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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion delivered by Ellis, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

A rule was issued on the District Magistrate of Khulna and the opposite party Amulya Ratan Kanjilal to show cause why the convictions and sentences of three petitioners — Kali Das Mukherjee, Bimal Kanti Chakravarty and Karnadhar Roy Mondal — should not be set aside. The petitioners were charged under Section 147 and Section 427 of the Penal Code for events alleged to have occurred on 28-3-1945 at Lockpur Bazar (Police Station Jakirhat, Bagerhat sub-division, Khulna district). The prosecution alleged that the petitioners were members of an unlawful assembly whose common object included looting a cutchery, demolishing a privy, and erecting fencing on certain settlement plots (Nos. 879, 878, 881 and 883) belonging to Rai Bahadur Sailendra Nath Ghose and others; and that they caused mischief of about Rs. 300 by demolishing a privy on plot No. 878.

The factual origin of the incident is described as a quarrel between Rai Bahadur Sailendra Nath Ghose and rival landlord Babu Dhirendra Nath Ghose over a newly established market ("new hat") centered on plot No. 879 where the new cutchery stood. The petitioners were tried by Mr. S.C. Mukherjee, a Magistrate of the first class at Bagerhat, and convicted under Sections 147 and 427. The Magistrate sentenced Kali Das Mukherjee and Bimal Kanti Chakravarty to fines (initially Rs. 200 each) and Karnadhar Roy Mondal to concurrent six-month terms of imprisonment under each section. On appeal the Sessions Judge reduced the fines for the two petitioners to Rs. 150 each but maintained the imprisonment sentence for Karnadhar.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate's local inspection contravened the provisions of Section 639-A of the Criminal Procedure Code (as argued by petitioners) and thus improperly influenced the conviction.
  2. Whether Ext. 41 (a General Diary entry) was improperly admitted in evidence in the absence of the constable who made the entry, and whether reliance on it vitiates the Sessions Judge's decision.
  3. Whether the conviction under Section 147 (rioting) could be sustained given the contention that no force was used and that, at most, the petitioners could be convicted under Section 143 (unlawful assembly).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Mr. N.K. Basu)

  • The Magistrate's local inspection contravened Section 639-A, CrPC, because a local inspection may only be held for the purpose of appreciating evidence already recorded; the Magistrate improperly sought or obtained new information and thereby acted as a quasi-investigating officer and should have made himself a witness subject to examination and cross-examination.
  • The Sessions Judge relied on Ext. 41 (a General Diary entry) which was improperly admitted in evidence without the constable who made the entry being called; reliance on such inadmissible evidence vitiates the conviction or at least the factual finding that a new fence had been erected.
  • The conviction under Section 147 cannot be maintained because there was no evidence that force was used on any person in prosecution of the common object; at best the petitioners could be convicted under Section 143.

Prosecution / Respondent Position (as appearing in the record)

  • The prosecution alleged that the unlawful assembly's common object was to loot the cutchery, demolish the privy and erect fencing on specified settlement plots, and that in prosecution of that common object rioting (S.147) and mischief (S.427) were committed.
  • The prosecution adduced witness evidence including police officers (P.W.2 and D.Ws.12 and 13), the District Magistrate (P.W.7) and other witnesses to show there was no fencing prior to the occurrence and that a new fence appeared thereafter; a General Diary entry (Ext.41) was also placed on the record and used as corroboration by the Sessions Judge.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each of the principal objections raised by Mr. N.K. Basu in turn and explained its reasoning based on the record before it:

  1. On the local inspection: The court found that the Magistrate's inspection was conducted after notice, in the presence of both parties and counsel, and that the recorded memorandum of inspection was dated and subsequently shown to the lawyers. The court held that the Magistrate did not use the inspection to "ferret out fresh evidence" but to appreciate evidence already on record — specifically, the cross-examination testimony of defence witness Nur Baksha Bakshi (D.W.4), who described the plinth and concrete base dimensions of the privy. Given that such evidence was before the Magistrate, the court saw no fault in the Magistrate's action in scraping the earth to verify whether a concrete base existed.
  2. On Ext. 41 (General Diary entry): The court acknowledged that Ext. 41 was "improperly admitted" in the absence of the constable who could have given oral evidence. However, the Sessions Judge did not rely exclusively on this entry. Independent oral evidence — including testimony by the complainant's witnesses, police officers (P.W.2 and D.Ws.12 and 13), and the District Magistrate (deposed as P.W.7) — supported the conclusion that there had been no fencing prior to the occurrence and that a new fence was seen on 29-3-1945. The court therefore treated Ext. 41 as corroborative; excluding it would not undermine the finding that a new fence had been erected.
  3. On the charge under Section 147: The court relied on Section 146 of the Penal Code (as interpreted within the judgment) to explain that when force or violence is used by any member of an unlawful assembly in pursuit of the common object, every member of the assembly is guilty of rioting under Section 147. The court also explained that "force or violence" need not be confined to violence against persons but can extend to inanimate objects (for example, demolishing a privy or erecting fencing). Therefore, the absence of evidence of force against a person did not preclude conviction under Section 147.
  4. On sentencing disparity (Karnadhar Roy Mondal versus the other two petitioners): The court examined the Magistrate's sentencing rationale, which had described Kali Das Mukherjee and Bimal Kanti Chakravarty as "tools" of their master Babu Dhirendra Nath Ghose and thus meriting only fines, whereas Karnadhar Roy Mondal had received imprisonment because he was said to be "at the root" of the trouble and because he was poor (the Magistrate thought it improper to fine him heavily). The court found this differentiation unjustified: if the two petitioners could be viewed as pawns, the same characterization could apply equally to Karnadhar. On parity grounds, the court found no reason to treat Karnadhar differently.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court upheld the convictions of all three petitioners. It affirmed the sentences (as reduced by the Sessions Judge) for Kali Das Mukherjee and Bimal Kanti Chakravarty, and it altered the sentence of Karnadhar Roy Mondal.

The direct effects on the parties are:

  • Kali Das Mukherjee and Bimal Kanti Chakravarty: Sentences affirmed — each to pay a fine of Rs. 150 (reduced by the Sessions Judge from Rs. 200); in default, each to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months.
  • Karnadhar Roy Mondal: The substantive term of imprisonment previously imposed was set aside. He was sentenced instead to pay a fine of Rs. 150 under S.147 and Rs. 150 under S.427, or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months on each count; the sentences to run concurrently.
  • The rule nisi was disposed of on these terms; the petitioners are to pay the fines or, in default, undergo the substituted terms of imprisonment; the order for compensation will stand.

No new legal precedent was articulated in this opinion; the court resolved procedural and evidential challenges raised on the facts and court record, and the decision's implications are limited to the disposition of the rule and the modification of the sentence for Karnadhar Roy Mondal.

Disposition: Rule disposed of in the terms stated above. Akram, J. concurred. "Order accordingly."

    Kali Das Mukherji And Others Accused v. Emperor

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Ellis, J.:— In this case a rule was isued on the District Magistrate of Kbulna and on the opposite party Amulya Ratan Kanjilal to show cause why the conviction of the three petitioners Kali Das Mukherjee, Bimal Kanti Ghakravarty and Karnadhar Roy Mondal and the sentences passed on them should not be set aside.

    2. The charges against the three petitioners were one under S. 147, and the other under S. 427, Penal Code. They were charged for that on 28-3-1945, at Lockpur Bazar under police station Jakirhat in the Bagerhat sub-division of Khulna district they were members of an unlawful assembly the common object of which was to loot the cutchery, demolish the privy and erect fencing on the land of the cutchery belonging to Rai Bahadur Sailendra Nath Ghose and others on settlement plots Nos. 879, 878, 881 and 883 of Mouza Lockpur and in prosecution of that common object committed an offence of rioting and thereby committed an offence under S. 147, Penal Code. They also stood charged that on the same day and at the same place they committed mischief to the extent of about Rs. 300 by demolishing the privy attached to the cutchery on plot No. 878 in the lawful possession of Rai Bahadur Sailendra Nath Ghose and others and thereby committed an offence under S. 427, Penal Code.

    3. The origin of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the present proceedings is a quarrel between Rai Bahadur Sailendra Nath Ghose and his rival landlord Babu Dhirendra Nath Ghose over the Lockpur new that which lies to the east of the District Board Road. Babu Dhirendra Nath Ghose does not lay any claim to the old that which lies to the west of the District Board Road but the dispute has arisen in connection with fee new hat which the Rai Bahadur is establishing over plot No. 879 of the cadastral survey map on which plot the new cutchery is located and its adjacent plots. It is claimed on the side of the prosecution that as a result of this dispute in the early hours of the morning of 28-3-1945 the incident complained of actually took place. The petitioners were tried by Mr. S.C Mukherjee, a Magistrate of the first class at Bagerhat and were convicted under ss. 147 and 427, Penal Code. The two petitioners Kali Das Mukherjee and Bimal Kanti Chakravarty were sentenced to a fine of Rs. 200 each while the third petitioner Karnadhar Roy Mondal was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months imprisonment under each of the two sections. On appeal the learned Sessions Judge reduced the sentences of fine passed on the two petitioners Kali Das Mukherjee and Bimal Kanti Chakravarty to a fine of Rs. 150 but maintained the sentence of rigorous imprisonment imposed on the petitioner Karnadhar Roy Mondal.

    4. The first point that has been taken by Mr. N.K Basu in his argument on behalf of the petitioners relates to the local inspection which was held by the trying Magistrate. The order sheet shows that on 4-12-1945 both the parties prayed to the Magistrate to hold a local inspection and he arranged to visit the place of occurrence on the morning of 9-12-1945 in the presence of both parties. He actually did hold the inspection on the date fixed in the presence of both parties and their lawyers and he recorded a memorandum of inspection which is dated 12-12-1945, at the foot of which he recorded an order directing that it was to be shown to the lawyers of both parties on that day. On 15-12-1945 the order-sheet shows that he heard further arguments of both sides on the basis of the memorandum of local inspection. Thereafter he adjourned the case for consideration and then passed orders on 2-1-1946. Mr. N.K Basu on behalf of the petitioners claims that by his action the learned Magistrate contravened the provisions of Section 639-A of the Cr PC, which governs local inspections. That section records that any Judge or Magistrate may at any stage of any enquiry, trial or proceeding, after due notice to the parties, visit and inspect any place in which an offence is alleged to have been committed, or any other place which it is in his opinion necessary to view “for the purpose of properly appreciating the evidence given on such enquiry or trial” and shall without unnecessary delay record a memorandum of any relevant facts observed at such inspection. Mr. N.K Basu claims that the only purpose for which a Magistrate may hold a local inspection is for the purpose of understanding evidence which has actually been recorded. He has no power in such local inspection to obtain information which did not appear from the evidence of the witnesses. If he holds a local inspection for the purpose of obtaining such further information then he ceases to be a Magistrate appreciating the evidence which has already been given but turns himself into a quasi investigating officer and as such ought to put himself forward as a witness and submit to examination and cross examination as to the facts which he says he observed. The answer to this argument must be that the Magistrate in this case was not holding a local inspection for the purpose of ferreting out fresh evidence in the case. There is already on record in the evidence of one of the defence witnesses Nur Baksha Bakshi, D.W 4 a statement in cross-examination to the effect that “The plinth was about 2 ft. in height and the concrete base was about 1½ ft. in breadth”. Remembering that this evidence had been given before him we do not think that any fault can be found with the learned Magistrate if he had the earth scraped away in order to see whether as a matter of fact there really was any concrete base for the privy.

    5. It was hinted that the learned Magistrate's judgment in view of the contest between the rival zamindars and the position of the witnesses as being tenants of one or the other was largely based on what he found in his local inspection and as this inspection was not justified under Section 539-B of the Cr PC, the finding based on it ought not to be maintained. We have already seen that the learned Magistrate was merely holding the inspection to appreciate evidence already on record and moreover as the judgment shows he did not rely entirely on what he found at the local inspection with regard to the concrete base or the privy but also relied on the evidence of other witnesses and in particular we might mention the evidence of P.W 7, the commissioner and D.W 18, the police officer who also deposed to relevant facts. We do not think therefore that there is any substance in this submission made by Mr. N.K Basu.

    6. The second point that has been made by Mr. N.K Basu is that the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is vitiated inasmuch as he took into consideration a piece of evidence which ought not to have been brought on the record. He is referring in this connection to Ext. 41, a General Diary entry, which he claims should not have been admitted in evidence in the absence from the witness-box of the constable who gave that information. It is true that this entry in the General Diary was improperly admitted in evidence. At the same time if that part of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge in which he makes a reference to this piece of evidence be scrutinised it will be seen that he does not rely on it exclusively as a finding that there actually was a new fence erected around certain of the plots of the locality. The learned Sessions Judge observed that it is abundantly clear from the evidence in the case that originally there was no fencing in existence around settlement plots Nos. 878, 879, 881 and 883. From the evidence of the complainant's witnesses and the police officers P.W 2 and D.Ws 12 and 13 it is quite clear that on the day before the occurrence there was no fencing in existence and the District Magistrate stated in his deposition that when he went to the land on the day after the occurrence that is on 29-3-1945, the fencing appeared to him to be new. The General Diary, entry was used by the learned Sessions Judge as corroborative evidence that a fencing had been set up in the night of occurrence by the men of Dhiren Babu. If it be ruled out of consideration, there is still the evidence to which reference has been made which in our opinion is quite sufficient to establish that there actually was a new fence erected on the night of the occurrence.

    7. The last point that has been urged by Mr. N.K Basu is that the conviction under S. 147, Penal Code cannot be maintained and that, at the most the petitioners can be convicted of an offence under S. 143, Penal Code. Mr. N.K Basu argues that there is no evidence to show that any force was used to any person in prosecution of the common object of the assembly and therefore no offence under S. 147, Penal Code has been committed. The answer to this argument must be that S. 146 of the said Code says that when force or violence is used by any member of an unlawful assembly in the prosecution of its common object, then each and every member of that assembly is guilty of an offence of rioting. The force and violence used have not to be defined as meaning force and violence only to persons but also cover inanimate object. There is thus no force in this submission of Mr. N.K Basu.

    8. There is therefore no reason to interfere with the conviction of any one of the three petitioners. With regard to the petitioners, Kali Das Mukherjee and Bimal Kanti Chakravarty who have each been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 150 only or in default to rigorous imprisonment for four months we see no reason to interfere. The case of Karnadhar Roy Mondal has been differently treated. The learned Magistrate when awarding sentence speaks of Kali Das Mukherjee and Bimal Kanti Chakravarty as being but tools in the hands of their master Babu Dhirendra Nath Ghose who simply carried out the orders of their master who was not an accused in this case. For that reason he thought that the ends of justice would be satisfied if he sentenced them to a fine and not to a substantive term of imprisonment. Karnadhar Roy Mondal was said to be at the root of all these troubles and as he was a poor man the Magistrate did not think it proper to sentence him to pay a heavy fine and so he sentenced him to imprisonment. If Kali Das Mukherjee and Bimal Kanti Chakravarty can be described by the learned Magistrate as simply pawns in the game we do not see why this description cannot also be applied to Kamadhar Boy Mondal, a poor man obviously set up to play his particular part in the incident. We therefore see no reason at all to distinguish between his case and that of the other petitioners.

    9. Accordingly we uphold the conviction of all the petitioners. We affirm the sentences passed on the two petitioners, Kali Das Mukherjee and Bimal Kanti Chakravarty.

    10. We set aside the substantive term of imprisonment imposed on Karnadhar Roy Mondal and sentence him also to pay a fine of Rs. 150 under S. 147, Penal Code and Rs. 150 under S. 427 of the Code or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. The Rule is disposed of in these terms. The petitioners will now pay the fines required of them or in default undergo the term of imprisonment imposed in lieu thereof. The order for compensation will stand.

    Akram, J.:— I agree.

    D.R

    11. Order accordingly.

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    Kali Das Mukherji And Others Accused v. Emperor
    (Jul 5, 1946)