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  • Ghouse 20 C. 834 : 20 I.A. 99 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 305 17 Ind. Jur. 321 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 501 and illustration (g) to Section 42 Specific Relief Act
  • SECTION 9 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
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  • Ghouse 20 C. 834 : 20 I.A. 99 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 305 17 Ind. Jur. 321 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 501 and illustration (g) to Section 42 Specific Relief Act
  • SECTION 9 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The original suit was brought by the plaintiff for a declaration that the plaint nanja land belongs to her and for a permanent injunction restraining defendants from interfering with her enjoyment. It was admitted that the melwaram in the land belongs to the plaintiff; the 1st defendant claimed ownership of the hudivaram. The first Court decreed the suit and the lower Appellate Court concurred. Defendants appealed to this Court.

The evidence included documentary exhibits referred to as Ex. C (the inam register) and Exs. A and B (comparatively recent title-deeds). The courts made concurrent findings that the plaintiff was in possession on the date of the suit and that the 1st defendant had never been in possession. The appellate record shows disagreement about how far back possession was proved: the lower Appellate Court indicated possession for over 40 years, but this Court construes the reliable finding as possession for 12 years prior to 16 October 1919 (i.e., possession for 11 years prior to the suit filed 17 September 1918).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was any evidence on which the lower Court's finding that the plaintiff has title to the land could be based.
  2. Whether, where neither party has established legal title but the plaintiff was in possession on the date of suit and the defendant had never been in possession, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree maintaining her possession by grant of the declaration and injunction she prays for.
  3. Whether permitting the plaintiff now to rely on possessory title would fundamentally alter the nature of the suit (as argued by the 1st defendant).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (1st defendant's) Arguments

  • There is no evidence to support the lower Court's finding that the plaintiff has title to the land; Ex. C (inam register) is not definite as to grant details; Exs. A and B do not recite that the kudivaram was sold and their age and attestation do not prove such a sale.
  • Allowing the plaintiff to rely now merely on possessory title would fundamentally alter the nature of the suit.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Position

  • The plaint alleged continuous possession since 1877 and denied that defendants ever had possession; the plaint sought a declaration and injunction.
  • The plaintiff emphasized long, anterior and peaceable possession and denied that the 1st defendant or his predecessors were ever in possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narayana Rao v. Dharmachar 26 M. 514. The presumption that a person in long, anterior and peaceable possession is, until the contrary is shown, the owner and is entitled to maintain possession against all but the true owner. The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that the plaintiff's peaceable possession gives her a presumption of ownership sufficient to maintain possession against one who has neither title nor possession.
Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghouse 20 C. 834 : 20 I.A. 99 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 305 17 Ind. Jur. 321 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 501. The Privy Council ruling (and related authorities) supporting the maintainability of a suit by a person in peaceable possession and the legal principles reflected in illustration (g) to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court relied on this ruling as a direct authority for the maintainability of the plaintiff's suit and for affirming the correctness of the decree of the lower Appellate Court.
Somasundaram Chetty v. Vadivelu Pillai 31 M. 681 : 4 M.L.T. 344 Where a plaintiff, having failed to prove lawful title, attempts to rely on a legal title by prescription but has not put forward such a title in the plaint, the plaintiff may be non-suited. The Court distinguished this case from the present matter, noting that Somasundaram involved failure to plead a prescriptive claim, whereas in the present case possession was pleaded and contested at trial.
Maikal Servai v. Thambuswami Servai 25 Ind. Cas. 984 : 1 L.W. 858 : (1911) M.W.N. 784 When a plaintiff seeks possession against a party already in possession, a suit based on title must fail if the plaintiff does not prove title. The Court held this authority to be hardly in point because in the present case the defendant was not in possession; hence the reasoning in Maikal Servai did not dictate the result here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined the documentary evidence and found that Ex. C (the inam register) does not state definite details of the grant and that Exs. A and B (comparatively recent title-deeds) do not recite that the kudivaram was sold. The mere age of Exs. A and B and their attestation by Kathaperumal (the 1st defendant's paternal uncle) do not constitute evidence that the kudivaram was sold. On this basis the Court concluded there was insufficient evidence to support the lower Court's findings that the plaintiff had title.

Conversely, the 1st defendant had also not proved title; the courts below had made concurrent findings to that effect and no evidence establishing his title was produced. The courts also made concurrent findings that the plaintiff was in possession on the date of suit and that the 1st defendant had never been in possession. Although the lower Appellate Court spoke of possession for over 40 years, this Court treats the reliable evidential finding as possession for 12 years prior to 16 October 1919 (i.e., 11 years before the suit filed 17 September 1918).

Given that neither party established title but the plaintiff was in possession and the defendant never was, the Court addressed whether the plaintiff could maintain the suit. The Court rejected the 1st defendant's contention that allowing reliance on possessory title would fundamentally alter the nature of the suit, because the plaint explicitly pleaded possession since 1877 and denied defendants' possession; the written statement had, in turn, denied plaintiff's possession and asserted defendant's possession. The issues at trial specifically raised possession, so the defendant had the opportunity and duty to produce evidence to rebut the plaintiff's possession.

The Court referred to Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and to authorities (including Narayana Rao and Ismail Ariff) to the effect that a person in long, anterior and peaceable possession is presumed to be the owner until the contrary is shown, and is entitled to maintain possession against all but the true owner. The Court distinguished Somasundaram Chetty (where a plaintiff who sought to rely on prescription had not pleaded it and was non-suited) and Maikal Servai (where the plaintiff sought possession against a party already in possession and therefore a title-based suit failed when title was not proved). Applying these principles and distinctions, the Court concluded that the plaintiff could properly rely on possession to maintain the suit against a defendant who had neither title nor possession.

Holding and Implications

Second appeal dismissed with costs.

Holding: The Court found no reason to interfere with the decree of the lower Appellate Court and dismissed the second appeal with costs.

Implications: The decree of the lower Appellate Court upholding the plaintiff's declaration and injunction stands; the plaintiff is maintained in possession against the defendants in the circumstances found (neither party having proved title and the plaintiff having been in peaceable possession). The opinion applies established authorities (cited above) to support the maintainability of a suit by a person in peaceable possession and does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond those authorities.

    Periasami Muthiriyan v. Anandayi Ammal

    1. The original suit was by plaintiff for a declaration that the plaint nanja land belongs to her and for permanent injunction restraining defendants from interfering with her enjoyment. It was admitted that the melwaram in the land belongs to plaintiff. 1st defendant claimed that he owns the hudivaram. The first Court decreed the suit and the lower Appellate Court concurred. Defendants appeal.

    2. The first point taken is that there is no evidence on which the lower Court's findings that plaintiff has title to the land can be based. This, I think, must be allowed. Ex. C the inam register does not make a definite statement as to the particular details of the grant. Exs. A and B are only comparatively recent title-deeds and do not recite that the kudivaram was sold. The mere fact that they are more than 30 years old, and purport to have been attested by one Kathaperumal, paternal uncle of 1st defendant, cannot be any evidence that the kudivaram also was sold. There is no other evidence on the point.

    3. On the other hand 1st defendant also has not proved title. There are concurrent findings on this point and there is no evidence to prove his title.

    4. There are also concurrent findings that 1st defendant has never been in possession of the land; and that plaintiff was in possession on the date of suit. The lower Appellate Court holds further that plaintiff has been in possession of both varams for over 40 years, but, since to prove possession further back than 12 years from 16th October 1919 (the date of plaintiff's first witness's deposition) it relies solely on Exs A and B, mere recitals in which cannot prove the fact of possession, I must take it that its real finding is, relying as it does on plaintiff's 1st witness, that plaintiff has been in possession for 12 years prior to 16th October 1919. The suit was filed on 17th September 1918. So the position is this: neither party has established title, plaintiff was in possession on date of suit and for 11 years previously, and 1st defendant has never been in possession. In such circumstances is plaintiff entitled to a decree maintaining her possession by grant of the declaration and injunction she prays for.

    5. It is argued for 1st defendant that to allow plaintiff to rely now merely on possessory title is to fundamentally to alter the nature of the suit. But this I do not agree with. The plaint sets out clearly plaintiff's possession since 1877, and denies that defendants ever had possession. The written statement countered with a denial that plaintiff ever had possession, and assertions that 1st defendant was in possession on the date of suit, and that defendant and his predecessors-in-title were, as occupancy tenants, paying melvaram to plaintiff. On these findings issues 20 C. 834 : 20 I.A. 99 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 305 17 Ind. Jur. 321 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 501 and 31 M. 681 : 4 M.L.T. 344 were framed, raising the question whether plaintiff was in possession and the parties went to trial with that issue clearly before them. It was incumbent on 1st defendant to produce any evidence he had that plaintiff was never in possession and that he or his predecessors-in-title were in possession.

    6. I think this is clearly a case where if plaintiff had actually been dispossessed by 1st defendant, she could have successfully maintained a suit for possession against him under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. It is quite plain on the findings that plaintiff was in long anterior and peaceable possession at the time of the threat of dispossession. A person in such peaceable possession is, until the contrary is shown, presumed to be the owner, and is entitled to maintain his possession against all but the true owner. See Narayana Rao v. Dharmachar 26 M. 514. Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghouse 20 C. 834 : 20 I.A. 99 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 305 17 Ind. Jur. 321 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 501. The case reported in Somasundaram Chetty v. Vadivelu Pillai 31 M. 681 : 4 M.L.T. 344 is a case where the plaintiff, having failed to prove lawful title, relied on legal possession by prescription, i.e, again attempted to prove a title, legal, though not lawful, and was non-suited because he had not put forward such a title in the plaint. The present case is not similar. The case reported in Maikal Servai v. Thambuswami Servai 25 Ind. Cas. 984 : 1 L.W. 858 : (1911) M.W.N. 784 is also hardly in point since there plaintiff was seeking for possession as against a party already in possession. In such a case a suit based on title must fail when the title is not proved. The present suit is by a party in possession to be maintained in possession against one having neither title nor possession, Such a suit by its very nature relies not on title only but on possession also and defendants, as I have held, clearly realised the importance of attacking the plaintiff's plea so far as it was founded on possession also. The ruling of the Privy Counoil in Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghouse 20 C. 834 : 20 I.A. 99 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 305 17 Ind. Jur. 321 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 501 and illustration (g) to Section 42 Specific Relief Act are direct authorities for the maintainability of the suit, and for the correctness of the decree of the lower Appellate Court.

    7. I see no reason to interfere and dismiss this second appeal with costs.

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    Periasami Muthiriyan v. Anandayi Ammal
    (Feb 19, 1924)