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    Rameswar Khiroriwalla v. The King-Emperor Opposite Party.

    The Order of Mr. Justice Buckland was as follows:—

    This is an application made on behalf of the Crown that the bail of the prisoner Rameswar Khiroriwalla be cancelled. The prisoner has been committed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate for trial by this Court on charges under several sections, each one of which relates to an offence described as bailable in the second schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code. There is no need to specify them in detail. The prisoner was released on bail by my learned brother Mr. Justice Page on the 24th January last.

    This application is based on affidavits by Jogapati Mukherjee and Krishna Pada Bhattacherjee who were examined as witnesses before the committing Magistrate. They state facts showing that on the 13th and 14th and 16th February last the prisoner approached them for the purpose of influencing their evidence at the trial.

    The agreement has been chiefly directed to the point whether bail may be cancelled by the Court. It has been submitted that under sec. 496 a person accused of a non-bailable offence is entitled to bail as of right, that there is nothing in the section giving the Court power to cause the prisoner to be arrested and committed to custody, in other words, to order the bail to be cancelled, and that therefore the application should be refused.

    Sec. 497 which deals with cases of persons accused of non-bailable offences gives the Court a discretion in granting bail. It also provides that a High Court or Court of Sessions may cause any person who has been released on bail under that section, to be arrested and be committed to custody. Secs. 501 and 502 have also been referred to. They are in no sense applicable nor do they furnish any analogy. Sec. 501 provides for a case where insufficient sureties have been accepted or where the sureties afterwards become insufficient, and sec. 502 is, I apprehend, intended for the protection of a surety who desires to be released from his bond. Save for these sections my attention has not been directed to any section of the Code dealing with this question.

    Great emphasis has been laid upon the right of the prisoner to bail under sec. 496. I will assume that under that section the prisoner has a right to bail when brought before the Court, but, as I have pointed out to learned Counsel in the course of the argument, there is no such question now. The accused has been granted bail, and the section has been complied with. The question now before me is whether the bail may be cancelled. That is a totally different matter. It is argued that, because the prisoner is entitled to bail, the bail should continue, whatever the circumstances may be, by virtue of that section.

    On behalf of the Crown on the other hand, sec. 561(a) is relied upon, and that is in the following terms:— “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect, to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

    Mr. Chaudhuri on behalf of the prisoner submitted that to invoke sec. 561(a) would have the effect of incorporating into sec. 496 the effect of sec. 497(5). As to that it has been submitted, that sec. 561(a) by the opening words of the section implies that not even an express prohibition in the Code is to be deemed to limit or affect the power of the High Court to make an order which may be necessary to secure the ends of justice. Reference has also been made to the position of subordinate Courts, but no apprehension need arise, for sec. 561A is only applicable to High Courts.

    In his commentary on the Criminal Procedure Code, Sir John Woodroffe writes:—

    The concluding words of the section are very wide and must be read subject to the rule that where the Code lays down a procedure in a particular matter it must be followed, and that substantially this is a provision, not so much authorising new procedures as giving effect to those which have been enacted.

    This is a comment which the learned author has also made in his well-known work on the Civil Procedure Code, to which he here refers. What, I apprehend, it means is that where the Code provides for a matter the rules of the Code should be followed, but where the Code does not so provide, it is not exhaustive, and the Court may act under its inherent power. With the greatest possible respect for the learned author I am not confident that a case might not arise where it might be necessary in order to secure the ends of justice, to apply the section to its full capacity and make an order in conflict with some rule of the Code. But fortunately in this case it is not necessary to consider any such question for the Code does not, except in the cases to which I have referred, deal with the question of cancellation of bail. There is no section directly applicable to a case such as this.

    I have, in the course of argument, put hypothetical cases to learned Counsel for the prisoner, i.e, that of a prisoner on bail who was immediately on the point of departure by steamer from the port, or if to take another case, a juryman were to rise in his place in the jury-box and say that on the previous evening the prisoner had offered him a large sum of money. Learned Counsel logically was compelled to say that though the former might operate as a breach of the conditions upon which bail was granted, in the latter case the Court would have no power to cancel the bail. This is a proposition with which I cannot agree, nor that where, as in this case, there is a question of witnesses being tampered with, the Court has not the power forthwith, in order to secure the ends of justice, to cancel the bail and direct the prisoner to be committed to custody.

    In my judgment there can be no question that where it appears that attempts have been made by a prisoner to pervert the course of justice the Court has power under sec. 561(a), assuming there to be no power otherwise, to direct the cancellation of the bail-bond, and that the prisoner be committed to custody.

    Turning to the merits, an affidavit by the prisoner's brother has been filed in answer. This is not, in my opinion, sufficient to dispose of the allegations, but as the case has yet to be heard, and as the two deponents, whose affidavits have been used on behalf of the Crown, have yet to give their evidence, it is perhaps better that I should not do more than state my conclusion, and, on the merits, I am satisfied that the application should be allowed. The bail will be cancelled and the bonds discharged and the prisoner will be committed to custody.

    The Petitioner then moved the Criminal Bench and obtained a rule calling upon the Commissioner of Police and the Superintendent of the Presidency jail to show cause why an order under sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should not be made.

    Mr. Langford James (with Babu Satindra Nath Mukerjee) for the Petitioner.

    The Advocate-General (with Mr. Khundkar, Deputy Legal Remembrancer and Babu Mrityunjoy Chatlerji) for the Crown.

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    Rankin, C.J— In this case Rameswar Khiroriwalla has obtained a rule calling upon the Commissioner of Police and the Superintendent of the Presidency jail to show cause why the Petitioner should not be brought up before the Court under the provisions of sec. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

    The applicant was committed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate for trial by the High Court at Sessions in its Ordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction upon charges under several sections of the Indian Penal Code. Each of the charges relates to an offence described as bailable in the second schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code. On the 24th of January 1928 the applicant was released on bail by the order of Mr. Justice Page. Thereafter an application was made to Mr. Justice Buckland on behalf of the Crown for an order cancelling such bail upon the ground that on the 18th, 14th and 16th of February 1928 the applicant had approached certain witnesses for the purpose of influencing their evidence at the trial. Mr. Justice Buckland on the 24th of February 1928 made an order cancelling the bail, discharging the bail-bond and committing the applicant to custody pending his trial.

    The learned Judge in his judgment has carefully considered the meaning and effect of secs. 496 and 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code. He has come to the conclusion that the Court has power under the latter section to make such an order, assuming there to be no power otherwise. It is apparent from his judgment that this question was fully argued before him.

    This rule came on for hearing before us on the 8th of March by which time the trial of the applicant had begun and was proceeding de die in diem. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the applicant is at present properly and lawfully detained in public custody while the trial proceeds. The only order which we have been asked on behalf of the applicant to make is an order that would direct him to be brought before this Bench after the High Court Sessions had adjourned for the day and which would provide for the applicant to be set at liberty (upon his giving sufficient security) during the adjournments of the Sessions Court.

    The argument on behalf of the applicant is first that in view of sec. 496 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the learned Judge exercising the Ordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction of the Court had no jurisdiction in the circumstances to direct the cancellation of the applicant's bail or to direct his rearrest; secondly that accordingly the applicant is a person illegally detained in public custody. If these points be made out, then by the terms of sec. 491 the High Court may if it thinks fit direct that the applicant be set at liberty or be dealt with according to law.

    The High Court, which by sec. 491 is invested with certain powers, is defined by sec. 4(j) to mean “the highest Court of Criminal appeal or revision for any local area.” This means for the present purpose the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, which may act under cl. 36 of its Letters Patent by any Judge or any Division Bench thereof, subject to any rules that may be made or directions that may be given by competent authority. In practice, until recently, the powers conferred by sec. 491, which before 1923 were exercisable only over persons within the limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Court, were exercised by the Judge taking Sessions, that is, by the Judge exercising the Ordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction of the Court. Now that the powers are applicable to persons within the limits of the Court's Appellate Criminal Jurisdiction, it is certainly more convenient that they should be exercised by the Division Bench appointed to deal with criminal cases. It is not, however, evident to me upon the face of the Criminal Procedure Code that the powers of the High Court under sec. 491 might not, apart from any special rule made under the Letters Patent or any directions given by the Chief Justice, competently be discharged by a single Judge. This Bench is in no way a Court of Appeal from the learned Judge exercising the Ordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction and grave inconvenience would arise if the same High Court should make an order for arrest and also an order for release upon divergent views upon a question of jurisdiction. If this be possible, so far as the statute is concerned, it would be possible, for a single Judge to make an order overriding and nullifying an order of a Division Bench. A Judge or a Bench which exercises powers under sec. 491 has no claim to any particular precedence so as to require that the Sheriff should execute no order made by another Judge or Bench inconsistent therewith. It would introduce an incurable confusion into practice and theory if it were laid down that a considered judgment of the High Court upon a question of its jurisdiction could be challenged before the same High Court under sec. 491. In my judgment the circumstance that certain orders of this Court in its Ordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction are not appealable does not affect this matter. It appears to me that a case such as the present should be viewed on the principle that it would be a good return to a writ in the nature of habeas corpus to show that the application during his trial at Sessions was being detained under an order of this High Court which has not been set aside or varied. These considerations do not apply to orders made by Courts other than the High Court.

    It is sufficient for purposes of the present case to say that it seems to me to be wrong that this Bench should think fit under sec. 491 to retry for itself the question which has already been determined by this Court in its Ordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction, or to pass an order overriding an order already made by this High Court.

    In this view the rule will be discharged.

    C.C Ghose, J.:— I agree.

    S.C.M

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    Rameswar Khiroriwalla v. The King-Emperor Opposite Party.
    (Mar 15, 1928)