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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (R.S. Dhavan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition concerns the construction of a third-storey room on a house in Kaisthan, Saharanpur. The petitioner is Bhagwat Prasad, one of the co-owners of the house. The Municipal Board repeatedly warned the petitioner to stop building above the second storey, but he continued. A notice dated 31 October 1968 directed him to desist and remove the unauthorised work. The petitioner endorsed that he was repairing and constructing new rooms and, on 4 November 1968, wrote to the Chairman stating that he had submitted a map on 29 October 1968 seeking sanction and asking for recall of the notice because building materials would deteriorate.

The Municipal Board ultimately granted a sanction dated 13 January 1969, but that sanction was challenged by a co-owner, Prem Prakash, by way of an appeal under Section 318 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The District Magistrate (order dated 22 May 1969) found that the constructions were made without proper approval, that objections of the co-owner had not been considered, and remanded the matter to the Municipal Board for reconsideration in accordance with the bye-laws.

A Public Works Committee inspection (after notice to the petitioner) concluded that the third storey contravened the Municipal bye-laws: the house is on a private lane under 15 feet wide with houses on both sides; the third storey obstructed fresh air and light to the objector's house; the first and second storeys were in order but not the third storey. On 3 November 1969 the Nagar Palika cancelled the ex-post-facto permission for the third-storey construction and directed demolition within a week. The petitioner appealed to the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 318; the appellate authority examined the record, heard the objector and petitioner, and concluded the petitioner had knowingly violated the law, built beyond a 30-foot height limit prescribed by bye-laws, and could not be permitted a third storey because the house was not at the edge of the street.

The petitioner then approached this Court by writ petition. The petition raised legal objections to enforcement of bye-laws on the grounds that the lane was private and that Section 178 of the U.P. Municipalities Act absolved the petitioner from giving notice or seeking permission where a building is not adjacent to a public street. The High Court (R.S. Dhavan, J.) analyzed the statutory provisions and bye-law 14, rejected the petitioner's contentions, held that condonation of such unauthorised construction was impermissible, cited authority, and directed removal of the third-storey constructions by 31 October 1992, failing which the Nagar Palika could demolish them. The writ petition was dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner can avoid complying with the Municipal bye-laws on the ground that the lane in question is a private street not falling within the relevant statutory definition, and therefore escape restrictions on construction (particularly the prohibition on a third storey).
  2. Whether Section 178 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 relieves the petitioner from the obligation to give notice or seek permission for constructing a building or part of a building where the building is not adjacent to a public street.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Bhagwat Prasad)

  • Contended that the lane in front of the house is a private street and therefore the petitioner is not bound by the bye-law restrictions that apply to streets as contemplated by the U.P. Municipalities Act.
  • Relied on Section 178 of the U.P. Municipalities Act to argue that notice or permission to construct is unnecessary where a building is not adjacent to a public street, and therefore he was not obliged to obtain sanction or give notice for the third-storey construction.

Opposing Parties and Municipal Authorities (Nagar Palika / Public Works Committee / Objector Prem Prakash)

  • The Municipal Board repeatedly warned the petitioner to stop unauthorised construction and refused permission for the third storey; its subsequent inspections and committee findings identified the third storey as contrary to bye-laws.
  • Objector and co-owner Prem Prakash, who filed an appeal under Section 318, maintained a right to object and asserted that the sanction granted was sketchy and not consistent with bye-laws; he opposed the ex-post-facto regularisation of unauthorised construction.
  • The Public Works Committee and the District Magistrate concluded that the third storey contravened bye-laws: the lane width, the house not being at the edge of a street permitting a third storey, and the obstruction of light and ventilation to neighbours.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K. Ramdas Shenoy v. The Chief Officer, Town Municipal Council, Udipi, 1974 2 SCC 506 Supports the principle that condonation or retrospective regularisation of certain unauthorised constructions which are illegal under applicable bye-laws is not permissible. The Court relied on this authority to reinforce its conclusion that the Municipal Board was correct to refuse condonation and to require removal of the unauthorised third-storey construction; the High Court refused to exercise equitable discretion under Article 226 to permit the illegality.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by applying statutory text and bye-laws to the established facts and procedural history, with the following principal steps:

  1. Documentary and chronological facts: The court emphasized that the petitioner continued building after being warned and that he himself admitted on the record the constructions were without permission. The map seeking sanction bore the same date as the notice, establishing that the unlawful activity had already occurred when the sanction was sought.
  2. Character of the bye-law term "street": Bye-law 14 uses the plain term "street" without distinguishing between public and private. The bye-law prohibits more than two storeys and an aggregate height beyond 30 feet where the building is at the edge of a street not more than 15 feet wide.
  3. Interpretation of Section 178: The court reproduced and examined Section 178 (notice of intention to erect a building). It observed the opening mandate “Before beginning” and rejected the petitioner’s selective reliance on sub-section (2). The court noted sub-section (2) is subject to the proviso that a bye-law may extend the necessity of notice to all buildings; where a bye-law so provides, notice is required regardless of adjacency to a public street.
  4. Application of bye-laws to the facts: The public works inspection, the District Magistrate and the Chief Judicial Magistrate consistently found the third storey violated the Municipal bye-laws (height beyond 30 feet and not permissible because the house was not at the edge of the street), and caused obstruction to light and ventilation of the objector. These findings supported upholding the cancellation of the ex-post-facto sanction.
  5. Equitable discretion and condonation: The court held that condoning or permitting an illegal construction that the law prohibits would be contrary to both law and equity. Relying on precedent, the court found that Article 226’s discretionary remedy could not be used to suppress such illegality; the High Court should not exercise equitable powers to validate clear breaches of statutory bye-laws.
  6. Conclusion and operative direction: Given these findings and legal conclusions, the Municipal Board’s order cancelling permission and requiring demolition was "in order." The petitioner was directed to remove the third-storey constructions by 31 October 1992, failing which the Nagar Palika was permitted to demolish them.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petition was dismissed. The Municipal Board's cancellation of the ex-post-facto permission for the third-storey construction was upheld; the petitioner was ordered to remove the third-storey room by 31 October 1992, failing which the Nagar Palika may demolish the construction. The writ petition was dismissed with costs.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the petitioner must remove the unauthorised third-storey construction within the timeline provided or face demolition by the municipal authority. The court refused to exercise equitable discretion under Article 226 to condone the statutory and bye-law violations. The opinion applies existing statutory interpretation and precedent to deny retrospective regularisation of an unauthorised construction; it does not purport to announce a new legal principle beyond enforcing bye-laws and the established rule that courts should not condone flagrant illegality in urban development.

Source: Opinion of R.S. Dhavan, J., as provided in the supplied text.

    Bhagwat Prasad v. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur And Another

    R.S Dhavan, J.:— A construction on the third storey of a building in a locality known as Kaisthan, Saharanpur is the subject-matter of this writ petition. The Municipal Board has denied permission to the petitioner, Bhagwat Prasad, one of the co-owners of the house to construct a room as the third storey up to the second storey there is no issue. The construction of a third storey, a room is the controversy in this petition.

    2. The facts on record are thus:

    The Court notices from the record that the Municipal Board had at the very inception checked the petitioner to refrain from building activity over the second storey. The petitioner did not pay heed to the warnings of the Municipal Board. He continued with the constructions and, thus, invited a notice dated 31st October, 1968 that be must desist from carrying out the constructions and remove whatever he has constructed. On this notice, the petitioner made an endorsement declaring as an explanation that he was repairing the old house and also constructing some new rooms. Thus he accepted that what was under construction is without permission. Four days after the receipt of the notice, on 4th November, 1968 he wrote a letter to the Chairman Municipal Board, Saharanpur referring to the notice dated 31st October, 1968. In this letter he refers to having submitted a map seeking sanction for the constructions he was carrying out. The map was submitted on 29th October, 1968. In this letter the petitioner also mentions that he had construction material stored for carrying out repairs and that the material was likely to deteriorate. Thus, he sought recall of the notice.

    3. The petitioner did not fall in line with the law even when he was caught. It is accepted to the petitioner that the map he had submitted for seeking sanction of the constructions carries the same date as the date of the notice of which he was seeking a recall. The petitioner had already violated the law. That the petitioner had been carrying out constructions unauthorisedly without sanction is not a matter in issue but one of record. The sanction which the petitioner received is dated 13th January, 1969. But, the sanction which was permitted to the petitioner became a subject-matter of an appeal under Section 318 of the U.P Municipalities Act, 1916 by a co-owner of the same building.

    4. The law permits an objection to any person interested in the locality whether he is a co-owner or a rate-payer, Prem Prakash who filed an appeal before the District Magistrate, Saharanpur had the status to object. He is the co-owner and a rate payer both. In the appeal before him, under Section 318 of the Act, aforesaid, the District Magistrate records that the constructions were made by Bhagwat Prasad, without the approval of the plans by the Municipal Board, as prescribed by the bye-laws the objections of the co-owner were not taken into consideration when the unauthorised constructions were approved by the Municipal Board the third storey could only be made if the house was at the edge of the street. The District Magistrate was of the opinion that the order sanctioning the map for the third storey, particularly, was too sketchy and not consistent with the bye law. The matter was remanded to the Municipal Board for examining the matter de novo and the matter of sanctioning the constructions to be considered strictly in accordance with the bye laws. The order of the District Magistrate is dated 22-5-1969.

    5. Thereafter, the Chairman Public Works Committee and the public works engineer along with other members of the committee inspected the site after notice to the petitioner which he attempted to evade. The Public Works Committee of the Municipal Board gave its decision that the construction as the third storey was against the Municipal bye-laws, the house about on a private lane the width of which is less than 15 feet with houses on either side and members of the public have an unrestricted entry and a right of passage over this street and the third storey causes obstruction to the flow of fresh air and light to the house of the objector. The constructions on the first and second storey were found in order, but not the constructions on the third storey.

    6. On 3rd November, 1969, the Nagar Palika, Saharanpur, cancelled the ex-post-facto permission granted to the petitioner to regularise the irregularily made constructions as the third storey and directed the petitioner to demolish the third storey room within a week Against this order the petitioner filed an appeal before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur which now lay under Section 318 of the Act.

    7. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur, hereinafter referred to as the appellate authority noticed the entire record, the circumstances in which the constructions had been made previously without permission and unauthorisedly and thereafter the petitioner seeking, in effect, ex-post-facto sanction on a fact accomplished illegally. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate heard the objections of the co-owner Prem Prakash, and the version of the petitioner Bhagwat Prasad himself. Another aspect noticed by the appellate authority was that under the bye-laws, the height of the building stretched beyond 30 feet. The petitioner, by building the room on the third storey had violated the bye-law, and on the other hand the petitioner's house not being at the edge of the street a third storey in any case could not be permitted. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate noticed the record to comment that the petitioner knowingly violated the law after he had been warned and cautioned by the Municipal Board that what he was attempting to construct was irregular and illegal and is to be removed.

    8. The legal submissions before this Court are confined to two aspects (i) The petitioner cannot be required to conform to the bye-laws as the lane or the street, in context, is a private street, and not within the definition provided for under the U.P Municipalities Act, 1916(ii). The second argument follows from the first. The submission is that under Section 178 of the Act there is no obligation on petitioner to take permission or give notice of an intention to construct a building or part of it, if the building intended to be constructed is not adjacent to a public street.

    9. Both the arguments can be dealt with simultaneously. Now that the petitioner is talking of legalities to escape the obligation of the law, the law itself will need to be examined. Bye-law 14 of the Municipal Board, Saharanpur refers to the expression “street”. It neither mentions public nor private street, but, plainly the word “street”. The prohibition is that if the building be placed at the edge of a street which is not more than 15 feet wide, then, there shall not be more than two storeys of an aggregate height of 30 feet.

    10. Section 178 of the Act is of no help to the petitioner. In fact it makes the petitioner's case worse. This section is reproduced below:

    “178. Notice of intention to erect building or make well—

    (1) Before beginning, within the limits of the municipality,—

    (a) to erect a new building or new part of a building, or

    (b) to re-erect or make a material alteration in a building, or

    (c) to make or enlarge a well,

    a person shall give notice of his intention to the board.

    (2) The notice referred to in sub-section (1) as required in the case of a building shall only be necessary where the building abuts on, or is adjacent to, a public street or place, or property vested in Government or in the board, unless, by a bye-law applicable to the area in which the building is situated, the necessity of giving notice is extended to all buildings.

    (3) An alteration in a building shall, for the purposes of this chapter and of any bye-law, be deemed to be material if—

    (a) it affects or is likely to affect prejudicially the stability or safety of the building or the condition of the building in respect of drainage, ventilation, sanitation or hygiene, or

    (b) it increases or diminishes the height of area covered by or cubical capacity of the building or reduces the cubical capacity of any room in the building below the minimum prescribed in any bye-law, or

    (c) it converts into a place for human habitation a building or part of a building originally constructed for other purposes, or

    (d) it is an alteration declared by a bye-law made in this behalf to be material alteration.”

    11. The very first warning in Section 178, aforesaid, is that before greeting a new building or a new part of a building, even the intention to do so is to be intimated to the Municipal Board. In this regard the petitioner may mark the words at the beginning of the section, “Before beginning”.

    12. Sub-clause (2), of which the petitioner is seeking aid, appears to have been misunderstood by the petitioner. Sub-clause (2) does mention that the notice referred to in sub-clause (1) is to be given to the Municipal Board before erecting a building but it will not be necessary should the building (Sic) on, or is adjacent to, a public street. But the petitioner has not paid attention to the rest of the stipulation in this sub-clause which says that in case a bye-law applicable to the area in which the building is situated, prescribes otherwise, then the notice, before proceeding to construct shall be applicable to all buildings.

    13. Consequently, the bye-laws of the Municipal Board, Saharanpur, prohibit a building to go beyond a height of 30 feet and further do not permit the construction of a third storey. The other findings and the assessment of the authorities, whether the public Works Committee, the District Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate, all were agreed that the building erected by the petitioner a third storey, by violating the bye-laws also offends good ventilation by preventing light and air of the objector.

    14. Thus, in the circumstances, the law cannot permit the condonation of a construction, which the law would not permit to be sanctioned. The condonation of such unauthorised constructions cannot be done. What the law prohibits, in the discipline of urbanisation cannot be compounded. These are illegalities which are incurable. Thus, the Municipal Board, Saharanpur, was correct in requiring the petitioner to remove the constructions. K. Ramdas Shenoy v. The Chief officer Town Municipal Council, Udipi . 1974 2 SCC 506. Further, the petitioner has admitted on record that he constructed without permission and that when he was required to stop the constructions, he continued his activity. Thus, this is not a matter which this Court can condone as both the law and equity are against the petitioner. The High Court cannot permit the violation of the law, which in any case turns the equity against the petitioner, and then grant indulgence totally conscious of the circumstances that the writ petition is solely for the purpose to suppress the illegality which the public authorities have not permitted, Access to the High Court to utilise this discretionary and equitable remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not meant for such occasions. No illegality has been committed by the Municipal Board (Nagar Palika), Saharanpur. The notice requiring the petitioner to remove the constructions as the third storey is in order. The petitioner may remove these constructions by 31st October, 1992, failing which the Nagar Palika, Saharanpur may demolish them.

    15. The writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.

    16. Petition Dismissed.

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    Bhagwat Prasad v. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur And Another
    (Aug 27, 1992)