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  • Section 11, Clause (2) of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 32, Clause (3) of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 41, T.P. Act,
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citation codes
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  • Section 11, Clause (2) of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 32, Clause (3) of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 41, T.P. Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises from land on which Sarbeswar (uncle/nephew relationship with Ganganarain's family) lived for a long time. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 (sons of Sarbeswar) mortgaged the property to Bama Charan; in execution of that mortgage decree the land was put up for sale and purchased by Defendant No. 1 on 12 July 1919, with delivery of possession taken by him on 11 June 1920. The plaintiff brought suit for recovery of possession, claiming title. The defendants' defence was that the land belonged to the common ancestor and fell to Sarbeswar's share, that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had been in possession for more than 12 years and thus acquired title by adverse possession, and other questions were raised about the plaintiff's knowledge of the mortgage transaction.

Both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court decreed the plaintiff's suit. Defendant No. 1 (the purchaser) appealed to the present Court raising several points through his counsel.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the property purchased in the name of Ganganarain was his self-acquired property or should be presumed to have been purchased by his father (i.e., application of the presumption where property is bought in a son's name during the father's lifetime).
  2. Whether the plaintiff was estopped under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act by permitting Sarbeswar to represent himself as owner (principle of representation/holding out).
  3. Whether the plaintiff needed to serve a notice to quit before bringing a suit for khas possession if Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were in permissive possession.
  4. Whether the question of permissive versus adverse possession of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 could be raised in a second appeal (i.e., whether the factual question is open on second appeal).
  5. Whether Exhibits 4 and 5 (documents between third parties mentioning the plaintiff or his father in boundary recitals) were admissible in evidence and whether the lower Courts were competent to rely on them.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Defendant No. 1)

  • Under Hindu law, when property is bought in a son's name during the father's lifetime, the presumption is it was purchased by the father; the appellant relied on this general presumption and cited Parbati Dasi v. Rajah Baikunta Nath Das (1914) 15 M.L.T. 66.
  • Under Section 41, T.P. Act, the plaintiff was estopped from challenging Defendant No. 1's purchase because the plaintiff's father let Sarbeswar represent himself as owner (representation/holding out).
  • If Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were permissive occupants, the plaintiff should have served a notice to quit before suing for khas possession; reliance was placed on C.J. Phillips v. Nund Coomar Banerjee [1867] 8 W.R. 385.
  • The possession of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 was not permissive (i.e., they had possessory right) — a factual contention raised by the appellant.
  • The lower Courts wrongly relied on Exhibits 4 and 5 (boundary documents between strangers mentioning the plaintiff or his father); such documents are not admissible and the appellant cited prior authorities to challenge admissibility.

Respondent's Arguments (Plaintiff)

  • The respondent argued (by implication from the opinion) that no objection to the admissibility of Exhibits 4 and 5 was taken in the trial Court, and thus the appellant should not be allowed to question their admissibility at this stage.
  • The lower Courts found that Ganganarain had sufficient means (as a schoolmaster) and acquired the property for himself; the respondent relied on those findings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Parbati Dasi v. Rajah Baikunta Nath Das (1914) 15 M.L.T. 66 The criterion that, where a property stands in the name of a junior member of a Hindu family, the source of the money used for purchase determines whether it is self-acquired; if the junior has no separate fund, presumption is that the father purchased in the son's name. The Court distinguished this authority on the facts: in the present case there was evidence that Ganganarain (a schoolmaster) had means and acquired the property for himself, so the Parbati Dasi presumption did not apply.
C.J. Phillips v. Nund Coomar Banerjee [1867] 8 W.R. 385 Authority holding that when defendant is found to be in permissive possession, the plaintiff may have no cause of action (relating to need for notice or nature of possession). The Court held the facts of that case were not in common with the present case and rejected its direct application here.
Saroj Kumar Acharji Chowdhuri v. Umed Ali Howladar, A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 251 Authority bearing on admissibility of documents between strangers mentioning a party as owner in boundary recitals and on procedure when inadmissible evidence has been received. The Court followed the course adopted in that case and, finding Exhibits 4 and 5 inadmissible, sent the case back to the lower appellate Court to decide title after excluding those documents.
Abdulla v. Kunj Behary Lal [1911] 14 C.L.J. 467 Authority cited in the debate over admissibility of boundary documents between strangers mentioning a party as owner. The Court cited it as part of the historical conflict of opinion on admissibility but concluded recent decisions settled the point against admissibility in such circumstances.
Miller v. Babu Madho Das [1897] 19 All. 76 Principle that an erroneous omission to object to inadmissible evidence does not make that evidence admissible; omission to object is fatal only where the defect could be cured if raised in time. The Court relied on this authority to hold that the omission to object in the trial Court did not render Exhibits 4 and 5 admissible; the documents remained inadmissible despite lack of timely objection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered each point raised on appeal in turn and applied the factual findings of the lower Courts to legal principles and precedent:

  1. On the presumption that a purchase in a son's name during the father's lifetime is the father's purchase, the Court examined the facts that Ganganarain was a schoolmaster with means and that the Courts below found the land to be his self-acquired property. The Court distinguished Parbati Dasi v. Rajah Baikunta Nath Das on its facts (where the son had no separate funds) and concluded the lower Courts' finding that Ganganarain acquired the property for himself was dispositive.
  2. Regarding Section 41, T.P. Act (estoppel by representation or holding out), the Court reviewed factual findings that Sarbeswar's possession was permissive: Sarbeswar lived on the land in poor circumstances, was allowed to erect a hut on condition of domestic work for Ganganarain's family, and had no title to convey. On those facts the Court found no basis to hold that Ganganarain or the plaintiff had held out Sarbeswar as owner; consequently the estoppel argument failed. The Court also observed uncertainty whether Defendant No. 1 was truly a bona fide purchaser, since the property's document was in Ganganarain's name and should have put a purchaser on inquiry.
  3. On the contention that the plaintiff should have served a notice to quit before suing for khas possession if Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were permissive occupants, the Court found no substance in that contention because the property was in the possession of Defendant No. 1 (adverse possession vis-à-vis the plaintiff) and because Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had repudiated their licensee character and treated the property as their own. The Court held the facts differ from the Phillips authority relied on by the appellant.
  4. The question whether Defendants Nos. 2 and 3's possession was permissive or not was characterized as a question of fact, and the Court held it was not open for re-evaluation in a second appeal.
  5. The decisive issue for the Court was the admissibility of Exhibits 4 and 5: documents executed between third parties which in boundary recitals referenced Ganganarain as owner of neighbouring land. The Court reviewed the conflicting historical approaches to admissibility (various attempted foundations under Sections 11(2), 13 and 32(3) of the Indian Evidence Act) and concluded that a document between strangers to the suit mentioning a party or predecessor as owner of boundary lands is not admissible in evidence. The Court rejected the respondent's procedural objection (that no trial objection was taken) by relying on Miller v. Babu Madho Das to hold that an erroneous omission to object does not render inadmissible evidence admissible where admissibility cannot be cured by timely objection. Because the lower Courts had relied on these inadmissible documents, and because it was not possible on second appeal to be satisfied that their findings as to title were not influenced by reception of that evidence, the Court directed a remittal to the lower appellate Court to re-decide the plaintiff's title excluding Exhibits 4 and 5.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; DECREE OF THE LOWER APPELLATE COURT SET ASIDE; CASE REMITTED

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The appeal by Defendant No. 1 is allowed.
  • The decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside.
  • The matter is remitted to the lower appellate Court for a fresh decision on the issue of the plaintiff's title after excluding Exhibits 4 and 5 from consideration.
  • All other points raised on appeal are taken to have been decided against the appellant.
  • Costs will abide the result.

The opinion does not announce any broader legal precedent beyond the application of existing authorities to the facts; its practical consequence is to remove inadmissible boundary documents from consideration and to require re-evaluation of title without those documents.

    Chooni Lall Khemani v. Nilmadhab Barik And Others

    1. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that Ganganarain (father of the plaintiff) and Sarbeswar (father of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3) lived together as uncle and nephew and that Sarbeswar lived on the property in suit for a long time and that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 mortgaged it with Bama Charan who in execution of the mortgage decree put it up to sale and it was purchased by Defendant No. 1 on the 12th July 1919 and delivery of possession was taken by him on the 11th June 1920. Thereupon the plaintiff brought the present suit for recovery of possession on establishment of title. The defence was that the land belonged to the common ancestor of the parties and that it fell to the share of Sarbeswar who had possessory right to it and that Defendants (Nos. 2 and 3 sons of Sarbeswar, were in possession for more than 12 years and had acquired a right by adverse possession to the land. There were also the other questions raised with regard to the plaintiff's knowledge of the transaction between defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and Bama Charan which it is not necessary to refer now.

    2. Both the Courts have decreed the plaintiff's suit. The Defendant No. 1 has appealed and several points have been urged on his behalf by the learned vakil for the appellant.

    3. The first point raised by him is that under the Hindu Law, if a property is bought in the name of a son during the life-time of the father, the presumption is that it is purchased by the father. The facts found in this case are that at the time when this property was purchased the plaintiff's grandfather was alive. It was purchased in the name of and by Ganganarain who was a schoolmaster and Ganganarain acquired this property for himself. The learned Subordinate Judge in the lower appellate Court has not clearly stated his findings; but it is apparent from a reading of the judgment that what he means to say is that though Ganganarain's father was alive at the time when the property was purchased, but as Ganganarain was a schoolmaster and had sufficient means to purchase the property for himself, the property did not belong to the joint family. He also observes that it is the ordinary law that if any property is purchased by a son in his name during the father's life-time, the presumption will be that the son acquired it for himself and that it was not the family property. The learned vakil for the appellant has taken objection to this statement of the law and we are invited to consider the case of Parbati Dasi v. Rajah Baikunta Nath Das (1914) 15 M.L.T. 66. There the Judicial Committee had to deal with a very different set of circumstances. Then there was no evidence that the junior member of the joint Hindu family, in whose name the property was purchased, had any source of income or any separate fund with which the property was purchased. Their Lordships laid down the rule that where there is a dispute as to whether the property standing in the name of a junior member of a Hindu family is his self-acquired property the criterion is to consider from what source the money came with which the purchase was made. In that case the finding of fact was that the son in whose name the property stood had no separate fund or that the property in dispute was not purchased with money belonging to him and their Lordships held that in the absence of such evidence the presumption is clear and decisive that it was acquired by the father in the name of the son. This principle does not apply to the facts of the present case. We think that the finding on this point arrived at by both the Courts below, that the property in dispute was the self-acquired property of Ganganarain, concludes this matter.

    4. It is next argued under Section 41, T.P. Act, that the plaintiff was estopped from challenging the purchase of Defendant No. 1. It is said that the plaintiff's father acted in such a way as to allow Sarbeswar to represent himself as the owner of the property in question and therefore the plaintiff should not be allowed to avoid the transaction between Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and the bona fide purchaser as Defendant No. 1 is. That section is based on the well-known principle of representation or holding out. The facts found in this case do not help the appellant. The facts found in this connection are that Sarbeswar was in very bad circumstances and that Ganganarain who was better off permitted him to live on this land by erecting a hut on condition that his wife should cook in the plaintiffs' house and that the husband and wife should do other menial works of the plaintiffs' family. Sarbeswar's possession therefore was permissive and he had no title to convey to Defendant No. 1. On this finding it can hardly be contended that Ganganarain or the plaintiff held out Sarbeswar as the real owner of the land. This point was not raised in the Court below, and we do' not know whether Defendant No. 1 was a real bona fide purchaser, for one fact that stands prominent is that the document relating to this property was in the name of Ganganarain and it must set the purchaser on enquiry as to the title of his vendor. '

    5. The third point argued is that if Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were in permissive possession, the plaintiff had no right to bring a suit for khas possession without serving them with a notice to quit. There is no substance in this contention. The property, it appears, is not in the possession of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3. It is in the possession of Defendant No. 1 who Bo far as the plaintiff is concerned, is in adverse possession. In the second place the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 repudiated their character of being licensees and treated the property as their own. Reliance has been placed for this contention by the learned vakil for the appellant in the case of C.J. Phillips v. Nund Coomar Banerjee [1867] 8 W.R. 385. In that case the plaintiff brought a suit on the allegation that he was forcibly dispossessed. The defence was that the defendant was in permissive possession and so it was found by the Court below. It was therefore held in that case that the plaintiff had no cause of action. The facts of that case are not in common with the present case.

    6. The fourth point urged by the learned vakil for the appellant is that the possession of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 was not permissive, This is a question of fact and we do not think that it can be raised in second appeal.

    7. The last point taken on behalf of the appellant is, however, of some substance. Both the Courts below have relied upon two documents. Exhibits 4 and 5, which were executed between third parties, but in the recitals of boundaries of the lands covered by those documents the name of Ganganarain appears as the owner of the land lying to the south of the land of one exhibit and to west of the land of the other exhibit. The lower appellate Court, in giving its reasons for the conclusion that the plaintiff succeeded in proving his case, observes that the boundary documents described the land in suit as belonging to the plaintiff or to his father. It is argued that these documents are not admissible in evidence and the Courts below were not competent to take them as evidence in the case and for this purpose reliance has been placed upon the cases of Saroj Kumar Acharji Chowdhuri v. Umed Ali Howladar A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 251, and Abdulla v. Kunj Behary Lal [1911] 14 C.L.J. 467. There was at one time a conflict of opinion upon the admissibility of documents between strangers, where one of the parties to the suit was mentioned as owner of the boundary land; but recent decisions have finally settled the point. At one time it was attempted to make such documents admissible in evidence under Section 11, Clause (2) of the Indian Evidence Act. In some cases the admissibility of such documents was made to rest on Section 13 and in some other cases on Section 32, Clause (3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It is not necessary to go in detail into all these decisions. We are of opinion that a document between strangers to the suit in which mention is made of one of the parties or their predecessors as holding the land lying on the boundaries of the lands belonging to the executants of the document is not admissible in evidence. The learned vakil for the respondent, however, has argued that, as no objection was taken in the Court of first instance to the admissibility of those documents, the appellant is not entitled to question it at this stage. This objection cannot succeed as the documents being inadmissible in evidence the omission to take objection to their admissibility in time does not affect their admissibility. It has been held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Miller v. Babu Madho Das [1897] 19 All. 76 that an erroneous omission to object to such evidence does not make it admissible. The omission to take the objection to the admissibility of a document becomes fatal only in cases where if the objection is taken in time, any defect in its admissibility can be cured and the document made admissible. We accordingly hold that the documents (Exs. 4 and 5) are not admissible in evidence and the lower Courts were wrong in relying upon them. There are other pieces of evidence no doubt relating to the title of the plaintiff; but we in second appeal can hardly say that the findings of the Courts below as to the plaintiff's title and the purchase made in his name were not influenced by the reception of this inadmissible evidence and we are constrained to have recourse to the course adopted in the case of Saroj Kumar Acharji Chowdhuri v. Umed Ali A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 251. We, therefore, send the case back to the lower appellate Court for decision on the other evidence.

    8. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the lower appellate Court set aside, and the case remitted to that Court for its decision on the issue of the plaintiff's title after excluding from its consideration the documents, Exs. 4 and 5. All the other points raised must be taken to have been decided against the appellant. Costs will abide the result.

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    Chooni Lall Khemani v. Nilmadhab Barik And Others
    (Nov 25, 1924)