JUDGMENT
1. The plaintiff in this action seeks to recover half a share of the estate left by her deceased father Abdul Rahiman Sahib. He died on 16th June 1921 leaving as his heirs his mother Rabia Bi, his second wife defendant 4, his brothers defendants 1 to 3, his only daughter by a predeceased wife, the plaintiff, who was then a minor, and considerable property both moveable and immovable. According to the Mahomedan law by which the parties are governed, the plaintiff is entitled to a half share in the said property, defendants 1 to 3, 5/24ths share, defendant 4, one-eighth share and Rabia Bi, one-sixth share. Within a few months from the date of the death of Abdul Rahiman defendant 3 married defendant 4. Abdul Rahiman during his lifetime was carrying on a very flourishing business in ropes, coir, carpets, blankets, etc. and from out of the profits of the said business acquired considerable immovable property of the value of about Rs. 50,000. While Abdul Rahiman was alive, defendants 1 to 3 were working in the business. According to the plaintiff they were working merely as clerks and not as partners and therefore had no interest in the said business and in the properties left by him. The plaintiff asserts that taking advantage of the minority of the plaintiff and defendant 4's helpless position, the defendants set up an unfounded claim to the entire property left by her father and alleged that they were joint owners with him who was entitled only to a fourth share in the property. On this wrong assumption of fact the plaintiff states that the matter was referred to arbitration and in the arbitration proceedings the said Rabia Bi, the grandmother of the plaintiff and the mother of defendants 1 to 3, was made to represent the plaintiff. The arbitration thus proceeded on the basis that Abdul Rahiman was only entitled to a fourth share in the property and the arbitrators delivered their award on 10th October 1921 on that footing and distributed the property to Abdul Rahiman including the plaintiff. Under that award the business which was carried on by Abdul Rahiman was given over to defendants 1 to 3, who thereafter continued the business and made considerable profits therefrom. The award was filed in Court and a decree was passed in accordance therewith in O.P No. 91 of 1922. The plaintiff after attaining majority filed this suit on 27th March 1930 impeaching the said award and prayed for partition and delivery of her share. She alleged that defendants 1 to 3 wrongfully possessed themselves of the estate of Abdul Rahiman and claimed an account and administration of the estate of Abdul Bahi man and prayed that the plaintiff's share be ascertained and given over to her. On the date of the suit Rabia Bi was dead and her share of the property survived to defendants 1 to 3 who thus became entitled altogether to 9/24th share in all. The main defence of defendants 1 to 3 is contained in the written statement of defendant 2 and defendants 1 and 3 merely adopted the case set up by him. They denied that Abdul Rahiman was the sole and exclusive owner of the suit property, and asserted that they were equal sharers with him and submitted that the award was just and proper and could not be impeached. The plaintiff's right to demand an account of the business which they were carrying on since the date of her father's death was also denied.
2. Defendant 4, who was at that time married to defendant 3, naturally adopted defendant 2's written statement and made Common cause with them. None of defendants 1 to 4 did claim to have their share partitioned or delivered over to them in case the Court held that the award was not binding on the plaintiff. Defendant 4 died after the institution of this suit leaving as her heirs defendant 3 and defendants 5 to 8 who are her children. Defendant 9 intervened and got himself impleaded in the suit on the ground that he was an alienee of Item 4 of Sch. A to the plaint from defendants 1 to 3. He stated in his written statement that he had become a mortgagee of the property under the mortgage dated 21st July 1933 in utter ignorance of the institution of the suit and on the faith of representations made by defendants 1 to 3 that they were absolute owners thereof. He therefore submitted that the properties might in the division be allotted to the share of defendants 1 to 3. Several issues were raised in the case but the main issues relate to title, namely whether the property in suit was the sole and exclusive property of Abdul Rahiman Sahib or did he own them jointly with defendants 1 to 3; whether the award was binding on the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff could claim a right to the business carried on by defendants 1 to 3 subsequent to Abdul Babiman's death and to the property acquired out of the profits of the said business.
3. My learned brother Lakshmaha Rao J. who tried the case, in his judgment dated 7th April 1936, came to the conclusion that the award was not binding on the plaintiff, that the business carried on by Abdul Rahiman was his sole and exclusive business, that the properties in suit were acquired out of the said business and they belonged solely to him. On the basis of these findings he declared that the plaintiff was entitled to a half share in all the properties left by Abdul Rahiman on the date of his death and directed an account to be taken on the basis of the finding given by him and a scheme of division to be submitted in regard to the partition and delivery of a half share to the plaintiff. He declared also that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim any share in the business subsequently carried on by defendants 1 to 3. He gave directions to the Official Reference that in making the allotment the property mortgaged to defendant 9 should, if possible be allotted to defendants 1 to 3 reserving the question of substituted security for further consideration, if necessary. There was no direction for a general partition and it seems to me that clause 7(a) of the preliminary decree cannot be construed as a direction for a genera; partition. In the preliminary decree cl. 7(a) runs thus:
To effect a partition by metes and bounds of the said properties among the parties hereto according to the shares declared, above.
4. In order to understand what is meant by ‘the above’, the only reference to shares in the earlier portion of the decree is cl. 4, which runs thus:
That the plaintiff herein is entitled to a partition and allotment of a moiety in the said properties and to recover from defendants 1 to 3 and the share of defendant 4 in the hands of defendants 5 to 8 herein her said share together with mesne profits thereon from 18th June 1921, the date of her father's death.
5. If cl. 4 is literally construed, Mr. G. Ramakrishna lyer is right in his contention that it is only the plaintiff's and the plaintiff's share alone that was directed to be partitioned and delivered and there was no direction to make a partition inter se among the defendants. He also urged in support of his contention that defendants 1 to 4 had supported the award and did not pray for their share to be partitioned and delivered. But in view of the fact that defendant 9 requested that the property might be partitioned and delivered to them and in view of a similar request made by the alienees, defendants 10 and 11, it would perhaps be better to construe the decree as directing a partition among all the parties in so far as it may be necessary to give any relief to the alienees, and the judgment of my learned brother may be said to recognize this in so far as there is a direction that the mortgaged property should as far as possible be allotted to defendants 1 to 3. Defendants 10 to 12 got themselves impleaded on 11th December 1936 while the matter was pending before the Official Referee on the ground that they became purchasers of Item 3 in the plaint by a sale deed dated 26th July 1933 executed by defendant 3 for himself and as guardian of defendants 5 to 8. They submitted that the said item might in the division be allotted to the share of defendant 4. The learned Official Referee seemed to proceed on the basis that he must divide and deliver one moiety to the plaintiff. He has not divided the property by metes and bounds between all the sharers according to the rules of Mahomedan law. He finds the total value of the estate to be Rs. 1,14,999-15-2 and he states that on account of depreciation of the value of one item of property, Rs. 10,600 have to be deducted and therefore the total value of the estate that has to be divided is Rs. 1,14,399-15-2 and the plaintiff's half share would be of the value of Rupees 57,199-15-7. He also finds that all the moveable assets left by Abdul Rahiman had been dissipated by defendants 1 to 4 and that there was no chance of the plaintiff recovering even a small fraction of her share in the said assets. On the basis of the findings arrived at by him, he allotted to the defendants Item 4 of the plaint valuing it at Rupees 16,582 as also the moveables and out-standings belonging to the estate, which were valued by him at Rs. 81,542-15-2. After deducting Rupees 67,199-15-7, the value of the half share of defendants 1 to 4, he found that a sum of Rs. 40,191-15-7 would be payable by them to the plaintiff.
6. Thus, it will be seen that he has effected a division of the entire property into two moieties only, one going to the plaintiff and the other to defendants 1 to 4 jointly and has not allotted Item 4 of the plaint specifically to the shares of defendants 1 to 3 as prayed for by defendant 9. No portion of the property was allotted to defendant 4's share. The plaintiff has filed objections to the report and Mr. Ramakrishna Ayyar on her behalf has raised only two contentions based on those objections: (1) it being found by the Official Referee that all the moveable properties left by the deceased Abdul Rahim an of the value of Rs. 81,542-15-2 have been converted and appropriated by defendants 1 to 3, defendant 4 having also acquiesced in that conversion, and the plaintiff's half-share being about Rs. 62,000 the entire immovable property must have been allotted to her and for the balance only a personal decree should be given against the defendants. In the alternative he contended that a charge should be given in favour of the plaintiff over the property assigned to them for the amount decreed to her. (2) Inas much as the stock-in-trade of the business left by her father was utilized in the business subsequently carried on by defendants 1 to 3, she is entitled to get a half-share of the profits of the business and in lieu there, of interest on her share of the value of the assets from the date of her father's death.
7. The first contention raises a question of some importance and depends on the exact nature of the right possessed by an heir under the Mahomedan law in the property left by the deceased and also the nature of the right possessed by an alienee from such an heir. It is a well settled principle of Mahomedan law that upon the death of a Mahomedan owner, the inheritance vests immediately in his heirs, and is not suspended by reason of debts being due from the estate of the deceased: vide 7 All 8221 at pp. 828 and 829, per Mahmood J. As soon as succession opens the property devolves in specific shares among the heirs and they become independent owners of their specific shares. The nature of the tenure is analogous to that of tenants-incommon. In 40 Mad 2432 at p. 254 Abdur Rahim J. remarked thus:
As regards the nature of the tenure of the coheirs' shares, the heirs of a deceased Mahomedan take their shares in severalty, their rights being analogous to those of tenants-in-common and not of members of a joint Hindu family.
8. Tyabji in his book on Mahomedan law agrees with this view. He observes thus at page 772:
The point has been carefully considered and set beyond doubt by Abdur Rahim, J., who points out that under Mahomedan law, the co-heirs are said to have “Sherkat-ul-mulk” (i.e ownership of property as tenants-in-common or as it has been translated by Hamilton, parnership by right of property) and this is distinguished from “Sherkat-ul-ago” or partnership by contract:
9. (Vide 34 Mad 5113 at p. 512.) It follows from this that every heir is entitled to sell or mortgage or otherwise encumber his share of the property without reference to the other heirs just like any tenant in common. It is in recognition of this principle that the Privy Council laid down in 5 IA 2114 that a Mahomedan heir has the right to convey his own share of the inheritance and would be able to pass a good title to the alienee notwithstanding any debts which may be due from the deceased and a creditor of a deceased Mahomedan cannot follow his estate into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value to whom it has been alienated by his heir-at-law. Only a bona fide purchaser for value is protected because under the Mahomedan law before an estate can be distributed, debts and funeral expenses must first be discharged and a creditor is entitled to have recourse to every portion of the property left by the deceased. As against the other heirs the claim of the bona fide purchaser to have his share in the particular plot assigned to him is not absolute. It is a well-recognized principle of law relating to co-owners or tenants-in-common that an alienation by a co-owner or tenant-in-common of his share in any item of property is subject to the rights and equities of the other co-owners or tenants-in-common. The principle has been laid down by the Judicial Committee in 13 Lah 7025 at page 709 thus:
Where one of two or more co-sharers mortgages his undivided share in some of the properties held jointly by them, the mortgagee takes the security subject to the right of the other co-sharers to enforce a partition and thereby to convert what was an undivided shard of the whole into a defined portion held in severalty. If the mortgage therefore is followed by a partition, and the mortgaged properties are allotted to the other co-sharers, they take those properties, in the absence of fraud, free from the mortgage and the mortgagee can proceed only against the properties allotted to the mortgagor in substitution of his undivided share. This was the view taken by the Board in 1 IA 106.6
10. There is no difference in the application of this principle whether the property belongs to co-owners governed by Hindu lav? or Mahomedan law. In fact it is a principle of general jurisprudence. In (1841) 10 LJ Ch 221,7 where an alienee of an undivided moiety in a specific part of the estate insisted upon that part being allotted to him, the Vice-Chancellor, Shadwell, declined to accept his contention and remarked thus:
The alienee of part of an undivided estate, must take his interest, subject to a bill of partition being filed against him. If persons deal in such interests as undivided shares, they do so with the liability of having something assigned to them different from what they might originally possess.
11. A co-owner or a tenant-in-common can always file a suit for partition and have his share defined and delivered to him. The Court in effecting a partition is bound to adjust all the equities existing between the parties and arising out of their relation to the property to be divided. The equities to be adjusted would involve every matter relating to the common property with reference to which one tenant-in-common may equitably demand anything of the other such as contribution for repairs or improvements to the common property, accounting for waste of the common property and the enforcement of any lien or charge which a tenant-in-common may claim against the other in respect of any matter concerning the common property. In regard to the method of division the Court is not bound to allot an aliquot share of each species of property to each of the parties. It is enough if each tenant-in-common has an equal share of the whole. This is subject to the other equities which may have to be adjusted. In this case the plaintiff is admittedly entitled to a half share in the estate but she is not able to get her due and legitimate share by virtue of the fact that defendants 1 to 3 have dissipated a major portion of the estate consisting of the moveable property. The plaintiff is therefore justly entitled to demand that all the immovable property should be assigned to her and that no portion of the immovable property should be claimed by defendants 1 to 3. Freeman on “Co-tenancy and Partition” dealing with equities which may be enforced in a suit for partition observed at page 676 thus:
If one of the co-tenants has wasted any part of the lands of the co-tenancy, the Court may take that fact into consideration and do justice between the parties by assigning to the wrongdoer the part which he has wasted.
12. If this principle were to be given effect to, there can be no question that all the immovable properties comprised in the suit, being less than the value of the share which the plaintiff is entitled to, should be allotted to her. Even defendant 4 and her heirs could not object to this because by virtue of the preliminary decree defendants 1 to 3 and the heirs of defendant 4 have been made liable for the share of the plain, tiff (vide Cl. 4 of the preliminary decree extracted already and referred to) and this is because defendant 4 has made com mon cause with defendants 1 to 3.
13. The question now arises, should any portion of the property by virtue of the alienation by defendants 1 to 3 pendent like be allotted to the share of the defendants in order to give effect to the alleged equitable right in favour of the alienees? Ordinarily it would be just and proper to allocate properties which have been alienated to the shares of the alienor. But where it is not practicable or equitable, the Court is not bound to allot those properties but might allot any other properties and the alienees' only right is to have recourse to the properties so allotted. It may be that the sub stituted property or security may prove worthless but it is a risk every alienee of an undivided interest of a tenant-in-common in a specific item of property takes as a necessary incident of the alienation. Therefore there is nothing to preclude a Court from awarding to the plaintiff the immovable properties and awarding to the defendants the moveable properties which have been wasted by them, the only remedy of the alienee being to proceed against the moveable properties in their hands. But what is alleged in this case is that the alienecs are bona fide alienees and they have got therefore an equity in their favour. But it seems to me the equity of the plaintiff in this case is paramount to the equity in favour of the alienees. She has been unjustly deprived of her legitimate share in the property by the wrongful act of defendants 1 to 3 aided by defendant 4, and the property was converted and appropriated for their use during her minority. She lost no time in enforcing her claim as soon as she attained majority and the alienations were pendente lite. The alienees allege that they were ignorant of the institution of the suit but that fact is in my opinion immaterial as they cannot get higher rights than their alienors, i.e an alienee from a co-tenant takes his interest subject to the equities of the other co-tenants. But this is a case in which, if the alienees were not parties, they will be; affected by the doctrine of lis pendens. The title to the immovable property is specifically in question within the moaning of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
14. A question of title has been raised, namely whether the property in the suit belonged solely to Abdul Rahiman or was the joint property of defendants 1 to 3 and Abdul Rahiman. This issue would be quite: sufficient to attract the operation of lis pendens. No doubt a suit for administration has been held not to attract the operation of lis pendens until a preliminary decree for administration has been passed. But in this case the plaintiff has also prayed for partition and delivery of her share and for an account on the basis that defendants 1 to 3 have wrongfully possessed themselves of her father's property and misappropriated the bulk of it and this suit cannot therefore be viewed as a bare administration suit. But since the alienees rare formally on record and they will be bound by any decree passed in the suit, there is no need to consider the applicability of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. But the principle underlying the Section will have to be applied in favour of the plaintiff, i.e the Court in making the adjustment of equities in giving relief to her ought to confine itself to the legal rights of the co-heirs on the date of the institution of the suit without reference to the equitable rights of persons who derived title from them pendente lite as her rights should not be prejudiced by any intervening equity in the alienees. The plaintiff is entitled to say that so far as she as concerned, she is not bound to take any notice of a title acquired since the filing of the suit and “as to them it is as if no such title existed.”
15. I should like in this connexion to refer to the decision in 60 MLJ 79,8 where the facts were these. In the Tanjore Palace Estate suit which was filed for determining who were the rightful owners to the estate, certain defendants were known as Mangala Vilas defendapts and by the preliminary decree passed in the suit they were awarded three-fourth share. Appeals were prefer, red against the said decree and the said defendants were permitted to draw moneys in deposit in Court up to the limit of their share on giving security in case their shares were diminished in appeal. The High Court by its decree dated 21st January 1924 reduced the share to 3/7. Before the passing of the High Court decree some of the said defendants sold a half of their right, title and interest in the property to A. On the date of sale according to the first Court decree the alienees were entitled to 5/32nd share. By the High Court decree the share became reduced to 5/56ths and the suit was sent back to the District Court for a final decree. A was made a party to the suit on his application as defendant 31. The District Court on the application of one of the successful parties to the suit for restitution of the amounts drawn in excess by the Mangala Vilas defendants including the alienees by its order dated 25th November 1925 directed that the shares allotted to them be charged with the overdrawn amounts and directed further that the half share bought by A should also be subject to the charge. This charge was embodied in the final decree dated 27th February 1926. The question therefore was whether the charge should affect the property transferred to A. Wallace and Jackson, JJ. held that A took subject to the charge. The fol-lowing observations of Wallace J. in the course of the judgment are instructive:
It is not disputed that in an ordinary partition suit the Court may, in working out its preliminary decree for the purpose of adjusting shares instead of making an actual division of all the property, give one coparcener a charge over the shares of another for any difference in favour of the former. In such a case it is obvious that the charge was not created by the preliminary decree but springs out of the obligation of the Court to allot each coparcener his proper share……If the imposition of a charge is in the opinion of the Court a suitable alternative to depriving a coparcener of some property in order to adjust the shares the Court has discretion to impose a charge……. The imposition of such a charge being within the scope of the suit and within the jurisdiction of the Court, any such charge imposed on the shares of the Mangala Vilas defendants will bind their alienees pendente lite.
16. Vide also 35 Cal 388.9 The principle of these decisions will apply to the present case. Mr. Badhakrishnayya places considerable reliance on the decision of the Privy Council in 5 IA 211 and contends that till a decree for administration or partition has been passed, having regard to the fact that the property purchased was that of an heir-at-law of a deceased Mahomedan owner, an alienee would acquire good title and would not be affected by the doctrine of lis pendens. On examining the facts of that case closely, it seems to me that decision does not support his contention. No doubt, the mortgage which was made subject to the decree in the suit, which went up to the Privy Council, was effected after the preliminary decree for partition and administration was passed. But the observations of their Lordships are wide enough to cover a case where a suit has been brought by an heir-at-law for an account from his co-heirs and where the title to the property was specifically put in issue. In that case it will be seen that there was a contest between & person called Najmoodin who claimed to be the son of the deceased owner and his three widows. The widows asserted that he was not the legitimate heir and he was not entitled to any portion of the estate. But that question was ultimately decided in favour of Najmoodin and he was held entitled to a share in the estate. Their Lordships in that case upheld an alienation made prior to the institution of the suit but negatived the rights of the alienee under an alienation made subsequent thereto, though, no doubt, the alienation was made subject to the decree directing Najmoodin to account for the estate in his hands and pay the amount due to the plaintiffs in that case from and out of the estate. The following observations of their Lordships make the point clear:
The great distinction between this case and the other is that in the present case the mortgage bond was executed pending the suits brought by the widows, whereas in the other case the mortgage bond was executed before the institution of the widow's suits. In this case the widows claim under a purchase in execution of the decree of the widow Tayyuban, the effect of which was stated in the judgment in the other appeal. The High Court held that the purchaser under the decree upon the mortgage bond was bound by the decree of the widow, inasmuch as the mortgage had been executed during the pendency of the widow's suit. Phear J. in delivering judgment says: ‘I need hardly say that a decree of this kind, directing the person in whose hands the property was to account for it in order that it might be applied for the purpose of discharging the debts due from Khoorshed Ali was a decree against that property and operative to bind it in the hands of Najmoo din, and therefore of any other person who took from Najmoodin with notice of the decree, of under such circumstances as to make him affected by the doctrine of lis pendens’.
17. The words “under such circumstances as to make him affected by the doctrine of lis pendens” taken in connexion with the distinction adverted to by their Lordships seem clearly to indicate that their Lordships in that case came to the conclusion that the mortgage was affected by lis pen dens not because of the fact that it was effected subsequent to the decree of the first Court but because it was executed during the pendency of the suit. Emphasis was laid more upon the word ‘pendency’ rather than upon the word ‘decree.’ If before the institution of the suit an alienee has no right against the other co-tenants to demand that the property alienated should be set apart to his alienor's share, much more so where a tenant-in-common has brought a suit to have a partition effected in which equities would be adjusted. If seems to me therefore that the contention, advanced by Mr. Bamakrishna Iyer should prevail and the learned Official Referes' should have allotted the entire immovable-property to the plaintiff. In this view if is unnecessary to consider the further contention raised by him that at any rate the immovable property allotted to the defendant's share should be made subject to & charge in the plaintiff's favour for the amount of the money that has been found due and payable by defendants 1 to 4 in respect of her share, though as I have already indicated, his client would be entitled to a charge which would prevail over the mortgage of defendant 9 and the sale in favour of defendants 10 to 12. The next contention raised by him is as-regards the claim for profits in the business carried on subsequent to the death of Abdul Rahiman by defendants 1 to 3 or for interest in respect of her share of the value of the stock in trade that existed on the date of the death of Abdul Bahiman. The claim for profits was negatived by my learned brother Lakshmana Rao J. It therefore follows that the plaintiff must be entitled to interest. This is not seriously controverted by the defendants. I there fore award her interest at six per cent, per annum on her share of the assets which is Rs. 10,000 from 18th June 1921 up to date. If all the immovable properties are allotted to the plaintiff, the amount payable by the defendants will be Rs. 40,191-15-7 minus Rs. 16,582. In the view I have taken and having regard to the fact that there are no moveable properties of the estate of Abdul Rahiman Sahib available for partition, there is no use in directing a partition of the said moveables among defendants 1 to 4 to enable defendants 9 to 12 to have recourse to them. I do not therefore think it necessary to refer the matter again to the Official Referee. In the result the report of the Official Referee will be modified in the light of my findings and a final decree will be drawn in accordance there, with. The plaintiff will have her costs of suit and the proceedings before the Official Referee from defendant 1 and from the assets of defendants 2 and 4 in the hands of the Official Assignee. Defendants 9 to 12 will bear their own costs of suit. The Receiver will put the plaintiff in possession of all the moveable properties covered by the Referee's report and found to belong to Abdul Rahi man's estate by the 1st June.
C.R.K/D.S
18. Order accordingly.