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  • Mookerjee
  • Chotzner, JJ.
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  • Chotzner, JJ.
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (now the appellant) instituted a suit for recovery of possession of land and mesne profits in the Court of the Second Munsiff at Midnapore. The plaintiff originally valued the subject-matter at Rs. 600 and paid court-fee accordingly. The defendants objected that the suit had been undervalued and that, if correctly valued, it would fall outside the pecuniary jurisdiction of that court.

On 1 December 1921 the Munsiff determined the value of the subject-matter to be Rs. 6,000 and returned the plaint for presentation to the proper court. On 21 December 1921 the plaint was presented before the Subordinate Judge at Midnapore, but the plaintiff there valued it at Rs. 1,125 and paid court-fee on that basis. The defendants again objected.

The suit was taken up for trial on 14 September 1922; the hearing lasted three days and on 16 September 1922 the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the merits and directed the plaintiff to pay the deficit court-fee. The parties disputed whether the plaintiff had given an undertaking to pay the deficit fee before the trial; the fee ordered was not paid.

The decree dated 23 October 1922 recited that the Subordinate Judge had determined the value at Rs. 6,000 and that the deficit court-fee had not been paid. On 3 February 1923 the decree was amended in respect of costs to compute them on the basis of a Rs. 6,000 valuation and to award separate costs to different defendants.

The plaintiff appealed to this Court on 20 April 1923, challenging the amended decree only on the question of costs. The memorandum of appeal was valued by reference to the difference between the original and amended costs and the appellant paid the required court-fee for the appeal. The Stamp Reporter noted the decree's recitation that the deficit court-fee had not been paid, and on receipt of the records the matter was placed before this Court for orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this Court may compel the appellant to pay the deficit court-fee under Section 12 of the Court-Fees Act 1870 where (the parties dispute) the trial judge determined valuation at Rs. 6,000 but the plaintiff allegedly failed to comply with a direction or undertaking to pay the deficit fee.
  2. Whether clause (2) of Section 12 (read with paragraph ii of Section 10) applies when the detriment to the revenue is attributable to the plaintiff's failure to fulfil a direction/undertaking rather than to an erroneous decision on valuation by the trial court.
  3. Whether a litigant who has given an undertaking to the court (and then breaches it) is in contempt such that the appellate court should refuse to entertain his appeal until he purges that contempt.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • There is no provision in law that permits this Court to compel the appellant to pay the deficit court-fee.
  • Section 12 of the Court-Fees Act is inapplicable because the valuation question was not wrongly decided by the trial court; the revenue loss is due to the plaintiff's failure to carry out the trial court's direction (or the alleged failure), not to an erroneous judicial decision on valuation.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent relied upon the provisions of Section 12 of the Court-Fees Act, 1870, which (inter alia) permit a court of appeal to require a party to pay an additional fee where the appellate court considers the valuation question was wrongly decided, and to apply provisions of section 10, paragraph ii.
  • Implicitly, the respondent contended that the Court had power to require payment of any deficit court-fee arising from an improper valuation decision or its correction on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Inland Revenue v. Oliver (1909) A.C. 427 Cited in the context of interpreting fiscal statutes and the limits of construction to prevent evasion. Listed among authorities showing how fiscal provisions should be strictly construed but not to permit evasion; used as part of the statutory interpretation background.
Partington v. Attorney General (1869) 4 H.L. 100 Cited regarding construction of fiscal statutes. Referenced with other authorities to illustrate the principles governing interpretation of fiscal enactments.
Cox v. Rabbits (1878) 3 A.C. 473 Cited regarding construction of fiscal statutes. Included in the list supporting the interpretive approach to fiscal provisions.
Pryce v. Monmouthshire Ry. Co. (1879) 4 A.C. 197 Cited regarding construction of fiscal statutes. Referenced as authority in the same grouping concerning statutory construction of revenue provisions.
Oriental Bank Co. v. Wright (1880) 5 A.C. 842 Cited regarding construction of fiscal statutes. Used in the discussion of how fiscal statutes are to be construed.
Tennant v. Smith (1892) A.C. 150 Cited regarding construction of fiscal statutes. Part of the authorities listed to frame the rule on statutory construction in fiscal contexts.
Secretary of State for India v. Scoble (1903) A.C. 299 Cited regarding construction of fiscal statutes. Referenced among cases addressing interpretation of revenue-related legislation.
United States v. Thirty-Six Barrels of Wine (1870) 7 Blatchford 459 Cited regarding construction of fiscal or revenue-related provisions. Included in the list of authorities demonstrating interpretive approaches to fiscal law.
A.G. v. Furess Ry. Co. (1899) 2 Q.B. 267 Cited regarding construction of fiscal statutes. Listed with other authorities on statutory construction principles applicable to revenue matters.
Dharmapal v. Krista Dayal [1909] 10 C.L.J. 631 Cited for the limitations and explanation of the rule that a contemnor is not to be heard until he has purged his contempt. Relied upon as a key authority where prior decisions about contempt and the consequences of breach of undertaking were reviewed and analysed.
Clarke v. Dew [1829] 1 Russ. & M. 103 Cited as part of the body of decisions on the rule denying relief to contemnors until purged. One of multiple authorities reviewed in connection with the court's conclusion about contempt for breach of undertaking.
Hering v. Clovery [1841] 12 Sim. 410 Cited among authorities on contempt and denial of privileges to contemnors. Referenced as part of the jurisprudential foundation for the court's contempt-related conclusion.
Carter v. Career [1845] 5 Moor. P.C. 252 Cited in the context of contempt doctrines. Included among cases illustrating the principle that a contemnor may be denied court favours until he has purged his contempt.
Chuck v. Cremi [1846] 1 Coop. Tem. Cott. 205 Cited in the context of contempt doctrines. One of the cases collected and relied on in the court's review of the contempt rule.
Russell v. East Anglian Ry. Co. [1850] 3 Mac. & G. 104 Cited in relation to consequences of contempt. Part of the array of authorities supporting the court's reliance on contempt principles.
Garstin v. Garstin [1865] 4 Sw. & Tr. 73 Cited regarding denial of privileges to a contemnor. Used as part of the general survey of cases on contempt.
Cavendish v. Cavendish [1866] 15 W.R. (Eng.) 182 Cited in the context of contempt jurisprudence. Included among the precedents reviewed by the court.
Gordon v. Gordon [1904] P. 163 Cited as an important modern example of the doctrine denying relief to contemnors. Referred to as a case that collected and analysed prior authorities on the subject; relied upon in reasoning about contempt.
Wenman v. Osbaldiston [1719] 2 Bro. P.C. 276 Earlier authority on denying relief to contemnors until purge. Part of the historical authorities the Court noted in support of the contempt principle.
Hill v. Bissel [1730] Moseley 258 Early precedent on contempt consequences. Included in the compilation of relevant cases.
Vowel v. Young [1803] 9 Ves. 172 Authority on contempt and consequences for litigants in breach of undertakings. Referenced as part of the doctrinal background.
Anon [1808] 15 Ves. 174 Authority cited in the context of the contempt rule. One of the cases noted by the Court in the survey of the doctrine.
Bellchamber v. Giani [1819] 3 Madd. 550 Authority on contempt-related denial of relief. Included among historical precedents relied on for the contempt principle.
Killing v. Killing [1821] 6 Madd. 68 Cited regarding contempt consequences. Part of the group of authorities reviewed by the Court.
Odell v. Hart [1828] 1 Molly. 492 Precedent on contempt and denial of privileges. Referenced in the Court's review of authority on the point.
Bryan v. Twigg [1834] 3 L.J. Ch. 114 Cited as authority concerning contempt for breach of undertakings. Included in the survey of cases the Court considered.
Lord Cranstown v. Goldshede [1836] 2 Y. & C. 70 Authority on contempt consequences. One of the historical precedents relied upon for the doctrine.
Wilson v. Bates [1838] 3 My. & Cr. 197 Cited among cases on contempt and privileges. Included in the Court's contemplation of the doctrine denying relief to contemnors.
Crawforth v. Holder [1839] 3 Y. & C. 718 Authority on contempt-related denial of relief. Part of the body of cases cited in support of the contempt principle.
Harrison v. Harrison [1842] 4 Moon. P.C. 96 Cited as part of the jurisprudence on contempt. Referenced by the Court in its review of authorities.
Goldfield v. Cobbett [1849] 12 Beav. 91 Authority on consequences of contempt. Included among cases supporting the rule limiting relief to contemnors.
Taylor v. Taylor [1849] 1 Mac. & G. 397 Cited in relation to contempt jurisprudence. Part of the collected authorities reviewed by the Court.
Futvoye v. Kennard [1859] 2 Giff. 110 Authority on contempt and undertakings to the court. One of the precedents considered in the Court's analysis of contempt.
Burdell v. Hay [1863] 33 Beav. 189 Cited in the context of the doctrine denying relief to contemnors. Included in the historical review of authorities.
Gould v. Twine [1874] 13 L.J. Ch. 381 Authority on contempt consequences. Referenced in the Court's consideration of precedent.
White v. Bromige [1878] 26 W.R. 312 Cited among authorities on denying relief to those in contempt. Included in the Court's review of the doctrine.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory provisions invoked and contested: Section 12 of the Court-Fees Act 1870 (which contains a clause that the trial court's valuation is final as between the parties and a second clause allowing a court of appeal, reference or revision to require additional fee where the appellate court considers the valuation question was wrongly decided to the detriment of the revenue) and paragraph ii of Section 10 (which authorises staying proceedings and dismissal if an additional fee required is not paid).

The appellant's primary contention was that Section 12(2) is inapplicable because there was no erroneous judicial decision about valuation; the detriment to the revenue arose from the plaintiff's failure to comply with the direction of the court (or with an undertaking). The Court acknowledged that fiscal provisions are to be strictly construed, citing a series of authorities to that effect, but observed that the precise legal consequences depend on the facts.

The Court then addressed the factual dispute about how the trial proceeded despite the valuation objection. The normal course would have been for the Subordinate Judge to decide valuation and require payment of any deficit before trying the suit on the merits. The parties' accounts differed: the defendants asserted that the plaintiff gave an undertaking to pay the deficit before decree; the plaintiff denied giving any such undertaking. After examining the affidavits, the Court accepted the defendants' narrative, stating it was inconceivable that an experienced Subordinate Judge would have tried the suit on the merits unless an undertaking had been given.

The Court proceeded to the consequences of breach of such an undertaking. It observed that breach of an undertaking given to the court, pending proceedings, and on the faith of which the court sanctioned a particular course of action, amounts to misconduct constituting contempt. The Court reviewed authority (including Dharmapal v. Krista Dayal and numerous earlier decisions) explaining the well-settled principle that a person guilty of such contempt is not to be heard until he has purged his contempt and paid costs. The Court described the doctrine as limiting the privileges available to a litigant in contempt and noted that the rule is restricted to proceedings in which the contempt occurs.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the plaintiff had effectively obtained a trial on the merits by giving an undertaking which he subsequently breached when the decision went against him. By refusing to pay the court-fee demanded on a suit valued at Rs. 6,000 but adopting that valuation to secure the appellate forum, the plaintiff had placed himself "entirely out of court." In short, the plaintiff was in contempt and therefore had no standing to be heard by this Court until he purged that contempt.

The Court therefore concluded that the appeal should not be entertained. The decision emphasizes the Court's reliance on the contempt doctrine rather than invoking Section 12(2) as a direct statutory basis to require payment in the circumstances described.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: THIS APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The appeal was dismissed with costs; the hearing fee was assessed at five gold mohurs.
  • The practical effect on the appellant is that he is not permitted to prosecute this appeal in this Court because, on the Court's findings, he stands in contempt for breach of an undertaking to pay the deficit court-fee and has not purged that contempt.
  • No broader new legal precedent is announced beyond the application of established principles: the opinion rests on well-known rules about contempt for breach of undertakings to the court and the consequence that a contemnor may be denied certain privileges until he purges his contempt. The Court's decision is thus an application of existing doctrine to the particular facts before it.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond that text has been added.

Show full summary ...

    Raj Rajeswari Jiu And Others v. Gati Krishna Chakrabarti And Others

    1. This appeal raises a question of some novelty and of considerable importance.

    2. The plaintiff, who is the appellant in this court, instituted a suit for recovery of possession of land and mesne profits in the Court of the Second Munsiff at Midnapore. The subject-matter of the litigation was valued at Rs. 600 and court-fee was paid accordingly. The defendants objected that the suit had been undervalued and that, if properly valued, it would be found to be beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court where it had been instituted. This point was investigated and on the 1st December, 1921, the Munsiff came to the conclusion that the value of the subject-matter of the litigation was Rs. 6,000. The result was that the plaint was returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court. On the 21st December, 1921, the plaint was presented in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Midnapore; but notwithstanding the finding of the Munsiff, the suit was valued at Rs. 1,125 and court-fee was paid accordingly. The defendants objected that the suit had been undervalued. The objection was manifestly of vital importance from a two fold standpoint. In the first place, if the value of the suit was Rs. 6,000 instead of Rs. 1,125, the forum of a possible appeal would be the High Court and not the court; of the District Judge. In the second place if the value was Rs. 6,000 instead of Rs. 1,125, a considerable amount of additional court-fee would be leviable from the plaintiff. The suit was taken up for trial on the 14th September, 1922. The hearing lasted for three days and on the 16th September, 1922, the suit was dismissed on the merits. The judgment of the Subordinate Judge embodied a direction upon the plaintiff to pay the deficit court-fee. The parties are not agreed as to what happened at the trial and how this order came to be made. This much is clear that the court-fee demanded by the Subordinate Judge was not paid. The decree dated the 23rd October, 1922, recited, first, that although the suit had been valued at Rs. 1,125 by the plaintiff, its value had been determined by the Subordinate Judge to be Rs. 6,000 and, seeondly, that the deficit court-fee had not been paid up to that date by the plaintiff. On the 3rd February, 1923, the decree was amended in respect of costs. In the decree as originally drawn up, the costs had been calculated on the basis of a valuation of Rs. 1,125. The decree was amended, and costs were calculated on the basis of a valuation of Rs. 6,000. The decree further directed that separate costs would be paid to the different sets of defendants. The plaintiff, who was apparently satisfied with, the decree as originally drawn up, now found himself in a position of embarrassment and. on the 20th April, 1923, lodged the present appeal in this Court against the amended decree. The grounds were directed not to the merits but to the question of costs. The memorandum of appeal was valued at the difference between the original and amended costs and the court-fee was paid accordingly. The Stamp Reporter did not fail to notice the note made in the decree that the deficit court-fee had not been paid by the plaintiff; but the question could not be considered at that stage, because till the records were received, it could not be ascertained whether the amount due from the plaintiff had or had not been deposited in the lower court. On the receipt of the records, the matter has now been placed before us for orders. The appellant has urged that there is no provision of the law which entitles this Court to compel him to pay the deficit court-fee. The respondent has relied upon the provisions of Section 12 of the Court-Fees Act 1870. The first clause of the section provides that the decision of the trial court upon the question of valuation is final as between the parties to the suit. The second clause provides for the correction of error, if any, committed in this respect by the trial court. The second clause is in these terms:

    But whenever any such suit comes before a court of appeal, reference or revision, if such court considers that the said question has been wrongly decided, to the detriment of the revenue, it shall require the party by whom such fee has been paid to pay so much additional fee as would have been payable had the question been rightly decided and the provision of section 10, paragraph ii, shall apply.

    3. Paragraph ii of Section 10 provides that where in the opinion of the court, the valuation of the suit has been wrongly estimated and the plaintiff has consequently been required to pay an additional fee, the suit shall be stayed until the additional fee is paid. If the additional fee is not paid within such time as the court shall fix, the suit shall be dismissed.

    4. The appellant contends that Section 12 is by its terms inapplicable. The question of valuation has not been wrongly decided by the trial court, and though there has been a detriment of the revenue, it is attributable, not to an erroneous decision of the court upon the question of valuation, but to the failure of the plaintiff to carry out the direction of the court. In these circumstances, it is argued that clause (2) of section 12 is of no assistance. It may be conceded that a provision of this character should be strictly Construed and that additional fee should be levied from a party litigant only in exact conformity with the precise words of the statute; although provisions in fiscal statutes should not be so construed as to furnish a chance of escape and a means of evasion: Inland Revenue v. Oliver (1909) A.C. 427; Partington v. Att. Gen. (1869) 4 H.L. 100; Cox v. Rabbits (1878) 3 A.C. 473; Pryce v. Monmouthshire Ry. Co. (1879) 4 A.C. 197; Oriental Bank Co. v. Wright (1880) 5 A.C. 842; Tennant v. Smith (1892) A.C. 150; Secy. of State for India v. Scoble (1903) A.C. 299; United States v. Thirty-Six Barrels of Wine (1870) 7 Blatchford 459; A.G. v. Furess Ry. Co. (1899) 2 Q.B. 267. But this manifestly raises the question, what is the position of a litigant who takes up such an attitude, That must be determined with reference to the facts of the particular case before the court.

    5. It is not disputed that in the normal course of events the question of valuation should have been decided in the first instance and an order made by the Subordinate Judge upon the plaintiff to pay the deficit court-fee before he proceeded to try the suit on the merits. There has been a divergence of statement between the parties as to how there was a departure from the provision of the law on the subject. The defendants maintain that the suit was tried on the merits because the plaintiff gave an undertaking that the deficit court-fee would be paid before the decree was drawn up. The plaintiff maintains, on the other hand, that no such undertaking was given. "We have examined the affidavits placed before us and we have come to the conclusion that the story narrated by the defendants should be accepted as true. It is inconceivable that an experienced Subordinate Judge would have proceeded to the trial of the suit on the merits, unless an undertaking had been given that the deficit court-fee would be paid. What the plaintiff has done in substance is that he has obtained a trial of the matters in controversy on the merits and he has gone back on his undertaking because the result has proved unfavourable. In these circumstances, the question arises, what action should be taken by the court.

    6. It is unquestionable that the breach of an undertaking given to the court by a litigant, pending proceedings, on the faith of which the court sanctions a particular course of action or inaction is misconduct amounting to contempt. It is further well-settled that when a person is guilty of such contempt he places himself in a perilous situation so as not to be heard by the court till he has purged his contempt. Lord Chief Baron Gilbert laid it down as a general rule that the contemnor who is in contempt is never to be heard by motion or otherwise till he has cleared his contempt and paid the costs; as for example, if he comes to move for anything or desires any favour of the court (Gilbert on Forum Romanum 102). The limitations of this rule were examined and explained in the case of Dharmapal v. Krista Dayal [1909] 10 C.L.J. 631, where the decisions in Clarke v. Dew [1829] 1 Russ. & M. 103; Hering v. Clovery [1841] 12 Sim. 410; Carter v. Career [1845] 5 Moor. P.C. 252; Chuck v. Cremi [1846]) 1 Coop. Tem. Cott. 205; Russell v. East Anglian Ry. Co. [1850] 3 Mac. & G. 104; Garstin v. Garstin [1865] 4 Sw. & Tr. 73; Cavendish v. Cavendish [1866] 15 W.R. (Eng.) 182; Gordon v. Gordon [1904] P. 163; were analysed and reviewed. Reference may further be made to the cases of Wenman v. Osbaldiston [1719] 2 Bro. P.C. 276; Hill v. Bissel [1730] Moseley 258; Vowel v. Young [1803] 9 Ves. 172; Anon [1808] 15 Ves. 174; Bellchamber v. Giani [1819] 3 Madd. 550; Killing v. Killing [1821] 6 Madd. 68; Odell v. Hart [1828] 1 Molly. 492; Bryan v. Twigg [1834] 3 L.J. Ch. 114; Lord Cranstown v. Goldshede [1836] 2 Y. & C. 70; Wilson V. Bates [1838] 3 My. & Cr. 197; Crawforth v. Holder [1839] 3 Y. & C. 718; Harrison v. Harrison [1842] 4 Moon. P.C. 96; Goldfield v. Cobbett [1849] 12 Beav. 91; Taylor v. Taylor [1849] 1 Mac. & G. 397; Futvoye v. Kennard [1859] 2 Giff. 110; Burdell v. Hay [1863] 33 Beav. 189; Gould V. Twine [1874] 13 L.J. Ch. 381; White v. Bromige [1878] 26 W.R. 312; where the applicability of this doctrine came under consideration in diverse circumstances. It is in fact an elementary rule that one in contempt may be denied certain favours; of the court and privileges, until he has purged himself of contempt, and a useful collection of cases was brought to the notice of the court in the course of the argument in Gordon v. Gordon [1904] P. 163. The rule denying privileges is limited to proceedings in which the contempt occurs. A litigant in contempt has no standing in the court. In the case before us, the attitude of the plaintiff has placed him entirely out of court. He is competent to appeal to this court, only on the assumption that a decree has been made against him in a litigation valued at Rs. 6,000. If the value of the suit is Rs. 1,125, as he pretended in the court below, the appeal lay to the Court of the District Judge. He has adopted the view of the Subordinate Judge that the value of the subject-matter of this litigation is Rs. 6,000 in order to enable him to seek the assistance of this court. He has, however, most inconsistently refused to pay the court-fee leviable on the plaint in a suit valued at Rs. 6,000, We are consequently of opinion that the appeal should not be entertained.

    7. The result is that this appeal is dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing fee at five gold mohurs. Appeal dismissed.

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    Raj Rajeswari Jiu And Others v. Gati Krishna Chakrabarti And Others
    (Aug 2, 1923)