Whether
Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
Yes
To be
referred to the Reporter or not?`
Yes
Whether
their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment?
No
Whether
this case involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order
made there under ?
No
Whether
it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
No
=========================================================
MAHILA UTKARSH TRUST THRO ITS
PRESIDENT & ORS
Versus
UNION OF INDIA THRO SECRETARY
& ORS.
=========================================================
Appearance:
MR
GAUTAM M JOSHI, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner in SCA No.2984/12
MR
MIHIR JOSHI, SR. ADVOCATE with MR. MAULIKJ R SHAH and MR BHAVESH BL
CHOKSHI in SCAs No. 11532 of 2013 & 11533 of 2013
MR
ANSHIN H DESAI, learned counsel for respondent No.1
MR
PARTH BHATT, ASST. GOVT. PLEADER the Respondent No. 2
=========================================================
CORAM:
HONOURABLE
THE CHIEF JUSTICE
MR.
BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA
and
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date : 13/12/2013
CAV JUDGEMNT
(PER
: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
MR. BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA)
1. All
these three Special Civil Applications were taken up and heard
together as a common question of law is involved in all these
matters, viz. whether Section 66(1) (b) of the Factories Act, 1948
[the Act hereafter] and it s proviso are ultra
vires
the Constitution of India being violative of Articles 14, 15, 16,
19(1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.
1.1 In Special Civil
Application No. 11533 of 2013, an additional, alternative prayer has
been made for a direction upon the State-respondent to issue
appropriate notification as provided in the proviso to sub-section
(b) of Section 66(1) of the Act enabling the petitioners to permit /
employ women employees to work up to 10.00 p.m.
2. The facts stated in Special
Civil Application No. 2984 of 2012 may be summarized thus:
2.1 The petitioner is a Public
Charitable Trust registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public
Trust Act, 1950 and is engaged in the activity of upliftment of women
and is active in the creation of employment for women and protection
of their interest in general. The petitioner trust works for the
creation of employment for women in the District of Amreli and is
active in the filed of protection of interest of women in the matter
of employment and social issues. Amreli District, and in particular,
Damnagar Town, is the main centre of activity of the petitioner
Trust. The economy of Amreli District is largely based on
agriculture and agriculture-based industries. The main crop is
cotton. Families which are having agricultural fields or are engaged
in other ancillary activities are more or less well off. Male
members of the rest of the families have to migrate to other major
cities in search of employment, leaving their families at local
level. Female folk are constrained to work either at small diamond
polishing centres or cotton Gins or cottonseed oil extraction plants.
Real difficulty arises because of the shifts on which they are
supposed to work. Mostly the shifts are from 8.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m.,
4.00 p.m. to 12 midnight and 12 midnight to 8.00 a.m. . The area
surrounding Damnagar is principally cotton-growing area. Therefore,
during the season, the plants work 24 hours a day and this is the
time during which there is an extreme dearth of workmen and because
of the working in shifts, women cannot be engaged between 7.00 p.m.
and 6.00 a.m. in view of the prohibition of section 66(1)(b) of the
Act, and during the morning and noon hours, they have to take care of
their school-going children. As a result of this, they are unable to
engage themselves in any kind of economic activity. Women of that
area, are thus, constrained to be unemployed only because of the
statutory prohibition imposed by section 66(1)(b) of the Act.
3. The case made out by the
petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 11532 of 2013 is as
follows:
3.1 The petitioners are women
of tribal areas of District Valsad. Some of the petitioners are
unskilled labours whereas some others are qualified individuals.
Respondent No.3 is a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956
and is engaged in the manufacturing activities of various food
products like wafers, etc. under the brand name Balaji .
Respondent No.3 is having its factory near village Dungri of Valsad
District. The respondent has been employing tribal women in its
factories on a mass scale and has been providing special facilities
to such women workers of the factory.
3.2 According to the
petitioners, in the tribal areas of Valsad District dominated by
Dhedia Patel and other small tribal communities, it is a known
phenomenon that the major, and in some case, the sole breadwinner of
the entire family are female members. The petitioners have to attend
to their daily domestic activities and thereafter the petitioners
search for some suitable job/employment so that they can earn
livelihood for their family. As such, the petitioners keep on
enquiring with the factories situated within close vicinity of their
villages for job vacancies. However, time and again, it is informed
by the management of such factories/establishments that in view of
the embargo put by section 66(1)(b) of the Act, they are not able to
engage the petitioners and other female workers as the timings
prescribed in the said section is such that it comes in the way of
the owners of the factories in employing them in more than one
shifts. It has been conveyed that the rigour of the said section
entailed criminal action and exposes the factory owners / management
to criminal cases in case of slightest variation. This directly
affects the job opportunities of the petitioners and results in the
denial of employment on the ground of gender.
3.3 According
to the petitioners, sometimes the shifts in the factories are fixed
keeping in view the availability of electricity, transport facility,
distance from the prime localities etc. in which case, the second
shift may end beyond 7.00 p.m. while third shift starts and ends
mainly during the night hours. Hence the embargo created by the
impugned section makes it restrictive to employ women employees in
such shifts. On the other hand, it may happen that all the women
workers may not be able to work in the first shift owing to the
capacity of a particular factory unit, as also because of domestic
commitments of women including fetching water, milking animals,
taking care of children, attending cultivation work etc. Hence, the
petitioners make applications to the nearby factories to permit them
to work in the night shifts. As a matter of fact, more than 200
women from tribal areas have made such applications to the respondent
No.3 and like factories. However, the respondent has shown inability
to permit the petitioners to work in the 2nd
or night shift because of restrictions imposed by virtue of the
impugned section.
4. Similarly, the case made out
by the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 11533 of 2013 may
be summed up thus:
4.1 The petitioners, for its
manufacturing activities, are engaging both male and female employees
in its factory. Since the petitioners are engaged in the business of
manufacturing food products, as a market trend and owing to various
reasons, the petitioners are mainly engaging female workers. As such,
out of approximately 825 direct employees, almost 535 employees are
female. The work includes testing of the raw materials, mixing of
ingredients, spices etc., supervising the cooking process, operating
machineries at the appropriate time, packaging the products etc.,
which is performed by female employees better and more effectively
and efficiently than male employees.
4.2 The factory of the
petitioners is situated in a tribal area of Valsad District dominated
by Dhedia Patel and other small tribal communities. It is a known
phenomenon that in tribal communities, the major, and in some cases,
the sole breadwinner of the entire family is the female members.
Female employees of the petitioners are mainly from such tribal
villages/areas in the vicinity of almost 30 to 50 kms. from the
factory. Hence because of the employment with the petitioners, the
socio-economic status of the said tribal families has witnessed a
positive growth and change since the past few years.
4.3 Ever since the inception of
the establishment of the factory in question, there has not been any
untoward incident in the factory premises where any female worker has
faced any problem of sexual harassment or of any other nature. This
is also because of the fact that almost all the staff including
workers, labourers, managerial and supervisory, and security
personnel, etc. are women. Moreover, the petitioners by providing
extra facilities are safeguarding measures to such women employees
such as free transportation from their respective villages, providing
free medical treatment at the factory as also, in almost five
designated clinics in different villages. Moreover, for the women
having children, a child-care-centre is also provided in the factory
premises. The workers are provided with R.O. drinking water and are
also given uniform by the Company. In case of ill-health of a worker
during working hours, special transportation is also provided to drop
the particular employee at his/her place. In addition thereto, the
workers are provided with hygienic food at the rate of Rs.10/- per
plate at the Canteen and free tea twice during a shift. This is the
reason that the petitioner-Company is always flooded with
applications from women from nearby villages who are willing to work
in the petitioners factory in the day as well as in the night
shifts.
4.4 The petitioners had also
received written applications from almost 340 women employees
requesting the management to permit them to work in night shift so
that they can earn additional income and/or can come for work at
their convenient timings. The petitioners, by communication dated 1st
August 2012 addressed to the Director of Industrial Safety and
Health, Ahmedabad, with a copy to other concerned authorities, sought
permission to allow women workers to work in night shifts. However,
no decision was taken by the concerned authorities on the said
application. The petitioners were under a bona
fide impression that
the petitioners can employ women employees beyond 7.00 p.m. and not
after 10.00 p.m. Hence, certain women employees were permitted to
work till 8.00 p.m.
4.5 On 20th
July 2012, the officers from the office of the respondent No.3
inspected the factory premises of the petitioners and it was alleged
that the petitioners are permitting women employees to work during
night hours. Consequently, a notice dated 7th
August 2012 came to be issued to the petitioners.
4.6 Thereafter, again on 10th
September 2012, the officers from the office of the respondent No.3
visited the factory and found that certain female workers were
engaged in the activity of packing of wafers. Therefore, another
notice dated 10th
September 2012 was issued to the petitioners alleging breach of
section 54 of the Act, which prohibits any employer to make any
employee work beyond nine hours. Written explanation in response to
the same was sought from the petitioners. Accordingly, the
petitioners had submitted their written explanation dated 20th
September 2012 wherein it was clarified that no employee of the
petitioners were allowed to work in excess of nine hours. However,
it was stated that in the circumstances when the pick-up
transportation services arrives late, such employees waiting for the
transportation have to wait in the factory premises after their
working hours but it does not mean that the petitioners are taking
work from such employees after 5.00 p.m.
4.7 The explanation was not
accepted by the respondent No.3, and accordingly, the same was
communicated to the petitioners by the communication dated 27th
September 2012. In view of non-acceptance of the explanation and
alleging breach of section 54 of the Act, the respondent No.3 filed
various criminal cases against the concerned persons of the
petitioner-Company before the Court of the learned Judicial
Magistrate, Valsad.
4.8 Since the respondents No.2
and 3 were not taking any decision on various
applications/representations made by the petitioners to permit women
employees in the night shift, ultimately, the petitioners made a
detailed representation / application to the respondent No.2 under
Section 66(1) (b) of the Act, specifically requesting the Government
to issue a notification declaring relaxation in the working hours of
women employees permitting them to work in the night shift. The
petitioners had also referred to the notification issued by the
Madhya Pradesh State. In addition to the said application, the
petitioners had also written to the Director, Industrial Safety and
Health, Ahmedabad on 9th
January 2013 contending inter
alia that with
effect from 1st
January 2013, the petitioners are not taking any work from women
employees in the night shift and the manufacturing process requires
about 200 women employees to work up to 10.00 p.m. It was,
therefore, requested to permit the petitioners to allow women
employees to work up to 10.00 p.m. on condition that the petitioners
would provide them free transportation and ensure fullest security
measures.
4.9 A copy of the application
dated 9th
January 2013 given by the petitioners to the respondent No.2 was also
sent by registered post AD to the respondent No.3 on 18th
January 2013 and in response thereto, the respondent No.3 called upon
the petitioners by communication dated 31st
January 2013 to submit written consent of such women workers willing
to work in night shift. In reply to the said letter, the petitioners
responded on 1st
February 2012 with consent letters of 484 women employees willing to
work in night shift and requested the authority to issue a
notification at the earliest.
4.10 Despite the above facts
and circumstances and ignoring the willingness of the women employees
to work in night shift and / or beyond 7.00 p.m., the respondent
No.2, by communication dated 1st
June 2013 rejected the request of the petitioners for issue of a
notification as contemplated under section 66(1)(b) of the Act. The
said decision has been passed, according to the petitioners, without
recording any reasons for arriving at it. None of the
representations of the petitioners appear to have been considered by
the respondent No.2, according to the petitioners. The Government
has, thus, refused to exercise the discretion which it possesses,
without giving any cogent reasons for doing so.
4.11 In the above situation,
the petitioners have approached this Court by way of the present
petition by contending that the impugned section clearly
discriminates women on the basis of gender and hence, violates the
very fundamental rights of women. It has also been contended that
the State Government does have the authority to issue appropriate
notification relaxing the timings for female employees; however, none
of the above contentions are considered by the authorities.
5. In all
these matters, in addition to the notices issued upon the
respondents, this Court also directed to issue notice upon the
learned Attorney General of India as the prayer was for declaration
that section 66(1)(b) of the Act and its proviso are ultra
vires
the Constitution of India. Pursuant to such notice, Mr. Anshin Desai
has appeared for the Union of India. Mr. Parth Bhatt, the learned
Assistant Government Pleader has appeared on behalf of the
respondent-State.
6. Mr. Mihir Joshi, the learned
Senior Advocate, has made submissions on behalf of the petitioners in
Special Civil Applications No. 11532 of 2013 and No. 11533 of 2013
while Mr. Gautam Joshi, the learned advocate, has argued on behalf of
the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2984 of 2012.
7. The submissions made on
behalf of the petitioners may be summed up thus:
[a]. Section
66(1)(b) of the Act is
ultra vires
Articles 14, 15, 16, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India
inasmuch as it discriminates the factory workers based on gender only
and such gender discrimination is absolutely irrational, arbitrary,
outdated and without any base or nexus which can be related to the
object sought to be achieved.
[b]. Section
66(1) (b) of the Act is a clear case of denial of employment only on
the ground of gender. Even the proviso to section 66(1)(b) of the
Act, which enables the State Government to grant exemption only to a
limited extent, also suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and the
same is unreasonable, irrational, meaningless and hence, ultra
vires
Articles 14, 15, 16, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.
[c]. Gender classification
indicated above, although appears to be superficially favouring the
women, is nothing but a piece of legislation imposed by male-dominant
society whereby the men want to restrict the women to household
activities and impose artificial restrictions which is violative of
Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
[d]. Although the provision
ostensibly appears to be beneficial to women, is only a pretext for
sex-based discrimination, and, when women are recruited in the
Police, Army, Air Force and various avocations and professions, there
is no justification for not allowing women to work in the night shift
in the factories as long as adequate safeguards and protections are
afforded to them, and if the women voluntarily come forward to work
in the night shift for their own reasons, the same cannot be denied
only on the ground of gender.
[e]. Even assuming that
section 66(1)(b) of the Act is valid, the proviso to sub-section
should have enabled the State Government to relax the rigour of the
said section by varying the timings for women workers so that they
are permitted to work in all factories even on night-shift subject to
the safeguards to prevent exploitation of women. However, the said
proviso empowers the State Government to relax the rigour of the
section marginally and the exercise of the power of relaxation only
with respect to a particular type of industry, and therefore, the
said proviso also has to be declared as unconstitutional. The
statutory provision itself confer powers to the State Government to
frame rules to exempt women from working only in the fish-curing and
fish-canning factories and thus, it has restricted the powers of the
State Government to exempt women working in other factories from the
purview of Section 66(2) of the Act.
[f]. Such classification
between the women workers employed in fish-curing and fish-caning
factories on one hand and the women workers employed in other
factories on the other hand is discriminatory, and there is no
reasonable nexus for such a classification with the object sought to
be achieved and hence, the said proviso is also arbitrary and
violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India and
unconstitutional.
[g]. Such restriction is
nothing but the reflection of the mentality of male chauvinism and it
has not allowed women a fair share in power and attaining economic
independence though various other constitutional amendments have been
introduced providing reservation of seats to women in public life,
such as election of women to Panchayats and Municipalities and for
other local bodies.
[h]. The
basis for the provisions of reservation of 1/3rd
seats is found in the convention No. 89 of the International Labour
Organization to which the Government of India is also a signatory.
Even the conditions of work published by International Labour Office,
Geneva with respect to the prohibition of the work during night,
while summarizing the legal provisions, has clearly indicated that in
several countries, laws prohibiting the work during night by the
women workers have been repealed or significantly relaxed.
[i]. By way of reference to the
provisions of the Act in Chapter VI, it appears that provisions have
been made with respect to the regulation of working hours of adults.
Section 51 prescribes that no adult worker shall be required or
allowed to work in a factory for more than 48 hours in a week.
Section 52 provides that no adult worker shall be required or allowed
to work in a factory on the first day of the week which is subject to
certain exemptions. Section 53 provides for compensatory holidays.
Section 54 prescribes that subject to section 51, no adult worker
shall be required or allowed to work in a factory for more than nine
hours in any day. Section 55 provides for intervals for rest of at
least half an hour. Section 57 provides where a worker in a factory
works on a shift which exceeds beyond midnight for the purposes of
sections 52 and 53, a holiday for a whole day shall mean in his case
a period of 24 consecutive hours beginning when his shift ends.
Section 58 prohibits overlapping of shifts and section 59 provides
for payment of extra wages for over time. Section 61 provides for a
notice board being maintained indicating the hours of work, shift
etc. in every factory. Section 62 provides for maintenance of a
register of adult workers. Section 65 enables the State Government to
grant exemptions.
[j]. Except in section 66, the
restriction or regulation or privileges or obligations imposed are
identical in all respects and there is no difference from one worker
to another, be it a male or a female. Only in section 66 of the Act,
a discrimination is introduced and Section 66(1) (b) of the Act
provides that no women shall be required or allowed to work in any
factory except between the hours 6.00 a.m. and 7.00 p.m.
[k]. An analysis of section 66
would disclose that no exemption has been granted from the provisions
of daily hours of work under section 54 and no women shall be
required or allowed to work in any factory except between 6.00 a.m.
and 7.00 p.m. which restriction is subject to grant of exemption by
the State Government varying the limits between 10.00 p.m. and 5.00
a.m. .
[l]. By referring to the
provisions of the Act, the learned advocates for the petitioners
point out that the only factor which prohibits a woman worker being
engaged during the night-shift or third shift is solely based on
gender and not on any other factor which may come to the rescue of
the respondents. Such an additional factor neither exists, nor is
available, nor would it be even suggested by the respondents as to
take the impugned provisions away from the clutches of Article 15 (1)
of the Constitution.
7.1 The
learned advocates for the petitioners, therefore, pray for a
declaration that the above provision is ultra
vires
the provisions of Articles 14, 15, 16, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the
Constitution.
7.2 In support of their
contentions, the learned advocates for the petitioners relied upon
the following decisions:
1. TRIVENI K.S. v. UNION OF
INDIA reported in 2002-III-ILJ 320 [ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT].
2. VASANTHA R. v. UNION OF
INDIA & ORS reported in (2001) II ILJ 843 [MADRAS HIGH COURT].
3. NATURAL TEXTILES PVT. LTD.
v. THE UNION OF INDIA reported in 2007 (3) KAR LJ 286 [KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT].
4. J.K. INDUSTRIES LTD. v.
CHIEF INSPECTOR OF FACTORIES & BOILERS reported in (1996) 6 SCC
655.
5. VISHAKA v. STATE OF
RAJASTHAN reported in (1997) 6 SCC 241.
6. ANUJ GARG V. HOTEL
ASSOCIATION OF INDIA reported in AIR 2008 SC 663.
7. AIR INDIA CABIN CREW ASSOCN
v. YESHAWINEE MERCHANT reported in AIR 2004 SC 187.
8. Mr. Desai, the learned
advocate appearing on behalf of the Union of India, has, on the other
hand, opposed the aforesaid contentions advanced on behalf of the
petitioners and his submissions may be summarized thus:
[a]. The
Kerala High Court in the case of LEELA
V/S STATE OF KERALA
[supra]
has upheld the validity of section 66(1)(b) of the Act although the
Madras High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court have taken a
different view holding that section 66(1)(b) of the Act is
unconstitutional. Since the Kerala High Court has, after taking into
consideration the decisions of both the Madras High Court and the
Andhra Pradesh High Court decided not to accept the same, and the
said decision of the Kerala High Court being the latest one, this
Court should accept the decision of the Kerala High Court and declare
the impugned provisions as intra
vires
the Constitution.
[b]. A proposal to amend
section 66 of the Act is under active consideration of the Government
of India and according to the proposed amendment, women workers will
be allowed to work in factories in night shifts subject to conditions
of adequate safeguards being provided to them.
[c]. The ILO adopted a protocol
relating to Convention No.89, known as the Protocol of 1990 to the
Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), 1948. Under the provisions
of the Protocol, the competent authority in a country under its
national laws and regulations is authorized to modify the duration of
the night shifts or to introduce exemption from prohibition within
certain limits. Therefore, in view of the amendment to section 66 of
the Act, a viable solution is in line and is awaiting final touches
as per the principles laid down in ILO Protocol.
[d]. The
contention of the petitioners that the impugned provision is ultra
vires
Articles 14, 15, 16, 19(1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India,
gender discriminatory and irrational, arbitrary, outdated and without
any base, is not tenable because the restrictions are only limited to
night hours specified under provisions of section 66 of the Act, and
during the day time, there is no restriction whatsoever imposed on
employment of women in factories.
[e]. Further, the contention of
the petitioners that the proviso to section 66(1)(b) of the Act
restricting the State Government to authorize the employment of women
workers between 10.00 p.m. and 5.00 a.m. is unconstitutional, is not
tenable inasmuch as those have been incorporated in the larger
interest for protecting the women workers, under the prevailing
socio-economic conditions and also as per the ILO Convention 89 which
was ratified by Government of India. Moreover, discretionary powers
are vested with the State Governments to decide the same based on
merits of every case.
[f]. The
Parliament is contemplating to introduce an amendment to the
Constitution of India for providing reservation of one third of seats
to women in the Lok Sabha and also in all Legislative Assemblies and
other Local Bodies at the State Level, as it has been realized that
time has come for empowerment of women in the field of economy and
employment. As the proposal to introduce the amendment to the
Constitution of India for providing reservation to women being a
protective measure, so is the restriction of women to work during
night hours also intended for protection of women. Therefore, the
petitioners contention that the impugned provisions of the Act are
conservative, unconstitutional and ultra
vires,
is not correct. What has to be seen is the real intention of the
Legislature of contemplating the prevailing conditions in the country
at the time of enactment and as far as the protection of women is
concerned, it cannot be said that the provisions, as has been sought
to be challenged, has to be struck down by accepting a general
principle of safety.
[g]. While
enacting such provisions, public safety, safety of women etc. are all
of prime consideration and historical reasons are behind the
restriction of women being employed during night hours in order to
afford protection to them and to prevent their exposure to danger at
work place during night. The restrictions were necessitated to
safeguard women and to protect them from exploitation and sexual
harassment.
[h]. ILO adopted the convention
No.89 concerning night work for woman in 1948. India ratified the
convention on 27th
February 1950. Article 3 of the Convention 89 states that women
without distinction of all ages shall not be employed during the
night hours in any public or private industrial undertaking or any
branch thereof other than an undertaking in which only members of
same family are employed.
[i]. section 66(1)(b) of the
Act restricts the employment of women between 7.00 p.m. and 6.00 a.m.
. The proviso under section 66(1)(b) empowers the State Government
to vary the limits and restricts employment of women between 10.00
p.m. and 5.00 a.m. Section 66(2) empowers the State Government to
exempt from the restrictions set out in Section 66(1) (b) of the Act.
This exemption is specially given to fish-curing and fish-canning
factories where employment of women beyond the hours specified are
necessary to prevent damage to or deterioration of the raw material
(fish). The above reasoning cannot be adopted to cotton industry
based on the exemption clause.
[j]. The intention of the
Legislature in enacting the above provision is to protect the dignity
of women and to see that the women are safe while working in a
factory. The restrictions were necessitated to safeguard women and
to protect them from exploitation and sexual harassment.
[k]. Under the provisions of
the Protocol relating to Convention No.89, known as the Protocol of
1990 to the Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), 1948, the
competent authority in a country under its national laws and
regulations is authorized to modify the duration of the night shifts
or to introduce exemption from prohibition within certain limits. The
Protocol has since been ratified by India and has come into effect on
21st
November, 2004. Therefore, in order to provide flexibility in the
matter of employment of women during night, it is necessary to amend
section 66 of the Act. It is, therefore, proposed to amend the said
section so as to provide certain flexibilities. However, the
employer has to ensure certain occupational safety and adequate
protection to the women so employed. The proposed amendment will
also result in optimal utilization of the installed capacity,
promotion in exports and generation of employment opportunities for
women.
[l]. The Act is a piece of
social welfare legislation. It was enacted primarily with the object
of protecting women employed in factories against the industrial and
occupational hazards. The provisions are calculated to ensure that
the workers are not subjected to long hours of strain. The working
conditions should be humane. The Act promotes safety, health and
sanitary conditions at the place of work. An appropriate work
culture conducive to safety, health and happiness of workers is
evolved through the provisions of the Act.
[m]. The
impugned provision merely represents a social reality. It is
calculated to ensure that women shall be able to take care of their
families, their children do not suffer and equally it is calculated
to ensure dignity in work, and that the women are not exposed to the
hazards of working in night hours.
8.1 Mr.
Desai, therefore, submitted that there is no necessity for declaring
the impugned provision as ultra
vires any of the
Articles of the Constitution of India.
9. The
only question, therefore, that arises for determination in these
writ-applications is whether the provisions contained in section
66(1) (b) of the Act is ultra
vires the provision
of the Constitution of India.
10. In
order to appreciate the aforesaid question, it will be profitable to
refer to the following provisions of the Act:
42. Washing
facilities.
(1). In every factory
(a). adequate and suitable
facilities for washing shall be provided and maintained for the use
of the workers therein;
(b). separate and adequately
screened facilities shall be provided for the use of male and female
workers;
(c). such facilities shall
be conveniently accessible and shall be kept clean.
(2). The State Government
may, in respect of any factory or class or description of factories
or of any manufacturing process, prescribe standards of adequate and
suitable facilities for washing.
43. Facilities for
storing and drying clothing.
The State Government may,
in respect of any factory or class or description of factories, make
rules requiring the provision therein of suitable places for keeping
clothing not worn during working hours and for the drying of wet
clothing.
44. Facilities for
sitting.
(1). In every factory
suitable arrangements for sitting shall be provided and maintained
for all workers obliged to work in a standing position, in order that
they may take advantage of any opportunities for rest which may occur
in the course of their work.
(2). If, in the opinion of
the Chief Inspector, the workers in any factory engaged in a
particular manufacturing process or working in a particular room are
able to do their work efficiently in a sitting position, he may, by
order in writing, require the occupier of the factory to provide
before a specified date such seating arrangements as may be
practicable for all workers so engaged or working.
(3). The State Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that the
provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to any specified
factory or class or description of factories or to any specified
manufacturing process.
45. First-aid
appliances.
(1). There shall in every
factory be provided and maintained so as to be readily accessible
during all working hours first-aid boxes or cupboards equipped with
the prescribed contents, and the number of such boxes or cupboards to
be provided and maintained shall not be less than one for every one
hundred and fifty workers ordinarily employed at any one time in the
factory.
(2). Nothing except the
prescribed contents shall be kept in a first-aid box or cupboard.
(3). Each first-aid box or
cupboard shall be kept in the charge of a separate responsible person
who holds a certificate in first-aid treatment recognised by the
State Government and who shall always be readily available during the
working hours of the factory.
(4). In every factory
wherein more than five hundred workers are ordinarily employed] there
shall be provided and maintained an ambulance room of the prescribed
size, containing the prescribed equipment and in the charge of such
medical and nursing staff as may be prescribed and those facilities
shall always be made readily available during the working hours of
the factory.
46. Canteens.
(1). The State Government
may make rules requiring that in any specified factory wherein more
than two hundred and fifty workers are ordinarily employed, a canteen
or canteens shall be provided and maintained by the occupier for the
use of the workers.
(2). Without prejudice to
the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for
(a). the date by which such
canteen shall be provided;
(b). the standards in
respect of construction, accommodation, furniture and other equipment
of the canteen;
(c). the foodstuffs to be
served therein and the charges which may be made therefor;
(d). the constitution of a
managing committee for the canteen and representation of the workers
in the management of the canteen;
(dd). the items of
expenditure in the running of the canteen which are not to be taken
into account in fixing the cost of foodstuffs and which shall be
borne by the employer;
(e). the delegation to the
Chief Inspector, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, of
the power to make rules under clause (c).
47. Shelters, rest rooms
and lunch rooms.
(1). In every factory
wherein more than one hundred and fifty workers are ordinarily
employed, adequate and suitable shelters or rest rooms and a suitable
lunch room, with provision for drinking water, where workers can eat
meals brought by them, shall be provided and maintained for the use
of the workers:
Provided that any canteen
maintained in accordance with the provisions of section 46 shall be
regarded as part of the requirements of this sub-section:
Provided further that
where a lunch room exists no worker shall eat any food in the work
room.
(2). The shelters or rest
rooms or lunch rooms to be provided under sub-section (1) shall be
sufficiently lighted and ventilated and shall be maintained in a cool
and clean condition.
(3). The State Government
may
(a). prescribe the standards
in respect of construction, accommodation, furniture and other
equipment of shelters, rest rooms and lunch rooms to be provided
under this section;
(b). by notification in the
Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of
factories from the requirements of this section.
48. Crehes.
(1). In every factory
wherein more than thirty women workers are ordinarily employed there
shall be provided and maintained a suitable room or rooms for the use
of children under the age of six years of such women.
(2). Such rooms shall
provide adequate accommodation, shall be adequately lighted and
ventilated, shall be maintained in a clean and sanitary condition and
shall be under the charge of women trained in the care of children
and infants.
(3). The State Government
may make rules
(a). prescribing the
location and the standards in respect of construction, accommodation,
furniture and other equipment of rooms to be provided under this
section;
(b). requiring the provision
in factories to which this section applies of additional facilities
for the care of children belonging to women workers, including
suitable provision of facilities for washing and changing their
clothing;
(c). requiring the provision
in any factory of free milk or refreshment or both for such children;
requiring that facilities
shall be given in any factory for the mothers of such children to
feed them at the necessary intervals.
49. Welfare officers.
(1). In every factory
wherein five hundred or more workers are ordinarily employed the
occupier shall employ in the factory such number of welfare officers
as may be prescribed.
(2). The State Government
may prescribe the duties, qualifications and conditions of service of
officers employed under sub-section (1).
51.
Weekly hours .-
No adult worker shall be
required or allowed to work in a factory for more than forty-eight
hours in any week.
54.
Daily hours.-
Subject to the provisions
of section 51, no adult worker shall be required or allowed to work
in a factory for more than nine hours in any day:
Provided that, subject to
the previous approval of the Chief Inspector, the daily maximum hours
specified in this section may be exceeded in order to facilitate the
change of shifts.
57. Night shifts.
Where a worker in a
factory works on a shift which extends beyond midnight,
(a). for the purposes of
sections 52 and 53, a holiday for a whole day shall mean in his case
a period of twenty-four consecutive hours beginning when his shift
ends;
(b). the following day for
him shall be deemed to be the period of twenty-four hours beginning
when such shift ends, and the hours he has worked after midnight
shall be counted in the previous day.
58. Prohibition of
overlapping shifts
(1). Work shall not be
carried on in any factory by means of a system of shifts so arranged
that more than one relay of workers is engaged in work of the same
kind at the same time.
(2). The State Government or
subject to the control of the State Government, the Chief Inspector,
may, by written order and for the reasons specified therein, exempt
on such conditions as may be deemed expedient, any factory or class
or description of factories or any department or section of a factory
or any category or description of workers therein from the provisions
of sub-section (1).
59. Extra wages for
overtime.
(1). Where a worker works in
a factory for more than nine hours in any day or for more than
forty-eight hours in any week, he shall, in respect of overtime work,
be entitled to wages at the rate of twice his ordinary rate of wages.
(2). For the purposes of
sub-section (1), ordinary rate of wages means the basic wages
plus such allowances, including the cash equivalent of the advantage
accruing through the concessional sale to workers of foodgrains and
other articles, as the worker is for the time being entitled to, but
does not include a bonus and wages for overtime work.
(3). Where any workers in a
factory are paid on a piecerate basis, the time rate shall be deemed
to be equivalent to the daily average of their full-time earnings for
the days on which they actually worked on the same or identical job
during the month immediately preceding the calendar month during
which the overtime work was done, and such time rates shall be deemed
to be ordinary rates of wages of those workers:
Provided that in the case
of a worker who has not worked in the immediately preceding calendar
month on the same or identical job, the time rate shall be deemed to
be equivalent to the daily average of the earning of the worker for
the days on which he actually worked in the week in which the
overtime work was done.
Explanation. For the
purposes of this sub-section in computing the earnings for the days
on which the worker actually worked such allowances, including the
cash equivalent of the advantage accruing through the concessional
sale to workers of food grains and other articles, as the worker is
for the time being entitled to, shall be included but any bonus or
wages for overtime work payable in relation to the period with
reference to which the earnings are being computed shall be excluded.
(4). The cash equivalent of
the advantage accruing through the concessional sale to a worker of
food grains and other articles shall be computed as often as may be
prescribed on the basis of the maximum quantity of food grains and
other articles admissible to a standard family.
Explanation 1. Standard
family means a family consisting of the worker, his or her spouse
and two children below the age of fourteen years requiring in all
three adult consumption units.
Explanation 2. Adult
consumption unit means the consumption unit of a male above the
age of fourteen years; and the consumption unit of a female above the
age of fourteen years and that of a child below the age of fourteen
years shall be calculated at the rates of 0.8 and 0.6 respectively of
one adult consumption unit.
(5). The State Government
may make rules prescribing
(a). the manner in which the
cash equivalent of the advantage accruing through the concessional
sale to a worker of food grains and other articles shall be computed;
and
(b). the registers that
shall be maintained in a factory for the purpose of securing
compliance with the provisions of this section.
66. Further restrictions
on employment of women.
(1). The provisions of this
Chapter shall, in their application to women in factories, be
supplemented by the following further restrictions, namely:
(a). no exemption from the
provisions of section 54 may be granted in respect of any woman;
(b). no woman shall be
required or allowed to work in any factory except between the hours
of 6 A.M. and 7 P.M.:
Provided that the State
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, in respect
of any factory or group or class or description of factories, vary
the limits laid down in clause (b), but so that no such variation
shall authorize the employment of any woman between the hours of 10
P.M. and 5 A.M.;
(c). there shall be no
change of shifts except after a weekly holiday or any other holiday.
(2). The State Government
may make rules providing for the exemption from the restrictions set
out in sub-section (1), to such extent and subject to such conditions
as it may prescribe, of women working in fish-curing or fish-canning
factories, where the employment of women beyond the hours specified
in the said restrictions is necessary to prevent damage to, or
deterioration in, any raw material.
The rules made under
sub-section (2) shall remain in force for not more than three years
at a time.
10.1 At this stage it will also
be appropriate to refer to the following
Provisions of the Constitution
which are quoted below:
14.
Equality before law.-
The State shall not deny to
any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the
laws within the territory of India.
15. Prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of
birth.
(1). The State shall not
discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
(2). No citizen shall, on
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of
them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or
condition with regard to-
(a). access to shops, public
restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or
(b). the use of wells,
tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained
wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the
general public.
(3). Nothing in this article
shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women
and children.
(4). Nothing in this article
or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making
any special provision for the advancement of any socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
(5). Nothing in this article
or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the
State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement
of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for
the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such
special provisions relate to their admission to educational
institutions including private educational institutions, whether
aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational
institutions referred to in clause (1) of Article 30.
16. Equality of
opportunity in matters of public employment.-
(1). There shall be equality
of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or
appointment to any office under the State.
(2). No citizen shall, on
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth,
residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against
in respect of, any employment or office under the State.
(3). Nothing in this article
shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard
to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under
the Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State or
Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State a
Union territory prior to such employment or appointment.
(4). Nothing in this article
shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation
of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens
which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in
the services under the State.
(4A). Nothing in this
article shall prevent the State from making any provision for
reservation in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to
any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in
favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which in the
opinion of the State are not adequately represented in the services
under the State.
(4B). Nothing in this
article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled
vacancies of a year which are reserved for being filled up in that
year in accordance with any provision for reservation made under
clause (4) or clause (4A) as a separate class of vacancies to be
filled up in any succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies
shall not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in
which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty
per cent reservation on total number of vacancies of that year.
(5). Nothing in this article
shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the
incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any
religious or denominational institution or any member of the
governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular
religion or belonging to a particular denomination.
19. Protection of certain
rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.-
(1). All citizens shall
have the right-
(a). to freedom of speech
and expression;
(b). to assemble peaceably
and without arms;
(c). to form associations or
unions;
(d). to move freely
throughout the territory of India;
(e). to reside and settle in
any part of the territory of India; and
(f) e [*****]
(g). to practise any
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
(2). Nothing in sub-clause
(a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or
prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the
said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of
India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign
States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt
of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence.
(3). Nothing in sub-clause
(b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law
imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India
or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred by the said sub-clause.
(4). Nothing in sub-clause
(c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law
imposing, in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India
or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise
of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.
(5). Nothing in sub-clauses
(d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from
making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the
interests of the general public or for the protection of the
interests of any Scheduled Tribe.
(6). Nothing in sub-clause
(g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law
imposing, in the interest of the general public, reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said
sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall
affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to,
or prevent the State from making any law relating to,-
(i). the professional or
technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or
carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii). the carrying on by the
State, or by a Corporation owned or controlled by State, of any
trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion,
complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.
11. In
our opinion, in considering whether a particular legislation is
invalid, the writ-Court should follow the principles as laid down by
the Supreme Court in the case of STATE
OF MADHYA
PRADESH V. RAKESH KOHLI AND ANOTHER reported
in
(2012) 6 SCC 312,
wherein
the Apex Court considered various earlier decisions of the said Court
laying down the circumstances in which a writ-Court can declare a
statutory provision as ultra
vires in
the following manner:
"24.
While dealing with the aspect as to how and when the power of the
Court to declare the statute unconstitutional can be exercised, this
Court referred to the earlier decision of this Court in Rt.
Rev. Msgr. Mark Netto v. State of Kerala [(1979) 1 SCC 23] and held
in para 46 of the Report as under: (P. Laxmi Devi case, [(2008) 4 SCC
720] SCC p. 740)
"46.
In our opinion, there is one and only one ground for declaring an Act
of the legislature (or a provision in the Act) to be invalid, and
that is if it clearly violates some provision of the Constitution in
so evident a manner as to leave no manner of doubt. This violation
can, of course, be in different ways e.g. if a State Legislature
makes a law which only Parliament can make under Schedule VII List I,
in which case it will violate Article 246(1) of the Constitution, or
the law violates some specific provision of the Constitution (other
than the directive principles). But before declaring the statute to
be unconstitutional, the Court must be absolutely sure that there can
be no manner of doubt that it violates a provision of the
Constitution. If two views are possible, one making the statute
constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former
view must always be preferred. Also, the Court must make every effort
to uphold the constitutional validity of a statute, even if that
requires giving a strained construction or narrowing down its scope
vide Rt.
Rev. Msgr. Mark Netto v. State of Kerala [(1979) 1 SCC 23], SCC para
6 : AIR para 6.
Also, it is none of the concern of the Court whether the legislation
in its opinion is wise or unwise."
11.1 Then
in paras 56 and 57, the Court stated as follows: (P. Laxmi Devi case
[(2008) 4 SCC 720], SCC p.744)
"56.
In our opinion adjudication must be done within the system of
historically validated restraints and conscious minimisation of the
Judges personal preferences. The Court must not invalidate a statute
lightly, for, as observed above, invalidation of a statute made by
the legislature elected by the people is a grave step. As observed by
this Court in State
of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh [AIR 1952 SC 252] (AIR p. 274, para 52)
52.
. . The legislature is the best judge of what is good for the
community, by whose suffrage it comes into existence. . .
57. In our opinion, the
Court should, therefore, ordinarily defer to the wisdom of the
legislature unless it enacts a law about which there can be no manner
of doubt about its unconstitutionality."
25. The
Constitution Bench of this Court in Mohd.
Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar [AIR 1958 SC 731]
while dealing with the meaning, scope and effect of Article 14,
reiterated what was already explained in earlier decisions that to
pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be
fulfilled, namely,
(i). the classification must
be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons
or things that are grouped together from others left out of the
group, and
such differentia must have
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute
in question.
The
Court further stated that classification might be founded on
different basis, namely, geographical, or according to objects or
occupations or the like and what is necessary is that there must be a
nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act
under consideration.
26. In Mohd. Hanif Quareshi
[AIR 1958 SC 731], the Constitution Bench further observed that there
was always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of an
enactment and the burden is upon him, who attacks it, to show that
there has been a clear violation of the constitutional principles. It
stated in para 15 of the Report as under : (AIR pp. 740-41)
15.
. . The Courts,
it is accepted, must presume that the legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are
directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds. It must be borne in
mind that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and
may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed
to be the clearest and finally that in order to sustain the
presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into
consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report,
the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which
can be conceived existing at the time of legislation.
27.
The above legal position has been reiterated by a Constitution Bench
of this Court in Mahant
Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi [AIR 1959 SC 942].
28. In
Hamdard
Dawakhana v. Union of India [AIR 1960 SC 554],
inter alia, while referring to the earlier two decisions, namely,
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. [AIR 1955 SC 661] and Mahant Moti Das [AIR
1959 SC 942], it was observed in para 8 of the Report as follows :
(Hamdard Dawakhana case [AIR 1960 SC 554], AIR p. 559)
8
. Therefore, when the
constitutionality of an enactment is challenged on the ground of
violation of any of the articles in Part III of the Constitution, the
ascertainment of its true nature and character becomes necessary i.e.
its subject-matter, the area in which it is intended to operate, its
purport and intent have to be determined. In order to do so it is
legitimate to take into consideration all the factors such as history
of the legislation, the purpose thereof, the surrounding
circumstances and conditions, the mischief which it intended to
suppress, the remedy for the disease which the legislature resolved
to cure and the true reason for the remedy. . .
In
Hamdard Dawakhana, the Court also followed the statement of law in
Mahant Moti Das and the two earlier decisions, namely, Charanjit
Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India [AIR 1951 SC 318]
and State
of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara [AIR 1951 SC 318] and
reiterated the principle that presumption was always in favour of
constitutionality of an enactment.
29. In one of the recent
cases in Karnataka Bank Ltd., [(2008) 2 SCC 254] while referring to
some of the above decisions, in para 19 of the Report, this Court
held as under: (SCC pp. 262-63)
"19.
The rules that guide the constitutional Courts in discharging their
solemn duty to declare laws passed by a legislature unconstitutional
are well known. There is always a presumption in favour of
constitutionality, and a law will not be declared unconstitutional
unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt; to doubt the
constitutionality of a law is to resolve it in favour of its
validity . Where the validity of a statute is questioned and there
are two interpretations, one of which would make the law valid and
the other void, the former must be preferred and the validity of law
upheld. In pronouncing on the constitutional validity of a statute,
the Court is not concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom, the justice
or injustice of the law. If that which is passed into law is within
the scope of the power conferred on a legislature and violates no
restrictions on that power, the law must be upheld whatever a Court
may think of it. (See State
of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara. [AIR 1951 SC 318])"
12. Bearing in mind the above
principle we now propose to consider whether Section 66 (1) (b) of
the Act violates any of the provisions of the Constitution.
13. A plain reading of Section
66 of the Act quoted above will indicate that by sub-section 1(b)
thereof, a restriction has been imposed upon the employment of women
in factories between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. with a proviso that the State
Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, in respect of
any factory or group or class or description of factories, vary the
above time-limit only to the extent of permitting the women to work
up to 10 p.m. and not beyond that or from 5 a.m. in stead of 6 a.m.
but not earlier than 5 a.m. Sub-section (2) of Section 66, however,
permits the State Government to make Rules providing for the
exemption from the restriction set out in sub-section (1) to such
extent and subject to such condition as it may prescribe for the
women working in fish-curing or fish-canning factories, where the
employment of women beyond the hours specified in the said
restrictions is necessary to
prevent damage to or deterioration in any raw material
with further condition that such rule should not remain in force for
more than three years at a time.
14. The question before us is
whether the above restriction of employment of women during night can
be supported in the light of the Constitutional Provisions contained
in Article 14, 15, 16, 19(1) (g) and 21.
15. In our opinion, after the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ANUJ
GARG VS. HOTEL ASSOCIATION OF INDIA
reported in AIR 2008
SC 663, there is no
scope of upholding the provisions of Section 66(1) (b) as a valid
piece of legislation.
15.1 In the case of ANUJ
GARG VS. HOTEL ASSOCIATION OF INDIA
(supra),
the question before the Supreme Court was whether Section 30 of the
Punjab Excise Act, 1914, which is a pre-constitution legislation,
prohibiting employment of "any man under the age of 25 years"
or "any woman" in any part of such premises in which liquor
or intoxicating drug is consumed by the public was a valid piece of
legislation after the coming into operation of the Constitution.
15.2 In the above context,
Supreme Court made the following observations dealing with various
contentions raised in support of such an enactment:
7. The Act is a
pre-constitutional legislation. Although it is saved in terms of
Article 372 of the Constitution, challenge to its validity on the
touchstone of Articles 14, 15 and 19 of the Constitution of India, is
permissible in law.
While embarking on the questions raised, it may be pertinent to know
that a statute although could have been held to be a valid piece of
legislation keeping in view the societal condition of those times,
but with the changes occurring therein both in the domestic as also
international arena, such a law can also be declared invalid.
In John Vallamattom and Anr.
v. Union of India [(2003) 6 SCC 611], this Court, while referring to
an amendment made in UK in relation to a provision which was in pari
materia with Section 118 of Indian Succession Act, observed :
The constitutionality
of a provision, it is trite, will have to be judged keeping in view
the interpretative changes of the statute affected by passage of
time.
Referring to the changing
legal scenario and having regard to the Declaration on the Right to
Development adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights as also
Article 18 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1966, it was held :
33. It is trite that
having regard to Article 13(1) of the Constitution, the
constitutionality of the impugned legislation is required to be
considered on the basis of laws existing on 26-1-1950, but while
doing so the court is not precluded from taking into consideration
the subsequent events which have taken place thereafter. It is
further trite that the law although may be constitutional when
enacted but with passage of time the same may be held to be
unconstitutional in view of the changed situation.
8. Changed social psyche and
expectations are important factors to be considered in the upkeep of
law. Decision on relevance will be more often a function of time we
are operating in. Primacy to such transformation in constitutional
rights analysis would not be out of place. It will be in fitness of
the discussion to refer to the following text from "Habits of
the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life" by R.
Bellah, R. Madsen, W. Sullivan, A. Swidler and S. Tipton, 1985, page
286 which suggests factoring in of such social changes.
"The transformation of
our culture and our society would have to happen at a number of
levels. If it occurred only in the minds of individuals (as to some
degree it already has) it would be powerless. If it came only from
the initiative of the State, it would be tyrannical. Personal
transformation among large numbers is essential, and it must not only
be a transformation of consciousness but must also involve individual
action. But individuals need the nurture of crops that carry a moral
tradition reinforcing their own aspirations.
These are commitments that
require a new social ecology and a social movement dedicated to the
idea of such a transformation."
15.3 While taking into
consideration various International Treaties, the Supreme Court, in
the above context made the following observations:
9. International
treaties vis-¿-vis the rights of women was noticed by this Court in
a large number of judgments, some of which we may notice at this
stage.
10. In Githa Hariharan v.
Reserve Bank of India [(1999) 2 SCC 228], this Court was faced with
construing Section 6(a) of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956
and Section 19(b) of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The sections were
challenged as violative of the equality clause of the Constitution,
inasmuch as the mother of the minor is relegated to an inferior
position on ground of sex alone since her right, as a natural
guardian of the minor, is made cognizable only 'after' the father.
The court relied upon the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, 1979 ("CEDAW") and the
Beijing Declaration, which directs all State parties to take
appropriate measures to prevent discrimination of all forms against
women is quite clear. It was held by the court that the domestic
courts are under an obligation to give due regard to International
Conventions and Norms for construing domestic laws when there is no
inconsistency between them.
11. In Air India v. Nergesh
Meerza [(1981) 4 SCC 335], this Court was faced with the
constitutional validity of Regulation 46(i)(c) of Air India
Employees' Service Regulations, it was provided that the services of
the Air Hostesses would stand terminated on first pregnancy. The
Court after considering various US Supreme Court judgments regarding
pregnant women held that the observations made therein would apply to
the domestic cases.
12. In Municipal Corporation
of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) and Anr. [(2000) 3 SCC 224],
the short question which was to be decided by this Court was whether
having regard to the provisions contained in Maternity Benefit Act,
1961, women engaged on casual basis or on muster roll basis on daily
wages and not only those in regular employment were eligible for
maternity leave. The Court while upholding the right of the female
workers to get maternity leave relied upon the doctrine of social
justice as embodied in Universal Declaration of Human Rights Act,
1948 and Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women held that the provisions of the same
must be read into the service contracts of Municipal Corporation.
13. In Madhu Kishwar and
Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [(1996) 5 SCC 125], challenge was
made to certain provisions of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 providing
succession to property in the male line in favour of the male on the
premise that the provisions are discriminatory and unfair against
women and, therefore, ultra vires the equality clause in the
Constitution. The Court while upholding the fundamental right of the
Tribal women to the right to livelihood held that the State was under
an obligation to enforce the provisions of the Vienna Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
which provided that discrimination against women violated the
principles of equality of rights and respects for human dignity.
14. In Vishaka and Ors. v.
State of Rajasthan and Ors. [(1997) 6 SCC 241], the writ petition was
filed for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of working women
under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India with the
aim of finding suitable methods for realization of the true concept
of "gender equality"; and preventing sexual harassment of
working women in all work places through judicial process to fill the
vacuum in existing legislation. This Court while framing the
guidelines and norms to be observed by the employers in work places
to ensure the prevention of sexual harassment of women, inter alia,
relied on the provisions in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women as also the general
recommendations of CEDAW for construing the nature and ambit of
constitutional guarantee of gender equality in our Constitution.
15. In Randhir Singh v.
Union of India and Ors. [(1982) 1 SCC 618], this Court while holding
that non-observance of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'
for both men and women under Article 39(d) of the Constitution
amounted to violation of Articles 14 and 16, recognized that the
principle was expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law
including the Preamble to the Constitution of the International
Labour Organization.
16. In Liverpool and London
S.P. and I. Association Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I and Anr. [(2004) 9
SCC 512], this Court had to interpret the meaning and import of the
word 'necessaries' used in Section 5 of the Admiralty Court Act,
1861. The Court while importing the meaning of the same through
Foreign (American) Court decisions, opined - :
It is true that this
Court is not bound by the American decisions. The American decisions
have merely a persuasive value but this Court would not hesitate in
borrowing the principles if the same is in consonance with the scheme
of Indian law keeping in view the changing global scenario. Global
changes and outlook in trade and commerce could be a relevant factor.
With the change of time, from narrow and pedantic approach, the court
may resort to broad and liberal interpretation. What was not
considered to be a necessity a century back, may be held to be so
now.
15.4 While highlighting the
ground reality of the post independence era, the Supreme Court
further observed:
22. We may now look into
the ground reality. In India, hospitality industry has grown by leaps
and bounds. As noticed hereinbefore, liquor, in the hospitality
industry, is being served not only in the bar but also in the
restaurant. Service of liquor is permissible also in the rooms of a
hotel.
23. The impugned provision
provides for wide restrictions. It prohibits employment of any woman
in any part of the premises where liquor is being served. It would
prohibit employment of women and men below 25 years in any of the
restaurants. As liquor is permitted to be served even in rooms, the
restriction would also operate in any of the services including
housekeeping where a woman has to enter into a room; the logical
corollary of such a wide restriction would be that even if service of
liquor is made permissible in the flight, the employment of women as
air-hostesses may be held to be prohibited.
24. Hotel Management has
opened up a viesta of young men and women for employment. A large
number of them are taking hotel management graduation courses. They
pass their examinations at a very young age. If prohibition in
employment of women and men below 25 years is to be implemented in
its letter and spirit, a large section of young graduates who have
spent a lot of time, money and energy in obtaining the degree or
diploma in hotel management would be deprived of their right of
employment. Right to be considered for employment subject to just
exceptions is recognized by Article 16 of the Constitution. Right of
employment itself may not be a fundamental right but in terms of both
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, each person
similarly situated has a fundamental right to be considered therefor.
When a discrimination is sought to be made on the purported ground of
classification, such classification must be founded on a rational
criteria. The criteria which in absence of any constitutional
provision and, it will bear repetition to state, having regard to the
societal conditions as they prevailed in early 20th century, may not
be a rational criteria in the 21st century. In the early 20th
century, the hospitality sector was not open to women in general.
In the last 60 years, women in India have gained entry in all spheres
of public life. They have also been representing people at grass root
democracy. They are now employed as drivers of heavy transport
vehicles, conductors of service carriage, pilots et. al. Women can be
seen to be occupying Class IV posts to the post of a Chief Executive
Officer of a Multinational Company. They are now widely accepted both
in police as also army services.
(Emphasis
supplied by us)
15.5 The Supreme Court in the
above decision, explained the topics of
Right to employment vis-¿-vis Security: Competing Values by
observing as follows:
32. The instant matter
involves a fundamental tension between right to employment and
security.
33. The fundamental tension
between autonomy and security is difficult to resolve. It is also a
tricky jurisprudential issue. Right to Self-Determination is an
important offshoot of Gender Justice discourse. At the same time,
security and protection to carry out such choice or option
specifically, and state of violence-free being generally is another
tenet of the same movement. In fact, the latter is apparently a more
basic value in comparison to right to options in the feminist matrix.
34. Privacy rights prescribe
autonomy to choose profession whereas security concerns texture
methodology of delivery of this assurance. But
it is a reasonable proposition that that the measures to safeguard
such a guarantee of autonomy should not be so strong that the essence
of the guarantee is lost. State protection must not translate into
censorship.
35. At the same time we do
not intend to further the rhetoric of empty rights. Women would be as
vulnerable without State protection as by the loss of freedom because
of impugned Act. The
present law ends up victimizing its subject in the name of
protection. In that regard the interference prescribed by State for
pursuing the ends of protection should be proportionate to the
legitimate aims. The standard for judging the proportionality should
be a standard capable of being called reasonable in a modern
democratic society.
36. Instead of putting curbs
on women's freedom, empowerment would be a more tenable and socially
wise approach. This empowerment should reflect in the law enforcement
strategies of the State as well as law modelling done in this behalf.
37. Also
with the advent of modern State, new models of security must be
developed. There can be a setting where the cost of security in the
establishment can be distributed between the State and the employer.
38. Gender equality today is
recognized by the European Court as one of the key principles
underlying the Convention and a goal to be achieved by member States
of the Council of Europe.
In the case of Abdulaziz,
Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, [1985] ECHR 7, the Court
held:
As to the present
matter, it can be said that the advancement of the equality of the
sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of
Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would have to be
advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could
be regarded as compatible with the Convention.
Following Abdulaziz (supra)
the European Court of Human Rights once again observed in Van Raalte
v. The Netherlands, [1997] ECHR 6:
"In the applicant's
submission, differences in treatment based on sex were already
unacceptable when section 25 of the General Child Care Benefits Act
was enacted in 1962. The wording of Article 14 of the Convention
(Art. 14) showed that such had been the prevailing view as early as
1950. Moreover,
legal and social developments showed a clear trend towards equality
between men and women. The
applicant drew attention to, inter alia, the Court's Abdulaziz,
Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 May 1985
(Series A No. 94), which stated explicitly that "the advancement
of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member
States of the Council of Europe" and that "very weighty
reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on
the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the
Convention" (loc. cit., p. 38, para. 78)."
(Emphasis supplied)
(See also Schuler-Zgraggen
v. Swizerland, [1993] ECHR 29; and Petrovic v. Austria, [1998] ECHR
21)
Stereotype Roles and Right
to Options
39. Professor Williams in
"The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism" published in 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982) notes
issues arising where biological distinction between sexes is assessed
in the backdrop of cultural norms and stereotypes. She characterizes
them as "hard cases". In hard cases, the issue of
biological difference between sexes gathers an overtone of societal
conditions so much so that the real differences are pronounced by the
oppressive cultural norms of the time. This combination of biological
and social determinants may find expression in popular legislative
mandate. Such legislations definitely deserve deeper judicial
scrutiny. It is for the court to review that the majoritarian
impulses rooted in moralistic tradition do not impinge upon
individual autonomy. This is the backdrop of deeper judicial scrutiny
of such legislations world over.
40. Therefore, one issue of
immediate relevance in such cases is the effect of the traditional
cultural norms as also the state of general ambience in the society
which women have to face while opting for an employment which is
otherwise completely innocuous for the male counterpart. In such
circumstances the question revolves around the approach of State.
41. Instead
of prohibiting women employment in the bars altogether the State
should focus on factoring in ways through which unequal consequences
of sex differences can be eliminated. It is State's duty to ensure
circumstances of safety which inspire confidence in women to
discharge the duty freely in accordance to the requirements of the
profession they choose to follow. Any other policy inference (such as
the one embodied under section 30) from societal conditions would be
oppressive on the women and against the privacy rights.
(Emphasis
supplied by us).
15.6 The only difference in the
facts of the present cases from the one involved in the above
decision of the Supreme Court is that in the above case, there was
total prohibition for the entry of the women whereas in the present
case, there is prohibition during the nighttime. But the reason in
both the cases appears to be the same, for the alleged security of
the women. If the total prohibition for the alleged security of the
women is found to be unreasonable by the Supreme Court, for the
selfsame reason, even the partial prohibition should also be held to
be unreasonable encroachment on the fundamental right of women. In
such a situation, it
is State's duty to
ensure circumstances of safety which inspire confidence in women to
discharge the duty freely in accordance to the requirements of the
profession they choose to follow and
with the advent of
modern State, new models of security must be developed. There can be
a setting where the cost of security in the establishment can be
distributed between the State and the employer as
pointed out by the Supreme Court in the above decision.
16. We have no doubt in our
mind that the provision of the Act impugned in these applications has
definitely infringed the fundamental right of a female citizen not
only in the matter of equal opportunity of employment but also in
carrying on with her own business with the same privileges a male
citizen enjoys unless she decides to employ male workmen for the
night shift for overcoming the above statutory provision. A female
owner of a business, howsoever competent and qualified she may be,
even herself, will not be entitled to supervise the job of either the
male workers or the female ones engaged by her during the night shift
for the restriction imposed by the Section 66(1) (b) in spite of
making adequate arrangement for her safety and that of her female
workers. Even if she decides to employ only the female employees and
makes adequate arrangement for safety of her employees in the factory
and also makes arrangement for transportation of her employees from
their residence to the factory and again back to the residence, law
will not permit her to expand her business by introducing night shift
unless all the employees during that shift happen to be male and she
entrusts the supervision of her own business to some qualified male
employee against her wish.
17. We also find substance in
the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that after
introduction of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 66, the basis of
the restriction originally imposed has lost its significance. The
above provisions permit participation of the female workers in the
factory even during the night shifts for a continuous period of three
years at a time if the business happens to be one of fish-curing or
fish-canning as if in those types of business, there is no necessity
of the safety and security of the female employees during the night
shifts.
18. Mr. Desai placed strong
reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of MANOHAR
LAL VS. THE STATE OF PUNJAB
reported in AIR 1961
SC 418 in support of
his contention that the restriction imposed under section 66(1)(b) of
the Act is not unreasonable.
18.1 In the case of MANOHAR
LAL VS. THE STATE OF PUNJAB [supra],
Section 7(1) of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940 provided that
Save as otherwise
provided by this Act, every shop or commercial establishment shall
remain closed on a closed day .
Sub-section 2(1) provided that the
choice of a close day shall rest with the occupier of a shop or
commercial establishment and shall be intimated to the prescribed
authority within two months of the date on which this Act came into
force . The
appellant in that case had chosen Friday as a closed day, i.e. the
day of the week on which his shop would remain closed. The Inspector
of Shops and Commercial Establishments, Ferozepore Circle, visited
the appellant s shop on Friday, the 29th
January 1954, and found the shop open and the appellant s son
selling articles. He was, therefore, prosecuted and ultimately
convicted and sentenced by the Additional District Magistrate, which
was also confirmed by the High Court of Punjab. In such context, the
matter came up to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, the
learned advocate for the appellant restricted his attack on one
point. He urged that the provision violated the appellant s right
to carry on his trade or business guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) and
that the restriction imposed was not reasonable within Article 19(6)
because it was not in the interest of the general public. The learned
counsel also drew the attention of the Supreme Court to the long
title of the Act reading An
Act to limit the hours of work of Shop Assistants and Commercial
Employees and to make certain regulations concerning their holidays,
Wages and terms of service
and submitted that the insistence on the appellant to close his shop,
in which there were no employees , was really outside the
purview of the legislation and could not be said to sub-serve the
purpose for which the Act was enacted. In other words, the
submission of the learned counsel was that the provision for the
compulsory closure of his shop for one day in the week served no
interests of the general public and that it was unduly and
unnecessarily restrictive of his freedom to carry on a lawful trade
or business, otherwise in accordance with law, as he thought best and
in a manner or mode most convenient or profitable. The Supreme
Court, however, turned down the aforesaid contention after taking
into consideration the entire provisions of the Act. In that
context, the Supreme Court made the following observations in
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment:
5. It will be seen that
while under sub-cl. (4) employers are injuncted from employing
persons who had already worked for the maximum number of permitted
hours in another establishment, sub-cl. (5) lays an embargo on the
worker himself from injuring his health by overwork in an endeavour
to earn more. From this it would be apparent that the Act is
concerned-and properly concerned-with the welfare of the worker and
seeks to prevent injury to it, not merely from the action of the
employer but from his own. In other words, the worker is prevented
from attempting to earn more wages by working longer hours than is
good for him. If such a condition is necessary or proper in the case
of a worker, there does not seem to be anything unreasonable in
applying the same or similar principles to the employer who works on
his own business. The learned Judges of the High Court have rested
their decision on this part of the case on the reasoning that the
terms of the impugned section might be justified on the ground that
it is designed in the interest of the owner of the shop or
establishment himself and that his health and welfare is a matter of
interest not only to himself but to the general public. The
legislation is in effect the exercise of social control over the
manner in which business should be carried on-regulated in the
interests of the health and welfare not merely of those employed in
it but of all those engaged in it. A restriction imposed with a view
to secure this purpose would, in our opinion, be clearly saved by
Art. 19(6).
6. Apart from this, the
constitutionality of the impugned provision might be sustained on
another ground also, viz., with a view to avoid evasion of provisions
specifically designed for the protection of workmen employed. It may
be pointed out that acts innocent in themselves may be prohibited and
the restrictions in that regard would be reasonable, if the same were
necessary to secure the efficient enforcement of valid provisions.
The inclusion of a reasonable margin to ensure effective enforcement
will not stamp a law otherwise valid as within legislative competence
with the character of unconstitutionality as being unreasonable. The
provisions could, therefore, be justified as for securing
administrative convenience and for the proper enforcement of it
without evasion. As pointed out by this Court in Manohar Lal v. The
State, 1951 SCR 671 at p. 675 : (AIR 1951 SC 315 at p. 316) (when the
appellant challenged the validity of this identical provision but on
other grounds) :
The legislature may
have felt it necessary, in order to reduce the possibilities of
evasion to a minimum, to encroach upon the liberties of those who
would not otherwise have been affected..........To require a
shopkeeper, who employs one or two men, to close and permit his
rival, who employs perhaps a dozen member of his family, to remain
open, clearly places the former at a grave commercial disadvantage.
To permit such a distinction might well engender discontent and in
the end react upon the relations between employer and employed.
18.2 In our opinion, the
observation of the Supreme Court in the facts of that case cannot
have any application to the present one inasmuch as in the above case
before the Supreme Court, there was compulsion upon the shop owner to
close at least one day in the interest of the health and welfare not
merely of those employed in it but also of those engaged in it and
the Supreme Court held that such restriction is saved by Article
19(6) of the Constitution.
19. In the case before us,
there is no restriction of closure of factory if male workers are
employed, and the only restriction is on the night shift if female
workers are employed, and as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the
case of ANUJ GARG VS.
HOTEL ASSOCIATION OF INDIA [supra],
we may borrow the language of the Supreme Court with slight
modification by observing that instead
of prohibiting women employment in
the factory during night-shift
the State should focus on factoring in ways through which unequal
consequences of sex differences can be eliminated. It is State's duty
to ensure circumstances of safety which inspire confidence in women
to discharge the duty freely in accordance to the requirements of the
profession they choose to follow. Any other policy inference (such
as the one embodied under Section 66(1) (b))
from societal conditions would be oppressive on the women and against
the privacy rights.
Even in the case of MANOHAR
LAL VS. THE STATE OF PUNJAB [supra],
as pointed out by the Supreme Court in paragraph 6 of the judgment,
to require the factory owner who employs only female workers to close
and permit his rival who employs male workers to remain open clearly
places the former at a grave commercial disadvantage. Thus, the
above decision relied upon by Mr. Desai is of no help to his client
and rather supports the decision we propose to take.
20. Mr. Desai also relied upon
another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of RAMDHANDAS
AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF PUBJAB
reported in AIR 1961
SC 1559 dealing with
a similar provision of the Punjab Shops and Commercial Establishments
Act, 1958, which put limitation as to hours of work of employees and
specification of opening and closing hours. The Supreme Court, by
relying upon the above decision in the case of MANOHAR
LAL VS. THE STATE OF PUNJAB [supra],
upheld the said legislation.
21. In the above two cases
relied upon by Mr. Desai, there is no unreasonable restriction on
female workers regarding scope of employment or running of a trade
but the said provision lays
an embargo on the worker himself from injuring his health by overwork
in an endeavour to earn more be
such worker a male or a female.
We, thus, find that those decisions are irrelevant for our purpose.
22. As regards the decision of
the
Kerala High Court in the case of LEELA
V/S STATE OF KERALA
[supra],
it appears from paragraph 19 of the judgment that the Division Bench
was of the view that the provisions of Section 66(1) (b) of the Act
merely recognizes a social reality and that it was calculated to
ensure that women shall be able to take care of their families and
that their children do not suffer. According to the said Division
Bench, it was calculated to equally ensure that women are not exposed
to the hazards of working in a factory at night.
22.1 With great respect to the
Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, we are unable to accept the
aforesaid proposition in view of the subsequent decision of the
Supreme Court, which we have quoted above.
23. So
far as the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case NATURAL
TEXTILES PVT. LTD. v. THE UNION OF INDIA
[supra],
it appears that the said High Court independently did not consider
the question of vires but relied upon the decision of the Madras High
Court in the case of VASANTHA
R. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS
[supra],
and in paragraph 6 made the following observations:
It
is needless to say in the circumstances that when once any of the
High Courts in the territory of India while dealing with the central
legislation if it strikes down a particular provision as
unconstitutional and the same being removed from the statute, the
submission that it is applicable only to the particular area is
without any basis, unless and until the said order is set aside by
the higher Court or by the larger bench and the effect of removal of
a particular provision from the statute will have a bearing on the
entire territory of India. In that view of the matter once again
declaring section 66(1)(b) of the Factories Act as unconstitutional
is redundant and such a prayer may not survive for consideration,
rather, it is to be clarified that if the authorities without knowing
the implications try to enforce the said provision which is declared
as unconstitutional and removed from the statute, unless it is shown
that such an order is passed that it is applicable only to the
particular territory, it amounts to enforcement of a provision
without there being a statute and without there being any authority
of law.
23.1 We
are, however, unable to agree with the above observations in
paragraph 6 that once any of the High Courts in India declares a
statutory provision as ultra
vires,
the said decision will be binding even beyond the territorial limit
of that Court and also upon other High Courts. Therefore, we do not
accept the contention of Mr. Gautam Joshi, the learned advocate
appearing on behalf of the petitioner in one of the matters, that in
view of the said decision, there is no scope of even adjudicating the
above question at our instance.
24. We,
however, respectfully agree with the views taken by the Madras High
Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court that Section 66(1) (b) of the
Act is ultra
vires
the Constitution of India.
25. In
view of what have been stated above, we hold that the provisions
contained section 66(1)(b) of the Act is ultra
vires
Articles 14, 15, 16, and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
25.1 We, however, observe that
while permitting female employees to work during the night shift, it
will be a condition precedent upon the employer to make adequate
measures for the safety and security of the female employees who
would work during the night shift and the entire provisions of the
Act including the ones relating to welfare and working hours should
be strictly followed even during the night shifts. In addition, it
will be also the duty of the employer to make arrangements for
transportation of the female employees who work in the night shift
from their respective residence to the factory before the work
commences and from the factory to their respective residence after
the duty hours of the night shift if the same ends before 6.00 a.m.
Moreover, as indicated above, the arrangements should also be made
for opening adequate medical unit for such female employees and the
provision for Cr¿ches as provided for in section 48 of the Act
should also be strictly adhered to even during the night-shift. The
owners / occupiers of the factories who intend to run night-shift
with women workers shall, before starting such shift, inform the
respondents in writing of their intention and such night-shift with
women workers shall start only after the authorities of the State
Government, after inspection, is satisfied with the arrangement of
safety and security measures made by the owners / occupiers and even
after starting such shifts, if during subsequent inspection any
deficiency is found, it will be open to the State Government to pass
order stopping such night-shift.
26. With the above observations
and directions, these writ-applications are disposed of. In the facts
of the case, there shall be, however, no order as to costs.
Sd/-
(BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA,
CJ.)
Sd/-
(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.)
mathew
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