We are invited in this rule to consider under sec. 163, sub-sec. (3) of the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1899 read with sec. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, the legality of the decision of a Small Cause Court Judge in an appeal preferred under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 162 against an order of the Chairman of the Corporation overruling an objection to valuation preferred by the present Opposite Party. The substantial question of law which requires consideration is whether a compound wall or a boundary wall is a building within the meaning of sec. 151, cl. (b), and is liable as such to assessment of Municipal rates. The Small Cause Court Judge in a careful and well-considered judgment has answered the question in the negative. In our opinion, the view taken by him is correct and his decision ought to be affirmed.
Sec. 151 prescribes the mode of ascertainment of the annual value of lands and buildings. Buildings are divided into two classes: cl. (a) relates to buildings erected for letting purposes or ordinarily let; cl. (b) deals with buildings not erected for letting purposes and not ordinarily let. In any case which falls within cl. (a) of sec. 151 it cannot be seriously contended that a compound wall or boundary wall by itself can be properly described as a building. The question is whether there is in this respect any substantial difference between the two clauses. Now the term building is not defined in the Act although in sec. 3, cls. 3, 4, 14, 24 and 36 we have definitions of building line, building of the warehouse class, domestic building, masonry building and public building. None of these definitions support the theory that a compound or boundary wall was intended by the framers of the statute to be treated as a building. On the other hand, it was ruled by this Court in the case of Corporation of Calcutta v. Jogeshwar Laha that a detached wall built of masonry was not a masonry building within the meaning of cl. 25 of sec. 3 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. The learned Judges pointed out that the derivative meaning of the term building might possibly be comprehensive enough to indicate whatever is built, but they observed that various provisions in the Calcutta Municipal Act pointed to the conclusion that the term “building “was not intended to include a wall. To take some illustrations: secs. 292, 351, 352 and 427 make it reasonably plain that the distinction between a building and a wall was present to the minds of the framers of the Act and that they did not regard the former as including the latter. The learned Judges further pointed out that if the contrary view were adopted, we might be constrained to uphold the position that a wall constructed from the plinth upwards of some material other than masonry, comes under the definition of hut. An interpretation of the Act which leads to a result of this character ought to be avoided. If practicable. We may further add that an examination of the provisions of Sch. XVII shows conclusively that the rules laid down for the use of building sites and the execution of building work were never intended to apply to compound walls. It is needless to examine these provisions in detail because even a cursory examination of the rules will show that if a compound wall is treated as a building governed by the rules in question, the rules become in many instances either meaningless or purposeless. Against all this, we have it pressed upon us on behalf of the Corporation that the term building admits of a very comprehensive interpretation and that consequently we ought not to exclude a compound wall from the scope of the expression “building.” It is sufficient to point out that the Calcutta Municipal Act must be construed as a whole, and that in other statutes framed for similar purposes the term “building “has not been usually interpreted in its derivative sense. For instance in Wendon v. London County Council(2), it was noted that a mere wall could not be deemed a building. Lord Justice Lopes quoted with approval the observation of Cockburn, C.J, in Clarke v. Vestry of Pancues(3) to the effect that the mere raising of a wall was not the erection of a building, though the wall might be a building when it was covered over. Similarly in Levey v. London County Council(4), Lord Justice Lindley observed that though in one sense every wall, every thing erected, is a building, it does not necessarily follow that this wide interpretation should be adopted when a man erects a wall to mark off his boundary and preserve his rights as the owner. To the same effect are the decisions in Ellis v. Plumstead(5), Lord Aucland v. Westminister Local Board of Works(6), Slaughter v. Sanderland(7) and Foster v. Fraser(8). This view is not negatived by the decisions in Long Eaton Co. v. Midland Ry. Co.(9) and Aylward v. Mathews(10) to which reference was made in support of this rule. On the other hand, in Tresdell v. Gay(11), it was observed that the term “building” cannot always be held to include every species of erection on land, and that, taken in its broadest sense, it very often means only an erection intended for use and occupation as a habitation, or for some purpose of trade, manufacture or ornament, constituting a fabric or edifice, and not merely a wall, a fence, a gate, or the like. In this view a structure can hardly be called a building unless it is capable of occupation as following within the residential class or within the class connected with commercial industry or in some way or other. [Powell v. Boraston(12), Morish v. Harris(13)]. This view need not be adopted in its entirety for our present purposes. It is sufficient to hold that the various provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act to which we have already referred negative the conclusion that a boundary or compound wall is a building within the meaning of sec. 151, cl. (b). We may add that some reference was made at the bar to the provisions of the Bombay Act VI of 1873, III of 1898, and III of 1901. But no useful purpose would be served by an examination of the Bombay statutes because there a definition of the term “building “has been attempted by the Legislature.
In conclusion we may observe that the view we take is in accord with the inter-predation put upon the statute by the Municipal authorities themselves till very recently. Indeed the case before us is admittedly a test case to determine whether the new construction adopted by the Municipal authorities is or is not correct. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that Courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it at the time of its enactment and sines by those whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply it. Baleswar v. Bhagirath. We do not suggest for a moment that such interpretation has by any means a controlling effect upon the Courts; such interpretation may, if occasion arises have to be disregarded for cogent and persuasive reasons and in a clear case of error a Court would without hesitation refuse to follow such construction. [Evanturel v. Evanturel]. In the present case, however, the language of the statute, whether interpreted by itself with reference to its various provisions or in view of the construction which has been placed upon it by the Municipal authorises for a long series of years. Certainly, from 1899, possibly from 1888 (see sec. 122 of Bengal Act II of 1888), does not lend any support to the contention of the Petitioner Corporation.
The result therefore is that this rule must be discharged with costs. We assess the hearing fee at three gold mohurs.
Rule discharged.