Dulat and Harbans Singh, JJ.:— This order will dispose of two Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 47 and 48 of 1964 filed by the State Government challenging a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court accepting two Writ Petitions Nos. 711 and 712 of 1963 filed by Naurata Ram and Sugna Ram and setting aside their removal from the membership of Municipal Committee Budhlada.

2. Naurata Ram and Sugna Ram were the members of Municipal Committee, Budhlada. Naurata Ram's brother Madan Lal and Sugna Ram himself were the lessees to two of the shops belonging to the Municipal Committee since before their election as members of the Municipal Committee. A sub-committee consisting of some three other members of the committee was constituted to go into the question of suggesting reasonable increase in the rent of some 200 shops belonging to the Municipal Committee, including the two shops mentioned above. Recommendations were made by this sub-committee suggesting increase of rent in case of some shops and not recommending any increase in case of others. The rent of Sugna Ram's shop was recommended to be increased from Rs. 11/- to Rs. 12.37 nP. and to Madan Lal's from Rs. 21/- to Rs. 23.12 nP. In the general meeting of the committee in which these recommendations were considered, both Naurata Ram and Sugna Ram were present. The recommendations made by the sub-committee were accepted unanimously. It is not disputed that Naurata Ram and Sugna Ram, by rule 3-A of the rules framed under section 240 of the Municipal Act, were prohibited from attending and voting at this meeting as it related to a matter in which they or their near relations had a direct or indirect interest. For attending the meeting in breach of this rule, the State Government served a notice on these two members to show cause why they should not be removed from the membership for having flagrantly abused their position as members. They put in separate explanations stating, inter alia, that the sub-committee had recommended enhancement of the rents and there was no suggestion that the work of the sub Committee was in any way interferred with and that by a unanimous vote these recommendations were accepted and consequently the question of abusing their position as members did not arise. After considering these explanations, the State Government removed them from membership under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Municipal Act by two separate notifications for having flagrantly abused their position. They were further disqualified from seeking re-election for a period of one year each. The two writ petitions mentioned above were filed challenging the aforesaid notifications. These writs were accepted and the State Government has filed two aforesaid appeals.

3. It is not denied that rule 3-A was contravened by the two respondents in attending the meeting in which the question of enhancement of rent of the shops, as stated above, was considered. The learned Single Judge, however, came to the conclusion that this contravention was not of a nature as would amount to abuse, much less flagrant abuse, of their position as members. He went on to observe as follows:—

“At best, it is a case of indiscretion on the part of the petitioners, there was no suggestion at the meeting that the rents which had been raised had not been properly raised or the raise was inadequate. The petitioners had no hand in the deliberations of the sub-committee. No suggestion has been made in the return that they in any manner influenced the deliberations of the sub-committee. The report was acceptable to the opposition group as well and this fact clearly shows that everything was above board and the report was unexceptionable. In this situation, it must be held that the provisions of S. 16(1)(e) of the Act were not satisfied * *.”

The learned counsel for the State took up the position that once rule 3-A which is a rule directly dealing with the conduct of a member of the Municipal Committee as such, is contravened, the State Government is justified in coming to the conclusion, without going into the circumstances surrounding the contravention or the decisions taken or the matters considered at the meeting that there has been flagrant abuse. In other words, his argument was that the mere presence of a member, who is interested in the matter which is for consideration before the Committee, may influence the remaining members in taking a particular view. In the Municipal Committee, with which we are concerned, admittedly, there are only eight members and it was averred in the petition that five of them were returned on Jan Sang ticket and three on Congress ticket and that one of the five Jan Sang members changed over to Congress side and thus there were two groups in the Committee each of four members. As observed by the learned Single Judge, the fact that the decision was unanimous shows that the report was even acceptable to the opposition group, Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the State, however, argued that it is not possible to say what view would have been taken by the remaining six members including four of the opposition group, if the two members, with whom we are now concerned and who were personally interested in the matter, had not been present there. The rule prohibiting the presence of the members interested in a matter to be discussed at a meeting is based on sound commonsense, and it is very desirable that the same should be strictly followed. However, the question for determination is that if that rule is contravened by inadvertence or even deliberately, what is the consequence? Sub-clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Municipal Act authorises the State Government to remove a member only if it comes to the conclusion that a member has not only abused his position as a member but has flagrantly abused the same. It does not provide that any contravention of the rules relating to the conduct of a member, by itself, would amount to flagrant abuse. According to the learned counsel however, a mere breach is enough and the State Government would be authorised to direct the removal of the member irrespective of the fact whether taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, no reasonable person could possibly come to the conclusion that the contravention of the rule amounted to abuse of his position as a member. For this, there is no warrant. The Full Bench decision of this Court in Joginder Singh v. The State of Punjab . 1963 65 P.L.R 297 F.B., to which my learned brother Dulat, J. as well as the learned Single Judge, who decided this case, was a party, and on which main reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the State does not support the contention raised by the learned counsel. The observations at page 279 of the report are as follows:—

“What the clause (16(1)(e)) means is that if a member of a Committee, in disregard of his duty, does any act or acts, which shock a reasonable mind, then he can be removed by the State Government, and again it is the State Government that has to form that opinion. I am quite clear that if the allegations of fact made against the petitioner were true, then the State Government could well have held that the petitioner had flagrantly abused his position as a member of the committee.”

From this, it was urged that once the State Government forms the opinion in question, then this Court cannot go into the matter and it was urged that it is not for this Court to go into the question whether the conclusion arrived at is correct or not. I had an occasion to consider these observations in Satya Dev v. State of Punjab . 1964 66 P.L.R 381., while sitting with Dua, J. and I felt that the observations, reproduced above, went clearly to show that the Court could go into the question whether, in the circumstances of the case, a member has been guilty of an act which is in disregard of his duty and which amounts to abuse of his position as a member and, amounts to flagrant abuse of his position. Dua, J. specially discussed this point in a separate but concurrent judgment as to whether the decision of the State Government is sacrosanct and completely immune from judicial scrutiny by this Court. After discussing certain cases he observed in paragraph 18 of the report as follows:—

“* * * I find it somewhat difficult to persuade myself to hold that the legislature has intended to confer on the State Government an absolute and uncontrolled power, by merely forming or expressing its subjective opinion, not only to remove whomsoever it likes from the membership of the Municipal Committee, * * but also to deprive him of his valuable right of franchise, and then to claim complete immunity from judicial scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

4. Reference may also be made in this connection to Letters Patent Appeal No. 47 of 1962 decided on 5th December, 1963 State of Punjab v. Wary am Chand . L.P.A No. 47 of 1962., to which I was a party.

5. In view of the above decisions, it can be said that it is now the firm opinion of this Court that the orders passed by the state Government under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Municipal Act are subject to scrutiny by this Court with a view to check two matters: First, whether the grounds of removal are not extraneous to the conduct of the member as much and, secondly, if the grounds are not extraneous, to see that the act or acts done by the member in disregard to his duty are such as can shock a reasonable mind. In the present case, it is not denied that the contravention of the rule alleged is not extraneous to the conduct of a member as such. The question, however, remains whether the breach, in view of the circumstances of the case, can be said to be an abuse of a type which can shock the conscience of a reasonable person. If it can shock the conscience of a reasonable person, the decision of the State Government will not be liable to be quashed simply because the Court may take a different view of the things. As already indicated, here there is no allegation, much less proof, that the two appellants in any way influenced the decision of the sub-committee in recommending the increase in the rent proposed for the two shops in which they were interested. As mentioned by the learned Single Judge, the proposals, when put before the committee, were accepted as reasonable by all the members and again, there is no suggestion that these two persons in any way influenced the decision of the remaining six members which included four persons belonging to the opposite party. Furthermore, there is no suggestion in the charge or in the return that the increase in the rent of these two shops was not fair or was not in accordance with the rent of other similar shops leased by the Municipal Committee or even of other similar shops owned by the private persons. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, no reasonable person can possibly come to the conclusion that these persons have abused their position as members, much less to say that they have abused their position to an extent as to shock the conscience of any reasonable person. It would have certainly been more discreet and in accordance with the rules, if they had refrained from attending the meeting but the there fact that they happened to attend the meeting either due to inadvertance or otherwise, by itself, cannot lead to the above conclusion without there being any further allegation that by so doing they have abused their position.

6. In view of the above, the order of the learned Single Judge is proper and there is no force in this appeal and the same is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.