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  • section 107(1) of the Government of India Act, 1933.Section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act
  • provisions of section 107(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935.The Civil Revision
  • provisions of this Act, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
  • Tenancy Act by the Amending Act of 1937 (Bihar Act VIII
  • Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.I
  • Judicial Procedure and sections 1585 to section 177
  • provisions of section 1634 of the Bihar Tenancy Act,
  • Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provision of section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act
  • provision of this Act, the Code of Civil Procedure
  • XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 100(2) of the Government of India Act
  • SECTION 311 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sub-section (2), the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 143(2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act,
  • Civil Judicature. Section 9 of the Code
  • section 1634 of the Bihar Tenancy Act
  • section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act
  • 107(1) of the Government of India Act
  • section 153 of the Bihar Tenancy Act).
  • provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act
  • provision of the Bihar Tenancy Act.
  • section 4(1) of the Code of Civil
  • Bihar Tenancy Act provides:(1)
  • section 4 of the Code
  • Order XXI rule 66(2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 107(1) of the Government of India Act, 1933.Section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act
  • provisions of section 107(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935.The Civil Revision
  • provisions of this Act, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
  • Tenancy Act by the Amending Act of 1937 (Bihar Act VIII
  • Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.I
  • Judicial Procedure and sections 1585 to section 177
  • provisions of section 1634 of the Bihar Tenancy Act,
  • Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provision of section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act
  • provision of this Act, the Code of Civil Procedure
  • XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 100(2) of the Government of India Act
  • SECTION 311 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sub-section (2), the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 143(2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act,
  • Civil Judicature. Section 9 of the Code
  • section 1634 of the Bihar Tenancy Act
  • section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act
  • 107(1) of the Government of India Act
  • section 153 of the Bihar Tenancy Act).
  • provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act
  • provision of the Bihar Tenancy Act.
  • section 4(1) of the Code of Civil
  • Bihar Tenancy Act provides:(1)
  • section 4 of the Code
  • Order XXI rule 66(2)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Full Bench: Chatterji, J.; concurring judgments by Fazl Ali, C.J. and Manohar Lall, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two separate rent execution matters were referred to a Full Bench because both raised the common question whether section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act is void as repugnant to the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore void under section 107(1) of the Government of India Act.

One matter (the Civil Revision) challenged an order of a Munsif dismissing a rent execution case. The rent decree under execution arose from a suit valued at Rs. 99-15-3. Because the amount claimed exceeded Rs. 50, an appeal lay to the District Judge under section 153 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, but no appeal was taken. The Civil Revision was presented directly against the Munsif's order.

The other matter (the Miscellaneous Appeal) arose from a rent execution where the original suit was valued at Rs. 4-9-8. The Munsif who passed the decree had final jurisdiction under section 153 (amount not exceeding Rs. 50), so his order in execution was not appealable; an appeal filed to the lower appellate Court was therefore incompetent and dismissed. The decree-holder appealed; because the jurisdictional question arose, the memorandum of appeal was treated as an application in revision by the Full Bench.

Facts of the execution: the holding (one plot) was valued by the Court at Rs. 52. At the first sale there was no bidder except the decree-holder, whose bid equalled the decretal amount of Rs. 12-15-0. The Court adjourned the sale. At the next sale the decree-holder again alone bid up to the decretal amount. Because that bid was less than the price specified in the sale proclamation, the Court declined to accept the bid (citing section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act) and dismissed the execution. The decree-holder appealed; the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal. The decree-holder then brought the Miscellaneous Appeal to the Full Bench (treated as revision).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act is void for repugnancy to the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore void under section 107(1) of the Government of India Act.
  2. Whether section 163A falls within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature (i.e., whether it is a matter covered by items in the Provincial Legislative List, or instead by item 4 of the Concurrent Legislative List — "Civil Procedure").
  3. Whether the Civil Revision was maintainable where an appeal lay under section 153 of the Bihar Tenancy Act (i.e., whether revision under section 115 CPC was barred because an appeal was available).
  4. Whether the executing Court was justified in dismissing the execution case solely because the decree-holder refused to bid up to the price specified in the sale proclamation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Decree-holder (as represented in the opinion)

  • Argued (as recorded in the opinion) that section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act is repugnant to the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore void under section 107(1) of the Government of India Act.
  • Contended that the executing Court erred in dismissing the execution solely because the decree-holder declined to bid up to the sale-proclamation price; there was no warrant in section 163A for such dismissal and the decree-holder should have been given an opportunity to take further steps (for example, to obtain a fresh sale proclamation).

Respondent / Provincial Government (as presented through the Advocate-General)

  • Contended that section 163A is valid and falls within the Provincial Legislative List — specifically, that it pertains to matters covered by item no. 2 ("procedure in Rent and Revenue Courts") or item no. 21 ("Land ... the collection of rents ... including the relation of landlord and tenant").

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia (Federal Court) States the principle (drawing on Stock Motor Ploughs v. Forsyth) that where paramount legislation does not purport to be exhaustive and itself permits or recognises other laws restricting or qualifying the general provision, such qualification by another law cannot be held repugnant to the paramount law. The Court invoked this principle (as applied in Megh Raj) to interpret section 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (the saving clause) and to conclude that section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act — a special procedural provision — is not repugnant to the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code.
Stock Motor Ploughs v. Forsyth Referred to as the decision underlying the principle that a paramount statute which permits or recognises qualifications cannot render those qualifications repugnant. Referred to (via Megh Raj) to support the proposition that the Code's provisions, when not exhaustive, do not invalidate special or local laws that qualify them.
United Provinces v. Musammat Atiqa Begum (Gwyer, C.J.) Observation that the legislative lists are broadly worded and items should not be read narrowly; general descriptive words should extend to ancillary or subsidiary matters fairly and reasonably comprehended by them. The Court used these observations to support the conclusion that the expression "the collection of rents" in item 21 of the Provincial Legislative List is wide enough to include recovery of rent by suit, and therefore that section 163A falls within the Provincial Legislative List (item 21).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion proceeds in distinct analytical stages, each tied to statutory text and the specific facts before the Court:

  1. Maintainability of the Civil Revision: The Civil Revision challenged an order of a Munsif in a case where the original suit amount exceeded Rs. 50. Under section 153 of the Bihar Tenancy Act an appeal lay to the District Judge. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure bars revision against an order which is appealable. Therefore the Civil Revision was not maintainable and was dismissed (without costs).
  2. Competence of the Miscellaneous Appeal and treatment as revision: In the second matter the original suit value did not exceed Rs. 50 and the Munsif had final jurisdiction under section 153; the order in execution was therefore not appealable, rendering the appeal incompetent. Because the question argued was one of jurisdiction, the memorandum of appeal was treated by the Court as an application in revision.
  3. Statutory relationship between the Bihar Tenancy Act and the Code: Section 143(1)–(2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act allows the High Court to make rules and provides that, subject to rules and other provisions of the Tenancy Act, the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to such suits. The Court construed section 143(2) to mean that the Code applies only so long as there is no provision in the Tenancy Act on the subject; once a provision is made in the Tenancy Act (if enacted by a competent authority), the Code ceases to apply in that respect.
  4. Repugnancy argument under the Government of India Act: The appellant argued that section 163A (introduced by the 1937/1938 amendments) was repugnant to the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code (which pre-dated Part III of the Government of India Act and thus qualified as "existing Indian law") and therefore void under section 107(1) of the Government of India Act. The Court considered the definition of "existing Indian law" and noted that the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) was in force before Part III; thus the repugnancy question arose.
  5. Interaction of section 4(1) of the Code and Federal Court authority: Section 4(1) of the Code (saving clause) preserves special or local laws and special procedure. The Court relied on the Federal Court's decision in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia (and the principle from Stock Motor Ploughs v. Forsyth) to hold that where the paramount legislation (the Code) does not purport to be exhaustive or unqualified, and recognizes other laws restricting or qualifying the general provision, those qualifications are not repugnant. Thus section 163A — prescribing a special form of procedure in rent recovery — is not repugnant to the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2).
  6. Characterisation under the legislative lists: The Court examined whether section 163A fell under item 4 of the Concurrent Legislative List ("Civil Procedure"). It distinguished "Civil Procedure" (procedure of Courts of Civil Judicature) from the special procedure for rent suits under the Bihar Tenancy Act, noting rent suits are not "civil suits" in the ordinary sense and that the Tenancy Act specifically confers jurisdiction and prescribes procedure. The Court therefore concluded that section 163A does not fall under item 4 of the Concurrent List.
  7. Provincial competence: The Court concluded that section 163A falls within item 21 of the Provincial Legislative List ("Land ... the collection of rents ..."), observing that the phrase "collection of rents" is broad enough to include recovery of rent by suit. The Court also observed that section 163A may fall under item 2 (jurisdiction and powers of courts; procedure in rent and revenue courts) but did not need to decide that point once it found item 21 sufficient to establish Provincial competence.
  8. Application to the facts (executing Court's conduct): On the specific execution facts, the Court held that the executing Court was not justified in dismissing the execution solely because the decree-holder refused to bid up to the sale-proclamation price. Nothing in section 163A authorised immediate dismissal in such circumstances. The proper course would have been to give the decree-holder an opportunity (for example, to obtain a fresh sale proclamation) and, only if he failed to take further steps, to dismiss the execution.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

SECTION 163A OF THE BIHAR TENANCY ACT IS NOT VOID. The Full Bench concluded that section 163A is within the competence of the Provincial Legislature (principally under item 21 of the Provincial Legislative List), is not repugnant to the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore is not void under section 107(1) of the Government of India Act.

Additional dispositive rulings:

  • The Civil Revision was held not maintainable (and dismissed) because an appeal lay under section 153 of the Bihar Tenancy Act and section 115 CPC bars revision where an appeal is available.
  • The Miscellaneous Appeal (treated as a revision application) was allowed: the orders of the Courts below (which had dismissed the execution and dismissed the decree-holder's challenge) were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the trial Court to be dealt with according to law in light of the Court's observations.
  • The Court found the executing Court erred in dismissing the execution solely for a low bid; the decree-holder should have been given opportunity to take further steps (e.g., a fresh sale proclamation).
  • There was to be no order as to costs in the circumstances recorded by the Court.

Implications: The direct effects are that (1) section 163A remains a valid provision of the Bihar Tenancy Act; (2) the particular execution proceeding was remitted for further lawful proceedings consistent with the Full Bench's directions; and (3) the executing Court must not dismiss an execution solely because a decree-holder bids only the decretal amount but must allow opportunity for further steps. The opinion does not purport to lay down any broader new precedent beyond the conclusions described above.


End of summary. This summary is confined strictly to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or law beyond that text.

    Ram Ran Vijay Prasad Singh v. Kishun Singh

    Chatterji, J.:— This Miscellaneous Appeal and the Civil Revision, which arise out of two separate rent execution cases, were referred to a Full Bench, because the question involved in both the cases is whether section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act is void by reason of the provisions of section 107(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935.

    The Civil Revision may be disposed of on the short ground that it is not maintainable. It is directed against an order of the Munsif dismissing a rent execution case. The decree under execution is a rent decree passed by a Munsif in a suit valued at Rs. 99-15-3. As the amount claimed in the suit exceeded Rs. 50, an appeal lay from the order complained of to the District Judge (see section 153 of the Bihar Tenancy Act). No such appeal was filed, but this application in revision has been presented directly against the order of the Munsif. Under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure no revision lies against an order which is appealable. Clearly, therefore, this application in revision is not maintainable; and I would dismiss it, but without costs.

    The Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against an appellate order dismissing, in concurrence with the Court of first instance, a rent execution case. The suit in which the rent decree under execution was obtained was valued at Rs. 4-9-8 Only. The decree was passed by a Munsif empowered to exercise final jurisdiction under section 153 of the Bihar Tenancy Act. As the amount claimed in the suit did not exceed Rs. 50, the order passed by the Munsif in the execution case was not appealable. Therefore the appeal which was filed in the lower appellate Court was not competent. Consequently this second appeal does not lie. But as the question argued is one of jurisdiction, the memorandum of appeal may be treated as an application in revision.

    In the execution case the decree-holder asked for sale of the holding in respect of which the rent decree was obtained. The holding which consists of one plot only was valued by the Court at Rs. 52. When it was put up for sale, there was no bidder except the decree-holder and he bid up to the extent of the decretal amount only, i.e, Rs. 12-15-0. As the bid was low, the Court adjourned the sale. Again when on the next date the holding was put to sale, the decree-holder was the only bidder and his bid was to the extent of the decretal amount. As this amount was less than the price specified in the sale proclamation, the Court did not accept the bid in view of the provisions of section 1634 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, and it dismissed the execution case. The decree-holder then preferred an appeal to the lower appellate Court which, was dismissed. Hence this Miscellaneous Appeal by the decree-holder.

    Section 143 of the Bihar Tenancy Act provides:

    (1) The High Court may, from time to time, with the approval of the Provincial Government, make rules consistent with this Act, declaring that any portions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall not apply to suits between landlord and tenant as such or to any specified classes of such suits, or shall apply to them subject to modifications specified in the rules.

    (2) Subject to any rules so made, and subject also to the other provisions of this Act, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all such suits.”

    No rules have been framed by this High Court under sub-section (1) barring the applicability of any provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, according to sub-section (2), the Code of Civil Procedure will apply to all suits between landlord and tenant where there is no other provision of the Bihar Tenancy Act. When in 1936 the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure was added by this High Court in exercise of its rule-making power conferred by section 122 of the Code, there was no corresponding provision in the Bihar Tenancy Act. Consequently the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) would apply to execution cases under the Bihar Tenancy Act; and it was in force when section 1634 was inserted in the Bihar. Tenancy Act by the Amending Act of 1937 (Bihar Act VIII of 1937).

    It has been argued that section 1634 of the Bihar Tenancy Act is repugnant to the proviso to Order. XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and is, therefore, void under section 107(1) of the Government of India Act, 1933.

    section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act (omitting the provisos which are not material to this case) runs as follows:—

    “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a holding or portion of a holding advertised for sale shall not be sold for a price lower than that specified in the sale proclamation.”

    The proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure is in these words:—

    “Provided that no estimate of the value of the property, other than those, if any, made by the decree-holder and judgment-debtor respectively together with a statement that the Court does not vouch for the accuracy of either, shall be inserted in the sale-proclamation”.

    Section 107(1) of the Government of India Act provides:—

    “If any provision of a Provincial law is repugnant to any provision of a Federal law which the Federal Legislature is competent to enact or to any provision of an existing Indian law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List, then, subject to the provisions of this section, the Federal law, whether passed before or after the Provincial law, or, as the case may be, the existing Indian law, shall prevail and the Provincial law shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.”

    The expression “existing Indian law according to the”, definition given in section 311 of the Government of India Act, means

    “any law, ordinance, order, byelaw, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of Part III of this Act by any legislature, authority or person in any territories for the time being comprised in British India, being a legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, ordinance, order, byelaw, rule or regulation”.

    Part III of this Act refers to “The Governors' Provinces”. The proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure came into force before the commencement of Part III.

    The contention is that section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act deals with a matter relating to “Civil Procedure” which is covered by item no. 4 of the Concurrent Legislative List which stands thus:—

    “Civil Procedure, including the law of Limitation and all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the date of the passing of this Act; the recovery in a Governor's Province or a Chief Commissioner's Province of claims in respect of taxes and other public demands, including arrears of land revenue and sums recoverable as such, arising outside that Province”.

    That being so, it is said, section 163A which was enacted by the Provincial Legislature, is void inasmuch as it is repugnant to the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure which is an “existing Indian law”.

    I shall assume for the moment that the provision of section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act is a matter which is covered by item no. 4 of the Concurrent Legislative List and does not fall within the Provincial Legislative List. Under section 100(2) of the Government of India Act a Provincial. Legislature also has power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List. It cannot, therefore, be disputed that section 1634 of the Bihar Tenancy Act was within the competence of the Provincial Legislature. The true effect of section 143(2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act, in my opinion, is that the Code of Civil Procedure will apply only so long as there is no provision of this Act. In other words, if there is no provision of this Act, the Code of Civil Procedure will, apply, but once a provision is made in the Act—no matter when— provided it is enacted by a competent authority, the Code of Civil Procedure will no longer apply. If this is the true effect of section 143(2) of the Act, this was the “existing Indian law” at the time section 163A of the Act was enacted. In this view no question of repugnancy of section 163A of the Act arises.

    Then again there is the following saving clause in section 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure:—

    “In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time, being in force”.

    This provision clearly recognises that nothing in the Code will affect any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. In the Federal Court case, Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia, Varadachariar, J., referring to the decision in Stock Motor Ploughs v. Forsyth, observed. “The principle of that decision is that where the paramount legislation does not purport to be exhaustive or unqualified, but itself permits or recognises other laws restricting or qualifying the general provision made in it, it cannot be said that any qualification or restriction introduced by another law is repugnant to the provision in the main or paramount law”. In the present case the paramount law is the Code of Civil Procedure. The effect of the above saving clause in section 4 of the Code is that there being no specific provision to the contrary, nothing in the Code will affect the provision of section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy ‘Act which prescribes a special form of procedure. Therefore, according to the said decision of the Federal Court, the provision of section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act cannot be said to be repugnant to the proviso to Order XXI rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    I shall now consider how far the contention that the provision of section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act is a matter covered by item no. 4 of the Concurrent Legislative List can be accepted. It has been contended, on the other hand, by the learned Advocate-General, who appeared on behalf of the Provincial Government to support, the validity of section 163A, that it refers to a matter covered by item no. 2 or 21 of the Provincial Legislative List. These two items are as follows:—

    “2. ‘Jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List; procedure in Rent and Revenue Courts’.

    “21. Land, that is to say, rights in or oyer land, land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents: transfer, alienation and devolution of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization; Courts of Wards; encumbered and attached estates; treasure trove.”

    It must be borne in mind that the Bihar Tenancy Act, as its preamble shows, is an enactment “relating to the Law of Landlord and Tenant”. Section 163A finds place in Chapter XIII of the Act which, as it now stands after amendment by the Bihar Act II of 1938 is headed “Judicial Procedure for the Recovery of Rent by suit” and consists of sections 143 to 1774. Prior to the amendment of 1938 Chapter XIII, which consisted of sections 143 to 158, was headed “Judicial Procedure” and sections 1585 to section 177 were included in Chapter XIV headed “Sale for arrears under decree”. The amendment of 1938 merely altered the arrangement of the various sections which were previously included in Chapters XIII and XIV, and it is clear from the present heading of Chapter XIII that section 163A is a matter of procedure for the recovery of rent by suit.

    The expression “the collection of rents” in item 21 of the Provincial Legislative List seems to me to be wide enough to include recovery of rent by suit. In this connection it will be useful to refer to the following Observations of Gwyer, C.J in the case of United Provinces v. Musammat Atiqa Begum: “The subjects dealt with in the three legislative lists are not always set out with scientific definition. It would be practically impossible for example to define each item in the Provincial List in such a way as to make it exclusive of every other item in that list, and Parliament seems to have been content to take a number of comprehensive categories and to describe each of them by a word of broad and general import…….I think however that none of the items in the lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense, and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it”. The general descriptive words in item 21 of the Provincial Legislative List include “the collection of rent”; and if the Provincial Legislature can legislate with respect to collection of rents amicably, it must also have power to legislate with respect to recovery of rents by suit. In my opinion, therefore, section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act refers to a matter covered by item 21 of the Provincial Legislative List.

    In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to decide whether the provision of section 163A is also covered by item 2 of the Provincial Legislative List. I may, however, observe that as the section puts a limitation on the power of the Court executing a rent decree to sell a holding or a portion of a holding for a price lower than that specified in the sale proclamation, it may come under item no. 2.

    Item 4 of the Concurrent Legislative List refers to “Civil Procedure”. The expression “Civil Procedure”, as I understand it, means procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature, or in other words, procedure in civil suits. This may be gathered from the preamble to the Code of Civil Procedure which shows that it is an Act relating to “the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature”. Section 9 of the Code indicates that the Courts of Civil Judicature are to try all civil suits. Suits under the provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act cannot be called civil suits. In fact the distinction between civil suits and rent suits is well-recognised. Nor can the Court trying rent suits be regarded as a Court of Civil Judicature. It is true that suits under the Bihar Tenancy Act are tried by the Civil Court, but it is because jurisdiction is specially conferred on the Civil Court by the provisions of the Act. The Bihar Tenancy Act is a special law which has its own provisions relating to procedure in rent suits. Section 143 of the Act, which I have already quoted, makes it clear that the procedure in rent suits under the Act may be different from the procedure in civil suits. Procedure in rent suits under the Bihar Tenancy Act, therefore, can hardly be said to be “Civil Procedure”. Consequently the provision of section 163A of the Act does not fall under item 4 of the Concurrent Legislative List.

    For the aforesaid reasons I am of opinion that section 163A of the Bihar Tenancy Act is not void.

    There is one other point raised on behalf of the appellant. It is said that the executing Court was not justified in dismissing the execution case merely because the decree-holder refused to bid up to the amount specified in the sale proclamation. This contention must prevail. There is nothing in section 163A to warrant such dismissal. The Court ought to have given the decree-holder an opportunity to take out a fresh sale proclamation, or to take such further steps as he thought proper; and if he failed to take any further steps, it would, of course, have been open to the Court to dismiss the execution case.

    I would accordingly allow the appeal, treating the memorandum of appeal as an application in revision, set aside the orders passed by the Courts below and remit the case to the first Court so that it may be dealt with according to law in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances, there will be no order for costs.

    Fazl Ali, C.J:— I agree.

    Manohar Lall, J.:— I agree.

    K.D
    Appeal allowed.
    Application dismissed.

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    Ram Ran Vijay Prasad Singh v. Kishun Singh
    (Nov 8, 1943)