The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Abdur Rahman, J.:— This is a batch of five appeals arising out of the same number of suits, three of which were preferred by Vaishnavite Brahmins of Vadagalai sect and the remaining two by those of Tengalai sect for certain declarations and injunctions in regard to the famous Sri Ranganathaswami temple at Srirangam. The District Judge of Trichinopoly being obviously disinclined to be drawn into disputes, which he considered to be of a religious nature, dismissed all of them on the ground that they were nos of a civil nature and were thus barred by Section 9 of the CPC. Both the parties have appealed and the main point to decide is whether Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to try these suits. Another point which was raised in the lower Court, but which was left undecided, was that even if it be held that some questions could be determined by a Civil Court, their cognizance was barred under either Section 92 of the CPC, or under Section 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. Although this point was not, as stated above, determined by the trial Court, we have permitted the counsel for the parties to address us on it as well as for the obvious reason that it would be futile to remand the cases if we were of the opinion that they were not competent to be heard without the requisite sanction of the authorities mentioned in Section 92 of the CPC, or Section 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (2 of 1927). The two points which we are thus called upon to consider are (1) do the allegations contained in these suits pertain to matters which are civil in character; and (2) if so, are they barred either by Section 92 of the CPC, or Section 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. It will thus be necessary to go into every plaint with the object of deciding these questions in the order in which they are stated. Before going into the merits of the allegations, it would be better first to consider the legal aspect and then apply the principles which one is able to deduce from the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act to each suit separately.
2. A careful study of Section 9 of the CPC, will show that it has been drafted so as to confer jurisdiction on Civil Courts to try all suits of a civil nature unless their cognizance was either expressly or impliedly barred. As a general rule, whenever a right, which has been described by Salmond in his famous work on Jurisprudence “as an interest both recognized and protected” has been violated, it would give rise to a cause of action and would be entertainable by Civil Courts of the country. The explanation to the Section (S. 9) has, been added to clarify the position that a right to property or to an office could be agitated in Civil Courts, although its determination may involve a decision of questions in regard to religious ritual or ceremonies incidentally. Prom what has been laid down in the Section, it is fairly apparent that questions regarding rituals or ceremonies alone could not be adjudicated by Civil Courts if they were not essentially connected with what may be stated to be civil rights of an individual or individuals. It may be stated in the end that a suit complaining against an infringement of a right including that of worship would ordinarily be presumed to be within the competence of a Civil Court, unless it has been shown not to be so by those who rely on the exception, the rule as stated above being to the contrary. The principles which have been enunciated by ma are well recognized but difficulties usually arise in applying them to the facts of a particular case. This brings me to the next question regarding the bars created by Section 92 of the CPC, and Section 73 of the Religious Endowments Act. These Sections deal with matters which are of civil character and these bars have been obviously created with the object of avoiding unnecessary or frivolous suits against the trustees in regard to trust properties. It may not be necessary at this state to consider the further question as to what reliefs are covered by these Sections. They would be discussed in regard to the particular suit or suits where it may be found to be necessary so to decide. A large number of authorities was cited by the counsel for the parties but the distinguishing feature of almost every case is that it was filed against a stranger and not against a trustee. It has not therefore been considered necessary to discuss them. It is quite enough at this stage that a careful study of these two Sections and the authorities on which reliance was placed has led me to the conclusion, (a) that no worshipper has a right to maintain an action for any of the reliefs covered by either of these Sections (Section 92 of the CPC, and Section 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act), except when he seeks to enforce an individual right without securing the necessary sanction from the authorities mentioned in them; (b) from the above it follows as a corollary that the prohibition contained in clause (a) will not apply to a suit by a trustee against his co-trustees. Bearing these various principles in mind, I will have to determine the nature of each suit and it will be more convenient to start with those which have been brought on behalf of the Thengalai sect. O.S No. 2 of 1933 was filed with the object of asking for a declaration that the order passed by the devasthanam committee authorising the receipt of the ornaments with vadagalai namams as an offering and permitting them to be placed on the Goddess on day on which they were presented was ultra vires and illegal as being opposed to usage and tradition. An injunction was also asked for restraining the trustees and their successors in office from using the ornaments offered with vadagalai marks and adorning the deity with them in the said temple. Whether a particular deity is adorned with a particular ornament on a particular day is surely a matter of ritual and has nothing to do with a civil right. The plaint does not allege any denial of a claim to any right to property, nor does it contain any statement which will bring the case within one definition of what is ordinarily understood by a civil right. It is only frivolous to allege that by adorning the deity with the presented ornaments for a day, the thengalai character of the temple would be affected. I have therefore no hesitation in turning down the appellant's contention and dismissing the suit. The Appeal No. 290 of 1933 accordingly fails and is dismissed.
3. So far as Suit No. 3 of 1933 is concerned, it has been alleged in paras. 4 and 5 of the plaint that at the time of the daily tiruvaradhanam (food offerings) and other occasions the plaintiffs and the members of their goshti (assembly) only have the right to recite the Vedam and are entitled to certain incomes and honours on account of their being members of the goshti (assembly) holding the temple vedaparayanam miras office but this has been questioned by the followers of vadagalai sect lately. These allegations are, in my opinion, sufficient to bring the plaintiffs' claim within Section 9 of the CPC. They not only allege a right of worship which they state in the plaint to have been infringed but they further claim the right to an office as well as to its emoluments, which would dearly bring the matter within the cognizance of a Civil Court. The learned District Judge appears to have overlooked the plaintiffs' allegation that their right of worship was being infringed and their claim to the office with certain emoluments was being denied. Moreover, the members of the goshti claim to be some kind of office-holders in the temple and are thus entitled to have their grievances ventilated in a Civil Court. The plaintiffs in this suit are trying to enforce their rights as officeholders and would thus not fall within the ambit of either Section 92 of the CPC, or Section 73 of the Religious Endowments Act. In view of this finding it would be necessary to vacate the order of the learned District Judge and remand the case to him for, trial on the other issues which have not been so far determined. Appeal No. 287 of 1933 is therefore accepted and Suit No. 3 of 1933 is consequently remanded for disposal on the merits.
4. Coming to the suits filed on behalf of the vadagalai sect and taking up O.S No. 5 of 1933, I find that the archakas complain in para. 7 of their plaint against an order having been passed by defendant 1, who is the executive trustee of the temple, under which they have been directed to prostrate before the deity only once and not twice in accordance with their own religious beliefs. They have been, it is alleged, threatened to be dismissed if they refuse to carry out this order. This allegation, it is apparent, refers to the plaintiffs' individual rights as archakas if they wish to continue in their offices and at the same time wish to carry on their worship in accordance with what they alleged to be an immemorial practice. These allegations are, in my opinion, of such a nature as would bring the case within the cognizance of a Civil Court. Viewed in this manner, the cognizance of this case would neither be barred under Section 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, nor under Section 92 of the CPC. The plaintiffs are praying for certain individual rights as office-holders to be enforced by Courts of law and they should be allowed to have the freedom of their conscience and follow their immemorial custom, if they succeed in establishing it. Appeal No. 341 of 1933 has to be, for the above reasons, accepted and the suit would have to be remanded to the lower Court for disposal on the merits.
5. The second suit filed on behalf of the vadagalai sect is O.S No. 4 of 1933. It seeks for two declarations: (1) that the trustees of the temple have committed breach of trust in putting or causing to be put any namam or mark other than the thilaka to Mulavar, Sri Ranganathaswami and, (2) in putting or causing to be put new or additional thengalai namams or marks to the idols in and about the temple and in several articles and things thereof. It has been alleged in para. 13 of the plaint that the act of putting a namam on the God head is highly sacrilegious, that the puja to the God is rendered inefficacious and that the trustees of the temple have no power to introduce unshastraic innovations. Although an attempt has been made in the plaint to show that this act of the trustees would seriously affect the plaintiffs' right of worship, I have arrived at the conclusion after a careful consideration that this is a pure matter of ritual based on usage and must be held to be barred by Section 9 of the CPC. The attempt to characterize the practice of putting namams on the God's head as illegal appears to be due to the fact that the predominant character of this temple happens to be thengalai and it is highly distasteful to the vadagalais to seethe Gods they worship along with then galais bearing the latter's marks. Had they been on the contrary adorned with vadagalai marks instead of thengalai marks, the so-called sacrilege would never have been, one feels, made a ground of attack. So far as this part of the claim is concerned, I am of the opinion that it is not cognizable by Civil Courts and must be dismissed.
6. The other part of the claim however stands on a different footing. The allegations contained in para. 14 of the plaint make it clear that a very serious attempt is being made on behalf of the followers of the thengalai sect to introduce their own namams on the temple properties with a view to alter the character of the temple. There is no doubt that the plaint, as pointed) out by the learned District Judge, was drafted with an eye on the decision reported in 30 Mad 158,1 but this would not in any way detract from the value of the plaint or the seriousness of the allegations contained in it. An attempt to alter the character of the temple by erasing the namams of one: sect or by adding the namams of another sect in order to throw the namams of the other into oblivion or at least to reduce them to such an insignificant proportion that they may be almost ignored has been held in 30 Mad 158 to be an allegation which would be cognizable by Civil Courts and I respectfully concur with the expression of opinion contained in that judgment. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that this allegation of the plaintiff is cognizable by a Civil Court. If this were all, the plaintiff would be entitled to have this suit remanded.
7. But before this can be done, the question must be decided if the relief consequent on this right would be covered by Section 92 of the CPC, or under Section 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. Both these Sections are mutually exclusive and if the latter Section is applicable, the former Section would not apply. Moreover, it was contended by Mr. Radhakrishnayya however that the proposition enunciated by me in (a) in an earlier portion of the judgment was not quite applicable to this suit as the plaintiffs in the present case were claiming rights for themselves as individuals in their character as such. I cannot agree with this contention as I am not disposed to treat the right put forward as one of individual worship. It is really a question relating to the administration of a trust. Turning to 30 Mad 158 he urged that the right of worshippers to institute a suit was recognized in spite of the fact that he might have been claiming rights which are not only individual in their character but which he may be claiming in common with others. A careful study of this ruling however would show that Sir John Wallis did not state what has been contended for by the learned counsel. The facts of the case were that a suit was filed by a trustee, and that is important against his co-trustees for an injunction restraining certain vadagalai co-trustees from trying to convert a Vaishnavite temple at Tiruppukuzhi, which was thengalai in character, into that of vadagalai by substituting namams of the latter sect for that of the former. An injunction was also prayed for that a copper processional idol of the vadagalai guru may not be introduced into the temple for the first time. It will thus be seen that the suit was Teally between trustees of the temple inter se and would not be covered by the first proposition which has been laid down by me but would be covered by the second. Even if there were any remarks in that judgment regarding the general right of worshippers, they would be in the nature of an obiter. But if the judgment is correctly understood, it would be found that Wallis J. (as he then was) has only said at the bottom of page 163:
If, as dharmakarthas, they commit a breach of trust cognizable by the Civil Courts they may be restrained at the suit of the other dharmakarthas or worshippers.
8. I only understand this sentence to mean that the learned Judge was not thinking at the time if a suit referred to in that sentence could have been filed either with or without sanction as required by Section 92 of the CPC, or Section 73 of the Religious Endowments Act. He was only dealing with the rights of persons at whose instance a suit of the character mentioned in that judgment could be instituted. I am unable to discover any dictum either in the sentence mentioned above or at p. 165 which could be construed in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant. Reference may be made in this connexion to 45 Mad 1132 which has been followed in a very recent judgment by a Division Bench of this Court 1937 MWN 849.3
9. The next question then is, if the relief is barred under Section 73 of the Madras Religious Endowments Act. “Religious endowment” has been defined in Section 9, sub-clause 11 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 2 of 1927, to mean all property belonging to, or given or endowed for the support of, maths or temples or for the performance of any service or charity connected therewith and includes the premises of maths or temples but does not include gifts of property made as personal gifts or offerings to the head of a math or to the archaka or other employee of a temple.
10. Section 73, sub-cl. 2 provides that
Sections 92 and 93, R. 8 of O. 1 of Sch. 1, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall have no application to any suit claiming any relief in respect of the administration: or management of a religious endowment and no suit in respect of such administration or management shall be instituted except as provided by this Act.
11. A reference to the above definition of “religious endowment” would show that a deity is not covered by the definition and although it may be a juridical entity entitled to own dedicated property in the; legal sense, it is according to Hindu law something more than property and cannot be said to be owned by any particular class of Hindu or Hindus generally. Having held that Section 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, is inapplicable, I have to ascertain if this matter is covered by Section 92 of the CPC. Mr. Radhakrishniah contends that Section 92 of the CPC, would not be a bar to his claim as the relief sought by his: clients in the present suit is not covered by any of the reliefs which are specified in that Section. I do not agree. The question relating to the formation of a scheme has-first of all been clearly specified and this is a matter which would fall appropriately under that head. But even if it did not, it would be covered in any case by clause (h). It has been argued that this clause was not intended to provide any relief other than the ones which are mentioned in clauses (a) to (g). The learned counsel for the appellants placed his reliance in support of that construction on the well-known exposition of that branch of the law by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in 55 Cal 519.4 There is nothing in that case however which detracts from the view taken by me. All that their Lordships lay down in the case was that the words “further or other relief” mentioned in cl. (h) “must on general principles of construction be taken to mean relief of the same nature as contained in cls. (a) to (g).” This does not mean that the relief to be granted under cl. (h) must necessarily be the same as given in cls. (a) to (g). If this were so, cl. (b) must be assumed to be redundant and it is a well-known maxim of interpretation that no word or clause in an enactment should be held to be superfluous and the statute has to be so interpreted as to impute some meaning into the words used by the Legislature in an Act. Moreover, the word ‘or’ preceding cl. (h) is significant and is intended to cover reliefs other than those specified in cls. (a) to (g). I am therefore of the opinion that even if cl. (g) is not held to be strictly applicable, it would, in any case, be covered by cl. (h) since, to use their Lordships own words given above, the relief would at all events be in the nature of the one specified in cl. (g) of S. 92. II must therefore hold that this relief is covered by S. 92 and cannot be agitated in a Civil Court without complying with the requirements of that Section. The result is that this suit, although of a civil nature, would also have to be dismissed as it has been filed without the requisite sanction.
12. Coming to the third suit, O.S No. 6 of 1933, this was filed on behalf of the followers of the vadagalai sect for a declaration that the plaintiffs and other vadagalai worshippers are entitled to worship the idols of Sri Natha Munigal and Sri Vedanta Desigar and for their being carried in procession on the occasions and in the manner specified in Sch. (b) and permitting them to participate according to mamul in the festivals of Sri Ranganatha on the said occasions and receiving the customary honours and perquisites with a consequent injunction. I have considered the matter very carefully and having regard to the fact that it is an ordinary right of a citizen to worship according to his own belief, any deity or god as he chooses to do, I am of the opinion that it is a right of a civil nature. But in view of what has been said in regard to O.S No. 4 of 1933, this relief must also be held to be barred under Section 92 of the CPC, and the suit dismissed for want of proper sanction. The only question now left is one of costs, and as the parties have partially succeeded in establishing their respective contentions and partly failed, we think that the most equitable order in the circumstances of this case would be that in Appeals Nos. 290 of 1933, 340 of 1933, and 221 of 1933 the parties do bear their own costs both in this Court as well as in the lower Court. Costs in Suits Nos. 3 and 5 of 1933, which are being remanded, will abide the result.
Venkatasubba Rao, J.:— I agree with my learned brother who has exhaustively dealt with the question raised. The five suits out of which these appeals arise comprise six claims—four by the vadagalais and two by the thengalais. Section 9 of the CPC, enacts a rule which is very simple to state but very difficult to apply. It is a fundamental rule that the Civil Courts of the land shall try suits of a civil nature, but a suit does not cease to be one of a civil nature because in order to decide it the Court has to decide questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. The substantive part of S. 9 enacts the first part of the above rule: the explanation to it, the second part. Right to property or right to an office is, as the explanation points out, a civil right, but that is enacted only by way of illustration. The right of worship has been held in numerous cases to be a civil right of which the Courts will take cognizance. When rights of religious worship become inter, twined with religious ritual or religious tenet, the question presents the utmost difficulty. The right of worship cing, as already stated, a civil right, the Court is bound, when there is a claim made to it, to adjudicate upon it although that right depends on questions of ritual or tenet. It is often difficult to ascertain in a given case—is the matter one of religious worship which the Civil Courts will entertain or one of religious ritual or tenet which the Civil Courts will not? There is another distinotion of vital importance. Does a particular right partake of a right of worship which, it may be mentioned, is essentially an individual or personal right or does is pertain to the administration of a religious trust, i.e, a right which the Legislature has provided should be vindicated on behalf of the public. No such distinction can arise, it is obvious, where there is neither a trust nor a trustee, but where the infringement complained of it is in respect of a religious trust, the distinction becomes important whether the claim put forward relates to the personal right of worship or to the administration of a public religious trust. In the former case, it is open to any aggrieved individual to file a suit in the ordinary way to establish his right; in the latter case the right should be vindicated in the manner provided for by the Legislature and in no other, in other words, by S. 92 or some other analogous provision being availed of. These, briefly, are the principles which, in my opinion, bear upon the decision of the six claims which the suits under appeal have given rise to. In the light of these principles I shall now proceed to dispose of the six claims which in my opinion fall under three groups.
13. Group 1: Appeal No. 290 of 1933.—The thengalai plaintiffs object to the thirumangaliyams with vadagalai namams being placed round the neck of the goddess. The substance of the complaint is this: The trustees seem to have made an order that when thirumangaliyams with vadagalai marks are offered to the deity, they should be placed at the foot of the goddess. But the devasthanam committee rescinding this order directed that the jewel should be put on the neck of the goddess on the particular day it is presented. I am definitely of the opinion that no right of a civil nature is involved in this complaint, as neither the obaracter of the worship nor that of the temple is in the least affected; the grievance is in respect of a trivial matter of religious observance and the suit is therefore not maintainable and the appeal accordingly fails.
14. Appeal No. 221 of 1933. (Claim No. 1).—This appeal arises out of an action by the vadagalais and it comprises two claims; with the first of those claims alone I shall deal here. It is alleged that neither the vadagalai nor the thengalai namam should be placed on the godhead itself, for, the namam represents the foot of God. Under the cloak of this claim, the vadagalai plaintiffs seek to get removed the thengalai namam admittedly adorning the forehead of the deity. It is said that according to the Shastras it is an act of sacrilege to place a namam on the godhead. It would be a fruitless task to attempt to enquire what the ancient Shastras prescribe; indeed, the adherents of the rival sects may argue endlessly about the meaning of a particular text. In such cases, as has been often observed, the only safe guide is usage: 4 Mad 3155 and 30 Mad 158. It is not denied that the present contention is opposed, not only to the traditional usage of the Srirangam temple but of several celebrated shrines in South India. In my opinion the claim is a frivolous one and to allow it to be tried would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Moreover, the matter is at best one pertaining to religious ritual and as such is excluded from the cognizance of a Civil Court. The appeal, so far as it relates to this claim, therefore fails.
15. Group 2: Appeal No. 287 of 1933:— The suit here pertains to a religious office. The plaintiffs are thengalais and claim on behalf of themselves and others said to belong to a goshti, the office described as the vedaparayanam miras alleged to attach to the temple. They further claim that certain emoluments and honours appertain to the office in question. They complain that the devasthanam trustees and some members of the vadagalai sect have done some acts which have the effect of throwing doubt on their claim to the office. The constitution of the alleged goshti is no doubt vaguely described, but it is not our province now to decide whether the claim is true or false. The right claimed here is not dissimilar in its legal incidents to the claim in 5 Mad 313.6 On the allegations in the plaint it must be held that the suit is of a civil nature and allowing the appeal we must remit the case to the lower Court to be heard on its merits.
16. Appeal No. 341 of 1933.—This is a suit by the vadagalai archakas who are hereditary office-holders and temple servants. They maintain that as ordained by the Shastras they have been from time immemorial prostrating themselves before the deity at least twice, while performing certain ceremonies as archakas. Their complaint is that the trustees have directed that they should prostrate themselves only once and have threatened them with dismissal in case they disobey the order. If the allegations are true, the function of prostration is inherent in the religious office which the plaintiffs hold. The duty and the office are inseparably associated and I find it difficult to separate the one from the other and hold the duty to be a question of mere ritual. According to the plaintiffs, prostrating themselves twice is a matter of conscience, and to be told to deviate from the traditional usage on pain of dismissal, is an outrage on their religious sentiment. On these allegations, the claim is, in my judgment, one of a civil nature and the appeal should therefore be allowed and the suit remitted for trial.
17. Group 3: Appeal No. 221 of 1933: Claim No. 2.—I admit I feel considerable difficulty in defining in precise terms what does or what does not fall within the principle of this group. What is meant by the expression “matter pertaining to the administration of a religious trust?” On the one hand, this must be distinguished from matters of ritual and on the other from the individual right of worship. To decide where the line is to be drawn is not infrequently attended with considerable difficulty. In great Hindu temples with their innumerable sub-shrines and minor idols and multiplication of ceremonies, settled religious observances get established by usage and tradition. There are many such observances and it is wrong to treat every observance, irrespective of its character, as involving a question of right of worship as to treat it as a matter of ritual. The vadagalai plaintiffs complain that the trustees have committed breaches of trust by erasing vadagalai namams and replacing them by thengalai namams and otherwise increasing the number of the latter. They maintain that such action on the part of the trustee is likely to affect the character of the temple. These namams, it is alleged, have been put upon the temple, certain articles belonging thereto and on certain minor idols. In 30 Mad 158 it has been held that the removal or alteration of namams amounts to an interference with property and that the trustees of a temple ought not to be permitted to make changes affecting the character of the temple as a religious institution. The complaint is not that by any innovation in regard to the principal deity the right of individual worship has been invaded or interfered with. Whether a particular matter should, owing to its importance, be treated as involving the right of individual worship, must, in my opinion, depend upon circumstances. It is difficult to say in general terms what constitutes in the abstract an infraction of the right of worship. However, the complaint in question I am disposed to treat as one relating to the administration of a religious trust. This being so, the suit is incompetent, as the procedure prescribed by Section 92 of the CPC, or Section 73 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act (whichever is the provision applicable) has not been adopted. I am not disposed to regard 30 Mad. 158 as an authority to the contrary; on the other hand, it inferentially supports the view I have indicated. The matter there was originally heard by Subramania Aiyar and Davies, JJ. who differed. Subramania Aiyar J. held that the suit should be regarded, as one brought by a trustee against his co-trustees to vindioate the former's individual right; he was therefore of the opinion that no leave was necessary under S. 18 of Act 20 of 1863. But Davies J. held that the act complained of was the act of a majority of the trustees and was as such binding upon the plaintiff in his capacity of a trustee. Owing to this difference of opinion, there was a Letters Patent appeal, which was heard by a Bench of three Judges, who affirmed the view of Subramania Aiyar J. They held that the act of the majority complained of was ultra vires of the trustees and did not bind the dissenting trustee and therefore the suit was in effect one to establish the private right of the plaintiff trustee. On that ground the learned Judges decided that the want of sanction did not render the suit bad.
18. If this antecedent history is borne in mind, it will be seen that the suit in the case referred to, was not brought on behalf of any section of the public to vindioate a public right, but was brought by a trustee to have a private wrong redressed. Nor is the judgment in 12 Pat 6817 to the opposite effect. There, the plaintiff representing the Digambari sect sued the defendants who represented the Swetambari sect under O. 1, R. 8 of the CPC. No question of a trust or trustee was raised and the relief was claimed not against any trustee of an institution but against a rival section of the community. That ground of distinction is sufficient for my purpose, but I may point out incidentally that the right infringed there was of such magnitude as to be properly designated a right of worship. The charans in the old shrines were the impressions of the foot-prints of the saints, each bearing a lotus mark. The Swetambaris, who preferred to worship the feet themselves, have evolved another form of charan which shows the toe nails and must be taken to be a representation of a part of the foot. This the Digambaris refused to worship as being a representation of a detached part of the human body. I conceive this to be fundamentally different from an increase in namams (a bare matter of proportion), it being common ground that the offending namams on temple walls or minor deities do not, as such, interfere with the right of worship.
19. The question then remains, which of the two provisions govern the present case — Section 92 of the CPC, or Section 73 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act? The provision in the local Act applies to “religious endowments” only and that expression as defined by the Act means property and nothing more. As already stated, a part of the complaint relates to the idols in the temple, and idols or consecrated images are juridical persons or juristic entities and cannot be treated as property. Then it follows as observed by me in 1935 MWN 6078:
The respective spheres of Section 92 of the CPC, and Section 73 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act, must not be forgotten. The latter Act removes, as already stated, from the ambit of S. 92, which relates to all trusts of a religious nature, only those religious trusts which amount to “religious endowments” under that Act.
20. I am therefore of the opinion that the provision which applies is Section 92 of the CPC. But Mr. Radhakrishnayya contends that the reliefs asked for in the suit are not those contemplated by S. 92. The question is one of substance and not of mere form. The case here is not only one of “breach of trust” (that is what the plaintiffs themselves allege), but as shown above, the “direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of the trust.” Then cl. (g) refers to the “settling of schemes.” A direction that in the administration of the trust, the trustee shall do a certain thing or abstain from doing it, is surely not alien to a scheme of management. That is a relief falling within cl. (h) ejusdem generis with the relief specifically mentioned in cl. (g). I do not regard any of the numerous cases cited by Mr. Radhakrishnayya as compel, ling me to take a different view from what I have taken. The Section has been enacted with a view to prevent unrestricted access to Courts: otherwise, trustees may be harassed by endless suits brought by different individuals, each alleging his own grievance. One might put many instances of acts of management in a Hindu temple, Which however distasteful to particular individuals or sections of the public, cannot reasonably be regarded as invading a personal right of worship; nor can such acts be dismissed as already stated as being matters of mere ritual or tenet. It is in such cases that S. 92 is brought into play and evasion of that Section ought not to be allowed in public interests and the Courts will watch this with the utmost diligence; to relax the restriction imposed by the Section would be to open the flood-gates of spurious litigation. Take a case of breach of trust; it may be of a trivial nature or for some other reason ought not to be permitted to be agitated in a Court of law. The Advocate-General is expected to apply his mind to the question and is not bound as a matter of course to give sanction. The provision is a salutary one and ought not to be allowed to be defeated or evaded. On the ground of want of sanction under S. 92 the suit, in so far as it relates to this claim, fails and the appeal to the same extent should also be dismissed. Appeal No. 340 of 1933.— Here is a suit brought on behalf of vadagalais to compel the trustees to take in procession the idols of Nathamuni and Vedanta Desi kar (two of the numerous minor deities) within the precincts of the temple on certain occasions. I am not prepared to regard the right alleged to have been infringed, to be of such an important nature as to amount to a right of worship. The cases cited by Mr. Radhakrishnayya, such as 52 IA 61,9 are beside the point, as they deal with the use of a highway as a place of religious worship — a question with which we are not concerned. The remarks I have made with reference to the appeal I have just dealt with apply with equal force here. The suit fails for want of sanction under S. 92 and the appeal should accordingly be dismissed. I am in full agreement with the orders as to costs passed by my learned brother.
C.R.K/S.G
21. Order accordingly.