J.V. Vannisami Thevar v. J.V.R. Chellasami Thevar, Madras High Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Case Number

Second Appeal No. 953 of 1917.

Attorney(S)

Messrs. T. Narasimha Aiyangar, S. Rangachariar and S. Vaidyanatha Aiyar for the Appellants.
Messrs. T. Rangachariar and K. Sankara Sastri for the Respondents.

Judges

Oldfield
Seshagiri Iyer, JJ.

Acts

clause of Sect. 3 clause 5 of the Estates Land Act.
provision of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
Sect. 42 of the Specific Relief Act
Sect. 3 (5) of the Estates Land Act
Sect. 149, Bengal Act, VIII of 1885,
Sect. 194 of the Estates Land Act,
Art. 14 of the Limitation Act,
Art. 11 of the Limitation Act
Sect. 1 of Act VIII of 1869

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is a lessee under the Rajah of Ramnad. The village at issue was divided into two parts: 11/16th belonged to a Devastanam (of which the Rajah is trustee) and 5/16th was described as a Jeevitham grant in favour of the villagers. The plaintiff is a descendant of one of the grantees; the defendants are descendants who claim dual (Kudivaram and Melavaram) rights in the 5/16th portion. The plaintiff's case is that the Melvaram on the 5/16th portion is collected solely by the Rajah and that a portion of that collection is paid over to the defendants as a Jeevitharam grant.

An application was made by the plaintiff to the Collector under Section 3(5) of the Estates Land Act to be registered as the sole land-holder; that petition was rejected by an order dated 17 April 1913 (Ex. B). The present suit was instituted on 27 August 1913 seeking a declaration that the plaintiff alone is entitled to be regarded as land-holder under the Estates Land Act. The plaint originally contained a further prayer for an injunction; that part was withdrawn by the plaintiff's counsel, leaving the suit principally for a declaratory judgment under the last clause of Section 3(5) of the Estates Land Act.

The Courts below held on the merits that the plaintiff (lessor) was entitled to the declaration. The matter proceeded to the present appeal. The High Court (judges including Oldfield, J. and Seshagiri Aiyar, J.) considered issues of limitation, the nature of the statutory right under Section 3(5), the applicability of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and whether the disputed land constituted an "estate" for the purposes of the Estates Land Act. The appeals were dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation, particularly by Article 14 of the Limitation Act, given the lapse of more than one year after the Collector's order under Section 3(5).
Whether the Collector's order under Section 3(5) of the Estates Land Act is provisional ("subject to any decree or order") and therefore not final.
Whether Section 3(5) of the Estates Land Act creates or recognises a special form of suit such that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act (and its proviso requiring consequential relief) is inapplicable.
Whether, in a suit seeking declaration under Section 3(5), the plaintiff is compellable to seek further/consequential relief (for example, physical possession) under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
Whether the disputed claim relates to an "estate" within the definition of the Estates Land Act (with reference to various sub-clauses), given the inam/enfranchisement history of the 5/16th portion and the inam title deed (Ex. C).
Whether the defendants' possession of the inam title deed and proceedings connected to it are conclusive against the plaintiff's claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

The suit is barred by limitation under Article 14 of the Limitation Act because more than a year elapsed after the Collector passed his order.
The Collector's order under Section 3(5) is final for practical purposes and creates a special form of suit; consequently Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and its proviso apply, compelling the plaintiff to seek consequential relief (e.g., possession) rather than a bare declaration.
The plaintiff, being in a position to seek further relief, has claimed only a bare declaration and therefore the suit is incompetent under the proviso to Section 42.
The 5/16th portion (the Jeevitham/Inam) was enfranchised in favour of the defendants (reliance on Ex. C, the inam title deed), so the village is not an "estate" within the meaning of the Estates Land Act; consequently the plaintiff cannot claim the statutory recognition he seeks.
The defendants' possession and the inam title deed and related proceedings should be regarded as conclusive in their favour.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

The Collector's order under Section 3(5) is provisional and "subject to any decree or order of a competent Civil Court," so the suit is not barred by limitation; the order may be reconsidered upon a Civil Court decree.
The remedy sought under Section 3(5) is a statutory right (not an ordinary common-law declaration) and therefore the plaintiff is not compellable under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act to claim further consequential relief in the same suit.
The plaintiff is not in a position to seek further relief (such as physical possession) in the present proceeding; a declaration will enable him to approach the Collector for further relief under the Estates Land Act.
The inam title deed and related proceedings relied on by the defendants are not conclusive; the courts below were entitled to find on the evidence that the village is part of the estate and that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration.
As a matter of practical pleading and remedy, the plaintiff withdrew the injunction portion of the prayer and confined the suit to obtaining the declaratory relief contemplated by Section 3(5).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Jagadamba Devi v. Protap Ghose	Instances where a suit allowed by a statute (e.g., Section 149, Bengal Act VIII of 1885) is regarded as a special remedy.	The court held that these decisions do not assist in interpreting Madras Section 3(5) because the Bengal provision (Section 149) included a specific definition (e.g., prayer for restraining payment out of money in Court) absent in Madras Section 3(5).
Rubi-un-Nissa v. Gooljan Bibee	Paired with Jagadamba Devi as an example of a special statutory remedy under Bengal law.	Similarly treated as not helpful for interpreting Madras Section 3(5) because of differences in statutory wording and scope.
Robert Fischer v. Secretary of State for India in Council	Decision concerning proceedings before the Collector; supports view that a declaration enables pursuit of further relief from the Collector.	The court referred to this decision to show that a declaration can enable approach to Collector for further relief and that the present case was clearer because the plaint referred directly to Collector proceedings.
Fisher v. Secretary of State	Supports the view that a declaration enables the Collector to be approached for giving further relief; consequential relief may be sought in another proceeding.	Invoked to support the proposition that the proviso to Section 42 does not bar a bare declaration where consequential relief must be sought in another forum or procedure.
Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar	Example where the plaintiff alleged ouster from possession and thus physical possession could be claimed; used to consider whether possession must be sought.	Distinguished: in Rathnasabapathi the plaintiff had alleged ouster and adverse possession by co-trustees; here the facts were different and the court held a declaration alone was sufficient.
Ramdoss v. Hanumatha Rao	Observation that in some facts possession may be adverse even after a declaration; used to interpret Rathnasabapathi.	The court cited this case to explain why Rathnasabapathi involved an ouster making possession claim necessary, and found the present facts not similar.
Ramados v. Hanumantha Rao	Referenced interpretation of Rathnasabapathi regarding physical possession claims.	Used (as an interpretive reference) to reinforce that Rathnasabapathi involved ouster and therefore allowed possession claims; the present case differs.
Administrator General of Bengal v. Bhagan Chandra Ray Chaudry	Held that where property was attached and in possession of a Receiver (under Section 146 CrPC), a plaintiff need only seek a bare declaration.	Relied on to support the principle that a declaration may be adequate where consequential relief (e.g., possession from a Receiver) is to be claimed by production of the decree in another forum.
Kathama Nachiar v. Dorasinga Tevar	Privy Council decision discussed in relation to what consequential relief a party is bound to seek with a declaration; pointed out limits of its applicability.	The court noted the decision but declined to base its judgment on it, observing that it was given with reference to a different statutory provision (Section 15 of Act VIII of 1859) and contained statements not thought applicable to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
Kristnam Sooraya v. Pathma Bee	Referred to in discussion of consequential relief and declaration suits.	Referenced as part of earlier authorities consonant with the court's approach; used in argument but no fresh rule beyond supporting authorities was derived in the opinion.
Baktwar Sigh v. Bhubgan Singh	Authority recognising a statutory creation of a right allowing a bare declaration (analogy to purchasers under Madras Act I of 1876 or Bengal Tenancy provisions).	Invoked to support the proposition that statutory rights (similar to those under the Estates Land Act) permit suits for bare declarations without requiring consequential relief to be claimed in the same suit.
Kriska Dashaha v. Hari Charan Banerjee	Similar recognition of a statutory right permitting a bare declaration.	Used as one of the authorities indicating that a statutory right may justify a suit for a bare declaration.
Secretary of State for India v. Maharajah of Venkatagiri	Decision dealing with enfranchisement and the rights to enfranchise Inam lands within permanently settled estates; showing earlier uncertainty on the subject.	Referred to in discussing whether enfranchisement of the 5/16th conclusively removed the village from the zamindari; the court held that earlier notions were hazy and that enfranchisement was not a conclusive test against the plaintiff's claim.
Arunachellam Chetty v. Venkatachalapathi Gurusawmigal	Held the Inam title deed to be "very good evidence" but not conclusive.	The court relied on this authority for the proposition that an inam title deed, although strong evidence, is not conclusive and does not prevent the court from accepting contrary findings of fact by competent courts below.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a number of steps, addressing limitation, the statutory nature of the relief, the necessity (or otherwise) of claiming consequential relief such as possession, factual questions about whether the land constituted an "estate", and the weight to be given to inam title deeds and related proceedings.

On the Collector's order and limitation: The judges construed Section 3(5) of the Estates Land Act as employing "very definite language" making the Collector's order essentially provisional and "subject to any decree or order of a Civil Court." Because the Collector's order can be reconsidered upon a Civil Court decree and is not final, the court concluded the plaintiff's suit was not barred by limitation (specifically rejecting the contention under Article 14 of the Limitation Act). The Collector's order was characterised as a "stop-gap" to be vacated ipso facto when a Civil Court pronounces on the rights of the parties.

On whether Section 3(5) creates a special form of suit: The court compared the Madras Section 3(5) with other statutory provisions that expressly define the form or content of the special suit (for example, Section 149 of Bengal Act VIII of 1885 or claim procedure in Order 21, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure). Because Madras Section 3(5) lacks any specification of the nature of the decree or order required, the court held that it does not create the sort of special statutory suit that would render the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act applicable in the same way as in those other contexts.

On the necessity of seeking possession/consequential relief: The court examined whether the plaintiff, having sought a declaration, was compellable to also claim consequential relief such as physical possession. It accepted the respondent's argument that the plaintiff was not in a position to seek further relief in the present proceeding. The court reasoned that the proviso to Section 42 applies to consequential relief that must be capable of being granted and enforced by the tribunal in which the declaration suit is brought. Where the consequence of a declaration is to enable the plaintiff to seek further relief in another forum or procedure (for example, before the Collector), the proviso does not render a bare declaration incompetent. Authorities such as Robert Fischer (Fisher) and Administrator General of Bengal v. Bhagan Chandra Ray Chaudry were relied on for this principle. Rathnasabapathi was considered and distinguished: in Rathnasabapathi the plaintiff had alleged ouster and adverse possession making a possession claim appropriate; that factual situation did not obtain in the present case.

On the merits and question of estate status: The court considered whether the 5/16th (the Jeevitham/Inam) removed the village from being an "estate" within the Estates Land Act. While the inam title deed (Ex. C) and enfranchisement proceedings were evidence that the Government thought it had the right to enfranchise the 5/16th, earlier uncertainties ("hazy notions") existed about the Government's powers to enfranchise inam lands within permanently settled estates. The language of Section 1 of Act VIII of 1869 was cited as indicating enfranchisement does not necessarily predicate a governmental right to enfranchise. The subordinate courts' finding that the Rajah had continued to collect Melvaram until recently was treated as a legitimate factual circumstance for reaching the conclusion that the village was part of the estate. The court accepted the lower courts' factual findings and held that the defendants had not shown the village was not an estate.

On the conclusiveness of the defendants' inam title deed and proceedings: The judges found that the defendants had not demonstrated that their possession of the inam title deed and the proceedings connected with it were conclusive against the plaintiff. Given the evidence and the lower courts' factual determinations, the High Court would not interfere with their decisions on the ground that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence.

These strands of reasoning led the court to conclude that (a) the plaintiff's suit was not barred by limitation; (b) Section 3(5) creates a statutory right permitting a suit for declaratory relief without necessarily compelling consequential relief in the same suit; (c) the plaintiff was not in a position to claim physical possession in the present proceeding; and (d) the findings of the lower courts on the merits (including the estate question) should stand.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals were DISMISSED WITH COSTS. The opinion explicitly states the appeal is dismissed and the second appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Implications:

The court held that the Collector's order under Section 3(5) of the Estates Land Act is provisional and "subject to any decree or order of a competent Civil Court," and therefore the plaintiff's suit challenging the Collector's order was not barred by limitation.
The suit for a bare declaration under Section 3(5) was found to be maintainable; the plaintiff was not compellable to seek physical possession or other consequential relief in the same suit where, on the pleadings, such relief could only be sought or enforced by another procedure (for example, by approaching the Collector after obtaining the declaration).
The defendants' inam title deed and related proceedings were not regarded as conclusive evidence preventing the courts below from finding in favour of the plaintiff; factual findings by the subordinate courts regarding the Rajah's collection of Melvaram and the character of the village were accepted.
The decision resolves the dispute between the parties by upholding the lower courts' declaration in favour of the plaintiff and rejecting the appellant's procedural and substantive objections. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new, broader precedent beyond the application of existing authorities to the facts before the court; it relies on and distinguishes earlier authorities to justify the disposition.

S. S. Appeal dismissed.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided judgment text and does not add or infer facts beyond that material.

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J.V. Vannisami Thevar v. J.V.R. Chellasami Thevar

JUDGMENT

Oldfield, J. — The facts are stated in the judgment of my learned brother which I have had the advantage of reading; and I agree with almost all his conclusions.

The Collector's order under Sect. 3 (5) of the Estates Land Act is no doubt not one which the aggrieved party need sue to displace. For, on the best construction I can give to the very definite language employed, that order is essentially provisional and cannot become irrevocable, so long as any sort of decree or order of a Civil Court can be obtained, which the Collector can be induced to regard as justifying reconsideration of his decision, the words “Subject to any decree or order” in the absence of any rules framed by the Government leaving the matter at large.

This entails a conclusion against the defendants appellants, on the question of limitation. It is also material in connection with the suggestion that Sect. 3 (5) creates or recognises a special form of suit, to which Sect. 42 of the Specific Relief Act and the requirement that all further possible relief shall be asked for are inapplicable. For the absence of any specification of the nature of the decree or order required is in marked contrast with the definite language used in other cases, in which a special form of suit is provided, in connection for instance with the claim procedure in O. 21, R. 63 of the Code of Civil, Procedure, or the separate registry of the portion of an estate under Sect. 5 of Act. I of 1876. Some argument has been based on Jagadamba Devi v. Protap Ghose and Rubi-un-Nissa v. Gooljan Bibee in which the suit allowed by Sect. 149, Bengal Act, VIII of 1885, is regarded as a special remedy. But Sect. 149 corresponds with Sect. 194 of the Estates Land Act, and whatever the content of the suit contemplated in them, its essential scope is defined as including a prayer for an order restraining payment out of money in Court. These decisions therefore whatever their effect on the merits of the questions they decide afford no assistance in the interpretation of the Madras Sect. 3 (5) in which there is no similar definition.

In these circumstances, I turn to the broader answer to defendants' objection, that as plaintiff cannot ask for physical possession, a declaration on which the Collector will be bound to nominate him under Sect. 3 (5) is all he can or need ask for. So far as the Collector and the proceedings before him are concerned, it is necessary to refer only to to the decision in Robert Fischer v. Secretary of State for India in Council, the present case being clearer, since there is a direct reference to those proceedings in plaint paragraph 8 and in part of the prayer portion. The difficulty arises however over the dispute between plaintiff and the contesting defendants regarding the title to the property and the remainder of the prayer, in which an injunction preventing theme from interfering with his management or exercise of powers under the Act is asked for. Nothing however seems to have turned on that portion at the trial and no allegations have been made except as to interference with plaintiff's right to proceed under the Estates Land Act, which the grant of a declaration should prevent. Mr. Rangacharyar on his behalf, has accordingly withdrawn this part of the claim and the only question remaining is whether possession as well as a declaration should have been asked for. It must be answered with reference to the purpose for which the declaration is directly required and the fact that our decree by enabling plaintiff to obtain recognition as a land-holder under the Estates Land Act will place him in a symbolical possession as complete and effective for every purpose as he could obtain by a delivery of such possession under O. 21, R. 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as he is not entitled to physical possession, that is the most he can obtain. Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar has been referred to. But there the plaintiff alleged and acquiesced in a finding that he had been ousted from possession by two of his co-trustees, who appear to have been subject to no obligation as tenants, such as proceedings under the Estates Land Act could have enforced and as was observed in Ramdoss v. Hanumatha Rao, “the possession of the property may be said to have been adverse to plaintiff and would have been adverse even after he had obtained the declaration sued for.” The facts before us are not similar and I therefore agree that the suit is sustainable without a prayer for possession. It follows that the issue as to valuation also must be found in plaintiff's favour.

On the merits I agree with my learned brother. The defendants have not shown us that their possession of the inam title deed and the proceedings in connection with it can be regarded as conclusive in their favour. This part of the case has been considered by the Lower Courts and we cannot interfere with their decision, on the ground that they have not appreciated its weight correctly.

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Seshagiri Aiyar, J.—The plaintiff is a lessee under the Rajah of Ramnad. The village in question was divided into two parts; 11/16th of it belongs to Devastanam of which the Rajah is the trustee; 5/16th, is described as the Jeevitham grant in favour of the villagers. The lessee is a descendant of one of these grantees along with the defendants. It is alleged that they are the holders of both the Kudivaram and Melavaram rights in the 516 portion. The dual right is not claimed by some of the ryots who support the plaintiff and are content to be regarded as possessing only the Kudivaram right. The case for the plaintiff is that the Melwaram on the 5/16th portion is collected solely by the Rajah of Ramnad and that a portion of that collection is paid over to the defendants as Jeevitharam grant. In as much as this right to collect and distribute was contested by some of the defendants, this suit has been brought for a declaration that the plaintiff alone is entitled to be regarded as land-holder under the Estates Land Act. As Mr. Rangacharyar withdrew the somewhat superfluous portion of the prayer relating to injunction, the plaint may now be regarded as one instituted solely for the purposes of obtaining a declaration regarding the status of the plaintiff as the dominant land-holder. Professedly the suit is for the relief suggested by the last clause of Sect. 3 clause 5 of the Estates Land Act. The Courts below have held on the merits that the plaintiff, lessor, is entitled to the declaration.

In this Court, in addition to disputing the decision on the merits, a forciable attack was directed against the maintainability of the suit in its present form. Prior to the institution of this suit, an application was made to the Collector under S. 3. (5) for registering the plaintiff as the sole land-holder. The petition was rejected; vide Ex. B. dated the 17th April 1913. Thereupon this suit was instituted on the 27th August 1913. The first contention of Mr. Narasimha Aiyangar for the Appellant was that the suit is barred by Art. 14 of the Limitation Act, as more than a year elapsed since the Collector passed his order. This contention must be overruled. The last part of S. 5 suggests that the order of the Collector is a temporary one. No finality is given to the other in case a Civil Court does not settle the question. The order of the Collector is “subject to any decree or order of a competent Civil Court”. The analogy of a suit on the rejection or allowing of a claim petition, to which Art. 11 of the Limitation Act applies has no bearing on the present question. In those cases if the order is not set aside, the parties will be concluded by the summary adjudication. In the case of the present order as I read the definition section, the Collector's decision will be ipso facto vacated whenever a Civil Court pronounces on the respective rights of the contending parties. It is really a stop-gap order because the affairs of the estate will be at a stand-still, unless there is a summary pronouncement by a responsible executive officer.

Therefore I am of opinion that the plaintiff's suit is not barred by limitation.

The more serious contention was that this suit is incompetent, as the plaintiff being in a position to ask for further relief, has claimed only a bare declaration. What has to be considered is whether this is a suit to which Sect. 42 of the Specific Relief Act applies and secondly, if it does apply whether the plaintiff is compellable to seek further relief.

The first of those points involves a consideration whether the claim in this suit is the ordinary common law right of declaration, or whether it is a special statutory right created by the Estates Land Act and therefore not affected by the proviso of Sect. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. I am inclined to think that the relief claimed in this suit is not the ordinary common law right. Ordinarily every co-sharer land-holder is entitled to pursue his remedies of collecting rent and enforcing its collection by the coercive process of distress, etc. The Estates Land Act has for some reason chosen to deprive some of the co-sharers of this right. Formerly, if there were more than one co-sharer, if the other co-sharers were unwilling to join in taking action against the tenant, any of them may institute proceedings against the tenant making the other co-sharers parties to the action. This procedure was attended by obvious inconveniences. The Estates Land Act has how invested one of the fractional share-holders with the sole right of taking proceedings under the Act. For the purpose he has to be in the language of Sect. 3, Cl. 5 “recognised or nominated” as the land-holder under the Act. There can be no doubt that this is not a common law right, but a right created by the statute. In seeking to enforce such a right, courts are not entitled to impose all the restrictions which a person seeking the ordinary relief of declaration is subjected to, by virtue of the Proviso to Sect. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Similar creations of rights are recognised by law. For example under Madras Act I of 1876, the purchaser of a portion of an estate can seek registration of his status in a Civil Court. It has never been contended that he is bound to ask for consequential relief as auxiliary to his claim for declaration. Under similar provision of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it has been held that a suit for a bare declaration will lie. Vide Jagadamba Devi v. Protap Ghose. In Baktwar Sigh v. Bhubgan Singh and in Kriska Dashaha v. Hari Charan Banerjee a similar right was recognised.

The second aspect of this contention was well answered by Mr. Rangachariar, the learned vakil for the respondent, by the argument that the plaintiff is not in a position to seek further relief. If seems to me that what is contemplated by the proviso to Sect. 42 is a relief consequential upon the cause of action alleged, and that it should not only be capable of being granted but of being enforced by the tribunal which is competent to entertain a suit for the declaration. If a consequential relief is necessary to seeking redress in another Court or in any other proceeding, the suit for declaration will not be within the mischief of the proviso, Fisher v. Secretary of State supports this view. In that case the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council pointed out that, if the plaintiff is armed with the declaration, the Collector can he approached for giving further relief. What I understand the judgment to say is not that the further relief will be enforced by way of execution but only by way of enabling the successful plaintiff to sue for it in another proceeding. In Administrator General of Bengal v. Bhagan Chandra Ray Chaudry it was held that where the property was attached under Sect. 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code and was put in possession of a Receiver, the plaintiff need only seek a bare declaration. The principle is that the declaration would enable the successful plaintiff to claim from the Receiver possession of the property on the production of the decree, Mr. Rangacharyar quoted Kathama Nachiar v. Dorasinga Tevar. Although that decision is that the Privy Council, I do not base my judgment on it; because it was given with reference to Sect. 15 of Act VIII of 1859 and contains statements of law, which, with all respect, I do not think will be applicable to Sect. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. None the less, there are indications in that judgment of the view that the consequential Relief which a party is bound to seek must be one which must legitimately arise from the cause of action stated in the plaint and claimable in the Court in which the suit is instituted. Reference may also be made to Kristnam Sooraya v. Pathma Bee, Strong reliance was placed by Mr. Narasimha Aiyangar upon Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar. In that case the learned judges in Second Appeal accepted the finding of the District Munsif that there was ouster of possession. Reading the judgment as a whole, it is clear that the learned judges acted on the view that physical possession can fee claimed against the defendants in that case. That is the interpretation placed on it by Ramados v. Hanumantha Rao.

In my opinion therefore, even if this suit should be regarded as one brought to secure a common law right, the plaintiff is not in a position to claim further relief, because on the allegations made in the plaint he can seek no other remedy in this proceeding.

The next point which to a certain extent touched upon the merits of the claim, is whether the claim in dispute relates to an estate. Mr. Narasimma Aiyangar argued that, as, admittedly, the defendants are the occupancy ryots and as the Jeevitham Inam was granted to them, this village in question is not an estate within the definition. It may be conceded that it will not come under Sect. 3, cl. 2 (d) and it is not argued that either clause (a), (b) or (c) is applicable. I fail to see why clause (e) does not govern the case. It is not denied that the plaintiff is a lessee of the 11/16th of the village; nor is it denied that he is lessee of the melvaram right, if any, in respect of the 5/16th of the village.

It was strenuously argued by the learned vakil for the appellant that in respect of the 5/16th, the Rajah of Ramnad is not entitled to collect the melvaram. Strong reliance wag placed on Ex. C., the inam title deed. There can be no doubt that the Government thought themselves justified in enfranchising the inam, in respect of this 5/16th in favour of the defendants. Apparently there was a dispute about the right of the Government to enfranchise. There is also the fact which is very incidentally alluded to, by the District Munsif that the Inam itself was granted prior to the Permanent Settlement. On these two facts it would be a legitimate conclusion that the village was not within the Zamindari and was not included in the assets of the zamindari, when the permanent settlement took place. But these are not conclusive tests. Prior to the decision in the Secretary of State for India v. Maharajah of Venkatagiri there were hazy notions regarding the rights of the Government to enfranchise Inam lands within permanently settled estates. It may be, although the Rajah of Ramnad contested the right of the Government to enfranchise the 5/16th village he was not advised that he can successfully question the interference of the Government. Moreover the language of Sect. 1 of Act VIII of 1869 makes it clear that the enfranchisement does not predicate even that the Government had a power to enfranchise. It declares that the right of the holder of the estate who has made the Inam Grant should not be regarded as taken away by the grant of the Inam title deed. These are strong prima facie grounds for holding that the village in question was not a part of the permanent estate; but it cannot be said that these tests are conclusive and that the courts below were not competent to decide the matter on further evidence regarding the ownership of the property. The Subordinate Judge refers to the fact that, notwithstanding the enfranchisement proceedings the Rajah of Ramnad has, until very recently, been collecting the Melvaram from the defendants' ancestors. That is a circumstance which a Court competent to pronounce on facts is entitled to take into account in reaching its conclusions. I do not think it is open to the High Court to say either the enfranchisement proceedings are conclusive or that the finding about the village being within the Zamindari is not based upon legal evidence. It is true that the Judicial Committee in Arunachellam Chetty v. Venkatachalapathi Gurusawmigal have referred to the Inam title deed as very good evidence; but they have nowhere stated that it is a conclusive evidence. I am therefore of opinion that we are bound to accept the finding of fact which has been given by both the Lower Courts on this question.

The result is that the defendants have not shown that the village is not an estate. For these reason I agree that the second appeal must be dismissed with costs.

S. S.Appeal dismissed.

J.V. Vannisami Thevar v. J.V.R. Chellasami Thevar

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

J.V. Vannisami Thevar v. J.V.R. Chellasami Thevar

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