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  • Section 539 or rather Section 92 of the new Civil Procedure Code.
  • provisions of Section 539, Civil Procedure
  • Section 539, Civil Procedure Code,
  • Section 42, Specific Belief Act,
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Acts
  • Section 539 or rather Section 92 of the new Civil Procedure Code.
  • provisions of Section 539, Civil Procedure
  • Section 539, Civil Procedure Code,
  • Section 42, Specific Belief Act,
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff instituted a suit seeking a declaration that he is the rightful Dharmakarta of the plaint temple, for reinstatement in that office, and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with him in that office. The plaintiff's father had been dismissed from the office of Dharmakarta in 1902 and died in 1905. In 1903, a suit was filed by the first defendant and another under Section 539, Civil Procedure Code, and a scheme of management was framed in December 1903 under which the defendants were appointed trustees of the temple (Original Suit No. 10 of 1903 in the District Court of Kistna). The present suit was filed by the plaintiff on attaining majority. The appeal identified three points for determination: (1) whether the suit is maintainable without a prayer for possession of the temple property; (2) whether the plaintiff can bring this suit in view of the scheme framed under Section 539, Civil Procedure Code; and (3) whether the plaintiff has a hereditary right to the office of Dharmakarta.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is the suit maintainable without a prayer for possession of the property belonging to the temple?
  2. Can the plaintiff bring this suit in view of the scheme framed under Section 539, Civil Procedure Code?
  3. Has the plaintiff a hereditary right to the office of Dharmakarta?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Advocate-General for the appellants relied on the ruling in Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar (1910) I.L.R., 33 Mad., 452 to contend that the question of maintainability had been concluded by that precedent.
  • The appellants contended that, in view of the scheme framed under Section 539, Civil Procedure Code, no suit would now lie except one under Section 539 to modify the existing scheme; in other words, the scheme is binding and the proper remedy to alter it lies under Section 539 (or the equivalent provision in the new Code), not by a private suit.
  • It was contended that the scheme settled under Section 539 is binding on worshippers and, if construed broadly, precludes the plaintiff from bringing a private suit to establish his claim to trusteeship.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff's claim sought reinstatement in the office of Dharmakarta (i.e., the office itself) and consequential rights; the relief was valued at Rs. 2,600, which the plaintiff relied on to show substantial relief distinct from nominal injunction claims.
  • The plaint averred, and the defendants did not traverse, that temple properties are in the possession of tenants "who will pay the rents to whomsoever holds the office of Dharmakarta"; the plaintiff relied on this to show that recovery of the office would necessarily result in recovery of the practical rights (the right to collect rent) connected with the temple property.
  • The plaintiff's guardian had applied to be made a party to the earlier Original Suit No. 10 of 1903 but that application was opposed and dismissed; the plaintiff relies on the fact his claim was not adjudicated in that scheme suit because he was not made a party.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Govindan Nambiar v. Krishnan Nambiari (1882) I.L.R., 4 Mad., 146 Rulings to which the District Munsif referred (noted as directed chiefly to stamp duty). The court held that the District Munsif's attention was chiefly directed to the question of stamp duty and not to the maintainability of the suit.
Sonachala v. Manika (1885) I.L.R., 8 Mad., 516 Rulings to which the District Munsif referred (noted as directed chiefly to stamp duty). Used similarly to show the Munsif's focus was on stamp duty rather than maintainability.
Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar (1910) I.L.R., 33 Mad., 452 Cited by Advocate-General to contend the question of maintainability was concluded by that decision. The court distinguished that case on its facts (there injunction valued at Rs.10 and claim for damages; here a claim for reinstatement valued at Rs.2,600 and practical recovery of office would entail recovery of rights over temple property).
Abdulkadar v. Mahomed (1892) I.L.R., 15 Mad., 15 One of the cases relied on in Rathnasabapathi Pillai for the proposition that a declaration might not give practical possession when property is adversely held by others. Distinguished: in those cases possession of the property remained adverse to plaintiff even after a declaration, whereas here tenants would pay rent to whoever holds the office, so recovery of the office entails practical recovery.
Narayanan v. Shankunni (1892) I.L.R., 15 Mad., 255 As above (relied on in Rathnasabapathi Pillai). Distinguished for the same reasons as Abdulkadar.
Jagannatha Charry v. Rama Rayer (1905) I.L.R., 28 Mad., 238 As above (relied on in Rathnasabapathi Pillai). Distinguished for the same reasons as Abdulkadar and Narayanan.
Kunj Biharji v. Keshavlal Hiralal (1904) I.L.R., 28 Bom., 567 Authority for the proposition that an award of possession of an office must be given practical effect by preventing interference with the rights that compose it. The court applied Jenkins, C.J.'s remark to support the view that recovery of the office would confer upon the plaintiff the practical rights (e.g., collection of rents) incident to that office.
Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi (1905) I.L.R., 3 Calc., 129 (P.C.) Held that an idol may be regarded as a juridical person capable of holding property. Applied to state that lands attached to a temple belong to the temple (or idol) and not to the Dharmakarta as owner; the Dharmakarta is the manager, and recovery of office gives the manager rights to collect rents rather than title to the lands.
Subramanyan v. Parameswaran (1888) I.L.R., 11 Mad., 116 Concerning the scope of consequential relief under Section 42, Specific Relief Act (i.e., relief is against defendants, not third parties). The court observed that even if consequential relief under Section 42 were available, defendants could not confer physical possession when tenants were in possession; thus Section 42's proviso did not bar the present suit on that basis.
Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry (1906) I.L.R., 33 Calc., 789 Authority for the proposition that a suit to enforce a private right is not of the kind contemplated under Section 539, Civil Procedure Code. The court relied on this to hold that the plaintiff's present suit is to enforce a private right and therefore is not a suit which properly lies under Section 539.
Prayag Doss Ji Varu, Mahant v. Tirumala Srirangacharlavaru (1905) I.L.R., 28 Mad. 319 Observations that Section 539 was intended to confer on Indian courts powers analogous to those of the English Court of Chancery in administration of public charities. The court invoked these observations as support for applying English chancery principles to schemes under Section 539 and to reason that schemes settled by Court are not to be lightly disturbed.
Prayag Doss Ji Varu v. Tirumala Srirangacharla Varu (1907) I.L.R., 80 Mad., 138 (P.C.) Privy Council judgment on the above matter; noted that no exception was taken to the remarks in the earlier Madras judgment. The court treated the Privy Council's silence on those remarks as confirmation that English chancery principles may be applied to Section 539 schemes in India.
Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev (1891) I.L.R., 15 Bom., 612 Taken as authority for the proposition that Indian courts possess jurisdiction in matters relating to administration of public charities analogous to the Court of Chancery. Cited to support the application of English chancery principles to Indian courts dealing with schemes under Section 539.
Annaji v. Narayan (1897) I.L.R., 21 Bom., 556 As above (jurisdiction of Indian courts analogous to Court of Chancery). Cited for the same purpose as Chintaman Bajaji Dev.
Attorney-General v. Worcester (Bishop) (1851) 9 Hare, 328 English authority: schemes settled by Court are not altered except upon substantial grounds. Applied to support the principle that a scheme once settled by Court cannot be altered except by the Court and then only on substantial grounds; this precludes private suits that would interfere with a charitable scheme.
In re Betton's Charity (1908) 77 L.J. Ch., 193 English authority: a scheme remains in force only until further order or the establishment of a new scheme. Used to show that schemes are subject to variation only by Court order and do not permit unilateral private litigation to effect change.
Be Browne's Hospital v. Stamford (1889) 60 L.T., 288 English authority that provisions in schemes may be varied by Court (example: number of governors). Cited to illustrate that variation of schemes is a matter for the Court, not unilateral action by individual parties.
In re Sekeford's Charity (1861) 5 L.T., 488 English authority that a Court will not, upon motion of one of the interested parties, alter a scheme which it has settled with the approval of the Attorney-General. Applied to support the position that a scheme settled by Court (with approval of public officers) will not be altered at the instance of a single interested person.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded issue by issue and grounded its conclusions on the facts of the case and authorities cited in the opinion.

1. Maintainability without a prayer for possession:

  • The court observed that the District Munsif's reference to Govindan Nambiar and Sonachala appeared directed chiefly to stamp duty rather than to maintainability. The maintainability question having been raised on appeal was to be decided anew.
  • The Advocate-General relied on Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar to argue the suit was not maintainable; the court distinguished that case on its facts. In Rathnasabapathi the injunction was nominal (valued at Rs.10) and the relief sought differed materially from the present suit.
  • In the present suit the plaintiff sought reinstatement in office (a claim to the office itself) and valued the relief at Rs.2,600. Importantly, the plaint stated (and the defendants did not traverse) that tenants in possession of temple lands would pay rent to whoever held the office of Dharmakarta. The court accepted this averment as correct.
  • Given that tenants would pay rent to the person holding the office, success in a suit for the office would involve the recovery of the temple property in practical effect (the right to collect rents). The court applied the reasoning in Kunj Biharji v. Keshavlal Hiralal to the effect that an award of possession of an office must be given practical effect by preventing interference with rights composed in that office.
  • The court noted that lands attach to the temple and belong to the temple (idol) — citing Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi — so the Dharmakarta is a manager; nevertheless the plaintiff's recovery of the office would entail the practical rights incident to management, particularly collection of rents.
  • Regarding Section 42, Specific Relief Act, the court accepted the proposition from Subramanyan v. Parameswaran that consequential relief under Section 42 is relief against defendants and not against third parties, and observed that defendants could not give physical possession against tenants in occupation. Thus the proviso to Section 42 was not a bar to the present suit.

2. Hereditary right to the office:

  • The court upheld the Subordinate Judge's finding that the office of Dharmakarta is hereditary in the plaintiff's family. The court relied on continuous possession of the office by members of the family since 1797 and on Exhibit A (an effective assertion in 1870), which did not appear to have been denied.

3. Maintainability in view of the scheme framed under Section 539:

  • The court addressed whether the plaintiff could bring a private suit to establish a right which might interfere with a scheme framed under Section 539. The plaintiff's guardian had unsuccessfully applied to be made a party to the earlier scheme suit; consequently the plaintiff's claim to the office was not adjudicated in that suit.
  • The court rejected the appellants' contention that the only remedy to alter the scheme is a suit under Section 539, observing that the present action was one to enforce a private right and therefore not the kind of proceeding contemplated under Section 539 (citing Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry).
  • The court examined the practical scope of a scheme's binding effect. It considered the meaning of making a scheme binding "on worshippers" and noted that, if read broadly, this would make the scheme practically binding on the world. The court therefore turned to English chancery principles (as applied in Indian authority, notably Prayag Doss Ji Varu) to determine the proper limits of a court-settled scheme.
  • Relying on English authorities (Attorney-General v. Worcester; In re Betton's Charity; Be Browne's Hospital; In re Sekeford's Charity) and the reasoning in Prayag Doss Ji Varu (and the Privy Council's silence on those remarks), the court adopted the principle that schemes settled by a court are not to be altered except upon substantial grounds and that a scheme settled by Court must be varied, if at all, by the Court itself. The court concluded that this principle precludes private suits between parties to establish private rights which would interfere with a charitable scheme settled by Court.
  • The court acknowledged the hardship to the plaintiff that he is precluded from seeking his private right by way of a private suit, and that the District Judge's refusal to make the plaintiff's guardian a party to the scheme suit may have prejudiced him. Nevertheless, the court held that the erroneous procedural order cannot create a right to sue which otherwise would not exist.
  • Accordingly, the court concluded the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable in view of the scheme settled in Original Suit No. 10 of 1903 and that granting the plaintiff the relief sought would materially alter a court-framed scheme without impleading other interested persons — an outcome the court found inequitable.
  • The court noted the plaintiff's apparent remedy, if any, would be to induce the Collector to seek modification of the Court's scheme by action under Section 539 (or Section 92 of the new Civil Procedure Code).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED; THE PLAINTIFF'S SUIT IS DISMISSED WITH COSTS THROUGHOUT.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff cannot maintain the present private suit against the trustees appointed under the scheme settled in Original Suit No. 10 of 1903. The appeal succeeds and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs.
  • Remedial consequence for the plaintiff: The court indicated the plaintiff's appropriate course, if any relief is to be sought against the scheme, is to seek modification of the Court's scheme through the Collector by invoking Section 539 (or Section 92 of the new Civil Procedure Code), rather than by a private suit against the trustees.
  • Broader legal implication: The court applied and endorsed the principle that a scheme settled by a court for the administration of a charitable or public trust should not be disturbed except by the court and on substantial grounds; accordingly, private suits that would materially alter a court-settled scheme are precluded. The opinion thus reinforces the established chancery principle (as applied in Indian courts) limiting private interference with court-settled charitable schemes.
  • On precedent-setting: The court's decision applies established principles and does not purport to create a novel rule beyond the principles invoked from prior Indian and English authorities; the decision operates to bar the plaintiff's private suit in the particular factual and procedural circumstances before the court.
Show full summary ...

    V. Ramados And Two Ors. v. K. Hanumantha Rao

    1. The plaintiff's suit is for a declaration that he is the rightful Dharmakarta of the plaint; temple and for reinstatement in the office and also for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with him in that office. The plaintiff's father was dismissed from the office of Dhurmakarta in 1902 and died in 1905. In 1903 a suit was filed by the first defendant and another under Section 539, Civil Procedure Code, and a scheme of management was framed in December 1903 under which the defendants were appointed trustees of the temple (Original Suit No. 10 of 1903 in the District Court of Kistna). The plaintiff has filed this suit on attaining majority. In this appeal three points arise for determination:

    (1) Is the suit maintainable without a prayer for possession of the property belonging to the temple?

    (2) Can the plaintiff bring this suit in view of the scheme framed under Section 539, Civil Procedure Code?

    (3) Has plaintiff a hereditary right to the office of Dharmakarta?

    2. No definite issue was framed on the first point as it was not specifically taken in the defendants' written statement but there is an issue (No. 9) "whether the plaint is properly stamped" which is said to cover this point. We think from the District Munsif's reference to the rulings in Govindan Nambiar v. Krishnan Nambiari (1882) I.L.R., 4 Mad., 146 and Sonachala, v. Manika (1885) I.L.R., 8 Mad., 516, that his attention was chiefly directed to the question of stamp duty and not to the question of the maintainability of the suit, but the latter having been very definitely raised in appeal must now be decided. The Advocate-General for appellants contends that the ruling in Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar (1910) I.LR., 33 Mad., 452, passed since the decree appealed against concludes the question. We think however the present case is distinguishable. In Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar (1910) I.LR., 33 Mad., 452, the suit was for a declaration that the plaintiff's dismissal was invalid, for an injunction and for damages, the injunction being valued at a nominal sum of Rs. 10. In the present suit the plaintiff asks for reinstatement in office, that is, he sues for the office and for an injunction and values his relief at Rs. 2,600 which is a very substantial relief. He further states in his plaint that the temple properties are in the possession of tenants "who will pay the rents to whomsoever holds the office of Dhartnakarta." This statement is not traversed in the written statement and must be accepted as correct. If therefore plaintiff gets possession of the office of Dharmakarta, the tenants will pay rent to him and the plaintiff will obtain all the possession to which he is entitled, i.e., the right to collect rent. The cases relied on in Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar (1910) I.L.R., 33 Mad., 452, i.e., Abdulkadar v. Mahomed (1892) I.L.R., 15 Mad., 15, Narayanan v. Shankunni (1892) I.L.R.. 15 Mad., 255 and Jagannatha Charry v. Rama Rayer (1905) I.L.R., 28 Mad., 238, can all be distinguished from the present case as in all those cases the possession of the property may be said to have been adverse to the plaintiff and would have continued to be adverse even after the plaintiff had obtained the declaration sued for. Here it is admitted that the lands are in possession of persons who are willing to pay rent to the plaintiff as soon as he recovers the office of Dharmakarta and consequently the success of his suit for the office will involve his recovery of the temple property so far as it is possible for such recovery to be obtained. In a similar case Kunj Biharji v. Keshavlal Hiralal (1904) I.L.R., 28 Bom., 567, Jenkins, C.J., remarked "How would practical effect be given to an award of possession of an office otherwise than by preventing interference with the rights of which it is made up," and this is very applicable in the present case. The lands attached to a temple do not belong to the Dharmakarta who is merely the manager but belong to the temple or idol, the Privy Council having held that an idol may be regarded as a juridical person capable of holding property--Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi (1905) I.L.R., 3 Calc., 129(P.C.). If the plaintiff in this suit were to get a decree for possession of the office and also of the lands belonging to the temple, what possession of the lands could be given by the court other than what plaintiff will admittedly obtain on recovering the office, i.e., the right to collect rent from the tenants in possession. Assuming also that the consequential relief referred to in Section 42, Specific Belief Act, is a relief against the defendants in the suit and not against third parties--vide Subramanyan v. Parameswaran (1888) I.L.R., 11 Mad., 116, the defendants in this suit could not give the plaintiff physical possession of the temple property as the physical possession is outstanding in the tenants. We think therefore that the proviso to Section 42 is no bar to the present suit.

    3. As regards the third question we think the Subordinate Judge's finding that the office of Dharmakarta is hereditary in the plaintiff's family is correct. Members of the plaintiff's family have held the office continuously since 1797 and there is no evidence that it was ever held by any other family. This is, we think, sufficient to prove the hereditary right which was in effect put forward in 1870 (Exhibit A) and does not seem to have been denied.

    4. The only remaining question is whether the plaintiff can bring this suit in view of the scheme framed in Original Suit No. 10 of 1903.

    5. The plaintiff's guardian applied to be made a party to that suit but his application was opposed by the plaintiffs in the suit of whom the first defendant is one and was dismissed. In that suit, therefore, the defendant's claim to the office of Dharmakarta was not considered, but notwithstanding this the Advocate-General contends that no suit will now lie except one under Section 539, Civil Procedure Code, to modify the scheme already framed. The plaintiff's present suit is one to enforce a private right and consequently is not one contemplated under the provisions of Section 539, Civil Procedure Code--Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry (1906) I.L.R., 33 Calc., 789. Even if the suit could by a stretch of language be considered to allege a breach of the trust by the Court which framed the scheme the plaintiff could not bring the suit under Section 539 for he alone is interested in his own claim and under that section the suit must be brought by two or more persons having an interest in the trust and there is no reason to suppose that any one would join plaintiff in a suit framed to benefit the plaintiff alone. In this view the plaintiff cannot sue under Section 539 merely to establish his right as hereditary trustee. Then arises the further question where the decree under Section 539 takes away the plaintiff's right to bring a suit which he could certainly have brought before such a scheme was framed. It is contended for the appellants that the scheme framed under Section 539 is binding on the world or at least on all worshippers of the plaint temple. If by 'worshippers' we mean all persons who may happen to worship in the plaint temple then the term will include not only the regular worshippers but a large number of outsiders who profess the same religion. If the scheme is binding on all worshippers it practically means that it is binding on the world. Can it be said that decrees under Section 539 have that effect? Reference has been made to the English law on the subject and we were at first doubtful whether that law could be applied to suits under Section 539, but in Prayag Doss Ji Varu, Mahant v. Tirumala Srirangacharlavaru (1905) I.L.R., 28 Mad. 319 at p. 324, we find the following observations:

    "The enactment of Section 539... was long after the passing of the English Trustees Act of 1850. Presumably, therefore that section may be taken as intended to confer upon the Courts in this country the same power that the Courts in England possessed at the time of its enactment... That the High Court and the District Courts in this country to which the jurisdiction is confirmed possess the same practically unlimited jurisdiction as the Court of Chancery in matters relating to the administration of public charities, religious or otherwise was taken for granted in Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev (1891) I.L.R., 15 Bom., 612 and Annaji v. Narayan (1897) I.L.R., 21 Bom., 556...."
    This case went upon appeal to the Privy Council [see Prayag Doss Ji Varu v. Tirumala Srirangacharla Varu ( 1907) I.L.R., 80 Mad., 138 (P.C.)], and no exception was taken to the above remarks in their Lordships' judgments. We may take it therefore that Courts in India have the powers possessed by the Court of Chancery and we may apply the principles of English law in this case. In Attorney-General v. Worcester (Bishop) (1851) 9 Hare, 328, it was held that schemes settled by Court are not altered except upon substantial grounds and in In re Betton's Charity ( 1908) 77 L.J. Ch., 193, it was held that a scheme remains in force only until further order or the establishment of a new scheme. Provisions in schemes may also be varied such as the number of Governors [Be Browne's Hospital v. Stamford (1889) 60 L.T., 288] and in In re Sekeford's Charity (1861) 5 L.T., 488 it was held that a Court will not, upon the motion of one of the interested parties, alter a scheme which it has settled with the approval of the Attorney-General. The principle adopted is apparently that a scheme once settled by Court cannot be altered except by the Court and then only on substantial grounds. This would seem to preclude suits between parties to establish a private right which if established would interfere with a charitable scheme settled by Court. No doubt it seems a hardship that the plaintiff shall be precluded from seeking to establish his private right, for ordinarily every person can be granted the relief to which he is entitled, but this principle cannot override the claims of the public and a charitable scheme settled by Court must be considered to have been settled for the benefit of the public. We must hold therefore that the plaintiff cannot maintain the present suit against the trustees appointed under the scheme. The District Judge ought not to have refused the plaintiff's guardian's application to be made a party to the scheme suit and the plaintiff may have been seriously prejudiced thereby. In any case his inclusion as a party would have finally decided his right to the trusteeship one way or the other. The erroneous order of the District Judge cannot however affect the plaintiff's right to sue and although it may be prejudicial to the plaintiff it cannot give him a right to sue which he otherwise would not have had. If plaintiff's present suit were decreed it would have the effect of very materially altering a scheme framed by the Court without impleading the other persons interested in the scheme and would be as inequitable towards them as the refusal to entertain the plaintiff's suit is to him. The plaintiff's only remedy, if any, would seem to be to induce the Collector to ask for a modification of the Court's scheme by taking action under Section 539 or rather Section 92 of the new Civil Procedure Code. We therefore think that the plaintiff's suit is not maintainable in view of the scheme settled in Original Suit No. 10 of 1903 and would in allowance of the Appeal dismiss this suit with costs throughout.

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    Comments

    V. Ramados And Two Ors. v. K. Hanumantha Rao
    (Sep 21, 1911)