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  • clause (c) of sub-Sec(1) of S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV of 1947)
  • S. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • S. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
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citation codes
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  • clause (c) of sub-Sec(1) of S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV of 1947)
  • S. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • S. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A labour dispute arose between Messrs. New Horizon Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd., Ariyur, Pondicherry (the Mills) and its worker Thiru G. Muthukrishnan (a stores attender) concerning his non-employment. Conciliation failed and the conciliation officer filed a non-conciliation report. The Government of Pondicherry initially declined to refer the dispute to the Labour Court by letter dated 14 January 1976. The New Horizon Sugar Mills National Workers' Union sent a further representation dated 31 January 1976, alleging among other things that the Government erred in refusing referral, invoking S.11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and seeking reconsideration on fresh material. The Government then issued G.O. (M.S.) No. 74/76 Lab., dated 31 March 1976, directing a reference to the Labour Court, Pondicherry under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of S.10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The reference framed the question whether non-employment of Thiru G. Muthukrishnan was justified and, if not, what relief he was entitled to and whether relief could be computed in monetary terms.

The Labour Court issued notices to the management. The Mills did not appear and were set ex parte. The Labour Court found the charge not proved beyond reasonable doubt and directed the management to reinstate the worker with back wages. The Mills challenged that award in W.P. No. 2399 of 1976 before the High Court, contending (inter alia) that they were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard before the Government made the second reference and that the Labour Court's ex parte proceedings and award violated principles of natural justice. A single Judge (Mohan, J.) concluded the reference was bad and that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction. The workmen filed W.A. 249 of 1976 (an appeal against Mohan, J.'s order). A Full Bench heard the matter and issued the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State Government, when making a second reference under S.10 of the Industrial Disputes Act after an earlier refusal, was obliged to give the employer (the Mills) an opportunity to be heard before making the reference.
  2. Whether principles of natural justice (notably audi alteram partem) apply to the State Government's decision to refer an industrial dispute under S.10, given that the function is administrative in character.
  3. Whether a Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide a reference which was made by the Government in the described manner (i.e., without hearing the employer) and, relatedly, whether any award made pursuant to such a reference is a nullity for want of jurisdiction.
  4. Whether the Labour Court's ex parte procedure and award (reinstatement with back wages) violated principles of natural justice and are therefore liable to be quashed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (New Horizon Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd.) — principal contentions

  • The Government's second reference (G.O. dated 31 March 1976) was made without giving the Mills any notice or opportunity to show cause, and therefore was ultra vires and void.
  • The Labour Court set the Mills ex parte and passed an award behind their back; the award is opposed to principles of natural justice and is a nullity.
  • The Mills were unaware of the facts under which the earlier order refusing reference was reconsidered; allegations of political pressure or other irregular motives were raised in support of their complaint.
  • The Labour Court lacked jurisdiction because jurisdiction flows from a competent reference; an incompetent reference leaves the Court without jurisdiction to adjudicate.

Respondents (Worker/Union and Government of Pondicherry) — principal contentions

  • The State Government, while acting administratively, was not obliged to hear the employer before making a reference; the decision was administrative rather than judicial or quasi‑judicial.
  • Refusal to make a reference on one occasion does not exhaust the Government's power to make a reference later; subsequent reference can be made if the Government deems it appropriate.
  • Mr. Dolia (counsel mentioned in the opinion) argued that no exhaustion occurred and that if fresh material or representations were presented by the worker/union, the Government could act administratively to refer the matter again without formally hearing the employer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, 1948 A.C. 87 Historic position that natural justice did not apply to administrative decisions (as viewed in 1948). Quoted to show the earlier restrictive view regarding application of natural justice to administrative acts; court contrasts this with later authorities.
Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. 40 House of Lords decision expanding application of natural justice to administrative decisions affecting rights. Used to support the proposition that administrative decisions must reflect fair procedure and that natural justice can apply to administrative acts.
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, 1969 2 A.C. 147 Principles on jurisdiction: an authority may have entered on an enquiry but still commit jurisdictional errors (including failure to comply with natural justice), rendering its decision a nullity. Adopted to demonstrate that failure to observe natural justice during an enquiry can deprive a tribunal or body of jurisdiction and make its decision a nullity.
R. v. Bolton, 1841 1 Q.B. 66 Formulation that jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement of inquiry; cited in wider discussion of jurisdictional concepts. Cited via Anisminic discussion to explain when jurisdiction exists and how it can be lost by procedural defects such as breach of natural justice.
M. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapur, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2379 Discusses the expanding contours of natural justice and the consequences of failing to observe it. Quoted to support the view that failure to adhere to natural justice can amount to avoidance of jurisdiction.
Avert Services v. Industrial Tribunal Statement that refusal to make a reference does not exhaust the Government's power to make a later reference; the power remains intact. The Court cites the passage but rejects the submission that this meant the Government could make a second reference without giving notice to the employer when prompted only by the workman's representation.
Abdul Salam & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1972) Held that when Government re-exercises its power to make a reference after earlier refusal on the basis of representations by the workmen, and without giving the employer an opportunity to rebut those representations, the subsequent order is violative of the rule of fair hearing. Relied on by the Court as precedent supporting the requirement that the employer be given an opportunity to rebut representations before a second reference is made; one of the authors of the present opinion was part of that decision.
Tiruchi Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. Gnanasambandam Held (on the facts) that principles of natural justice applied and that a second reference made without giving notice to the employer was invalid. Accepted by the Full Bench as laying down the correct law on the subject; used as controlling authority to quash the reference and consequent award in the instant case.
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India Dicta on narrowing the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial powers and the need for fair procedure by administrative bodies. Quoted as authoritative support for applying principles of fair hearing to administrative action that affects civil rights.
Workmen of Dalmia Cement v. State of Madras; Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd. v. Workmen; Good Year (India) Ltd v. Industrial Tribunal, 1968 2 L.L.J. 682; Sri Kiskna Jute Mills v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, 1977 2 L.L.J. 105 Instances of decisions (mostly single-judge decisions) to the effect that no notice was necessary when the Government acted for the second time under S.10. Noted by the Court as authorities taking an opposite view; the Full Bench considered the weight of authority in this Court and elsewhere and preferred precedents requiring notice/hearing (such as Tiruchi and Abdul Salam).
Other High Court single-judge decisions (e.g., American Express International Banking Corporation v. Union of India) Some single-judge decisions adopted the view that notice was not necessary for a second reference. Recognized as part of the conflicting authorities; the Full Bench relied on plural authority in its own Court and the principles in Kraipak to adopt the view that notice/hearing is required in the circumstances of this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench approached the problem by first discussing the evolution and scope of natural justice. It observed that older authorities (e.g., Franklin) limited natural justice to judicial or quasi-judicial settings, but later authorities (notably Ridge v. Baldwin) expanded the concept to require fair procedure even where administrative bodies exercise statutory functions that affect rights.

The Court emphasized the maxim audi alteram partem (no one should be condemned unheard) and explained that when an administrative body exercises authority that has potential civil consequences for individuals, it must act in accordance with fair play, which generally requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Relying on Anisminic and subsequent authority, the Court explained that failure to observe requirements of natural justice can result in absence of jurisdiction and render a decision a nullity. The Court noted the distinction between the legal existence of power (a refusal to refer does not extinguish the power to refer later) and the manner in which that power is exercised.

The Court considered the line of decisions from this High Court, notably Abdul Salam & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Tiruchi Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. Gnanasambandam, which hold that when the Government re-exercises its power to refer after an earlier refusal and does so on the basis of representations made by one party (here, the workman/union), fairness requires that the employer be given an opportunity to rebut those representations before a second reference is made. The Full Bench accepted that view as laying down the correct law.

The Court rejected the respondent's submission (as advanced by Mr. Dolia) that the Government could, in the interest of expediency, make a second reference without hearing the employer merely because the power to refer had not been exhausted. The Court held that where the second reference is prompted by representations from one party and no fresh material is independently elicited by the Government, fairness mandates notice to and an opportunity for the other party to be heard.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the Government of Pondicherry made the second reference on 31 March 1976 without hearing or giving notice to the Mills (the primary party). Consequently, the Government did not act fairly; the reference was defective. Because the Labour Court's jurisdiction derived from a valid reference, the Court concluded that the subsequent award (reinstatement with back wages) was made pursuant to an invalid reference and was therefore a nullity.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Full Bench held that the State Government, when re‑exercising its statutory power under S.10 to refer an industrial dispute after an earlier refusal, must give the employer an opportunity to be heard if the second reference is made on the basis of representations by one party; failure to do so renders the reference and any award passed pursuant thereto a nullity.

Disposition: The order of the single Judge (Mohan, J.) was upheld; the appeal by the workmen was dismissed and the Labour Court's award (dated 25 May 1976) was quashed. There was no order as to costs. An oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused.

Direct consequences: The Labour Court award in favour of the worker was quashed; the Mills obtained relief through the quashing of the reference and the award. The Full Bench applied and followed existing High Court and Supreme Court authority (notably Tiruchi and Abdul Salam & Co.), and the opinion does not purport to create a novel, broader precedent beyond the application of those authorities.

VCS

    G. Muthkrishan v. The Administrative Manager New Horizon Sugar Mills Pte. Ltd., Pondicherry & Ors.

    The Chief Justice.

    In C.M.P No. 8395 of 1976 filed in the course of the hearing of the above writ appeal, an expeditious disposal of the appeal was asked for. The Division Bench before whom it came, consisting of Kailasam. C.J and Balasubrahmanyan, J. referred the subject matter to a Fuil Bench. It is in these circum stances this writ appeal is coming before us

    2. The facts which are relevant for purposes of our adjudication may be set out, A Labour dispute is said to have arisen against Messrs. New Horizon Sugar Mills Pte. Ltd, Ariyur. Pondicherry in connection with the non-employment of Thiru G. Muthukrishnan, who was employed in the Mills as a stores attender. A conciliation as usual was attempted. But, no amicable settlement could be arrived at before the conciliation officer as between the worker represented by the New Horizon Sugar Mills National Workers Unior, Ariyur, and the management of the mills. On such failure, the Government, Law and Order department. Pondicherry, was asked to refer the subject-matter for adjudication to the Labour Court, Pondicherry. By its order, dated 14th January, 1976. the Government regretted its inability to refer the issue for adjudication to the Labour Court, Two weeks thereafter, the Workers' Union again made a representation to the Government of Pondicherry by its letter; dated 31st January, 1976. The grievance was that the Government committed an error by refusing to refer the case for adjudication. A reference is made to the introduction of S. 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act, where-in the Labour Court is said to have been vested with appellate powers so as to go into the question even as regards the quantum of punishment and the award of adequate relief. It was stated that the intention of the introduction of S. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act was to defend the worker from the penal action of the management without taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct committed by him. A fresh plea was also made out in the representation that the management seized a slim opportunity to take revenge against the workman to satisfy their grudge against him which was there for a long time. The speed with which the domestic enquiry completed its proceedings was also pressed into service. Factually, the representation contained certain fresh material on which a review of the original order made by the Government of Pondicherry under which they refused to make a reference, was sought. Admittedly, a copy of the said representation was not sent to the management. The Government of Pondicherry considered this repressntation made on 31st January, 1976 for ι second time directly by the Union for and on behalf of the workman and without notice to the management or without hearing them, passed G.O No. 74/76 LAB, dated 31st March, 1976 and issued the following notification:

    “Government of Pondicherry Abstract

    Acts—Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Dispute between the Management of Messrs. New Horizon Sugar Mills Pte Ltd, Ariyur, Pondicherry and its workers—referred to the Labour Court for adjudication

    G.O (M.S) No. 74/76 Lab. Labour Department, dated 31st March, 1976.

    Read: 1. Conciliation officer's non-conciliation report No. 77/75, Co. dated 6th January, 1976.

    2. This department's letter No. 292/76 Lab-dt. 14th January, 1976.

    Order: The following notification and the annexure shall be published in the next Issue of the Official Gazette;

    Whereas the Government are of the opinion that an Industrial dispute has arisen between the Management of M/s. New Horizon Sugar Mills Pte. Ltd. Ariyur, Pondicherry, and its workmen in respect of the matter meationed in the Aunexure to this Order;

    And whereas in the opinion of the Lt. Governor of the Union Territory of Pondicherry It is necessary to refer the said dispute for adjudication Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-Sec(1) of S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV of 1947) the Lt. Governor, Pondicherry, hereby directs that the said dispute be referred to the Labour Court, Pondicherry, for adjudication.

    Aanexure: “Whether the non-employment of Thiru C. Muthukrishnan is justified and if not to what relief he is entitled? to compute the relief, if any, awarded in terms of money if it can be so computed.”

    (By order of the Lt. Governor)

    (A. Chandrasekhara Menoa)

    Secretary to Government”

    On this, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Pondicherry, took up the subject-matter on file and issued notices to the management to appear before him. As they did not appear they were set ex parte. He was of the View that the charge levelled against the workman was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and in those circumstances, directed the management to reinstate the worker with back wages. The management questioned the award of the Labour Court in W.P No. 2399 of 1976. They referred to the order of the State Government, dated 31st March, 1976 excerpted above and factually submitted that no opportunity was given to them to show cause why the earlier order should be reviewed or revoked. In the affidavit is support of the writ petition they would say that the petitioner mills is not even await of the circumstances under which the earller order was superseded. They would allege that there should have been tome pressure, political or otherwise on the Government to reopen the earlier order refusing to refer the dispute for adjudication. The further allegation of the mills is that the Labour Court was wrong in having set the Mills ex parte and for having passed an award directing the reinstatement of the workman who was impleaded as the third respondent. They would refer to the modus operand adopted by the Labour Court. In particulars they, admitted that a first notice dated 1st, April, 1976 issued by the Labour Court was received by them on 3rd April, 1979 under which the workman was called upon to file his statement of claim by 23rd April, 1976 and furnish copies of such a claim statement to the petitioner mills: It also directed the petitioner to file an answer statement within two weeks from the date of the receipt of the claim statement. No date, however, was fixed for the hearing of the reference. The complaint of the mills is that on 27th April, 1976, they received another notice from the Labour Court dated 24th April, 1976 whereunder the workman for a second time (which means the workman has not filed his claim statement till then) was called upon to file his claim statement into Court on or before 7th May, 1976. The Mills were also given the usual time to file their reply statement. In the second notice also no date was fixed for the hearing of the case. The complaint of the petitioner mills is that they have not received either from the workman or any one representing him: or from Labour Court any claim statement or any other document which might have been put into the Labour Caurt by the workmen. The emphatic case of the petitioner mills is that they were not informed of the date of the hearing of the reference and as no notice to that effect had been served on the petitioner, there was no occasion for the petitioner to arrange for its being represented in Court to attend the hearing of the case. They expressed surprise that in the above circumstances they were set ex parte by the Labour Court. Their final complaint against the award, dated 21st May, 1976 challenged in the writ petition is that the award is a nullity as being opposed to the principles of natural justice, as it has been passed behind the back of the petitioner and as no notice was given by the Labiur Court, it is against all accepted principles of law. Their main contention is that the Government of Pondicherry having declined to make any reference for adjudication under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, they had no jurisdiction to make the reference subscquently at the instance of the workman without hearing the petitioner or without giving an opportunity to the petitio-ner and hence, the order of reference, dated 31st March, 1976 is ultra vires the powers of the Government. In those circumstances, it is contended that the Labour Court had no juiisdiction to entertain the subject-matter and in consequence, therefore, the award passed by the Labour Court, Pondicherry on, 25th May, 1976 is a nullity and has to be set aside. They sought for a Writ of Certiorari to quash the award in the above circumstances.

    3. The writ petition came up before Mohan, J. on 16th July, 1976. The learned Judge relying on earlier decisions of his in W.P 2388 of 1975 and W.P 344 of 1975 was of the view that the reference Itself was bad, and, therefore, the Labour Court did not have any jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter referred to it, since the jurisdiction of the Court springs only from a competent reference. He also added that it was open to the Government of Pondicherry to make a reference if they so choose after hearing the representation,

    4. The workmen filed an appeal W.A 249 of 1976. In the memorandum of ground and before us also, it was contended that the Government need not have heard the petitioner Mills before referring the dispute relating to the non-employment of the work-man. It was stated that as the State Government was not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function but only an administrative one there was no obligation cast on the Government to hear the management before making a reference even in a case where a reference was once declined. The particular ground on which the appeal is based is that the principles of natural justice would not apply when the State Government is exercising administrative functions. They question, therefore, the decision of the learned single Judge of our Court.

    5. Before us Mr. Dolia laid accent on the memorandum of grounds of appeal and contended that there was no exhaustion of the power of the Government when they refused to make a reference in the first instance. This proposition is beyond dispute, put Mr. Doha's contention was that if the worker seeks for a reference second time and while doing so, brings to the notice of the Government certain additional facts and materials, the Government though acting administratively should exercise such functions as are available under the Industrial Disputes Act, and even so without referring to the management of such an invocation of power, refar the subject matter to the Labour Court. Mr. Dolia stressed the first part of his argument and contended that as there was no exhaustion of power at any point of time the Government for a second time and without reference to the management who is the primary party to be heard in such mutters can act and call upon the Labour Court to adjudicate such a dispute. It is this second limb of the argument which is a poser for our main consideration.

    6. Natural justice has acquired a legalistic and artistic connotation by passage of time. In the recent past the principles of natural justice such as audi alterem partant (no man should be condemned without being heard) have been invoked only in proceedings before a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal. There was a lurking dislike to invoke the same, while administrative Tribunals, who are to give decisions on matters before them, were in action. Even in England, as late as in 1948, the House of Lords felt that natural justice had no part to play where an administrative decision was to be taken by an authority functioning under a statute—Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning . 1948 A.C 87. However, in 1963 the above thinking was scotched by the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin . 1964 A.C 40.. As principles of natural justice revolve round fair-play in action and as justice should not only be done but also seem to be done, any decision taken even by an administrative authority, acting under a Statute, should reflect a normal sense of what is right and what is wrong. Though the precise contours of the principles of natural justice are not easy to define, yet no person, as is likely to suffer any civil consequences, must be adjudged, unless he has notice of the proceedings and unless he has an opportunity of stating his case fully. Seneca (about 4 B.C), the famous stoic philosopher, who was tutor to emperor Nuro, sang;—

    “Whoever should adjudge anything, the other party not having been heard; Even though he should decide fairly. It would scarcely be fair”.

    Thus it is seen that one of the well known maxims audi alteram partem, which springs from the principles of natural justice, dictates that no man shall be condemned to a consequence unheard. This rule cannot, thereft re, be confined strictly to the conduct of legal proceedings, but ought to be made applicable to a body who is invested with the authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences to individuals,

    7. The peripheries of the principles of natural justice have been expanding dimensionally allwise. Avoidance of obeisance to such principles has been understood as avoidance of jurisdiction. This is clear from the decision of the House of Lords in Anismicnic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commis-sion . 1969 2 AC 147. Mathew, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in M. L. Sethi v. R P. Kapur . A.I.R 1972 S.C 2379 observed thus—

    “The word ‘jurisdiction’ is a verbal cast of any colours. Jurisdiction originally teems to have had the meaning which Lord Baid ascribed to if i Anismicnic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission namely, the entitlement ‘to enter upon the enquiry in question’. If there was an entitlement to enter upon an inquiry into the question; then any subsequent error could only be regarded as an error within the jurisdiction, the best known formulation of this theory in that made by Lord Henman in R. v. Bolton . 1841 1 Q.B 66. He said that the question of jurisdiction it determin able at the commencement, not at the conclusion of the enquiry. In Anismlnic Ltd: Lord Reid said—But there are many cases where, although, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, It has done or tailed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that Its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provision giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question, which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive

    In the same case Lord Pearce said—“Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the tribunal haying any jurisdiction to embark on an enquiri’ Or the Tribunal may at the end make an oreder that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or in the intervening stage while engaged on a proper enqalry the Tribunal may depart from the rules of natural justice; or It may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction. It would turn its enquiry into something not directed by Parliament and fail to make the enquiry which the Parliament did direct. Any of these things would cause its purported decision to be a nullity.”

    Thus, therefore, the principles of natural justice appears to be equally in vocable even in a case where an administrative decision is taken by a statutory functionary, Failure to adhere to such principles would result in a decision which is a nullity because of total of total absence of jurisdiction.

    8. In the above background let us consider matters which might arise in an industry. An industry is a society within a total society, being a segment of it. It projects rights and privileges which workers have in juxtaposition to such rights and privileges which employers have. In the words of a famous author ‘Industrial relations' means as they do, a totality of life, a diversity of interrelations between labour, employer, consumer and Government. Thus, therefore, if a matter which has an impact on such relationship, comes up for scrutiny and it becomes necessary, for statutory functionaries under the ‘Industrial Disputes Act, including the Government to take a decision on certain matters coming up before them, then the Government though acting in an administrative capacity, should appreciate that it is a body vested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences to individuals.

    9. In the instant case the Government firstly refused to refer the dispute which arose between the workmen and the mills to a Labour Court for adjudication. By such a non-reference there is no exhaustion of power. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Avert Services v. Industrial Tribunal.

    “Therefore, when the Government declines to make a reference the source of power is neither dried up nor exhausted. It only indicates that the Government for the time being refused to exercise the power but that does not denude the power. The power to make the reference remains in tact and can be exercised if the material and relevant considerations for exercise of power are available they being the continued existence of the dispute and the wisdom of referring it in the larger interest of Industrial peace and harmony. Refusal to make the reference does not tantamount to saying that the dispute, if It at all existed, stands resolved. On the contrary the refusal to make a reference, not compelling the parties to come to a talking table or before a quasi-judicial tribunal, would further accentuate the feelings and a threat to direct action may become imminent and the Government may as well reconsider the decision and make the reference. It is therefore, not possible to accept the submission that, if the Government had on an earlier occasion declined to make a reference, unless it be shown that there was some fresh or additional material before the Government, the second reference would be incompetent”.

    Mr. Dolia laid considerable stress on the above passage and contended that in the name of expediency the Government was right in having made the reference at the subsequent stage in the instant case. We are unable to agree with this contention and accept the proposition that in the above statement of law made by the Supreme Court, it was the intendment of the Supreme Court that, when the Government made a second reference, after their first refusal, they need not give notice to the other party, and that they could straightway act on a memorandum presented to them by one of the two parties who could request them for such an administrative action.

    10. As early as in 1972 in Abdul Solam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu (to which one of us was a party), this Court made the following observations (headnote):

    “Though the jurisdiction exercised by the appropriate Government, while making a reference under S. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is administrative in nature, yet, while it make a reference, it cannot be said that the safd order, act or thing done by the Government is a pure and simple administrative act without any impact upon the rights of the parties……If the Government, having refuged to refer an alleged industrial dispute for adjudication. Subsequently re-exercises Its power and refers the dispute for adjudication solely on the further representations made by the, representatives of the workman, without giving the employer an opportunity to rebut the content and scope of such representations, the subsequent order, being violative of the well known rule of fair hearing, would be unjust.”

    The Court concluded by saying that, if the Government suo motu changed their mind without anyone prompting them to do so and wanted to exercise their inherent power on the same material which was considered by them in the first idstance, them the position would be different.

    11. This decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in Tiruchi Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. Gnanasambandam Veeraawami, C.J speaking for the Bench, while leaving open the question whether the principles of natural justice would apply to every administrative order, held on the facts that such principles were applicable and that the Government's second order of reference made without giving notice to the employer was invalid.

    12. This decision was followed by Ismail, J. in 1974 in W.P 3232 of 1971, in 1975 by V. Ramaswami, J. in W.P 4671 of 1975; in 1979 by Mohan, J. W.P 3006 of 1974 and in 1979 Padmanabhan, J. in W.P 784 of 1979. The view expressed by one of us in Abdul Salam Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu was followed by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. v. State Of Karnataka & Ors. which in turn, differed from the earlier view taken by a single Judge of that High Court. A single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in a recent case in American Express International Banking Corporation v. Union of India adopted the same view. On the broader question, Abdul Salam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu followed the dicta in A.K Kraipak v. Union of India, which stated:—

    “The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi Judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated………In a welfare State, like India which is regulated and controlled by the rule of law It is Inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner, what was considered as an administrative power somo years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power.”

    13. Mr. Dolia, however, referred to the decision in Workmen of Dalmia Cement v. State of Madras,6 a judgment of a single Judge of this Court: Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd v. Workmen of Kirlosker Ekctrtc Co. Ltd. . 1974 2 L.L.J 537 a Judgment of a single Judge of the Karnataka High Court, (which was subsequently dissented to by a Division Bench of that Court), Good Year (India) Ltd v. Industrial Tribunal . 1968 2 L.L.J 682, and Sri Kiskna Jute Mills v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh . 1977 2 L.L.J 105 wherein the learned Judges were of the view that no notice was necessary, when the Government acted for the second time under S. 10 of the Act.

    14. Having regard to the weight of authority prevailing in this Court since 1970 which gained acceptance in some of the other Courts in our country, having and regard to the observations of the Supreme Court in Kraipak's case, we are of the view that the decision in Tiruchi Steel Rolling Mills Ltd v. Gnanasambandam, has to be accepted as having laid down, the correct law on the subject. In this view of the matter, we hold that the State Government of Pondicherry, when it made the reference acting for the second time, in exercise of its statutory power under S. 10 of the Act, did not act fairly, in that it did not hear the mills in question. It, therefore, follows that the award passed by the Labour court, Pondicherry, pursuant to such reference made by the Government, is also a; nullity and made without jurisdiction, and has therefor, to be quashed. The order of Mohan, J, is upheld and the appeal is dismissed; There will be no order as to costs.

    15. As state decisis is one of the accepted methods and guidelines ready for courts to be adopted and to be encouraged and as the weight of authority of decisions rendered in similar circumstances is against the petitioner and as the question involved is, in our view, not a matter of general importance which has to be decided by the Supreme Court, the oral application for leave to appeal against the Judgment is refused.

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    G. Muthkrishan v. The Administrative Manager New Horizon Sugar Mills Pte. Ltd., Pondicherry & Ors.
    (Oct 18, 1979)