Act, any decree of a Civil Court passed in regard to a debt after the date of an application under sec. 8 shall be treated as a nullity in so far as

    (a) it is inconsistent with any order passed by a Board under sec. (2) of sec. 13 regarding any debt or with any determination by the Board under sec. 18 of the principal and the arrears of interest of any debt included in a subsisting award; or.

    (b) it relates to a debt the documents in respect of which being in the possession or under the control of the creditor have not been produced before the Board and marked by the Board as required by sec. 14 unless it is proved to the satisfaction of the Civil Court that there were sufficient reasons for non-production of the documents before the Board.”

    Sec. 38 provides:

    “No appeal or application for revision shall lie against any decision or order of or award by a Board except as provided in this Act.”

    Sec. 40 provides for an appeal against the decision of the Debt Settlement Board to an Appellate Officer to be appointed by the Local Government and states in sub-sec. (6) that the orders of the Appellate Officer shall be final.

    Sec. 43 (1) provides that a Board shall in all proceedings under this Act, be subject to the control of the Local Government.

    Sec. 45 provides that except as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall not apply to any proceedings before a Board and that the procedure to be followed by the Board shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the Act.

    Sec. 46 provides that, subject to any rules made under this Act, no legal practitioner shall represent any party in any proceedings before a Board.

    Sec. 55 gives the Local Government power to make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act in certain specified particulars.

    By sub-sec. (2) the Local Government may by rule provide what is the maximum amount of debt which can be dealt with under the provisions of the Act.

    We are informed that no maximum amount of debt has been so fixed.

    The Act is clearly intended to deal with the burden of debt lying upon agriculturists and it involves a considerable interference with the rights of creditors under the ordinary processes of law. By reason of secs. 38 and 40 the Debt Settlement Tribunals, which are composed mainly of laymen, are placed outside the superintendence of the High Court.

    The question for decision is whether this Court is prevented by the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act from executing one of its own decrees.

    In the Court below it was contended that the Act had no application to the Original Side of the High Court, because the Court's Original Jurisdiction is ordinarily exercised within an area in the centre of Calcutta bounded by the Circular Road and the river Hooghly which has not been notified under sec. 1, sub-sec. (3) of the Act.

    If it is conceded that the High Court is a “Civil Court” within the meaning of the Act, I should agree with Mr. Justice Panckridge's order for the Reasons he has given.

    By sec. 1, sub-sec. (2) the Act extends to the whole of Bengal and if the High Court is a Civil Court, it seems to me that the provision of sec. 35, namely, “notwithstanding anything contained in any Acts no decree of a Civil Court shall be executed for the recovery of a debt included in an application under sec. 8 or a statement under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 until after the application has been dismissed by the Board in respect of such debt; or an award in which such debt is included has ceased to subsist under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 29” applies.

    The provision of sec. 1, sub-sec. (3) that the Act “shall come into force in such areas and on such dates as the Local Government may by notification direct” has reference to the setting up of the Debt Settlement Boards in the local areas under sec. 3. Once these Boards are set up, the Act has come into force in those areas by reason of sub-sec. (2) and its provisions apply to the whole of Bengal.

    It has been argued before us that the High Court is not a “Civil Court” within the meaning of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. We have been told that this argument was raised before Mr. Justice Panckridge but as he did not deal with it in his judgment it would appear that it was not argued Very strenuously.

    However we must deal with it now.

    There is no definition of “Civil Court” in the Act and it is noteworthy that although Civil Courts and Revenue Courts are mentioned in the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act the High Court is not mentioned. If the words “Civil Court” include the High Court it is clear that the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and determine suits is interfered with by secs. 33 and 34 and to execute its own decrees by sec. 35 of the Act.

    Again, in such an event a decree of the High Court would, under sec. 36, be treated as a nullity in certain events.

    If such indeed were the case, the statute ought to state it clearly and definitely.

    In the case of Balfour v. Malcolm , Lord Campbell said:

    “there can be no doubt that the principle is, ‘that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts can only be taken away by positive and clear enactments in an Act of Parliament.”

    Substitute for the word “Parliament” “the appropriate and competent legislature” and those words apply in the present case.

    The jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine suits and to execute its decrees is of longstanding. The Regulating Act of 1773 (13 Geo. III Cap. 63), sec. 13, gave the Supreme Court “full power and authority to exercise and perform all civil, criminal, admiralty and ecclesiastical jurisdiction and to do all such other things as shall be found necessary for the administration of justice and the due execution of all or any of the powers which, by the said Charter, shall or may be granted and committed to the said Court.”

    Cl. 15 of the Charter gave the Court power to execute its decrees through the Sheriff.

    The High Courts Act of 1861 (24 and 25 Vict., Cap. 104) which abolished the Supreme Court and established this High Court in its place, provided in sec. 9 that the High Court—

    “shall have and exercise all such criminal, civil, admiralty, vice admiralty, testamentary, intestate, original and appellate jurisdiction and all such powers and authority or and in relation to the administration of justice in the Presidency for which it is established, as Her Majesty by such Letters Patent grant and direct, subject, however, to such directions and limitations as to the exercise of the original, civil and criminal juriediction beyond the limits of the Presidency and as may be prescribed thereby, and, save as by such Letters Patent may be otherwise directed and subject and without prejudice to the legislative powers in relation to the matters aforesaid of the Governor-General of India in Council, the High Court to be established in the Presidency shall have and exercise all jurisdiction and every power and authority whatsoever in any manner vested in any of the Courts in the same Presidency abolished under this Act at this time of the abolition of such last-mentioned Courts.”

    The Letters Patent of 1865 provided in cl. 11 that the Court

    “shall have and exercise Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction within such local limits as may from time to time be declared and prescribed by any law made by competent legislative authority for India.”

    These local limits were fixed by the Calcutta High Court (Jurisdiction Limits) Act, 1919, as the area bounded by the Circular Road, Calcutta and the western bank of the river Hooghly.

    Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent provides:

    “The High Court shall be empowered to try and determine suits of every description…”

    Cl. 16 of the Letters Patent provides:

    “The High Court shall be a Court of appeal from the Civil Courts of the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort-William and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence.”

    Cl. 44 of the Letters Patent provides that the provisions of the Letters Patent:

    “are subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in legislative Council and also of the Governor-General in Council under sec. 71 of the Government of India, Act 1915 and also of the Governor-General in cases of emergency under sec. 72 of that Act….”

    In the Government of India Act, 1915, sec. 106 declared that:

    ‘the High Courts have such jurisdiction and all such powers and authority over, or in relation to, the administration of justice, as are vested in them by the Letters Patent and, subject to the provisions of any such Letters Patent all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as are vested in those Courts at the commencement of this Act.”

    If the words “Civil Court” include the High Court, then the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act passed by the Bengal Local Legislature in 1935 and assented to by the Governor-General on March 29th, 1936, clearly cuts down the powers of the High Court to hear suits and execute its decrees which it has derived from the Regulating Act through the Supreme Court and from the High Courts Act, the Letters Patent and the Government of India Act, 1915 and so interferes with the Government of India Act, 1915. That, it appears to me, would be contrary to sec. 80A, sub-sec. (4) of the Government of India Act, 1915, which provides that:

    “The local legislature of any province has not power to make any law affecting any Act of Parliament.'

    I cannot construe the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act as enacting something contrary to the Government of India Act, 1915, when another construction is possible and yet consistent with the purpose and meaning of the Act as a whole.

    If the two words in question were “civil court” (without the two initial capital letters) it might well be said that they mean all Courts in the Province exercising Civil Jurisdiction. But the words are “Civil Courts” (with initial capital letters); that would indicate that they mean a particular class of Court exercising Civil Jurisdiction well understood when the words “Civil Court” are used.

    It is common in this Province to refer to “Civil Courts” as distinct from the High Court. Thus there are “Civil Court” Holidays quite distinct from “High Court” Holidays.

    Cl. 16 of the Letters Patent of 1865 provides that

    “The High Court shall be a Court of Appeal from the Civil Courts (capitals) of the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort-William and from all other Courts subject to is superintendence.”

    That clearly recognises Civil Courts as a class of Courts of Civil Jurisdiction, separate from and subordinate to, the High Court.

    The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, which repealed the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1861, provides in sec. 3 that:

    “There shall be the following classes of Civil Courts under this Act;

    (1) The Court of the District Judge.

    (2) The Court of the Additional District Judge.

    (3) The Court of the Subordinate Judge and

    (4) The Cjurt of the Munsif.”

    The Civil Courts above-mentioned are the Courts with which the agriculturists, as defined in the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, are normally concerned; they are situate in the Districts where the agriculturists live and work; they are side by side, very often, with the Revenue Courts mentioned in the Act in the same context as Civil Courts. The agriculturist is concerned, only occasionally, with the High Court in Calcutta when an appeal from the Local Court comes up, as provided by cl. 16 of the Letters Patent; the agriculturist practically never uses the Original Side of the High Court, which is situated in the heart of the capital if Bengal and exercises Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction over an area which contains no agricultural land.

    In my view the words “Civil Courts” in the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act have the same meaning as they have in cl. 16 of the Letters Patent and in the Bengal Civil Courts Acts, 1887, namely, those Courts of Civil Jurisdiction in Bengal subordinate to the High Court, to wit, the Courts of the District Judge, the Additional District Judge, the Subordinate Judge and the Munsif.

    It follows that in my view the words “Civil Court” in the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935, do not include the High Court.

    It has been argued in this case by the Respondents that such a construction will interfere with the operation of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. If the Act is confined to relieving the burden of genuine agricultural debtors, as defined in the Act, such interference, if any, will be very infrequent. The present case has arisen because persons who were traders have sought to shelter themselves under the Act. Such attempts, if not carefully scrutinised and dealt with promptly and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act, can only have the effect of bringing the Act into disrepute and destroying trading credit upon which the prosperity of the Province, including the agriculturists, depends.

    The proper administration of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act and any amendment of the Act which may be necessary or desirable to carry out its purposes are matters for the consideration of the Government. This Court is solely concerned with the administration of justice according to law.

    For the above reasons I am of opinion that the appeal should be allowed, the order of the Court below set aside and an order made in terms of the summons of November 30th, 1937.

    The Appellant will get his costs here and below. The costs of this Court will be taxed as of an appeal against a decree.

    Lort-Williams, J.:— The debt referred to in the present case was contracted in Calcutta and a consent decree in respect of it was passed in the High Court in its Original Jurisdiction.

    Sec. 1 (2) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act provides that it extends to the whole of Bengal and (3) that it shall come into force in such areas on such dates as the Local Government may, by notification, direct.

    Sec. 2 (8) provides that “debt” includes all liabilities of a debtor with certain exceptions which are not relevant.

    Sec. 3 (1) provides that the Local Government may, by notification, establish one or more Debt Settlement Boards for any local area specified in the notification.

    Calcutta does not lie within any such area, though the debtor in question resides in such an area.

    The first question therefore which arises is, whether the Act and especially, secs. 32-36 thereof, applies to local areas in Bengal Such as Calcutta in which no such Board has been established.

    It has been decided, in the case of Bhagwan Dayal Sahu v. Chandulal Agarwalla that it does not.

    I respectfully disagree with that decision. The Act extends to the whole of Bengal. The provision in sec. 1 (3) that it shall come into force in such areas as the Local Government may by notification direct means that it shall come into force so far as concerns the establishment of Debt Settlement Boards as provided in sec. 3 and all matters arising under the provisions of the Act Consequent upon such establishment. “Debt” includes all liabilities of a debtor and sec. 11 provides that every debtor's application under sec. 8 for settlement of his debts shall contain a statement of debt which shall include the names and addresses of his creditors, the total amount claimed by each creditor, the history of each such debt and a declaration that all his debts have been included.

    The scheme and purpose of the Act being for the settlement of all the debtor's debts, it cannot have been intended that it should apply only to debts contracted within local areas for which Debt Settlement Boards had been established and that other debts contracted in Bengal, but without such areas, should be excluded.

    The next question to be decided is whether the Act and especially secs. 32-36 thereof, applies to the High Court in its Original Jurisdiction.

    At first sight it would appear that it does not. The Act applies to “Civil Courts.” There is no definition of this expression in the Act and the term is well-known in Bengal as applying to Courts established under the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1871 and the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887.

    But it is not very profitable to consider in what sense a term is used in other Acts. The expression “Civil Courts” is used in several Acts, in some of which it applies to the High Court and in some of which it does not.

    It is necessary to consider the provisions of the particular Act in order to discover the sense in which a particular expression is used in it.

    Sec. 14 (3) provides that certain documents shall not be admissible in evidence against the debtor in any suit by a creditor unless certain things are proved to the satisfaction of the Civil Court, meaning the Court in which such suit has been instituted.

    Sec. 18(1) provides that in determining the amounts of debts, the Board shall accept the decree of a Civil Court as conclusive between the parties to the decree.

    Sec. 22(5) provides that if within five years of the order declaring the debtor insolvent, any property is declared by a Civil Court to belong to the insolvent debtor, such property shall be available for distribution among his creditors.

    Apart from the general structure of the Act, these sections indicate that the Act applies to the High Court in its Original Jurisdiction. It would be unreasonable to construe these sections as if such satisfaction, decrees and orders of the High Court were to be excluded.

    There remains for decision the main and the most important question, whether the Act, so far as it purports to limit the jurisdiction of the High Court in its original jurisdiction, is beyond the powers of the local legislature. Assuming that the Act applies to the High Court, that it does purport to limit that jurisdiction is beyond question.

    The provisions of sec. 18 (4) preclude the Court from adjudicating upon the existence or amounts of debts concerning which a Board has given a decision.

    Sec. 21 limits the Court's discretion with regard to costs and its power to execute its own decrees.

    Secs. 25(3) and 27(2) provide for supersession of the Court's decisions.

    Secs. 32-36 provide that a Board may stay proceedings in the High Court ex parte, that the Court may not entertain certain suits and proceedings, that a Board may stay proceedings in the High Court by notification, that the Court shall not execute certain of its decrees and that certain other of its decrees shall be treated as nullities.

    That such provisions are beyond the power of the local legislature is, in my opinion, equally beyond question.

    The terms of sec. 80A (4) of the Government of India Act, 1919, are clear and unambiguous and provide expressly that

    “The local legislature of any province has not power to make any law affecting any Act of Parliament.”

    The powers and jurisdiction of the High Court are derived partly from the Letters Patent and partly from Acts of Parliament The first of these Acts was Statute 24 and 25 Vict. Cap. 104—being “an Act for establishing High Courts of Judicature in India.” Sec. 9 thereof not only gave all such jurisdiction, power and authority as was subsequently granted by Letters Patent, but preserved to the High Court all jurisdiction and every power and authority which had been vested in any of the Courts abolished under the Act. That Act was repealed by the Government of India (Consolidating) Act, 1915, but sec. 106 thereof gave all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were vested in the High Court by Letters Patent and at the commencement of the Act and the validity of any Letters Patent was expressly preserved. This Act was amended in 1916 and 1919 and as amended became the Government of India Act.

    The provisions of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act to which I have referred clearly “affect” sec. 106 of the Government of India Act, which is an Act of Parliament and so are ultra vires.

    Our attention has been drawn to the case of Ghulam Nizamuddin v. Akhtar Hussain Khan in which it was stated by Bennet, J., that the local legislature has power (with previous sanction) to pass laws affecting the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court whether derived from the Government of India, Act, the Letters Patent, or the Code.

    In the first place it is to be observed that the learned Judge's remarks were in the nature of obiter dicta. They were not necessary for the decision of the issues raised in that case and formed no part of the conclusion arrived at by Mukherji, J., the other member of the Bench.

    Secondly, they were, in my respectful opinion, based upon a patent fallacy namely, that the devolution rules made under the provisions of sec. 45A, must be read along with the sections of the Act and so read may contradict and override the specific provisions of the sections. But sec. 45A does not declare that the rules are part of the Act. It does not confer any powers except the power to make rules providing for the classification of central and provincial subjects, for devolution of authority in respect of provincial subjects and for allocation of revenues, for agency in relation to central subjects and for transfer of provincial subjects, all of which, subjects are dealt with in sections of the Act. I do not think that any of the devolution rules, if correctly interpreted, override, or contradict or were intended to override or contradict the express provisions of the Act as set out in the sections. If any of them are inconsistent with the sections the latter must prevail.

    In Schedule I, Part I, of the Devolution Rules Central subjects are classified and No. 16 covers civil law, including laws regarding status, property, civil rights and liabilities and civil procedure. No. 41 covers legislation in regard to any provincial subject, in so far as such subject is in Part II of the Schedule stated to be subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature.

    In Part II provincial subjects are classified and No. 17 covers administration of justice including constitution, powers, maintenance and organisation of Courts of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction within the province subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature as regards High Courts, Chief Courts and Courts of Judicial Commissioners and any Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction. It makes a clear distinction between Civil Courts and High Courts and in ferentially excludes the latter.

    It is true that this rule indicates that the Indian Legislature and provincial legislatures have concurrent powers of legislation on these subjects. But the schedule is subject to specific provisions in the sections of the Act and provincial legislatures may only legislate on such matters, subject to the overriding provisions of the sections. That is to say, they may only legislate With regard to the administration of justice, etc., so long as they are able to do so without “affecting any Act of Parliament”, as provided in sec. 80A(4). Moreover, the power to repeal or alter the provisions of sec. 106 of the Government of India Act has by sec. 131(3) been saved expressly for the Indian Legislature. This was necessary because of the provisions of sec. 65.

    For these reasons I agree that this appeal must be allowed.

    Bartley, J.:— The matter agitated before us is not the precise question at issue in the Court below.

    As formulated there, it was “whether ‘Civil Court’ when used in the Act is confined to a Civil Court within whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of an area notified under sec. 1(3) lies.”

    The exact question argued before us is whether, on receipt of a notice under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, the High Court can or cannot proceed to execute a decree duly made in the exercise of its Original Civil Jurisdiction.

    The answer depends on whether the words “Civil Court,” when used in the Act, include the High Court.

    The Act itself contains no definition of a Civil Court.

    Definitions existing in other Central or Provincial Acts, to which reference has been made in argument, sometimes include, sometimes exclude, the High Court.

    They do not help, apart altogether from the consideration that the interpretation of one statute cannot be used in construing another not made with the same intent.

    The Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act is a Provincial Act, for which previous sanction was obtained under sec. 80A of the Government of India Act, 1919.

    The preamble sets out that it is expedient to provide for the relief of agricultural debtors and to amend the law governing the relations between them and their creditors.

    Certain of the reliefs so provided are set out in secs. 33 to 36 of the Act.

    Sec. 33 debars any Civil Court from entertaining a suit application, or proceeding in respect of debts included in an application, or payable under an award, made under the Act.

    Sec. 35 bars the execution of decrees of a Civil Court for the, recovery of a debt in certain cases.

    Sec. 36 declares that a decree of a Civil Court shall in certain circumstances, be treated as a nullity.

    The unequivocal effect of the language used In these sections is to curtail the jurisdiction of a Civil Court.

    The jurisdiction of the High Court to “do all such things as shall be found necessary for the administration of justice and the due execution of all or any of the powers granted under its Charter” (to quote the language of Stat. 13 George III Cap. 63, by which it was enacted that a Supreme Court should be established at Fort William in Bengal by Charter or Letters Patent) is a jurisdiction inherited from the Supreme Court.

    Under the Indian High Courts Act of 1861 all jurisdiction and every power and authority whatsoever vested in the Supreme Court which was abolished by that Act, was conferred on the High Court.

    That Court was created by the Letters Patent of 1862 and continued by the Letters Patent of 1865.

    By the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1919, a consolidating Act, the High Courts were declared to have such jurisdiction and all such powers and authority over the administration of justice as are vested in them at the commencement of this Act.

    The jurisdiction thus conferred was by the Act itself, sec. 131(3), made subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature and a corresponding alteration was made in the Letters Patent.

    At the material time therefore the High Court had jurisdiction derived from an Act of Parliament to do all things necessary for the due execution of all powers granted under its Charter. Under the same Act that jurisdiction was subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature.

    In contrast to the Indian Legislature, the local legislature of any Province was debarred, under sec. 80A (4) of the Government of India Act from making any law affecting an Act of Parliament.

    The Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, being a local Act, incurs that disability.

    In so far therefore as it purports to affect the provisions of the Government of India Act, it would be ultra vires the powers of the local Legislature.

    It was suggested in argument that under the Government of India Act itself and the devolution rules framed under sec. 45A, a local legislature was empowered to make a law affecting that Act.

    The contention appears unsound.

    The general powers conferred on local legislature by sec. 80A to make laws for the peace and good government of a province, are subject in the first place, to the provisions of the Government of India Act itself.

    In the second place, a local legislature cannot, without previous sanction, make any law regulating a central subject or a provincial subject declared by the devolution rules to be either in whole or in part, subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature.

    The restriction here referred to has been removed in the case of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, for which the necessary sanction was obtained.

    Local legislation is however still controlled by the provisions of the Government of India Act itself and sec. 80A (4) provides that a local legislature has not power to make any law affecting any Act of Parliament.

    The powers of the Central Government to modify the provisions of the Government of India Act are set out in cl. 44 of the Letters Patent, in sec. 131 (3) of the Act itself and in the fifth Schedule to the Act. It is clear from that schedule that the jurisdiction, powers and authority of High Courts can only be modified by the Indian Legislature.

    It would follow then that any provision in a local Act which purported to affect the jurisdiction of the High Court would be ultra vires the powers of that Legislature.

    As pointed out previously, the provisions of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act affect the jurisdiction of Civil Courts.

    In so far however as the provisions of that Act are concerned, they must be construed on the presumption that the Legislature was aware of the existing state of law, under which local legislation could not affect and therefore could not have been intended to affect, an Act of Parliament [vide Kent County Council Exp. (4)].

    It follows from this that the words “Civil Court,” when used in the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, cannot be held to include the High Court.

    I would therefore, agree with my Lord, the Chief Justice and with Mr. Justice Lort-Williams that this appeal should be allowed.

    Nasim Ali, J.:— The point for determination in this appeal is whether the High Court is a “Civil Court” within the meaning of sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1936. The words “Civil Court” have not been defined in this Act. They have not been used in the same sense in the various statutes of this country passed by the Indian legislature or by the Provincial legislatures. It will not therefore be safe to look to the ether statutes to ascertain the meaning in which these words have been used in the Act under consideration.

    A “Civil Court” may be said to be a Court which decides purely civil question between persons seeking their civil rights. A revenue Court may also be a Civil Court in this sense. The Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, however, makes a distinction between a Civil Court and a Revenue Court. The proviso to secs. 18(1) and 22(5) of the Act may support the view that the words “Civil Court” include the High Court also, but the meaning of these words is to be ascertained from the Act as whole, because it must be presumed that the legislature used the same words in the same sense in the whole Act unless there were indications to the contrary.

    There is a presumption that in making an Act a Legislature acts intra vires.

    If on one interpretation of the words “Civil Court,” the entire Act becomes intra vires of the Provincial Legislature and on another interpretation some of the provisions in the Act become ultra vires, the interpretation which makes all the provisions in the Act intra vires must be preferred.

    Sec. 34 of the Act does not simply lay down a rule of procedure analogous to sec. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section not only Jays down that the suit or proceeding before the Civil Court is to be stayed pending the decision of the Board but it also lays down that the suit or proceeding in the Civil Court shall abate so far as it relates to the debt which is the subject-matter of the decision by the Board. The language of secs. 33 to 36 and the proviso to sec. 25 (3) is not such as would justify the interpretation that these sections only create a personal bar in the way of the enforcement of the rights of a certain class of creditors of this Province. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that by the Act a special tribunal with a special procedure has been set up to settle the disputes relating to the debts of the agriculturists of this Province, in order to oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts over these matters in this Province.

    The question therefore is, whether the Provincial Legislature can pass an Act validly so as to affect the jurisdiction, power and authority of the Courts in this Province. These Courts, so far as they are relevant for the purpose of the present appeal, are:—

    (1) The High Court; (2) the Courts constituted by the Bengal, Assam and N.W.P Civil Courts Act passed by the Governor-General in Council in the year 1887. The Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act was passed by the Bengal Legislature with the sanction of the Governor-General under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 80A of the Government of India Act, 1915-1919.

    Sec. 106 of this Act of Parliament declares the jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts in India in these terms:—

    (1) The several High Courts are Courts of Record end have such jurisdiction, Original and Appellate including Admiralty Jurisdiction, in respect of offences committed on the High Seas and oil such powers and authority over or in relation to the administration of justice, including power to appoint darks and other ministerial officers of the Court and power to make rules for regulating the practice of the Court as are vested in them by Letters Patent and object to the provisions of any such Letters Patent, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as are vested in those Courts respectively at the commencement of this Act.

    Cls. 12 and 16 of the Letters Patent define the Original and Appellate Jurisdiction of this Court. By cl. 44 of the Letters Patent the provisions of the Letters Patent are subject to the legislative powers of the Indian Legislature. By sec. 106(1A) of the Ait the Letters Patent establishing or vesting jurisdiction, powers and authority of the High may be amended from time to time by his Majesty by further Letters Patent. It is therefore clear that the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the High Court can be affected either by His Majesty by further Letters Patent or by the Indian Legislature.

    The next question is whether the powers of the Indian Legislature to affect the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court can be exercised by the Provincial Legislature with the sanction of the Governor-General under sec. 80A (3) of the Government of India Act, 1919, the material portion of which is as follows;—

    “The local legislature of any Province may not without the previous sanction of the Governor-General make or take into consideration any law”

    (e) regulating any Central snbject; or

    (f) regulating any Provincial subject which has been declared by rules under this Act to be either in whole or in part subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature in respect of any matter to which such declaration applies.”

    Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 80A, however, lays down that the local legislature of any Province has not power to make any law affecting any Act of Parliament.

    The Rules referred to in cl. (f) of sub-sec. (3) were framed under sec. 45A of the Act. Rule 3 of these Rules provides:

    “(1) For the purpose of distinguishing the functions of the Local Governments and Local Legislatures of Governors' Provinces from the functions of the Governor-General in Council and the Indian Legislature, subjects shall in those provinces be classified in relation to the functions of Government, as Central and Provincial subjects, in accordance with the lists set out in Sch. 1.

    “(2) Any matter which is included in the list of Provincial subjects set out in Part II of Sch. I shall to the extent of such inclusion be excluded from any Central subject of which, but for such inclusion it would form part.”

    Sch. I consists of two parts. The first part deals with Central subjects and the second part deals with Provincial subjects.

    Cl. 41 of Part I is in these terms:—

    “Legislation in regard to any Provincial subject in so far as such subject is in Fart II of this Schedule stated to be subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature and any powers relating to such subject reserved by legislation to the Governor-General in Council”

    Cl. 17 of Part II provides:

    “Administration of justice including constitution, powers maintenance and organisation of Courts of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction within the Province, subject to Legislation by the Indian Legislature as regards High Courts, Chief Courts and Courts of Judicial Commissioners and any Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction.”

    The constitution and powers of the Courts within the Province, excepting the High Court, are, therefore, Provincial subjects and are excluded from Central subjects by operation of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 45A of the Act….. The Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act therefore so far as it affects the jurisdiction of the Mofussil Courts is intra vires of the Bengal Legislature.

    The High Court comes under cls. (e) and (f) of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 80A of the Act. This sub-section is, however, controlled by sub-sec. (4). The effect of cl. (f) in sub-sec. (3), read with sub-sec. (4), in my opinion, is that the Local Legislature can make laws regarding the High Court provided such laws do not affect the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the High. Court vested in it by the previous Acts of Parliament which were confirmed by sec. 106 of the Government of India Act, 1915. Sanction obtained by the Provincial Legislature under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 80A cannot, therefore, validate laws passed by the Provincial Legislature which affect the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court vested in it by Parliament.

    I have already, pointed out that the provisions contained in secs. 25(3), 33, 34, 35 and 36 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act affect the jurisdictions and powers of the Courts mentioned therein. If the words “Civil Court” in those sections include High Court, the provisions contained in those sections would be ultra vires of the Bengal Legislature. If on the other hand those words exclude the High Court, the entire Act would be intra vires of the Bengal Legislature. I have already said that it is permissible to presume that an Act passed by the Legislature is intra vires of that Legislature. I would therefore interpret the Words “Civil Court” to mean the Civil Courts in the Province excepting the High Court. If, however, the Legislature intended to include the High Court within the expression “Civil Court,” then I must declare that the provisions of the Act including sec. 34, so far as they affect the jurisdiction and the powers of the High. Court vested in it by Act of Parliament, are ultra vires of the Bengal Legislature.

    I would therefore allow the appeal.

    Mitter, J.:— The questions in this appeal relate to the interpretation, scope and validity of sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act (Bengal Act VII of 1936) so far as it affects the powers of this Court in its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction.

    Both the Appellants and Respondents are dealers of piece goods and for the purpose of this appeal it must be taken that the Respondents are debtors as defined in the said Act.

    In June, 1935, the Plaintiffs, who are the Appellants before us, filed a suit in the Original Side of this Court against the Defendants Respondents, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 80,491-13-9. Of this sum Rs. 72,435-13-6 was claimed on account of the price of piece-goods supplied on credit and Rs. 8,056-0-3 on account of interest. The suit terminated in a consent decree for Rs. 52,000 on 20th December, 1935. By the terms of settlement the Defendants agreed to pay Rs. 52,000 with interest of 9 per cent, per annum in instalments. Some properties which included shares in Joint Stock Companies were charged and a provision was made that in default of the payment of the first instalment of Rs. 11,000 the whole of the decretal amount would become due and the Plaintiffs would be entitled to take out execution, to have a receiver appointed over the charged properties and to have them sold. The judgment-debtors made default and the Official Receiver was appointed Receiver of the charged properties. Later on the Official Receiver was discharged and on the 9th September, 1937, Messrs R.C Deb and J, N. Sharma were appointed Joint Receivers of the charged properties with power to sell the shares in the Joint Stock Companies. Before the joint receivers could sell, the judgment-debtors filed an application under sec. 8 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act before the Debt Settlement Board at Sanhyasikatee in the District of Jalpaiguri, in which application they included the debt due by them to the Appellants on the basis of the consent decree passed by this Court. The said Board issued a notice on September 18th, 1937, under sec. 34 of the said Act. This notice which was addressed to the Registrar of this Court was received by him on September 21st, 1937. As the judgment-debtor's Solicitor had informed the joint receivers that a notice under sec. 34 had been issued by the Sannyasi-kati Debt Settlement Board, the joint receivers held a meeting on the 24th November, 1937 and resolved to move the Court. On November 9th, 1937, the decree-holders filed an application in which they prayed for an order for directing the joint receivers to sell the shares. This application was heard by Mr. Justice Panckridge who held that the joint receivers could not sell the shares till the notice under sec. 34 had been withdrawn by the Debt Settlement Board.

    Three questions arise in this appeal, namely:—

    (i) Whether the notice under sec. 34 is effective or not as Calcutta is not included in the notification issued under sec. 1(3) of the Act.

    (ii) Whether the words “Civil Court” used in sec. 34 include the High Court and

    (iii) Whether sec. 34 is ultra vires so far as it affects the power of the High Court to execute its own decree.

    1. In the judgment of Mr. Justice Panckridge there is an elaborate discussion of the first of the aforesaid points. Disagreeing with the decision pronounced in the Appellate Side of this Court in Bhagwrn Dayal Sahu v. Chandulal Agarwala by a Division Bench, he held that sec. 34 will have its operation though Calcutta is not a notified area. I hold that the decision of Mr. Justice Panckridge on this point is sound and I agree with the reasons given by him except that I reserve my opinion with regard to the question of the extra territorial effect of the Act.

    2. The second question raised is not free from difficulty. The difficulty is mainly created by reason of the language employed in the Act itself. In my judgment the question must be approached by keeping in view the following fundamental principles namely:—

    (a) that the same word or the same set of words must be primâ facie construed in the same sense in the different parts of the same statute;

    (b) that jurisdiction of a superior Court can be taken away by the legislature only by clear and unambiguous language. This Rule, I take it, does not mean that the jurisdiction of such Courts can be taken away only by express words, though language to that effect has been employed in some old cases [e.g Rex v. Moreley (5)]. The high authority of Lord Eldon and Sir George Jessel, however, does not limit the rule within such narrow limits. In Attorney-General v. Mayor and Corporation of Dublin the former made the following observations;

    “This provision does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, because that jurisdiction cannot, in my judgment, be taken away but by express words or by words creating a necessary implication to that effect,”

    and in Jacobs v. Brett the latter made the following observations:—

    “In the next place I think nothing is better settled than that an Act of Parliament which takes away the jurisdiction of a superior Court of Law must be expressed in clear terms. I do not mean to say that it may not be done by necessary implication as well as by express words, but at all events it must be done clearly. It is not to be assumed that the Legislature intends to destroy the jurisdiction of a Superior Court. You must find the intention not merely implied but necessarily implied.”

    In Balfour v. Malcolm the House of Lords held that the jurisdiction of the Court of Session of Scotland to determine all actions or suits relative to the Water Companies Act (59 Geo. III, c. 116) had been taken away by sec. 80 of the said Act though no mention was made therein of the Court of Session. That decision proceeded upon the view that the words “no other Court or Courts but the Sheriff depute appointed by His Majesty” were to try those disputes arising under the said Act had by necessary implication ousted the jurisdiction of the Court of Session.

    (c) The third fundamental principle is that a particular meaning assigned by the Court to a particular word used in one statute should not necessarily be attributed to the same word used in an other statute, unless the scope and object of the two statutes be similar.

    The third principle takes away the force of the argument of the learned Advocate-General that the phrase “Civil Court” occurring in many other Acts both of the Indian and the Bengal Legislature includes the High Court within its ambit (e.g, Workmen's Compensation Act, Income Tax Act, Registration Act, Indian Succession Act, Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, Bengal Court of Wards Act, etc.).

    To find in what sense the legislature has used the phrase “Civil Court” in sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, it is necessary in my judgment to examine in the first instance the scope and scheme of the Act.

    The Act is intended for granting by a comparatively cheap method relief to agricultural debtors through the medium of Debt Settlement Boards established by the Local Government in areas notified under sec. 3 of the Act. The proceedings are to begin on an application either by the debtor or by the creditor made before such a Board. The application must be for settlement of the debts—of all the debts of the debtor. It may be dismissed by the Board summarily under sec. 13(3) or on grounds mentioned in sec. 17. If the application is not so dismissed, the Board has to proceed according to the following scheme. The amount of debts, principal and interest separately, must be first determined by the Board. Then follows the scheme of settlement. If there is an agreement between the debtor and a creditor of his or a number of them the agreement has, subject to the rules framed under the Act, to be recorded by the Board and incorporated in its award. This is an ordinary case. The remaining provisions of this portion of the Act bring out two distinct schemes. The first is, if I may call it, the scheme of compulsory settlement of his debts. If creditors whose claims amount to over 40 per cent, [or over 60 per cent, in the case mentioned in proviso (ii) to sec. 19] of the total indebtedness of the debtor, agree to a settlement, the remaining creditors can be indirectly forced to come to a settlement on the offer of the debtor to settle on such terms which the Board may consider to be fair. The Board may embody the terms of this compulsory settlement in its award to be made in the form prescribed in sec. 25 or without making an award may grant a certificate to the debtor in the prescribed form in respect of the debt in respect of which such an offer had been made by the debtor (sec. 19). When such a certificate is granted, the creditor affected is free to go to a Court of law to enforce his claim but he is placed by the Act under a disadvantage. He cannot get costs on his success and he can get interest not according to the contract rate but only simple interest at the rate of 6 per cent, on the principal amount of the loan as determined by the Board. The decree which he may get cannot forthwith be executed, but he will have to wait till all the other creditors whose claims have been included in the Board's award have been satisfied or till such an award has ceased to subsist by reason of the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 29, or if there be no award, for a period which may extend to ten years. When, however, an award has been made by the Board, the Act contemplates payment in instalments which may extend to a period not exceeding 20 years. The compulsory settlement can be made by the Board or certificate of the aforesaid nature and effect can be granted by it only if there is a settlement by way of compromise between the debtor and a number of his creditors whose dues amount to over 40 per cent, or 60 per cent, of his total indebtedness as the case may be. If there is no such settlement by way of compromise, the Board is powerless and the first of the two schemes through which relief was intended to be given to the debtor fails. The second scheme may then be put into operation. For the enforcement of this scheme the Board must come to a finding that the debtor would be unable to pay up in the course of 20 years and on that finding declare him insolvent. The consequences of an adjudication order under the Act are of a two-fold nature:

    (1) The Board may reduce his debts to such an amount as it would be possible for the insolvent to pay in instalments covering a period not exceeding 20 years and in that case direct payment in annual instalments. He is not divested of his properties but is given the chance to clear up his liabilities so reduced from the produce raised on his land by his labour. Here the legislature proceeds on the basis that labour of an agriculturist is an asset in itself and his creditors ought to have also the benefit of his future labour; or

    (2) The Board may direct the sale of his properties under the machinery of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act [except his dwelling house and such portion of his land as the Board may set apart for his maintenance under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 22] and direct the distribution of the sale proceeds among his creditors in the manner directed by it.

    The fundamental scheme cf the Act therefore is for complete administration of the affairs of an agricultural debtor through machinery of the Debt Settlement Boards. To effect the said purpose it is necessary in the first instance to ascertain and determine the total indebtedness of the debtor by the Debt Settlement Board and the legislature has made provision for the same. If the debtor makes the application before the Board, he must state therein his dues to all his creditors and he must disclose all his properties. If the application be by a creditor, he must not only specify therein his own dues but mention therein the names and addresses of the other creditors of the debtor and the particulars of his properties, so far known to him. (Sec. 11). After the application, be it by the debtor or by a creditor, is admitted, the Board has to take steps for ascertaining the names of and the amounts due to, all the creditors [secs. 13 and 18 (2)]. The object of the legislature as expressed in the Act itself, namely complete and beneficient administration of the affairs of an agricultural debtor, burdened or overburdened with debts, would be frustrated unless the Debt Settlement Boards were given in the first instance final jurisdiction to determine the total liability of the debtor [and this the legislature has done in sec. 18(4)] and unless in the next place the ordinary tribunals of the land are directed to keep their hands off as long as proceedings before the Debt Settlement Board are pending or till the award made by it had spent itself. Secs. 33 to 36 in my judgment have this intent and the words “Civil Court” used in those sections must mean and include all Civil Courts of the land, that is, all Courts which can entertain suits for the enforcement of money claims. The phrase “Civil Court” used in secs. 33, 34, 35 and 36 means in my judgment Courts of Civil Judicature and would include a Superior Court of Civil Judicature, e.g, the High Court.

    A consideration of some of the other sections of the Act also point to the same conclusion. To take a few sections, the phrase “Civil Court” has been used in the proviso to sec. 18(1). It must include the High Court, otherwise incongruous would be the result, for then a decree of the High Court would have before the Board no value whereas that passed by an inferior Court would be conclusive. The proviso to sec. 22(5) affords another argument in favour of the view that the legislature intended to include within the phrase “Civil Court,” all Courts, superior or inferior, of Civil Judicature. I accordingly hold that the words “Civil Court” in sec. 34 includes the High Court, exercising Original Civil Jurisdiction.

    The last question is whether sec. 34 of the Act affects the jurisdiction of this Court and if it does, whether to that extent it is ultra vires the powers of the provincial legislature.

    I cannot accept the argument of the Respondents that section and the cognate sections beginning from 33 only prevent a creditor of an agricultural debtor from instituting or continuing suits and proceedings in Civil Courts while an application for settlement of the debts of his debtor is pending before the Board or the award made by the latter is subsisting. The plain words of the sections militate against this view. Nor can I agree with the contention that sec. 34 preserves the jurisdiction of this Court but only lays down a rule of procedure, a rule analogous to the rule laid down in sec. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sec. 34 goes beyond staying proceedings in Civil Courts. The stay is only the first step intended to keep free and unfettered the powers and jurisdiction of the Board conferred by the Act, for as soon as the Board makes the award and in the award includes the debt in question, the suit or proceeding pending in the Civil Court and which had been stayed, abates. If there where proceedings in execution pending in the Civil Court, those proceedings would come to an end for) all times, for the award supersedes the decree of the Civil Court (sec. 36). There is moreover no analogy between sec. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code and sec. 34 of the Act, for in the former case the Court in which the suit is pending itself stays it. Its jurisdiction is not curtailed or affected but the stay under the terms of sec. 34 of the Act is one imposed from an outside authority. The first part of sec. 34 of the Act cannot therefore be regarded as laying down merely a rule of procedure in the sense used by the Lord Chancellor in Secretary of State v. Moment (8). Secs. 33 to 36 of the Act must in my judgment be read together for they deal with the different stages of a suit or proceedings in the Civil Court in relation to the proceedings before the Board. The first case is where no suit had been instituted in a Civil Court in relation to the debt concerned but where the proceedings are or have already been before the Board,—either the application is pending or the award made is subsisting. In this case a Civil Court cannot entertain the suit. The second is where the Board's jurisdiction is invoked after the suit had already been instituted in the Civil Court. There the first effect is the stay of these proceedings in the Civil Suit, with the ultimate possibility of the suit and proceedings being put an end to for ever. Sec. 34 therefore affects the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and as I have already held that the phrase “Civil Court” includes the High Court, it affects the jurisdiction of that Court by putting a fetter on its power to execute its own decree through its own processes.

    The Supreme Court was established in Bengal in 1774 under a Charter dated the 26th March of that year under the Regulating Act of 1773 (13 Geo. III c. 63). The Court, so established, was authorised not only to determine causes but to execute its own decrees through its own Sheriff (cl. 15 of the Charter). In 1861 the High Courts Act and the Indian Councils Act (24 and 25 Vict., c. 104 and 24 and 25 Vict., c. 67 respectively) were passed. By sec. 9 of the former Act all powers and jurisdiction which the Supreme Court then had were vested in the High Court. The Governor-General in Council was given the power to deal by legislation with the extent of the jurisdiction of High Courts to the extent mentioned therein. Sec. 22 of the Indian Councils Act made it unlawful for the Governor-General in Council to make laws and regulations affecting the High Courts Act of 1861, or any Act of Parliament passed after 1861. In 1865 the second High Courts Act was passed by Parliament and the Letters Patents issued in 1862 under the Act of 1861 was superseded by a Letters Patent issued in that year. This Letters Patent with some subsequent amendments is still in force. Cl. 44 of the Letters Patent expressly declares that all provisions of the Letters Patent so issued are subject to the legislative powers of the Indian Legislature (Governor-General in Legislative Council).

    It is now necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act (1915-1919). It is a consolidating Act. All the preceding Indian Councils Acts and the High Courts Act of 1865 were repealed. The legislative powers of the Indian legislature are defined in sec. 65 and of the Provincial legislatures in sec. 80A. There are three limitations on the powers of the former, the first of which is relevant to the case before us. It runs thus

    “Provided that the Indian Legislature has rot, unless expressly so authorised by an Act of Parliament, power to make any law repealing or affecting”

    (1) Any Act of Parliament passed after the year one thousapd eight hundred and sixty and extending to British India.”….

    The phrase “any Act of Parliament, etc.” to my mind includes not only an Act of Parliament passed after 1860 and any other Act to be passed by it in future but also the series of Government of India Acts from 1915 to 1919. This provision is virtually a re-enactment of Sec. 22 of the Indian Councils Act of 1861. The extent to which the Indian legislature can interfere with the powers and jurisdiction of the High Courts are exactly defined in the fifth Schedule. It cannot interfere with the constitution of those Courts but can by legislation curtail or extend their jurisdiction. By reason of sec. 106 this High Court has now and will continue to have till the amendment of its Letters Patent by His Majesty or till the Indian Legislature intervenes, the same jurisdiction and powers which it had under the repealed Indian High Courts Act.

    The powers of the provincial legislature are defined in sec. 80A. They have power to make laws for the peace and good government of the Provinces terms which are very wide. But this power is subject to the provisions of the Act. Sub-sec. (3) empowers those legislatures to make laws, but with the previous sanction of the Governor-General, among others, in matters

    “(e) regulating any central subject, or

    (f) regulating any provincial subject which hag been declared by rules under this Act to be, either in whole or in part subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature, in respect of any matter to which such declaration applies.”

    Sub-sec. (4) enacts that

    “The local legislature of any Province has not power to make any law affecting an Act of Parliament.”

    If the matter had not been complicated by the Devolution Rules framed under sec. 45A of the Act, the position would have been absolutely clear. On the construction that sub-see. (4) controls all the foregoing sub-sections of sec. 80A [Kumar Punyendra Narayan Deb v. Kumar Jogendra Narayan Deb (9)] the Provincial legislature even with previous sanction of the Governor-General could not have affected, curtailed or extended the jurisdiction and powers of this Court as conferred by the statute of Parliament (sec. 106) and if it had passed such a piece of legislation, it would have been ultra vires.

    It is necessary, therefore, to consider the scope and effect of the Devolution Rules of 1920 on the subject. Sec. 45A(1) enacts that

    “provision may be made by rules under this Act (a) for the classification of subjects in relation to the functions of Government as central and provincial subjects, for the purpose of distinguishing the functions of the local Govenments and local legislatures from the functions of the Governor-General in Councilland the Indian Legislature.”

    In this Act no special mention has been made of the authority which is to make those rules and therefore those rules have to be made under the procedure laid down in sec. 129A. Those rules are to be made by the Governor-General in Council with the sanction of the Secretary of State in Council and are to be laid before both the Houses of Parliament. Those Rules are to be void only if on an address being presented to His Majesty within a certain time by either House of Parliament praying for annulling those rules or any of them, His Majesty in Council annuls the same. The Devolution Rules of 1920 were made under the above procedure. In Part I of the Schedule A of those rules are specified the central subjects and in Part II the provincial subjects. Item No. 17 of Part II consists of two portions. The first portion creates no difficulty. By reason of the provisions made in the first portion the provincial legislature would be competent to legislate on matters concerning the administration of justice including constitution, power, maintenance and organisation of Courts of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction within the province. The Courts contemplated in this portion are not chartered High Courts, they are the Mofussil Courts, both Civil and Criminal, Courts of Small Causes in Presidency Towns and the Presidency Magistrates' Courts. The second portion of Item No. 17 creates the difficulty. That portion is complementary to Item No. 41 of Part I of Schedule A. These two (so far as they are relevant to the case before us), taken together, mean that the provincial legislatures are competent to legislate in matters relating to the administration of justice by the Chartered High Courts, in matters relating not only to the power and maintenance but also relating to the constitution of such Courts, but the legislations by the Provincial Legislatures are subject to the legislation by the Central Legislature. This means that in case of conflict of the laws passed by a Provincial Legislature and those passed by the Central Legislature concerning the High Courts, the laws passed by the latter would prevail.

    Mr. Banerjee's argument on the two items (No. 41 of Part I and the Second Part of item No. 17 of Part II) is that they are ultra vires. He says that sec. 45A(1)(a) of the Government of India Act provided for rules being made for the classification of subjects into central and provincial for the purpose of distinguishing the functions of the local legislature from the functions of the Indian legislature. But as the right to legislate in certain specified matters relating to Chartered High Courts, has been vested by the statute itself in the Indian legislature only, there is no scope for the framing of rules in that respect under sec. 45A(1)(a). His second contention is that inasmuch as power has been taken away by the statute from the local legislatures to pass laws which may affect statutes of Parliament concerning High Courts, the last part of Item No. 17, Part II of Schedule I of the Devolution Rules, if it means that the local legislatures can modify the provisions of the Government of India Act relating to the constitution, powers and jurisdiction of Chartered High Courts, is ultra vires. His third contention is that part of item No. 17 must be taken to have conferred on the provincial legislatures powers to legislate in respect of only such powers, etc., of the Chartered High Courts as has been conferred not by a statute of Parliament but by the Indian Legislature by laws made under the authority of sec. 131 read with the 5th Schedule. The first two contentions amount in substance to the contention that part of item No. 17 of the Devolution Rules is ultra vires. In my judgment this Court and no Court in the British Empire can say that any rule made under the procedure prescribed in sec. 129A is ultra vires. In Dale's case , Brett, L.J, made the following observations at p. 455 of the report:—

    “I am of opinion that the rules and orders have statutory authority, for not only is the authority given to certain persons by statute to draw them up, but it is provided that they shall be laid before Parliament for a certain time and if not objected to are then to be binding. Whenever that provision is introduced in an Act of Parliament, it seems to me that the rules and orders, if not objected to by Parliament, become part of the statute.”

    In Institute of Patent Agents v. Joseph Lockwood , though Lord Morris expressed a different opinion, the Lord Chanceller expressed an opinion similar to that of Lord Justice Brett in Dale's case . The principle seems to me to be that Parliament must be taken to have sanctioned them. If rules so made became part of the statute itself, no question that the Devolution Rules or any part of them is ultra vires arises, because the legislative authority of Parliament is supreme. I cannot accordingly agree with the first two contentions of Mr. Banerjee.

    To me it seems that the question is one of interpretation only and the same rules of interpretation are to be applied where two parts of the same statute are in conflict. The governing intention of the legislature must be found out and that part which agrees with that intention must be given effect to and the other part rejected as being repugnant. In cases like the one before us, the governing intention must prima facie be taken to be that expressed in the section of the statute and not in the rules framed under it [per Lord Herschell, L.C, in Joseph Lockwood's case ]. In the case before us, in the absence of any indication to the contrary the enactment must be taken as the governing consideration and the rule only subordinate.

    There is some force in Mr. Banerjee's third contention on this part of the case, for the construction put by him upon the second part of item No. 17 of Part II of Schedule A of the Devolution Rules avoids to a large extent its conflict with sec. 80A(4) and sec. 131(3) read with the fifth schedule. The only portion which purports to give power to the provincial legislature to make laws which may affect the constitution of Chartered High Courts and which cannot be reconciled with the statute on the basis of Mr. Banerjee's contention will have to be rejected on the ground of repugnancy. Even in this respect the Indian legislature has not the power. I cannot accordingly agree with what Bennet, J., has said by way of obiter in Ghulam Nizamuddin v. Aktar Hussain Khan , for the effect of his judgment is that those items of the Devolution rules have supplanted the relevant provisions of the Act. To put it in the language which I have used before, he has taken the governing intention of Parliament to have been expressed not in the statute itself [sec. 80A(4)] but in these rules.

    I accordingly hold that by reason of the provisions of sec. 80A(4) and sec. 131(3), read with the fifth schedule, sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, so far as it relates to proceedings of this Court, is ultra vires, notwithstanding the fact that sanction has been accorded to the local legislature by the Governor-General under sec. 80A(3).

    I would accordingly allow the appeal on this ground only.

    Solicitors: G.C Chunder & Co. for the Appellant; P.D Himatsingka for the Respondents.

    P.C

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