The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
This was a Rule calling upon the Opposite Party to show cause why the application (made by the Petitioner) under sec. 18 of the Rent Act for revision of the order of the Rent Controller should not be heard by the President of the Improvement Tribunal: or, in the alternative, why the order of the Rent Controller should not be set aside and such other order passed as to this Court may seem proper.
It appears that the Petitioner applied to the Rent Controller for fixing the standard rent of certain premises occupied by the Opposite Party as tenant. The Kent Controller discussed certain matters in his judgment and was of opinion that the rent paid by the tenant was fair, but he did not fix the standard rent and dismissed the application. The Petitioner then applied to the President of the Tribunal under sec. 18 of the Rent Act. The learned President held that the order of the Controller could not be regarded es a decision fixing the standard rent of the premises concerned, and that sec. 18 of the Act did not confer any Jurisdiction upon him to revise such an order. The Petitioner thereupon obtained this Rule.
As there was no decision by the Rent Controller fixing the standard rent the learned President was right in holding that he had no jurisdiction under sec. 18 of the Rent Act to revise the order.
The next question is whether the order of the Rent Controller should be set aside by us and he should be directed to fix the standard rent.
A preliminary objection has been taken by the Opposite Party to the hearing of this Rule on the ground that the Rent Controller is not a Court of Civil Jurisdiction, and that even if he is, the High Court has no power of revising his orders.
Now, r. 24 of the Rules framed by the Local Government under sec. 23 of the Calcutta Rent Act, lays down that in all proceedings before them under the Act, the Controller and the President of the Tribunal shall have all the powers possessed by a Civil Court for the trial of suits. See also r. 4 which says that in making inquiries under the Act, the Controller or President of the Tribunal shall follow, as nearly as may be, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the regular trial of suite, the substance only of the evidence being recorded as in appealable cases.
It is clear, therefore, that the Rent Controller is a Court of Civil Jurisdiction. The same view has been taken in Civil Revision Case No. 322 of 1921 [Bata Krishna Pramanik… v. A.K Roy…Opposite Party. (1)].
Then the question is whether the High Court has the power of revising the order of the Rent Controller under sec. 107 of the Government of India Act.
There is no doubt that under sec. 15 of the Charter Act (now sec. 107 of the Government of India Act), the High Court has powers of superintendence over all Courts subject to its Appellate Jurisdiction.
The question whether the High Court has the power of revising the orders of Courts (other than Civil Courts) exercising civil jurisdiction, under its general powers of Superintendence under sec. 15 of the Charter has been considered in several cases in connection with orders of the Collector's Court under Rent Act X of 1859, and under the Land Acquisition Act. One of the earliest cases on the point is Govind Coomar Chowdhuri v. Kristo Coomar Choudhuri (2), where it was held by the Full Bench that the High Court has the power of revising an order of the Deputy Collector under Act X of 1859. In the case of Nilmoney Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukherjee (3), it was held by the Judicial Committee that the High Court has power to interfere with the orders of the Collector under Act X of 1859. See also the case of Chaitan Patjosi Mohapatra,…Judgment-Debtor, Applicant; v. Kunja Behary Patnaik…Execution-Purchaser. (4). Then, again, in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, it has been held that the order of the Collector when acting judicially is subject to revision by the High Court. See The Administrator-General of Bengal v. Land Acquisition Collector, 24-Pergunnahs (5) and Krishna Das Roy v. Land Acquisition Collector of Patna (6).
Under the Calcutta Rent Act in the recent Civil Revision Case No. 401 of 1921 [Kali Dasi v. Kanai Lal De (7)], the High Court, Appellate Side, revised in order of the Rent Controller and in Civil Revision Case No. 322 of 1921 [Bata Krishna Pramanik… v. A.K Roy…Opposite Party. ]. It revised an order of the President of the Tribunal.
It is to be observed that under sec. 18 of the Rent Act an application against the decision of the Controller fixing the standard rent is to be made to the President of the Tribunal appointed under sec. 72 of the Calcutta Improvement Act in respect of premises in Calcutta, and such an application in respect of premises outside Calcutta is to be made to the principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in the District. Such principal Civil Court is certainly within the Appellate Jurisdiction of the High Court. As stated above, the President of the Tribunal is also within the Appellate (Revisional) Jurisdiction of this Court.
We are accordingly of opinion that this Court has the power of revision under its general powers of superintendence over the Rent Controller's Court under sec. 107 of the Government of India Act.
The next question is whether in the present case the order of the Rent Controller should be revised.
Now, sec. 15, sub-sec. (1) lays down that the Controller shall, on application made to him by any landlord or tenant, grant a certificate certifying the standard rent of any premises leased or rented by such landlord or tenant, as the case may be.
The Rent Controller has in the present case gone into the question of rent, and has expressed his opinion that the existing rent is fair, and even in one place of his judgment he has stated that the present rent may be the standard rent of the premises under sec. 2(f)(ii) but he has not fixed the standard rent. If he had fixed the standard rent, the Petitioner might have asked the President of the Tribunal to revise the order under sec. 18 of the Act.
It is contended on behalf of the Opposite Party that the Petitioner applied for fixing the standard rent and not for certifying the standard rent. But the standard rent cannot be certified unless it is first fixed.
The Rent Controller says that the application does not lie because it was made before the expiry of the lease. We do not see, however, anything to prevent an application being made before the expiry of the lease for fixing the standard rent.
We are of opinion that the Rent Controller was asked to fix the standard rent and certify it under the provisions of sec. 15 of the Act.
We do not express any opinion on any question as to the merits of the case which must be dealt with by the Rent Controller.
We accordingly set aside the order of the Rent Controller and direct him to fix the standard rent according to law. Costs two gold mohurs, to abide the result.
We trust the case will be taken up by the Rent Controller as early as possible.
N.G
Rule made absolute.