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  • provision of Order XXII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order XXII, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • provision of Order XXII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order XXII, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • provisions of Order XXII, Rule 6; (4)
  • Order XXII, Rule 6,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Tara Chand, born 13 November 1899, had a certificated guardian, Musammat Persauni, appointed for his person and property on 5 October 1907. After the appointment of that guardian, Tara Chand was adopted by his uncle, Lala Banarsi Das. In 1916 Musammat Champi sued Banarsi Das and others for partition of a house. Proceedings in the First Court were completed on 20 March 1917, judgment was reserved and fixed for delivery subsequently. Banarsi Das died between the reservation and the pronouncement of judgment; an application was made (around 28 March 1917) to bring Tara Chand on the record in place of his adoptive father. Tara Chand, once on the record, appointed a Pleader and contested the suit. A preliminary decree for partition was passed on 14 April 1917 and a final decree on 21 June 1917. Tara Chand appealed both decrees to the High Court and those appeals were dismissed on 28 June 1920.

On 14 September 1920 Tara Chand instituted the present suit (by his next friend and certificated guardian Musammat Persauni) seeking cancellation of the decrees on the ground that they were passed against him while he was a minor and without representation by a guardian. The learned Subordinate Judge of Meerut decreed the suit in favour of Tara Chand. Two defendants, Musammat Champi and Musammat Sona Dei, appealed against that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a minor who was not represented in the suit by a duly appointed guardian can be held to be bound by a decree passed against him where he neither alleges nor proves that the decree was unjust or prejudicial to him (explicitly framed at paragraph 11).
  2. Whether the decrees passed in the partition suit are saved by Order XXII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure when death occurred between the conclusion of hearing and delivery of judgment (raised by the appellants at paragraph 2 and discussed at paragraphs 4 and 16).
  3. Whether the guardianship certificate issued to Musammat Persauni became inoperative on the adoption of Tara Chand by Banarsi Das, and whether that adoption affected Tara Chand's age of majority (raised as a ground of appeal at paragraph 2).
  4. Whether the plaintiff (Tara Chand) was barred by estoppel from questioning the decrees or whether he was not entitled to relief because he was not prejudiced by lack of a guardian (grounds (4) and (5) in paragraph 2 and discussed at paragraphs 5 and 8).
  5. Whether a declaration is a proper remedy in the circumstances, or whether the appropriate remedy was an injunction (raised at paragraph 9).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as stated in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff failed to establish his date of birth as 13 November 1899 (ground 1, p.2).
  • On adoption by Banarsi Das the guardianship certificate issued to Musammat Persauni became inoperative and Tara Chand attained majority at the age of 18 on 13 November 1917 (ground 2, p.2).
  • The decree of the First Court is saved by the provisions of Order XXII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because death occurred between hearing and judgment (ground 3, p.2; developed at p.4 & p.16).
  • The plaintiff suffered no prejudice by the want of appointment of a guardian and was able to conduct his defence effectively himself, so he was not entitled to the declaration sought (ground 4, p.2).
  • The plaintiff was barred by the rule of estoppel from questioning the decrees (ground 5, p.2; lack of proof of estoppel emphasized at p.8).
  • It was also urged that the plaintiff's remedy should have been by injunction to restrain execution of the decrees rather than by a declaration (p.9), and the appellants cited Kinhamed v. Kutti for that proposition.
  • During argument, appellants' counsel alleged that Tara Chand had been presenting himself as a major dishonestly (characterized by counsel as "playing a trick") and that Tara Chand had purchased further shares and sought to re-open partition for self-interested motives (p.8).

Plaintiff / Respondent's Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff's counsel conceded the date of birth: Tara Chand was born on 13 November 1899 (p.3).
  • The adoption by Banarsi Das did not change Tara Chand's identity nor the continuing effect of the guardianship certificate issued to Musammat Persauni; the guardian's power and the District Court's appointment continued (p.3).
  • The decrees passed against Tara Chand while he was a minor and without proper guardian representation are void (p.5 and developed throughout Mukerji, J.'s reasoning).
  • The remedy of a declaration that the decrees are not binding on him was appropriate in the circumstances; the Kinhamed authority relied on by appellants was said to be inapplicable (p.9).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jungli Lall v. Laddu Ram Marwari (50 Ind. Cas. 529; 4 P.L.J. 240; (1919) Pat. 105) The Patna High Court held that where preliminary and final decrees were both passed against a dead person, the final decree was a nullity and was not saved by Order XXII, Rule 6. Used to support the proposition that Order XXII, Rule 6 deals with decrees against dead persons and does not save decrees passed against persons who were living and brought on record prior to judgment; the Court distinguished the present facts from those covered by the rule (p.4).
Walian v. Banke Behary Pershad Singh (30 C. 1021; 301. A. 182; 7 C.W.N. 774; 5 Bom. L.R. 822; 8 Sar. P.C.J. 512) (P.C.) Privy Council authority explaining that mere procedural irregularities do not necessarily render decrees or sales void, but the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed against persons who are not parties or not properly represented; in such cases decrees/sales are nullities. Relied upon (and its force explained) to show that where a person is not properly represented (e.g., an unrepresented minor), decrees are nullities; the Court applied this distinction between lack of jurisdiction (nullity) and mere procedural defect (not necessarily fatal) (pp.5-7, 13-15).
Ram Bareshha Ram v. Tarak Tewari (33 Ind. Cas. 805; 14 A.L.J. 589) Similar to the Privy Council authority; a Bench case of this Court dealing with representation of minors. Cited as a similar authority to Walian in support of the principle that lack of proper representation can render decrees void (p.5).
Pande Saldeo Narain v. Ramayan Tewari (71 Ind. Cas. 705; 2 Pat. 335; 4 P.L.T. 147; (1923) A.I.R. (Pat.) 242) Illustrates the distinction between void and voidable decrees; one of the judges pointed out that distinction. Cited to show the difference between defects that affect jurisdiction (void) and those that affect exercise of jurisdiction (voidable) (p.5).
Bhura Mal v. Har Kishen Das (21 A. 383; A.W.N. (1902) 76) Full Bench of this Court held that a decree passed against a minor without appointment of a guardian ad litem is void. Followed as authority that a decree against an unrepresented minor is a nullity (p.6).
Hanuman Prasad v. Muhammad Ishaq (23 A. 137; A.W.N. (1935) 229; 2 A.L.J. 615) Bench judgment following Bhura Mal and explaining the effect of Walian and other Privy Council authority. Used to support the position that where a minor is not properly represented the decree is void; supports reliance on Privy Council reasoning (p.6).
Khiarajmal v. Diam (32 C. 296; 1 C.L.J. 581; 32 I.A. 23; 8 Sar. P.C.J. 734; 9 C.W.N. 231; 2 A.L.J. 71; 7 Bom. L.R. 1) (P.C.) Privy Council observed that sales cannot be treated as void for mere irregularities, but the Court had no jurisdiction to sell property of persons not parties or not properly represented. Quoted as an authoritative exposition of the distinction between lack of jurisdiction (nullity) and mere procedural irregularity (p.6).
Ram Chander v. Chheda Lal (2 A.L.J. 460; A.W.N. (1905) 122) Held that where a minor was sued as a major and a decree passed against him, the decree was not binding on him. Also considered the effect of certificated guardianship on the age of majority. Cited to support the proposition that a person cannot be major in one district and minor in another and that decrees against minors so situated are not binding (p.7).
Purna Chandra Kunwar v. Bejoy Chand Mahtab / Bejoy Chand Mehtab (18 Ind. Cas. 859; 17 C.W.N. 549; 18 C.L.J. 18) Calcutta High Court decision holding that a decree obtained against a minor who was sued as a major without representation was a nullity; remanded some issues for trial as to liability. Described as the only case exactly in point and relied upon to conclude that Tara Chand was entitled to have the decrees declared not binding on him; the case was also relied on for remanding issues on liability where appropriate (pp.15-16, 18).
Murli Dhar v. Pitambar Lal (66 Ind. Cas. 372; 20 A.L.J. 329; 44 A. 525; (1922) A.I.R. (A.) 91; 4 U.P.L.R.(A.) 170) Example of a case where a minor was substantially represented and not prejudiced; courts refused relief when no prejudice shown. Cited to show the countervailing principle that when a minor has been substantially represented and not prejudiced, relief (declaration) may be refused; used to distinguish those facts from the present case (p.14).
Kinhamed v. Kutti (14 M. 167; 1 M.L.J. 328; 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 119) Cited by appellants for the proposition that injunction might have been the appropriate remedy instead of declaration. The Court considered the authority but found its facts peculiar and inapplicable to the present matter and held the declaration granted was a proper remedy (p.9).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two complementary lines: (a) procedural/technical points raised by the appellants (for example, applicability of Order XXII, Rule 6 and effect of adoption on guardianship), and (b) the substantive legal effect of rendering a decree against a person who was a minor and unrepresented.

Key steps in the Court's reasoning (as set out in the opinion):

  1. Concessions and preliminary factual findings: it was conceded that Tara Chand was born on 13 November 1899 and was therefore a minor when brought on the record and when the preliminary and final decrees were passed (pp.3, 13, 15).
  2. Effect of adoption on the guardianship certificate: the Court accepted the view (as conceded by respondent's counsel) that the adoption did not change Tara Chand's identity and did not nullify the power or continuing effect of the certificated guardian's appointment (p.3). The Court did not decide any wider question about adoption's effect on the certificate of guardianship beyond the facts of the case.
  3. On the applicability of Order XXII, Rule 6 (CPC): the Court examined the scope of that rule and concluded it applies to decrees rendered against a dead person where the Court was unaware of death and proceeded to judgment; it does not bear on decrees rendered against living persons (p.4). The Court further held that in the present case the hearing had not been finally concluded prior to the death of Banarsi Das because proceedings (bringing Tara Chand on the record) took place after the reservation of judgment; therefore Order XXII, Rule 6 could not be invoked to save the decrees (pp.4, 16).
  4. Distinction between lack of jurisdiction (void) and mere procedural irregularity (voidable): the Court relied on authorities (including Privy Council cases and Full Bench decisions) to explain that when a person is not a party to proceedings (for example, because a minor is unrepresented on the record), the Court lacks jurisdiction as regards that person and any decree against such a person is a nullity (pp.6, 14). By contrast, where a minor is properly before the Court (e.g., represented by a guardian not disqualified), procedural irregularities affecting appointment may affect exercise of jurisdiction but do not necessarily render the decree void.
  5. Application of precedent to the facts: on principle and authority (notably the Calcutta High Court decision in Purna Chandra Kunwar), the Court held that decrees passed against the plaintiff while he was a minor and unrepresented are void and not binding on him (pp.15-16). The Court emphasized that this outcome flows from substantive considerations of status and disability (minority), not merely from breach of procedure (pp.14-15).
  6. Consideration of prejudice and substantial representation: the Court acknowledged authorities establishing that where a minor has been substantially represented and has not been prejudiced, relief may be refused (e.g., Murli Dhar). However, those authorities were distinguished from the present facts because here the record showed the plaintiff was unrepresented and therefore the underlying jurisdictional defect rendered the decrees nullities (pp.14-16).
  7. Estoppel and proof: the Court noted the appellants failed to present evidence or to examine witnesses to prove estoppel or to show how Tara Chand's conduct caused them to act as they did in previous litigation (p.8). Mere accusations by counsel were insufficient.
  8. Discretion and remedy: the Court considered the argument that the declaratory relief was discretionary or inappropriate and that an injunction should have been sought. The Court found the declaratory relief granted was appropriate in the circumstances and rejected the appellants' reliance on Kinhamed v. Kutti as inapplicable on its facts (p.9).
  9. Consequences as to further proceedings: the Court observed that a declaration that the decrees are not binding on Tara Chand would re-open the partition suit at the stage when Tara Chand was brought on the record; in view of the nature of the relief sought (no claim for refund or restitution of costs), the Court found no bar to granting the declaration (p.17).

Summary of judicial disposition: One judge stated concisely "I would dismiss the appeal with costs" (p.10). Mukerji, J. delivered a detailed opinion applying the above reasoning and concluded the appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs on the higher scale (pp.18-19).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals are DISMISSED. The Court declared that the preliminary and final decrees passed against Tara Chand while he was a minor and unrepresented are not binding on him (pp.5-7, 15-18). Costs were awarded against the appellants (first judge: with costs; Mukerji, J.: dismissed with costs on the higher scale) (pp.10, 19).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The decree of the Subordinate Judge, which declared the earlier partition decrees not binding on Tara Chand, is sustained by the dismissal of the appeal; the partition suit will be re-opened at the stage at which Tara Chand was brought on the record, and Tara Chand is not bound by the decrees that were passed against him while he was an unrepresented minor (p.17).
  • On legal principle: The Court reaffirmed the distinction between (a) decrees rendered against persons who are not parties or not properly represented (which affect the Court's jurisdiction and render such decrees nullities) and (b) mere procedural defects in appointment of a guardian where the minor was substantially represented and not prejudiced (which may not automatically invalidate the decree). The opinion applied existing authorities rather than announcing a novel rule (pp.13-16).
  • Remedial consequences: The Court found the declaratory relief sought by Tara Chand appropriate in the circumstances and declined to require a different remedy (such as an injunction) where the facts and relief as pleaded supported the declaration (p.9).

    Musammat Champi And Anr. v. Lala Tara Chand And Tirloki Nath And Ors.

    1. The plaintiff, Tara Chand, who has since become a major, instituted a suit for cancellation of certain decrees of Court through his next friend Musammat Persauni, his certificated guardian. He is the son of Jainti Prasad, and was born on 13th November 1899. A guardian was appointed by Court of his person and property on 5th October 1907. He attained the age of majority on 13th November 1920. After the guardian was appointed, his uncle Banarsi Das adopted him. In 1916 one Musammat Champi sued Banarsi Das and others for partition of a house, and all proceedings were completed in the First Court on 20th March 1917. Judgment was reserved on that day and 30th March was fixed for delivery. Banarsi Das died between those two dates, and on 28th March Musammat Champi applied to bring Tara Chand on the record in' place of his adoptive father, Banarsi Das. He appointed a Pleader and contested the suit. On 14th April 1917, a preliminary decree for partition was passed, and a final decree on the 21st June. Tara Chand himself appealed from both decrees to this Court, and the appeals were dismissed on 28th June 1920. The present suit for the cancellation of all the four decrees on the ground that they were passed against him while he was a minor and not represented by a guardian was instituted on the 14th of September 1920.

    2. The learned Subordinate Judge of Meerut decreed 'the suit, and hence two of the defendants, Musammat Champi and Musammat, Sona Dei, have appealed. The grounds of appeal are: (1) that the plaintiff failed to prove that he was born on the 13th November 1899, (2) that on his adoption by Banarsi Das the guardianship certificate issued to Musammat Persauni, became inoperative, and the plaintiff attained majority at the age of 18 on 13th November 1917, (3) because the decree of the First Court sought to be cancelled is saved by the provisions of Order XXII, Rule 6; (4) that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree in this suit, because he was in no way prejudiced by the want of appointment of a guardian and he was able to conduct his defence effectively himself, and (5) that the plaintiff was barred by the rule of estoppel from questioning the decrees.

    3. There is no force in any of these grounds. It was conceded during the argument that the plaintiff was born on the 13th November 1899. Once a guardian was appointed to him, it mattered little what other property he acquired. The adoption did not change his identity and the power of the guardian, Musammat Persauni, and of the District Court, which appointed her, continued to be the same.

    4. Order XXII, Rule 6, prevents abatement when death takes place between the conclusion of the hearing and the pronouncement of the judgment, and the decree is passed against a dead man. Obviously this provision of law covers cases where the Court is unaware of the death of a party and proceeds on the supposition that the parties are alive. It was urged that in the present case, hearing concluded on the 28th of March and judgment was delivered on the 14th of April 1917, and that the death of Banarsi Das took place between the two dates. This is not a correct way of summarising the proceedings of the Court. After the 28th March and before the judgment was pronounced, some proceedings took place, namely, those of bringing Tara Chand on the record; there was, therefore, no conclusion of the hearing prior to the death of Banarsi Das. The rule deals with a decree against a dead man and not with one against living persons. It indicates how a decree against a dead man is to be construed and can have no reference to a decree passed against living persons. Even where preliminary and final decrees were both, passed against a dead person, the Patna High Court held that the final decree was a nullity and was not saved by the provisions of this rule. Jungli Lall v. Laddu Ram Marwari 50 Ind. Cas. 529; 4 P.L.J. 240; (1919) Pat. 105.

    5. The four decrees sought to be/cancelled were passed against a minor and were void. We have not to consider any question of prejudice to the plaintiff. The learned Counsel for the appellant quoted rulings in cases where the minor was not properly represented and the Courts refused to give him relief when it was discovered that he had not suffered any prejudice by improper representation. The first case is a Privy Council case of Walian v. Banke Behary Pershad Singh 30 C. 1021; 301. A. 182; 7 C.W.N. 774; 5 Bom. L.R. 822; 8 Sar. P.C.J. 512 (P. C). A Bench case of this Court, Ram Bareshha Ram v. Tarak Tewari 33 Ind. Cas. 805; 14 A.L.J. 589 was similar. The most recent case is that of the Patna High Court, Pande Saldeo Narain v. Ramayan Tewari 71 Ind. Cas. 705; 2 Pat. 335; 4 P.L.T. 147; (1923) A.I.R. (Pat.) 242. In this case, one of the learned judges (Das, J.) has pointed out the distinction between void and voidable decrees at page 352 Page of 2 Pat.--[Ed.] of the report:

    6. The Court has no jurisdiction to render judgment against one who is not a party to the suit, though it has jurisdiction to render judgment against one who is a party to the suit but who has not been brought before it by reason of the failure on the part of the Court to follow the particular procedure laid down in the Code. The one affects the existence of the jurisdiction of the Court; the other affects the exercise of it. To take a simple case, a minor is not a party to the suit, unless he is represented in the record of the suit by a guardian competent to act as, such. Where the record of the suit itself shows that the minor is wholly unrepresented, or that he is represented by a guardian disqualified from acting as such a guardian under the express provision of the Statute, the result is that the minor is not properly a party to the suit, and a judgment rendered against the minor is without jurisdiction and null and void. But where he is properly a party to the suit--and as he is properly a party if he is represented in the record by a guardian not disqualified from acting--the jurisdiction of the Court to try and determine the cause as against the minor is complete, and such jurisdiction will not be ousted, on proof that the Court did not follow the appropriate procedure for the appointment of the guardian," A Full Bench of this Court held a decree passed against a minor; without the appointment of a guardian ad litem to be void [Bhura Mal v. Har Kishen Das 21 A. 383; A.W.N. (1902) 76]. This ruling was followed by a Bench of two Judges in Hanuman Prasad v. Muhammad Ishaq 23 A. 137; A.W.N. (1935) 229; 2 A.L.J. 615 where the force of the Privy Council case of Walian v. Banke Behary Pershad Singh 30 C. 1021; 301. A. 182; 7 C.W.N. 774; 5 Bom. L.R. 822; 8 Sar. P.C.J. 512 (P. C) was explained, and the authority was quoted of the Privy Council case, Khiarajmal v. Diam 32 C. 296; 1 C.L.J. 581; 32 I.A. 23; 8 Sar. P.C.J. 734; 9 C.W.N. 231; 2 A.L.J. 71; 7 Bom. L.R. 1 (P. C). In the latter case their Lordships observed:

    7. Their Lordship.3 agree that the sales cannot be treated as void or now be avoided on the ground of any mere, irregularities of procedure in obtaining the decrees, or in the execution of them. But, on the other hand, the Court had no jurisdiction to sell the property of persons who ware not parties to the proceedings, or properly represented on the record. As against such persons the decrees and sales purporting to be made would be a nullity, and might be disregarded without any proceeding to set them aside." The present case is similar. The decrees passed against the plaintiff are a nullity and might be disregarded without any proceeding to set them aside. In Ram Chander v. Chheda Lal 2 A.L.J. 460; A.W.N. (1905) 122 this Court held that where a minor was sued as a major and a decree passed against him, the decree was not binding upon him. That was a case where a certificated guardian was appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act to the minor and it was held that such a minor did not attain majority until the age of 21. In that case it was contended that a guardian having been appointed to the minor's property in one district, the minor would attain the age of majority at 18 with respect to property situated in another district. The learned Judges held that a person cannot be a major in one district and a minor in another. Similarly, it may be stated here that Tara Chand cannot be a minor with respect to the property of his father Jainti Prasad, and major with respect to the property inherited by him from his adoptive father Banarsi Das. The Calcutta High Court also has held a decree against a minor to be a nullity [Purna Chandra Kunwar v. Bejoy Chand Mahtab 18 Ind. Cas. 859; 17 C.W.N. 549; 18.C.L.J. 18].

    8. As pointed out by the learned Judge of the lower Court the appellant did not come forward herself nor get any agent of hers examined to prove circumstances which would give rise to any question of estoppel. We were not told during the argument how the action of Tara Chand led the defendant, Musammat Champi, to act as she did in the previous litigation. It is not even alleged by an affidavit or otherwise that she was aware of how Tara Chand was acting, and had no knowledge of his being a minor. Her learned Counsel here represented that Tara Chand was playing a trick. Subsequent to the previous litigation, he had purchased more shares in the house (see paragraph 12 of the plaint) and by re-opening the litigation he desired to get a solid block for himself and oust Musammat Champi from the portion of the House allotted to her. I have, however, to decide a question of law and not of morality. These considerations may be submitted to the Trial Court in case there is a fresh trial of Musammat Champi's suit.

    9. Though not mentioned in the grounds of appeal, an argument was advanced here that a declaration is discretionary for this Court to grant and the circumstances of the present case are such that the discretion should not be exercised. The decrees are a nullity and may be disregarded so it cannot be said that the lower Court exercised its discretion wrongly in granting the declaration sought by the plaintiff. It is also urged that the plaintiff's remedy was by way of injunction to restrain the defendants from executing the decrees and not by way of declaration. The case of Kinhamed v. Kutti 14 M. 167; 1 M.L.J. 328; 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 119 was quoted as an authority. The facts of that case are peculiar and in no way applicable here. The remedy granted to the plaintiff was a proper one.

    10. I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

    Mukerji, J.

    11. This appeal raises the question whether a minor, who was unrepresented in the suit by any guardian, can be held to be bound by the decree passed against him, although he neither alleges nor proves that the decree passed against him is unjust or to his prejudice.

    12. The facts of the case are no longer in dispute and are as follows. The appellant Musammat Champi filed the Suit No. 203 of 1916 against one Lala Banarsi Das and several others for the partition of a certain house. The case was duly heard and concluded except for the judgment during the lifetime of Banarsi Das. The Court reserved judgment and fixed the 30th of March 1917 for delivery of it. Banarsi Das died on the 23rd of March 1917. An application was made to the Court by Musammat, Champi that the respondent, Tara Chand, the adopted son of Banarsi Das, might be brought on the record as his legal representative. This application was granted and ultimately on the 14th of April 1917 a preliminary decree was passed. The final decree for partition followed on the 21st of June 1917. Tara Chand on being brought on the record purported to appoint a Vakil and resisted the suit so far it lay in his power. He filed appeals to this Court against both the preliminary and final decrees which were, however, unsuccessful. Tara Chand was the natural son of one Jainti Prasad. On the death of Jainti Prasad Tara Chand's natural mother Musammat Persauni took out a certificate of guardianship, on the 15th of November 1907. It was after this certificate had been obtained that Tara Chand was adopted by Banarsi Das and passed into his family. Evidently everybody forgot that there was a certificated guardian and Tara Chand was throughout treated as a major. As already stated, he also regarded himself a major and accordingly resisted the suit and preferred the appeals. After the appeals were dismissed it struck Tara Chand that he might try his luck again and he accordingly brought the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, to obtain a declaration that the decrees passed against him were not binding on him on the sole ground that he was unrepresented in the suit, by a duly appointed guardian. He nowhere stated in the plaint how the decrees passed against him were prejudicial to his interests. He made certain allegations about the plaintiffs being aware of his minority and of her having dishonestly put him forward as a major. But that allegation has not been substantiated. As I have stated, the sole question to be decided is whether the mere fact that no guardian had been proposed or appointed for Tara Chand is sufficient to vitiate the decrees passed against him. It may be mentioned here that Tara Chand has purchased the shares of certain co-sharers in the property and possibly the sole object of the present suit is to re-open the partition and to: obtain a compact share in the property which would include not only his ancestral share but also the shares purchased by him.

    13. Before the case of Walian v. Banke Behari Prasad Singh 30 C. 1021; 301. A. 182; 7 C.W.N. 774; 5 Bom. L.R. 822; 8 Sar. P.C.J. 512 (P. C) was decided it was generally believed that a formal defect in the appointment of a guardian for the suit of a minor was in itself sufficient to vitiate all the proceedings against the minor in the suit. The case of Bhura Mal v. Har Kishan Das 21 A. 383; A.W.N. (1902) 76 may be cited as an instance. But since the Privy Council decided the case of Wallian v. Banke Behari Prasad Singh 30 C. 1021; 301. A. 182; 7 C.W.N. 774; 5 Bom. L.R. 822; 8 Sar. P.C.J. 512 (P. C) it is now clearly recognised that where a minor has been substantially represented and has not been prejudiced in the litigation it is not open to him to obtain the relief of a declaration that the decree is not binding on him. Following this case, it has been held that in order to find out whether the minor was substantially prejudiced or not, it would be necessary often to go into the merits of the case. If the representation is of a doubtful character the fact that the minor has not at all suffered would go to establish that the representation was substantial. The case of Murli Dhar v. Pitambar Lal 66 Ind Cas. 372; 20. A.L.J. 329;.44 A. 525; (1922) A.I.R. (A.) 91; 4 U.P.L.R.(A.) 170 was of this nature.

    14. The question, however, before me is what would be the effect of a decree in which the minor has not been at all represented. It has been urged with great force that unless the minor alleges that he was prejudiced for want of a guardian he has no right to succeed. It has been further pointed out that the objective law, namely the law of procedure, is merely a hand-maiden to justice and where a substantial justice has been done a breach of the rule of procedure cannot by itself be a ground for a suit. There can be no doubt that the last stated proposition is very correct. The Courts exist for granting redress. Where there is no prejudice, there is no grievance to be redressed. The mere fact that there has been a defect in following the procedure cannot be made a matter of grievance and there can be no redress. But the question raised in this appeal is not one of procedure but is one of substantive law. It is a question of status. There can be no doubt that a decree, however proper it may be, passed against a person who is already dead can be of no effect against the estate of the deceased. To quote an expression often used, the decree is a mere 'nullity'. The reason is this. The deceased person cannot be called upon to obey the decree and, therefore, the decree is of no consequence. The legal representatives of the deceased cannot be called upon on foot of the decree, to perform what the deceased person was called upon to perform. A minor suffers from certain disabilities under the law of minority. One of the disabilities is that he cannot come to Court either to seek a relief or defend an attack on him, except through a person who can properly represent him This is his disability owing to his being under a certain specified age. In this particular case that age was enhanced to 21 years owing to a certificate of guardianship having been granted to his natural mother. We have not been called upon to consider whether the factum of Tara Chand's adoption into another family in any way affected the guardianship certificate and whether his age for obtaining majority was reduced to 18 years. It has been conceded that Tara Chand was a minor when he was brought on the record as a major on the 29th March 1917. He was a minor when he preferred the appeals. Indeed, he was a minor when he brought the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. He attained majority during the pendency of the suit. Tara Chand was suffering from a disability to defend himself owing to his status of minority. In this particular case the minor (Tara Chand) was probably an intelligent person quite able to look after himself and his property. But he might have been only a baby one year old, when his father died, The law applicable would have been the same then, as in the present case. The question then is whether the bringing on the record of a person suffering from the disability of minority can be regarded as of no consequence if the ultimate result of the suit was in no way prejudicial to his interest. To my mind, in principle, there is nothing to differentiate the case of a decree passed against a dead man from a decree passed against a person who is suffering from the disability of minority without having a person appointed to look after his interest.

    15. No direct authority of this Court has been cited. A number of rulings was cited at the Bar but most of them could be distinguished on account of the facts involved in each case. The only case which appears to be exactly in point is the case of Purna Chandra Kunwar v. Bejoy Chand Mehtab 18 Ind. Cas. 859; 17 C.W.N. 549; 18.C.L.J. 18. In this case a decree for arrears of rent had been obtained against a minor who had been sued as a major without anybody to represent him in the litigation. It held that the decree could not be binding on him and was a nullity. On principle and authority, therefore, Tara Chand would be entitled to have it declared that the decrees are not binding on him.

    16. It was urged that, having regard to the peculiar fact of the case, namely, the arguments having been concluded during the lifetime of Banarsi Das, the provision of Order XXII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable and the decree passed was binding on the estate of Banarsi Das. Assuming, but without deciding that Order XXII, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code has any application to the facts of this case, it is clear that as a matter of fact no decree was passed against Banarsi Das. On the other hand, the only decree that was passed was against Tara Chand himself. The provisions quoted, therefore, can be of no avail to the appellants.

    17. The further question, however, still remains whether the plaintiff, Tara Chand, should wholly succeed in the suit or whether the Court should go into the merits of the case and see whether or not he was bound by the decree that was validly passed against the remaining defendants. For if the decree be such as to bind Tara Chand, without its having been specifically passed against him, he should not be allowed to escape the liability on the decree for the simple reason that he was without a guardian in the proceedings. He cannot be in a better position than he would have been in if he had not been at all made a party. In the Calcutta case Purna Chandra Kunwar v. Bejoy Chand Mehtab 18 Ind. Cas. 859; 17 C.W.N. 549; 18.C.L.J. 18 the High Court remanded the case for a trial of the question whether the minor was or was not liable along with the other defendants on account of the arrears of rent. The minor in that case had sued for the recovery of decree-money already paid and it was held that if he was liable, as a matter of fact, he could not recover the money he had paid. Similarly, in the case of Ram Chander v. Chheda Lal 2 A.L.J. 460; A.W.N. (1905) 122 issues were remanded for ascertaining what advantages, if any, had been derived by the plaintiff by the decree impeached. In this case the decree impeached is a decree for partition. Tara Chand could not be bound by a decree passed against any other of the defendants, The result of a declaration that the decrees are not binding on Tara Chand would be that the partition suit will be re-opened at the stage at which Tara Chand came in. No relief in the nature of a refund has been asked for. There is no prayer that the costs paid under the decree should be paid back to him. In the circumstances there seems to be no bar to the plaintiff obtaining the declaration that the preliminary and final decrees, whether passed by the Court of first instance or appeal are not binding on him.

    18. The result is that the appeal fails.

    19. The appeal is dismissed with costs here on the higher scale.

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    Musammat Champi And Anr. v. Lala Tara Chand And Tirloki Nath And Ors.
    (May 12, 1924)