Sinha, J.:— This is a miscellaneous second appeal which is directed against the judgment of the District Judge of Gaya, confirming that of the Munsif of Aurangabad in execution proceedings.
The appellant is the widow of one Ramautar Lal who had obtained the decree under execution. After the death of the decree-holder, Ramautar Lal, aforesaid, his sister, Raghubansi Devi, the respondent in this Court, took out execution of the decree on the allegation that the decree holder aforesaid, was merely her benamidar. She alleged further that the consideration for the handnote, which was the basis of the suit resulting in the decree under execution, had been paid by her to the judgment-debtor. The appellant, on the other hand, put in an application for being substituted as the legal representative of the decree-holder, as admittedly she is his heir. The contest between the admitted heir of the deceased decree-holder and his sister, who alleges herself to be the real decree-holder, was decided by the executing court in favour of the respondent. Against the decision of the executing court, holding that the real decree-holder was the said Raghubansi Devi, the appellant preferred an appeal which was heard by the District Judge, with the result that he agreed with the findings of the executing court, and dismissed the appeal. The District Judge repelled the contention raised before him that the question of benami could not have been gone into in the execution proceedings. This second appeal on behalf of the widow of the deceased decree-holder has been sought to be supported on the ground that the executing court could not go behind the decree, as it stands, and hold that the person whose name stands in the record as the decree-holder was not the real decree-holder and that the respondent was the person really entitled to the fruits of the decree.
Hence, the question to be decided in this appeal is whether the executing court could have gone into this question, and come to the finding to which it did, namely, that the respondent was the real decree-holder. In my opinion, the answer to this question has already been given by several decisions of this Court, namely, Ram Sewak Lal v. Satruhan Deo Sahai, Shaikh Mohammad Anas v. Bhupendra Prasad Shukul and Satyendra Narain v. Wahiduddin Khan. The effect of those decisions of this Court is that a decree can be executed (1) by the person or persons named in the decree as decree-holders, (2) by a person in whose name the decree has been assigned by the decree-holders, or (3) by a person who is the representative of the person named in the decree as decree-holder. The beneficiary, who alleges himself to be, the real decree-holder, does not come within any one of the three categories. Hence, he has no locus standi in the executing court to come up and claim that he is entitled to execute the decree in his own name. I feel myself bound by the decisions of this Court, referred to above, which are all Division Bench rulings. Hence, there is no scope for the discussion as to whether the contrary view held by the Madras High Court in the Full Bench decision in the case of Jaldu Balasubramaniam Chetty v. D. Kothandramaswami Nayanim Varu or similar decisions of the Calcutta High Court on the same point have rightly laid down the law. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad appearing on behalf of the respondent raised a preliminary objection that no second appeal lay in this case in view of the fact that the contest was between two persons, each claiming to be in the shoes of the original decree-holder, and it was not a question between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder or one who claims to be in the position of the decree-holder. But the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure are wide enough to include a controversy like the present between two persons, each one of them claiming to be in the position of the decree-holder. Hence, in my opinion, there is no substance in the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent.
This case originally came before Manohar Lall, J. who made the following observations, while referring the case to a Division Bench:—
“At one time I was of the opinion that no second appeal lies because the question in this case was a question between two contending decree-holders. But it appears to me that section 47(3), C.P Code contemplates the decision of such a question as arises in the present case, and therefore, second appeal does lie.
The question for decision involves the consideration of a number of authorities. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the decision of this Court reported in Shaikh Mohammad Anas v. Bhupendra Prasad Sukul, which was followed in Satyendra Narain v. Wahiduddin Khan concludes the matter. The question, however, which falls for decision in this case did not directly arise in any of those cases. The more direct case is of the Madras High Court reported in Bada Kristam Naidu v. Durvada Patrudu. As the question is of importance and as there is no direct case of the Court on this point, it is desirable that this case should be heard by a larger Bench. I myself feel inclined to accept the correctness of the decision of the Madras case and would hold that the learned courts below were justified in deciding who should be allowed to execute the decree.”
As I have already indicated that this Bench is bound by the previous Bench decisions of this Court, unless we take a view different from that expressed in those decisions and refer the case to a larger Bench, it must be held that the proper person to execute the decree in question is the legal representative of the deceased decree-holder, and not the respondent who alleges to be the real decree-holder. It appears that the Calcutta High Court also has not taken a consistent view of the legal position, and there was apparently a conflict between the several decisions of the Madras High Court on that question which was resolved by the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case aforesaid reported as Jaldu Balasubramaniam Chetty v. D. Kothandaramaswami Nayanim Varu. Hence, in my opinion, the safest course is to followthe cursus curiae of this Court.
Though benami transactions are very common in this country, and the courts have recognised such transactions, still, in my opinion, the tendency of legislation in this country is to discourage such transactions—see for example section 66 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 36 of the Revenue Sale Act XI of 1859. It would be introducing unnecessary complications in the summary decision of questions raised in execution proceedings by permitting such controversies as to whether or not the ostensible decree-holder was the real decree-holder. The executing court has got to take the decree as it stands, and parties should not be allowed to go behind the decree and allege and prove that some persons other than the parties appearing on the face of the record are the real beneficiaries. Such a question can more conveniently be dealt with in a regularly constituted suit. It was suggested that the lengthy process of a regular suit may entail some hardships on the real holder of the decree inasmuch as the decree itself may become barred by limitation while the controversy between two contending parties remains undecided. The simple answer to this objection is that a person who takes the hazardous course of throwing a veil on the real state of affairs must be prepared to take some risks attending such a transaction, as did actually happen in the case of Shaikh Mohammad Anas v. Bhupendra Prasad Shukul. It may also be that where the real decree-holder chooses to keep behind the scene, and takes a decree in the benami of another person, he may be confronted with the situation that the ostensible decree-holder has assigned the decree to a third party who is wholly innocent of the real state of affairs. The position in such a hypothetical case will be analogous to that contemplated by section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. There is no doubt that in appropriate cases the courts are not powerless to grant such relief as the equities of the case and the law on the subject permit; but the executing court should not be called upon to decide such questions which entail a prolonged enquiry as to who is the real person interested in the decree.
In view of all these considerations, it must be held that the courts below were not entitled to go into the question of benami raised on behalf of the respondent. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and the orders of the courts below set aside with costs throughout.
Beevor, J.:— I agree. The earlier decisions of this Court might be distinguished on the ground that the question was raised during the lifetime of the alleged benamidar; but the case of Satyendra Narain v. Wahiduddin Khan cannot be so distinguished.
K.D
Appeal allowed.