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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses a reference made to a Special Bench concerning the following question: whether under Mahomedan law one coparcener has any right of pre-emption where another coparcener happens to be the purchaser. The question arose because a Full Bench of this Court (in Lalla Nowbut Lall v. Lalla Jewan Lall) had earlier decided the point in the negative. Subsequently, the Allahabad High Court and a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court took the opposite view. A Division Bench of this Court considered that the Full Bench decision should be re-considered in light of authorities not placed before that Full Bench and therefore referred the question to a Special Bench. The reference was made in the context of a second appeal; the Court also disposed of the appeal on the merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether under Mahomedan law a coparcener has any right of pre-emption (shaffa) when another coparcener is the purchaser of the share.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The opinion indicates reliance on passages from the Hedaya which, when read, support the proposition that all persons entitled to shaffa have equal rights and that one coparcener can claim pre-emption against another. Specific Hedaya passages cited include statements that "when there is a plurality of persons entitled to the privilege of shaffa the right of all is equal" and directions for dividing shaffa per capita among present claimants.
  • The appellant also relied on the decision in Amir Hasan v. Rahim Buksh, which collected and quoted authoritative texts (Takmila Bahrur-Raik, Tatar Khaniyah, Durr-ul-Muktar, Fatawa Alamgiri, Inayah or Aini and Radd-ul-Mukhtar) establishing that even if the buyer is himself a pre-emptor, other persons with similar rights may claim pre-emption against him; and that in such cases the rights of claimants should be determined as they would be if the buyer had exercised pre-emption against a stranger, with division per capita.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent relied upon the Full Bench decision in Lalla Nowbut Lall v. Lalla Jewan Lall and certain earlier cases which took the opposite view, arguing that when a co-sharer conveys his share to another co-sharer no other co-sharer can have a right of pre-emption because the rights of all are equal and the original reason for the rule (preventing introduction of a disagreeable stranger) is absent.
  • It was also contended that the Full Bench decision had stood for about 60 years and should not be disturbed, and that Courts need not apply the strict rule of Mahomedan law to cases of pre-emption but should decide according to principles of justice, equity and good conscience (implying deference to established local precedent).
  • The respondent relied on earlier cases such as Moheshee Lal v. G. Christian and Teekadharee Singh v. Mohur Singh which expressed the view that Mahomedan law of pre-emption was not intended to apply when the purchaser is already a share-holder or neighbour (and in those cases no textual authority was cited in support).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lalla Nowbut Lall v. Lalla Jewan Lall (Full Bench) Held that one coparcener has no right of pre-emption against another coparcener who purchases (negative answer). The Court examined this Full Bench decision, found that key passages and original texts (not placed before that Full Bench) were not considered, concluded that the decision was wrongly decided, and overruled it.
Amir Hasan v. Rahim Buksh Collected authoritative texts establishing (1) that even when the buyer is himself a pre-emptor, other pre-emptors can claim against him, and (2) that claimants' rights should be determined per capita as if the buyer had acquired by pre-emption from a stranger. The Court relied on the authorities and analysis in this case as supporting the existence of the coparcener's right of pre-emption and cited it as a leading authority aligning with the view adopted by Allahabad and Bombay High Courts.
Abdullah v. Amanutullah Followed the reasoning in Amir Hasan (supporting coparcener pre-emption claims and division per capita). Noted as a subsequent case following Amir Hasan and supportive of the view that coparceners can claim pre-emption inter se.
Nader Husain v. Sadiq Husain Followed Amir Hasan (supportive precedent). Noted as another case that followed Amir Hasan and supported the appellant's position.
Vithaldas v. Jametram (Bombay Full Bench) Applied the Hanafi school principle that neighbours (co-sharers) have equal rights to pre-empt and allowed two neighbours with equal rights to exercise them. Referred to as a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court that followed Amir Hasan and supported the proposition that coparceners/neighbours can claim pre-emption inter se.
Moheshee Lal v. G. Christian Observed (in a dispute between non-Mahomedans adopting Mahomedan law locally) that if Mr. Christian was a coparcener no right of pre-emption as against a coparcener could exist; no authority was cited. Identified as one of the earlier cases taken by respondents for the opposite view; the Court noted that no textual authority was cited in this case.
Teekadharee Singh v. Mohur Singh Held that the Mahomedan law of pre-emption was not intended to apply where the purchaser is not a stranger but already a share-holder or neighbour; no texts of Mahomedan law were quoted. Again relied on by respondents for the opposite view; the Court observed that no text of Mahomedan law was cited in support in that case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a textual and comparative analysis of Mahomedan authorities and prior decisions, proceeding in the following steps as reflected in the opinion:

  1. Identified the precise question referred: whether a coparcener can claim pre-emption when another coparcener purchases the share.
  2. Re-examined the Full Bench decision in Lalla Nowbut Lall v. Lalla Jewan Lall, noting that the Full Bench apparently relied on an interpretation that the object of shaffa was primarily to prevent the introduction of a disagreeable stranger and therefore concluded no right exists inter se among coparceners.
  3. Analyzed the Hedaya passages that were not considered by the Full Bench and concluded that the Hedaya does not state that pre-emption can be exercised only against a stranger; rather, it contains language indicating equality of rights among all persons entitled to shaffa (e.g., "when there is a plurality of persons entitled to the privilege of shaffa the right of all is equal" and procedural rules for dividing shaffa equally among present claimants).
  4. Found that these Hedaya passages support the view that coparceners have equal pre-emptive rights and that denying one coparcener the right against another would violate the Hedaya's rule of equality.
  5. Considered the collection of authoritative texts and judicial exposition presented in Amir Hasan v. Rahim Buksh (and cases following it), which the Court summarized as establishing two propositions: (a) even if the buyer is himself a pre-emptor, other pre-emptors may claim against him, and (b) rights in such a case are to be determined as they would be had the buyer acquired the property by pre-emption from a stranger, with division per capita.
  6. Noted supportive authority in modern text writers (Baillie's Digest, Ameer Ali, Wilson) and the conformity of the Amir Hasan line of decisions with principles of justice, equity and good conscience rather than being contrary to them.
  7. Addressed the argument based on stare decisis and the longevity of the Full Bench decision: acknowledged the weight of a long-standing Full Bench ruling but observed that the Full Bench had not considered the relevant texts and that the pre-emptive cases were rare locally; concluded that overruling was justified because the original texts and authoritative juristic writings supported the appellant's position and because the rule is not contrary to equity.
  8. On that basis, the Court concluded that the Full Bench decision in Lalla Nowbut Lall was wrongly decided and answered the referred question in the affirmative, i.e., that a coparcener does have a right of pre-emption against another coparcener who purchases the share.
  9. Because the reference arose in a second appeal, the Court proceeded to dispose of the appeal on its merits: it awarded relief to the plaintiffs in accordance with the principles of division per capita laid down in the authorities (specifically awarding one-half of the property to the plaintiffs on payment of half the purchase money) and directed that each party bear its own costs in all Courts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held in the affirmative that under Mahomedan law a coparcener does have the right of pre-emption (shaffa) where another coparcener happens to be the purchaser, and it concluded that the earlier Full Bench decision in Lalla Nowbut Lall v. Lalla Jewan Lall was wrongly decided and is overruled.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The Plaintiffs (claimants of pre-emption) are entitled to a decree for one-half of the property which was the subject-matter of the pre-emption, upon payment of one-half of the purchase-money.
  • Each party is directed to bear its own costs in all the Courts.

Broader Implications Noted by the Court

  • The Court observed that its decision aligns with the enunciations of eminent Mahomedan jurists as collected in Amir Hasan v. Rahim Buksh and with decisions of the Allahabad and Bombay High Courts, and with statements in modern text-writers (Ameer Ali, Baillie's Digest, Wilson).
  • The Court noted practical considerations: cases of pre-emption are rare in the Province of Bengal (as then constituted), and because after the lapse of one year the purchaser's right cannot be challenged, the decision was not expected to unsettle many titles.
  • The opinion does not purport to create novel principles contrary to justice, equity or good conscience; rather it gives effect to what the Court described as the correct interpretation of Mahomedan juristic texts and prior supportive authorities.

All concurring judges listed in the opinion (Greaves, Rankin, Suhrawardy, Panton, Mukerji, Mallik JJ.) agreed with the judgment as delivered by the Chief Justice.

    Sheikh Enatullah v. Sheikh Kowsher Ali

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    Chatterjea, C.J:— The question referred to the Special Bench is whether under the Mahomedan law one coparcener has any right of pre-emption where another coparcener happens to be the purchaser.

    The question was decided by a Full. Bench of this Court in the negative in the case of Lalla Nowbut Lall v. Lalla Jewan Lall . Since then the Allahabad High Court and a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court have taken the opposite view, and having regard to the original authorities on the point which were not placed before the Full Bench in Lalla Nowbut Lall's case , a Division Bench of this Court was of opinion that the Full Bench decision should be re-considered, and hence this Reference to the Special Bench.

    In the case of Lalla Nowbut Lall v. Lalla Jewan Lall , Garth, C.J, delivering the judgment of the Full Bench said: “There appears to be no reason, either upon principle or authority, why the right of shaffa should exist as between coparceners: and the rule as laid down in Hamilton's Hedaya, Vol. III, Bk. 38, Chap. I, appears to have been misunderstood in this respect. That rule merely prescribes that any one partner (or coparcener) of a property has a right of shaffa as against a stranger, who purchases a share from his co-partner, and does not mean that the right exists as between co-partners who may purchase shares from one another. The object of the rule, as explained in that chapter and in Chap. 3, is to prevent the inconvenience which may result to families and communities from the introduction of a disagreeable stranger as a coparcener or near neighbour. But it is obvious that no such annoyance can result from a sale by one coparcener to another. The only result of such a sale would be to give the purchaser a larger share in the joint property than he had before, and perhaps larger than the other coparceners have.”

    But the Hedaya nowhere says that the right of pre-emption can be exercised only against a stranger and not against a coparcener who also can claim as a pre-emptor. On the other hand, there are indications in it to show that one coparcener can claim pre-emption against another. In Vol. III, Book XXXVIII, Chap. 1 (see Hamilton's Hedaya, Grady's Second Edition, page 549), it is laid down that “when there is a plurality of persons entitled to the privilege of shaffa the right of all is equal ….. “The argument of our doctors is, that the parties being all equal with respect to the principle on which their right of shaffa is grounded (namely, a conjunction with the lands sold) they are all consequently equal in the right itself.” It follows from these passages that all coparceners have got equal rights to shaffa. To hold that one coparcener has no right of pre-emption against another would be to deny him the right of equality and would be a violation of the Hedaya rule that the rights of all are equal. It seems that it is only in conformity with this rule of equality that the Hedaya says (page 549): “If some of the partners happen to be absent the whole of the shaffa is to be decreed equally amongst those who are present: for it is matter of uncertainty whether those who are absent would be inclined to demand their right: and the rights of those who are present must not be prejudiced on a mere uncertainty. If, however, the Kazee should have decreed the whole of the shaffa to one who is present, and an absentee afterwards appears and claims his right, the Kazee must decree him his half: and so likewise if a third appear, he must decree him one-third of the shares respectively held by the other two: in order that thus an equality may be established amongst them.”

    It appears, therefore, that the Hedaya supports the right rather than negatives it. On the other hand, the other authorities are distinctly in favour of such right. They are all collected in the case of Amir Hasan v. Rahim Buksh . The learned Judges referred to passages, and quoted the original texts, from Takmila Bahrur-Raik, Tatar Khaniyah, Durr-ul-Muktar, Fatawa Alamgiri, Inayah or Aini and Radd-ul-Mukhtar, which are works of very high authority, and the last of which according to Ameer Ali is “certainly esteemed as the best authority on Hanafi law,” and observed as follows:—“These texts, the authority of which has not been questioned by Mr. Abdul Majid on behalf of the Respondents, establish, as we have said, two propositions: first, that even when the buyer is himself a pre-emptor, that is, a person who would have the right of pre-emption against an outsider, other persons having a similar right of pre-emption are entitled to claim preemption against the buyer: and secondly, that in such a case the rights of the claimants to pre-emption should be determined in the same way in which they would have been determined, had the buyer acquired the property by enforcing his right of pre-emption against a stranger, in the absence of the other pre-emptors and the absentee pre-emptors had appeared subsequently and claimed pre-emption. In this view, as all persons having equal right of pre-emption are only entitled under the Mahomedan law to divide the property equally per capita, and as the purchasers in this case are two in number, the Plaintiff-Appellant is entitled to only a third share of the property sold.” The case was followed in Abdullah v. Amanutullah (4) and Nader Husain v. Sadiq Husain (5).

    A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Vithaldas v. Jametram following the case of Amir Hasan v. Rahim Buksh held that under the Hanafi School of Mahomedan law, neighbours have equal rights to pre-empt, and there is nothing which is contrary to the, principles of justice, equity and good conscience in allowing two neighbours who have equal rights of pre-emption to exercise them.

    In Baillie's Digest of Mahomedan Law, Book VII, Chap. VI, page 494, it is stated: “Pre-emption, according to us, is by heads (per capita). When a mansion is owned by three persons, one of whom has a half, another a third, and another a sixth, and the owner of the half having sold his share, it is claimed by the other two under their right of pre-emption, it is to be decreed between them in halves. Or, if the owner of the sixth should sell his share, it is to be divided between the other two in halves. And if one of them should cause his right to drop, the whole belongs, per capita, to those that remain. Or, if one is absent, decree is to be given, per capita, to those who are present. But if after decree of the whole to one who is present, a second should appear, half is to be decreed to him: and if a third should appear, decree is to be given to him for a third of what is in the hands of each of the other two. If the one who is present should surrender after decree has been given in his favour for the whole, the person who arrives is entitled to no more than a half.”

    In Ameer Ali's Mahomedan Law, 3rd Edition, Vol. I, page 597, it was stated: “When one co-sharer conveys his share to another co-sharer, no other co-sharer, if any, can have; a right of pre-emption, the rights of all being equal, and the reason on which the right is founded, therefore, being absent. In the other words, no right of pre-emption arises in favour of a coparcener when the purchaser himself is a co-sharer of the vendor and the claimant.’ No authority was cited in support of the proposition.

    In the fourth edition of the book at page 729 the learned author referring to the case of Lalla Nowbut Lall v. Lalla Jewan Lall states: “A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held that when a co-sharer conveys his share to another co-sharer, no other co-sharer, if any, can have a right of pre-emption, the right of all being equal and the reason on which the right is founded being therefore absent,” the latter portion of the passage in the 3rd Edition quoted above being omitted, and referring to the view taken in the Allahabad case of Amir Hasan v. Rahim Buksh observed: “This view is undoubtedly in conformity with the enunciations of the Mahomedan jurists. The principle is based on the following ground:—As all the pre-emptors have equal rights against a stranger, their rights are the same inter se, and it would be unfair to give preference to one sharer over the others. And any one pre-emptor may pre-empt in respect of his specific share: Abdullah v. Amanutullah .” In Wilson's Anglo-Mahomedan Law, 2nd Edition, page 401, sec. 358, it is stated:

    “If the claim is made by two or more persons belonging to the same category, they are entitled to equal shares of the pre-empted property on tendering their Respective quotas of the purchase money.”

    On behalf of the Respondent, reliance is placed upon the opposite view which was taken in the Full Bench case of Lalla Nowbut Lall v. Lalla Jewan Lall , and some cases which preceded it. In Moheshee Lal v. G. Christian (6), the dispute was between two non-Mahomedans, but the Mahomedan law of pre-emption had been adopted by the Hindus in the locality. The learned Judges Bayley and Pundit, JJ., observed:

    “If Mr. Christian was a coparcener no right of pre-emption as against a coparcener could exist.” No authority was cited, and the case was remanded for trying the issue (among others) whether custom makes pre-emption binding on a Christian in Bhagulpur.

    In Teekadharee Singh v. Mohur Singh (7) the same learned Judges (Bayley and Pundit, JJ.) held that the Mahomedan law of pre-emption was never intended to apply to a case in which the purchaser is not a stranger, but one who is already a share-holder or a neighbour. They observed: “Both the lower Courts were presided over by two Mahomedan Moulvies and the special Appellant's pleader, also a Moulvie, cannot quote any text of law in support of his claim.” So no text of Mahomedan law was quoted in either case.

    In the Full Bench case of Lalla Nowbut Lall v. Lalla Jewan Lall as already stated, neither the passages from Hedaya supporting the right (cited above) nor any other text of Mahomedan law was referred to or discussed in the judgment. Garth, C.J, in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, apparently based the decision on the ground that the object of the rule of shaffa is to prevent the inconvenience which may result to families and communities from the introduction of a disagreeable stranger as a coparcener or a near neighbour. But the doctrine of shaffa, as it is at present accepted, does not appear to be based entirely on that object. According to the Hedaya “the grand principle of shaffa is the conjunction of property:” Vol. III, Book XXXVIII, Chap. III, page 558, and it is on a conjunction with the lands sold that the right of shaffa is grounded: Vol. III, Book XXXVIII, Chap. I, page 549.

    The original idea of the rule of shaffa might have been to prevent vexation and inconvenience resulting from a disagreeable neighbour. But apparently the equality of the right of all shapes came to be fully recognised. It would be neither fair nor equitable to refuse their rights now only on the ground that the enjoyment of those rights would not be …. necessary for the original object with which the rule of shaffa might have been started.

    We were also referred to Tyabjee's Mahomedan Law, 2nd Edition, sec. 527, and Abdur Rahim's Tagore Lectures, page 273. Tyabjee does not give any decided opinion on the point. In Abdur Rahim's Tagore Lectures, it is stated that the reason “why this right is allowed is that the introduction of a stranger is likely to give rise to dissensions and inconveniences and the principle on which it is based is that each co-sharer having a right in every particle of the property, one co-sharer selling his share would thereby affect the enjoyment of his share by the other co-owner, and this he cannot do without his consent.” The reason stated is no doubt one of the reasons, but the learned lecturer was not dealing with the right of the coparceners claiming right of pre-emption inter se, and there is nothing in it against the right.

    It is contended that the law as laid down by the Full Bench and the cases which preceded it having stood for a period of about 60 years, we should not disturb the decision of the Full Bench; that we are not bound to apply the strict rule of Mahomedan law to cases of pre-emption but should decide such cases according to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. But in the first place, as already observed, neither the passages from Hedaya referred to above nor the original texts from the works of eminent Mahomedan jurists [cited in the Allahabad case of Amir Hasan v. Rahim Buksh ] were referred to or discussed by the learned Judges in the Full Bench case or in the other cases of this Court.

    In the next place although the Courts are not bound to decide cases strictly according to the rules of Mahomedan law in matters of pre-emption, there is nothing in the rule laid down by the Mahomedan jurists which is contrary to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. On the contrary the rule is based upon equality of rights of co-parceners, and Ameer Ali, as stated above, observes that “it would be unfair to give preference to one Sharer over the other. So that according to the learned author and the Mahomedan jurists, it is the view taken by the Allahabad Court and not that taken by the Full Bench of this Court which would be in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Lastly, it is true that the Full Bench decision has stood for over half a century and upon the principle of stare decisis the Court should not upset well-settled law, especially the decision of a Full Bench. But cases of pre-emption are very rare in the province of Bengal (as now constituted), and our decision cannot affect many titles, specially as after the lapse of one year the right of the purchaser cannot be challenged. Had there been conflict of opinion among Mahomedan jurists we would not have been disposed to disturb the rule laid down by the Full Bench of this Court. But it appears that the original texts of Mahomedan law are all in support of the view contended for on behalf of the Appellant: the view is not contrary to any principle of justice, equity and good conscience, and has been taken by the Allahabad and Bombay High Courts, and accepted as good law by the modern text writers. In these circumstances we think we would be justified in giving effect to what, according to Ameer Ali, is “undoubtedly in conformity with the enunciations of the Mahomedan jurists.”

    We accordingly hold that the case of Lalla Nowbut Lall v. Lalla Jewan Lall was wrongly decided and answer the question referred to us in the affirmative.

    As the Reference is made in a second appeal we have to dispose of the appeal itself.

    The Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for one-half of the property—the subject-matter of the pre-emption—on payment of half the purchase-money.

    Each party will bear its own costs in all the Courts.

    Greaves, J.:— I agree.

    Rankin, J.:— I agree.

    Suhrawardy, J.:— I agree with the judgment just delivered by the learned Chief Justice. All authorities under the Mahomedan law are at one on the question and no authority or text had been cited to the contrary view. It is not necessary to multiply authorities to those given in Amir Hasan v. Rahim Buksh .

    Panton, J.:— I agree with the learned Chief Justice.

    Mukerji, J.:— I agree.

    Mallik, J.:— I agree with the learned Chief Justice.

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    Sheikh Enatullah v. Sheikh Kowsher Ali
    (Aug 23, 1926)