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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from two connected interlocutory orders of a learned Judge:

  • An order refusing leave to sue under clause 12 of the Letters Patent.
  • An order, made on the same day, refusing leave to amend the plaint by excluding the joint family lands situated outside the jurisdiction.

The pleadings had originally been presented after an initial grant of leave to sue, but that grant was subsequently cancelled. The appellant sought leave to amend the plaint to exclude property outside the High Court's jurisdiction; the trial Judge refused that application. The present appeal challenges the refusal to grant leave to sue and also seeks to treat the refusal to permit the amendment as an appealable judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellate court should interfere with the learned Judge's discretion in refusing leave to sue under clause 12 of the Letters Patent.
  2. Whether an interlocutory order refusing leave to amend a plaint (to exclude property outside the jurisdiction) is an appealable "judgment" under the Letters Patent, or can only be challenged on appeal from the final decree.
  3. Whether there is power to give leave to sue where immovable properties forming part of the claim are situated in different jurisdictions (and whether separate suits may be maintained in the different jurisdictions).

Arguments of the Parties

Argument advanced by Mr. Ramaswami Aiyar (as reported)

  • The jurisdiction "to receive, try, and determine suits" in claims to property situated partly within and partly outside the jurisdiction of the High Court is dependent on the leave of the Court.
  • A plaint presented on the basis of a provisional grant of leave loses its validity when that leave is withdrawn; it cannot remain partially valid only in respect of property inside the jurisdiction.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of opposing parties' submissions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar Interlocutory order refusing to frame a particular issue is not a "judgment" within the meaning of the Letters Patent; such refusals can only be questioned on appeal from the final decree. The Chief Justice relied on this Full Bench ruling to hold that the order refusing leave to amend the plaint was not an appealable judgment and thus could not be separately appealed from.
Abdul Karim Sahib v. Badrudeen Sahib Authority involving facts somewhat similar; noted that in that case there was an appeal against both the decree and the interlocutory order. Distinguished by the court: unlike that case, there is no appeal against the decree here, so the present interlocutory order cannot be separately challenged as an appealable judgment.
Subba Rau v. Rama Rau Where immovable property is situated in different jurisdictions, separate suits lie in each jurisdiction for partition of the property situated there. Relied on by the Chief Justice to reject the view that there was no power to give leave in such cases and to confirm that separate suits are permissible for properties in different jurisdictions.
Balaram v. Ramchandra Supports the proposition that separate suits may be brought in different jurisdictions for partition of property situated there. Cited alongside other authorities to support the court's position that the rule requiring a partition suit to embrace all family properties does not apply where properties are in different jurisdictions.
Punchanun Mullick v. Shib Chunder Mullick Supports the principle that separate suits may be maintained in different jurisdictions for partition of property situated in those jurisdictions. Relied upon to reinforce the court's conclusion that parties retain the right to bring successive suits in respect of properties in different jurisdictions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded along the following lines:

  1. On the refusal to grant leave to sue under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the Chief Justice said the appellate court was not prepared to interfere with the learned Judge's exercise of discretion. In other words, the trial Judge's discretionary decision on leave was upheld.
  2. On the order refusing leave to amend the plaint (to exclude lands outside the jurisdiction), the Chief Justice held that such an interlocutory order is not a "judgment" within the meaning of the Letters Patent and therefore is not separately appealable. He relied on the Full Bench ruling in Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar, which held that an interlocutory order of similar effect must be challenged, if at all, on appeal from the final decree.
  3. The court distinguished Abdul Karim Sahib v. Badrudeen Sahib on the basis that, in that case, there was an appeal taken both against the decree and against the interlocutory order; in the present case there is no appeal against the decree, so the interlocutory order cannot be separately brought before the appellate court.
  4. Although the Chief Justice stated he did not accept the view that there was no power to give leave where properties are situated in different jurisdictions, he observed (and cited authorities) that it is well settled that where immovable property is in different jurisdictions separate suits lie in each jurisdiction for partition of the property situated there.
  5. Seshagiri Aiyar, J. concurred and added analytical observations: after cancellation of the order granting leave to sue the originally presented plaint became incapable of being proceeded with; the jurisdiction to receive, try and determine suits in respect of property partly inside and partly outside the High Court's territorial jurisdiction depends on the grant of leave; when that provisional leave is withdrawn the plaint loses vitality and cannot be treated as partially valid. Accordingly, the application to amend the plaint and the order refusing the amendment were deemed incompetent and infructuous. Because the order was infructuous and could not affect the plaintiff's rights to litigate (by presenting fresh suits for properties within jurisdiction), the plaintiff had no right of appeal against it.
  6. A further concurring opinion agreed with the Chief Justice that where properties lie in different jurisdictions the rule that a partition suit must embrace all family properties does not apply, and noted that the enabling section of the Civil Procedure Code has not deprived parties of the right to bring successive suits in respect of properties situated in different jurisdictions. That judge agreed that costs should be imposed on the plaintiff for unnecessarily invoking the Court's aid.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties

  • The appeal against the learned Judge's refusal to grant leave to sue is not interfered with; the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
  • The interlocutory order refusing leave to amend the plaint (to exclude property outside the jurisdiction) is not treated as an appealable judgment and, in the present circumstances (no appeal against the decree), cannot be separately appealed from.
  • Because the leave to sue was cancelled, the original plaint ceased to be prosecutable; the plaintiff remains free to pursue remedies in respect of properties within the jurisdiction by filing fresh suits in the appropriate forum.
  • Costs were awarded against the plaintiff for unnecessarily invoking the Court's aid.

Broader legal implications (as stated in the opinion)

  • The court reaffirmed existing principles that interlocutory orders of the kind here cannot be separately appealed under the Letters Patent and must generally be challenged on appeal from the final decree.
  • The court reiterated established law that where immovable properties forming the subject-matter lie in different jurisdictions, separate suits may be brought in respect of the property situated in each jurisdiction; the rule that a partition suit must embrace all family properties does not apply in that situation.

The opinion applies and relies upon existing authority; it does not purport to announce a novel legal principle beyond the application of those authorities to the facts before the court.

    Mahalingam v. C. Natesa Aiyar

    The Chief Justice. — In so far as this is an appeal from the order of the learned Judge refusing leave to sue under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent, we are not prepared to interfere with the exercise of the learned Judge's discretion. In so far as it can be regarded as an appeal against his further order on the same day refusing leave to amend the plaint by excluding the joint family lauds outside the jurisdiction, I am of opinion that such an order is not appealable as a judgment. In Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar it was held by the Full Bench that an interlocutory order refusing to frame a particular issue was not a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent although the effect of the order was to shut out one of the defences relied upon, and that the refusal could only be questioned on an appeal from the final decree. That ruling appears to me to govern the present case. In Abdul Karim Sahib v. Badrudeen Sahib(2), the facts of which were somewhat similar to the present, it is expressly stated in the foot-note that there was an appeal against the decree as well as against the order refusing to amend the written statement, whereas there is no appeal against the decree in the present case. I may say, however, that I am unable to agree with the view that there was no power to give leave in such a case, as it appears to be well settled that where the immoveable property is situated in different jurisdictions a separate suit lies in each jurisdiction for the partition of the property there situated-Subba Rau v. Rama Rau(3); Balaram v. Ramchandra(4); and Punchanun Mullick v. Shib Chunder Mullick(5). In the result, the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

    Seshagiri Aiyar, J. — I agree. In my opinion, the application to amend the plaint and the order passed thereon were both incompetent. After the cancellation of the order granting leave to sue, the plaint originally presented became incapable of being proceeded with. As contended for by Mr. Ramaswami Aiyar, the jurisdiction “to receive, try, and determine suits” in the case of claims to property situated partly within and partly outside the jurisdiction of the High Court is dependent on the leave of the Court. A plaint presented on the granting of a provisional leave loses vitality the moment the leave is withdrawn. It cannot be said that it is valid to some extent and invalid only to the extent of the property outside the jurisdiction of the Court. The party will not be precluded from pursuing his remedies in respect of the properties within the jurisdiction by tiling a fresh suit in that behalf. As the order was infructuous and could not affect the rights of the plaintiff to litigate his claim, the plaintiff had no right of appeal against it.

    I entirely agree with the learned Chief Justice in holding that where properties are in different jurisdictions, the rule that a suit for partition should embrace all the family properties has no application. The enabling section in the Civil Procedure Code has not deprived parties of the right to bring successive suits in respect of properties situated in different jurisdictions. As the plaintiff unnecessarily invoked the aid of the Court, I agree in the order as to costs against him.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Mahalingam v. C. Natesa Aiyar
    (Nov 24, 1915)