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  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • section 139, section 147, section 148, section 149, section 151 and section 153,
  • Finance Act, 2003, the amendment in section 153A
  • section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • INCOME TAX ACT
  • INCOME TAX ACT
  • provision of the Income-tax Act,
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citation codes
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  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • section 139, section 147, section 148, section 149, section 151 and section 153,
  • Finance Act, 2003, the amendment in section 153A
  • section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • INCOME TAX ACT
  • INCOME TAX ACT
  • provision of the Income-tax Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A search and seizure operation under section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was carried out on October 17, 2006 in the "Banarasi group of cases". Documents belonging to the respondent-assessee (M/s. Gopi Apartments) were allegedly found at the residence of Jeevan Kumar Agrawal. On September 27, 2008 a notice under section 153C was issued to the respondent after recording of a satisfaction (the opinion records that such a satisfaction was said to have been recorded). The respondent replied on December 24, 2008, asking that its earlier return be treated as filed in response to the section 153C notice.

The assessment for assessment year 2005–06 was completed on December 31, 2008, assessing total income at Rs. 1,05,93,010. The respondent appealed to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who, on February 26, 2010, deleted the additions. The Revenue appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), which on October 5, 2010 deleted the additions; that ITAT order was set aside on April 26, 2011 and remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals). On remand the Commissioner (Appeals) again allowed the appeal on June 4, 2012, holding that proceedings under section 153C were invalid for want of a recorded satisfaction by the Assessing Officer of the searched person. The ITAT affirmed that order on October 25, 2013 and dismissed the Revenue's appeal. The Revenue then filed the present appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, challenging the ITAT order of October 25, 2013.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether recording of a written “satisfaction” by the Assessing Officer of the searched person is a mandatory precondition before initiating proceedings against an "other person" under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  2. Whether, in a case where the Assessing Officer for the searched person and the other person is the same, handing over of seized books/documents and a prior recorded satisfaction are still necessary before proceeding under section 153C, or whether a satisfaction recorded subsequently in the assessment order of the other person suffices.
  3. Whether the Tribunal erred in quashing the notice under section 153C rather than deciding the merits of assessment additions in the hands of the "other person".

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Revenue / Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal)

  • When the Assessing Officer of the "searched person" and the "other person" is the same, there is no requirement to hand over books/documents to another Assessing Officer and no necessity to record a prior satisfaction as envisaged by section 153C; the same AO having jurisdiction obviates those formalities.
  • A satisfaction recorded subsequently in the assessment order in respect of the "other person" was sufficient compliance because the requirement under section 153C is procedural in nature.
  • The Tribunal should not have quashed the notice under section 153C and should instead have decided the question on merits (i.e., whether additions should be made and to what extent the income is assessable in the hands of Gopi Apartments).
  • Relied upon the Division Bench judgment in Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Classic Enterprises [2013] 358 ITR 465 (All) to support that satisfaction and handing-over can be treated differently when the same AO is involved.
  • Highlighted amendments by the Finance Act, 2003 and equivalence between sections (claimed) — e.g., section 158BC equivalent to 153A and section 158BD equivalent to 153C.

Respondent's Arguments (M/s. Gopi Apartments / Sri Ashish Bansal)

  • Initiation of proceedings under section 153C was illegal because no satisfaction was recorded by the Assessing Officer of the searched person prior to initiation of proceedings against the respondent, and recording of such satisfaction is mandatory.
  • Invited attention to the specific finding by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the ITAT that the Assessing Officer admitted that no such recorded satisfaction was available on the file.
  • Relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax-III v. Calcutta Knitwears, Ludhiana ([2014] 362 ITR 673 (SC)) in support of the mandatory nature and timing of the satisfaction requirement under the parallel provision (section 158BD).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Monish Maheshwari v. Asst. CIT, [2007] 289 ITR 341 (SC) Set out conditions precedent for invoking provisions equivalent to sections 158BC/158BD (i) satisfaction must be recorded that undisclosed income belongs to a person other than the searched person; (ii) handing over of seized books/documents to AO of the other person; (iii) AO must proceed under the relevant provision against the other person. The court held that the Monish Maheshwari ratio applies to section 153C as pari materia and supports the proposition that the prerequisites (including recorded satisfaction) must be met before applying the Chapter to an "other person". The present case was held to be governed by that ratio.
New Delhi Auto Finance P. Ltd. v. Joint CIT, [2008] 300 ITR 83 (Delhi) Discussed in the context of provisions in pari materia with section 153C (i.e., principles developed under section 158BD/158BC). Referenced by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as being based on provisions pari materia with section 153C. The court noted it but primarily relied on Supreme Court authority for the legal proposition applied.
Commissioner Of Income Tax-III v. Calcutta Knitwears, Ludhiana, [2014] 362 ITR 673 (SC) Determined at what stage a satisfaction must be recorded under section 158BD — held that a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared before transmitting records to the other AO; the court clarified stages when the satisfaction could be recorded but emphasized its mandatory character. The court applied the Calcutta Knitwears ratio to section 153C (being pari materia) and relied on it to hold that recording of satisfaction by the AO of the searched person is mandatory and must precede initiation of proceedings under section 153C against an other person.
The Commissioner Of Income Tax XIII v. Radhey Shyam Bansal, [2011] 337 ITR 217 (Delhi) Addressed the concept that "satisfaction" must be in writing and may be reflected in the assessment order or other records maintained by the AO. The court referred to this authority to support the view that the written satisfaction can be gathered from an assessment order or other written records of the AO, i.e., satisfaction must be reduced to writing and be tangible.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Classic Enterprises, [2013] 358 ITR 465 (All) Explained concept of "satisfaction" under the relevant provision; in that case the AO had recorded satisfaction and handed over books/seized material (specific factual posture). The court relied on this judgment to explain the meaning of "satisfaction" but distinguished it on facts: in Classic Enterprises the satisfaction was recorded and materials were handed over; in the present case no recorded satisfaction was found, so Classic did not advance the appellant's position.
Manish Maheshwari v. Asst. CIT, [2007] 289 ITR 341 (SC) Considered the conditions precedent for block assessments (sections 158BC/158BD) — emphasized the requirement of recorded satisfaction, handing over of documents, and initiation of proceedings under the relevant provision. The court treated the Manish Maheshwari ratio as applicable to section 153C and used it to conclude that the statutory conditions precedent (including recorded satisfaction) must be satisfied before applying section 153C to an "other person".

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by comparing section 153C (Chapter XIV, procedure for assessment) with section 158BD (Chapter XIV-B, procedure for searched cases) and concluded both provisions are in pari materia. The analysis followed these key steps, based exclusively on the opinion's text:

  1. Statutory comparison: The court reproduced and examined the text of section 153C and section 158BD and found the provisions analogous in purpose and structure, so the judicial interpretations of section 158BD were applicable to section 153C.
  2. Two-stage structure: The court set out the two-stage process arising from section 153C: (a) search/seizure and assessment proceedings against the searched person under section 153A; (b) recording of satisfaction by the AO of the searched person that seized items belong to another person, handing over of seized material to AO of that other person, and initiation of proceedings against that other person under section 153C read with 153A.
  3. Timing and nature of "satisfaction": Relying on Calcutta Knitwears and Monish Maheshwari, the court held that a written "satisfaction" by the AO of the searched person is mandatory (a sine qua non) and must be recorded before transmitting records or issuing notice to the other person. The satisfaction may be recorded at various permissible stages (at initiation of proceedings against the searched person, during assessment proceedings, or immediately after completion of assessment) but it must exist in writing prior to initiation of action under section 153C.
  4. Meaning of "satisfaction": The court explained that "satisfaction" denotes the AO's state of mind produced and evidenced in tangible form (a writing), such as in an assessment order, note or other record maintained by the AO. It is the conclusion drawn on the foundation of material available to the AO.
  5. Application to facts: The court noted a categorical finding by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the ITAT that there was no material on record showing the recording of satisfaction by the AO of the searched person prior to issuing the section 153C notice to the respondent. The Assessing Officer had stated in the assessment order that satisfaction was recorded, but on examination no such record was available; the Revenue failed to produce any copy of the purported satisfaction before the authorities below or before the court.
  6. Rejection of appellant's technical/contention: The court rejected the appellant's contention that the requirement of recorded satisfaction was merely procedural and that a later-recorded satisfaction (in the other person’s assessment order) sufficed, noting that Calcutta Knitwears had considered and rejected that proposition in the context of the pari materia provision (section 158BD). The court also rejected the argument that the same AO occupying jurisdiction over both persons negated the need for a recorded satisfaction, holding instead that recording satisfaction remains mandatory even where handing-over may be immaterial because the same AO is involved.
  7. Procedural default and appellate scope: The court observed that a plea raised in the present appeal was not raised in the grounds before the ITAT, but even on its merits the plea lacked substance in light of the admitted factual position and authoritative precedents.
  8. Conclusion: Because the mandatory recorded satisfaction was absent on the file and the legal position required such a recorded satisfaction to precede proceedings against the other person, the Tribunal's quashing of the proceedings under section 153C was upheld and interference was unwarranted under section 260A.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal under section 260A is DISMISSED. The court found no substantial question of law warranting interference with the impugned ITAT judgment which had affirmed the Commissioner (Appeals) order quashing the proceedings under section 153C for want of a recorded satisfaction by the Assessing Officer of the searched person.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The ITAT's and Commissioner (Appeals)'s findings that the proceedings under section 153C were invalid for want of a recorded satisfaction remain undisturbed; the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.
  • Legal consequence emphasised: The judgment applies the Supreme Court's interpretation of the pari materia provision (section 158BD) to section 153C, reinforcing that a written recorded satisfaction by the AO of the searched person is mandatory and must precede initiation of proceedings under section 153C against any other person.
  • No new principle beyond existing precedents: The court applied existing Supreme Court and High Court authorities to the facts and did not announce any novel legal doctrine; it concluded that the present case is governed by the established precedents referenced in the opinion.

This summary has been prepared exclusively from the contents of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond what appears in that text.

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    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Gopi Apartment

    Rajan Roy, J.:— This is an appeal of the Revenue under section 260A of Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the IT Act, 1961”).

    2. The facts of the case giving rise to the instant appeal are as under:

    A search and seizure operation under section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was conducted on October 17, 2006, in “Banarasi group of cases” encompassing residential and business premises of the said group. It is alleged that during the search and also during the assessment proceedings in respect of the “searched person”, certain incriminating material was recovered, which has been mentioned in the panchnama drawn at the residence of Jeevan Kumar Agrawal, which belonged to the respondent-assessee herein. Accordingly, a notice under section 153C dated September 27, 2008, was issued, after recording of the requisite satisfaction calling upon the respondent to file its return. The respondent, vide its reply dated December 24, 2008, submitted that the return of income, filed earlier, may be treated as filed in response to the notice under section 153C of the Income-tax Act.

    3. The assessment in respect of the respondent-M/s. Gopi Apartments was completed on December 31, 2008. The total income was assessed at Rs. 1,05,93,010 for the assessment year 2005–06. The respondent-assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) I, Kanpur, against the assessment order dated December 31, 2008. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) I, Kanpur, vide order dated February 26, 2010, deleted the entire addition by the Assessing Officer. The Revenue filed an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as “the ITAT”) against the appellate order dated February 26, 2010. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, vide order dated October 5, 2010, deleted the additions. The Revenue again filed an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal against the said order, which was set aside on April 26, 2011 and the matter was remanded back to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) I, Kanpur.

    4. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) I, Kanpur, vide its order dated June 4, 2012, again allowed the appeal in favour of the respondent-assessee. While deciding the appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) took note of the report of the Assessing Officer on the crossobjection filed by the assessee before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal the relevant extract of the report of the Assessing Officer, which was considered by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), is quoted hereinbelow:

    “As may be seen from the assessment order itself that the proceedings under section 153C were initiated on the basis of the seized material, documents belonging to the assessee found at the premises of Shri Jeewan Kumar Agarwal during the course of search proceedings. The Assessing Officer in the assessment order has specifically stated that the satisfaction for issuing notice under section 153C was recorded. However, on examination of record, such satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer is not available.”

    5. Based on the discussion made by him, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held as under:

    “5.4 In the absence of the ‘satisfaction note’ prepared by the Assessing Officer of the searched person, it has to be held that the Assessing Officer of the instant assessee could not have assumed jurisdiction under section 153C of the Act. Thus, all the proceedings undertaken under section 153C are to be declared as invalid, being annulled for want of jurisdiction. Since the assessment framed under section 153C has been annulled, no useful purpose shall be served by adjudicating on the merits of the case and/or other arguments of the appellant.”

    6. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) I, Kanpur, relied upon the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Monish Maheskwari v. Asst. CIT, [2007] 289 ITR 341 (SC) and by the Delhi High Court in the case of New Delhi Auto Finance P. Ltd. v. Joint CIT, [2008] 300 ITR 83 (Delhi), which were based on the provisions contained in section 158BD, which are in pari materia with the provisions of section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

    7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated June 4, 2012, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, which was decided on October 25, 2013, the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was affirmed and the appeal of the Revenue was dismissed. The relevant extract of the judgment of the learned Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is hereinbelow:

    “5. We have considered the rival submissions, perused the material available on record and gone through the orders of the authorities below. We find that on page 4 at paragraph 5, the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has reproduced the comments given by the Assessing Officer in the course of remand proceedings and as per the same, it was reported by the Assessing Officer that although the Assessing Officer in his assessment order has specifically stated that the satisfaction for issuing notice under section 153C was recorded, however, on examination of records, such satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer is not available. This goes to show that it was not brought on record by the Assessing Officer before the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) that any satisfaction was recorded by the Assessing Officer before issuing notice under section 153C of the Act by producing a copy of such satisfaction. Instead of this, it is specially reported by the Assessing Officer to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) that on examination of records, any satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer is not available. Before us also, the learned Departmental representative of the Revenue has not brought on record the copy of any satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer of the searched person, which is necessary for issuing notice to the present assessee under section 153C of the Act. In the absence of such satisfaction having been recorded by the Assessing Officer of the searched person, the present proceedings initiated by the present Assessing Officer against the present assessee under section 153C is without jurisdiction and, in our considered opinion, the same has been rightly quashed by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) by following the judgment of the Hon'ble apex court rendered in the case of Manish Maheshwari as reported in [2007] 289 ITR 341 (SC); [2007] 208 CTR (SC) 97. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere in the order of learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).

    6. In the result, the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.”

    8. It is in this factual background that the instant appeal has been preferred before this court under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, challenging the order dated October 25, 2013, passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow.

    9. We have heard Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Ashish Bansal, learned counsel for respondent assessee, and have perused the records.

    10. The contention of Sri Agrawal is two-fold. Firstly, he contends that, in the instant case, the Assessing Officer of the “searched person” and the “other person” being the same, there was no requirement of handing over of the books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned, as is mentioned in section 153C nor was there any necessity of recording a prior satisfaction before proceeding to assess the “other person”. The satisfaction subsequently recorded in the assessment order in respect of the “other person” was sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 153C, which, in any case, was procedural in nature. The Assessing Officer of both the proceedings, being the same, he was neither required to handover the documents to another Assessing Officer nor he had to record any satisfaction for the purpose of any other Assessing Officer since the same Assessing Officer of the same designation is having jurisdiction over both the persons, i.e “searched person” and the “other person” (not searched). Sri Agrawal relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this court rendered in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. 1. Classic Enterprises, [2013] 358 ITR 465 (All).

    11. It was contended that the Tribunal was not justified in quashing the notice under section 153C, instead of deciding the question on the merits as to whether additions are to be made and/or to what extent the income is to be assessed in the hands of Gopi Apartments.

    12. Sri Agrawal also contended that by the Finance Act, 2003, the amendment in section 153A with effect from June 1, 2003, was made and sections 153A and 153C were added in place of sections 153BC and 153BD. Section 158BC is equivalent to section 153A and section 158BD is equivalent to section 153C.

    13. He also contended that the reliance placed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Manish Maheshwari (supra) was misplaced and the case, at hand, was squarely covered by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Classic Enterprises (supra). In this regard, Sri Agrawal referred to the observation in Manish Mahesh-wari's case to the effect that “No proceeding under section 158BC had been initiated. There is, thus, a patent non-application of mind”.

    14. Sri Ashish Bansal, learned counsel for the respondent assessee, on the other hand, contended that the initiation of the proceedings under section 153C against the respondent-assessee itself was illegal, as no satisfaction was recorded by the Assessing Officer of the “searched person” prior to the initiation of such proceedings against the respondent-assessee as was mandatory. He invited the attention of the court to the specific finding recorded by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), as upheld by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, based on the admission by the Assessing Officer before it, which has already been taken note of by us in the earlier part of the judgment. Sri Bansal relied upon a recent judgment of the apex court in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax-Iii v. Calcutta Knitwears, Ludhiana passed in Civil Appeal No. 3958 of 2014 decided on March 12, 2014—since reported in [2014] 362 ITR 673 (SC) in support of his contention.

    15. Apart from the arguments, as noted above, no other argument was raised by the learned counsel for either of the parties nor any other judgment was cited before us in support of their respective contentions.

    16. The relevant provision, in the instant case, i.e, section 153C, is as under:

    “153C. Assessment of income of any other person.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 139, section 147, section 148, section 149, section 151 and section 153, where the Assessing Officer is satisfied that any money bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or books of account or documents seized or requisitioned belongs or belong to a person other than the person referred to in section 153A, then the bopks of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned shall be handed over to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person and that Assessing Officer shall proceed against each such other person and issue such other person notice and assess or reassess income of such other person in accordance with the provisions of section 153A.”

    17. The aforesaid provision is contained in Chapter XIV of the Income-tax Act, which contains the procedure for assessment.

    18. A somewhat similar provision exists in section 158BD under Chapter XIV-B, which contains the procedure for assessment of searched cases, which reads as under:

    “158BD. Where the Assessing Officer is satisfied that any undisclosed income belongs to any person, other than the person with respect to whom search was made under section 132 or whose books of account or other documents or any assets were requisitioned under section 132A, then, the books of account, other documents or assets seized or requisitioned shall be handed over to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person and that Assessing Officer shall proceed under section 158BC against such other person and the provisions of this Chapter shall apply accordingly.”

    19. The meaning and scope of the aforesaid provision contained in section 158BD came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax-Iii v. Calcutta Knitwears, Ludhiana (supra).

    20. The issue that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, as men-tioned in paragraph 3 of the judgment is being quoted hereinbelow (page 679 of 362 ITR):

    “The issue that falls for our consideration and decision in all these appeals is : at what stage of the proceedings under Chapter XIV-B does the assessing authority require to record his satisfaction for issuing a notice under section 158BD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’ for short).”

    21. After considering the rival contentions, relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act and the authorities on the subject, their Lordships held as under (page 690):

    “We would certainly say that before initiating proceedings under section 158BD of the Act, the Assessing Officer who has initiated proceedings for completion of the assessments under section 158BC of the Act should be satisfied that there is an undisclosed income which has been traced out when a person was searched under section 132 or the books of account were requisitioned under section 132A of the Act. This is in contrast to the provisions of section 148 of the Act where recording of reasons in writing are a sine qua non. Under section 158BD the existence of cogent and demonstrative material is germane to the Assessing Officers' satisfaction in concluding that the seized documents belong to a person other than the searched person is necessary for initiation of action under, section 158BD. The bare reading of the provision indicates that the satisfaction note could be prepared by the Assessing Officer either at the time of initiating proceedings for completion of assessment of a searched person under section 158BC of the Act or during the stage of the assessment proceedings. It does not mean that after completion of the assessment, the Assessing Officer cannot prepare the satisfaction note to the effect that there exists income-tax belonging to any person other than the searched person in respect of whom a search was made under section 132 or requisition of books of account were made under section 132A of the Act. The language of the provision is clear and unambiguous. The Legislature has not imposed any embargo on the Assessing Officer in respect of the stage of proceedings during which the satisfaction is to be reached and recorded in respect of the person other than the searched person…

    In the result, we hold that for the purpose of section 158BD of the Act a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared by the Assessing Officer before he transmits the records to the other Assessing Officer who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages : (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person under section 158BC of the Act; (b) along with the assessment proceedings under section 158BC of the Act; and (c) immediately after the assessment proceedings are completed under section 158BC of the Act of the searched person.

    We are informed by Shri Santosh Krishan, who is appearing in seven of the appeals that the Assessing Officer had not recorded the satisfaction note as required under section 158BD of the Act, therefore, the Tribunal and the High Court were justified in setting aside the orders of assessment and the orders passed by the first appellate authority. We do not intend to examine the aforesaid contention canvassed by the learned counsel since we are remanding the matters to the High Court for consideration of the individual cases herein in light of the observations made by us on the scope and possible interpretation of section 158BD of the Act.

    With these observations, the appeals are disposed of.”

    22. The provisions of section 158BD being in pari materia with the provi-sions of section 153C, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment clearly applies to the present case also.

    23. The reference to the assessment proceedings under section 158BC by the Supreme Court in the extracts quoted above is with regard to the “assessment proceedings” in relation to the “searched person” and not the “other person” as referred to in section 158BD.

    24. A bare perusal of the provision contained in section 153C of the Income-tax Act leaves no doubt that, as is provided under section 158BD, where the Assessing Officer, while proceeding under section 153A against a person who has been subjected to search and seizure under section 132(1) or has been proceeded under section 132A is satisfied that any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or books of account or documents seized or requisitioned belongs or belong to a person other than the person referred to in section 153A, then the books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned shall be handed over to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person and that the Assessing Officer shall proceed against each such other person and issue such other person notice and assess or reassess income of such other person in accordance with the provisions of section 153A.

    25. Thus, there are two stages:

    (1) The first stage comprises a search and seizure operation under section 132 or proceeding under section 132A against a person, who may be referred as “the searched person”. Based on such search and seizure, assessment proceedings are initiated against the “searched person” under section 153A. At the time of initiation of such proceedings against the “searched person” or during the assessment proceedings against him or even after the completion of the assessment proceedings against him, the Assessing Officer of such a “searched person”, may, if he is satisfied, that any money, document, etc., belongs to a person other than the searched person, then such money, documents, etc., are to be handed over to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over “such other person”.

    (2) The second stage commences from the recording of such satisfaction by the Assessing Officer of the “searched person” followed by handing over of all the requisite documents, etc., to the Assessing Officer of such ‘other person’, thereafter followed by issuance of the notice of the proceedings under section 153C read with section 153A against such “other person”.

    26. The initiation of proceedings against “such other person” are dependant upon a satisfaction being recorded. Such satisfaction may be during the search or at the time of initiation of assessment proceedings against the “searched person”, or even during the assessment proceedings against him or even after completion of the same but before issuance of notice to the “such other person” under section 153C.

    27. Even in a case, where the Assessing Officer of both the persons is the same and assuming that no handing over of documents is require J, the recording of “satisfaction” is a must, as, that is the foundation, upon which the subsequent proceedings against the “other person” are initiated. The handing over of documents, etc., in such a case may or may not be of much relevance but the recording of satisfaction is still required and in fact it is mandatory.

    28. In this regard, the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax-Iii v. Calcutta Knitwears, Ludhiana (supra), as noted above, clearly applies to the proceedings under section 153C also.

    29. The “satisfaction” has to be in writing and can be gathered from the assessment order passed in respect of the “searched person”, if it is so mentioned/recorded or from any other order, note or record maintained by the Assessing Officer of the “searched person”. The word “satisfaction” refers to the state of mind of the Assessing Officer of the person searched, which gets reflected in a tangible shape/form, when it is reduced into writing. It is the conclusion drawn or the finding recorded on the foundation of the material available. In this regard, reference may be made to the pronouncements in the case of The Commissioner Of Income Tax Xiii v. Radhey Shyam Bansal, [2011] 337 ITR 217 (Delhi) and the Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. 1. Classic Enterprises, [2013] 358 ITR 465 (All).

    30. In the case of Manish Maheshwari v. Asst. CIT, [2007] 289 ITR 341 (SC), their Lordships had the occasion to consider the provisions of sections 158BC and 158BD and held that the conditions precedent for taking recourse to a block assessment in terms of section 158BC and section 158BD were as under (page 348):

    “(i) Satisfaction must be recorded by the Assessing Officer that any undisclosed income belongs to any person, other than the person with respect to whom search was made under section 132 of the Act; (ii) The books of account or other documents or assets seized or requisitioned had been handed over to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person; and (iii) The Assessing Officer has proceeded under section 158BC against such other person.

    The conditions precedent for invoking the provisions of section 158BD, thus, are required to be satisfied before the provisions of the said Chapter are applied in relation to any person other than the person whose premises had been searched or whose documents and other assets had been requisitioned under section 132A of the Act.”

    31. The ratio of the judgment in Monish Maheshwari's case also applies to the provisions of section 153C and to the facts of this case.

    32. In the instant case, a categorical finding has been recorded by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that there is no material showing the recording of satisfaction by the Assessing Officer of the “searched person” prior to issuance of notice under section 153C to the respondent-assessee, i.e “the other person”. It was the admitted case of the Revenue before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that though the Assessing Officer (of the other person) in the assessment order had stated that the satisfaction for issuing notice under section 153C was recorded, however, on examination, recording of such satisfaction alleged to be recorded by the Assessing Officer was not available.

    33. In view of the legal position, as already discussed above and the admit-ted factual position as aforesaid, we are unable to accept the contentions of Sri Agrawal.

    34. We are also of the view that the plea, which is being raised in this appeal, was not raised in the grounds of appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, however, even otherwise such plea does not have any merit.

    35. The contention of Sri Agrawal that section 153C is only procedural in nature, therefore, the non-recording of prior satisfaction does not vitiate the assessment order, as, such satisfaction, has been recorded in the assessment order passed subsequently with regard to the other person, is also not acceptable for the reason that the Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Knitwears (supra) has already considered this aspect of the matter in the context of section 158BD, and after taking note of the fact that the said provision is a machinery provision has interpreted the same. In the light of the interpretation given by it and in view of the ratio laid down therein, the contention of Sri Agrawal does not hold ground. A clear and plain reading of section 153C leaves no doubt that recording of satisfaction by the Assessing Officer of the person searched is mandatory and it has to precede the initiation of proceedings against the other person (not searched).

    36. A specific query was put to Sri Agrawal as to whether, on the basis of the material collected during the search and seizure operation or during the assessment, proceedings against the “searched person” or thereafter, any proceeding could be initiated against the “other person” under any other provision of the Income-tax Act, he categorically replied that except section 153C, there was no other provision under which action could be initiated against him. The reliance placed by Sri Agrawal upon the Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. 1. Classic Enterprises (supra) far from helping his cause goes against him. We have already relied upon the said judgment to explain the concept of “satisfaction” under section 153C, which is required to be recorded in writing. However, on the other issues, the said judgment is distinguishable for the reason that in the said case, the Assessing Officer had recorded his “satisfaction” and after recording the satisfaction on the subject matter on August 2, 2006, handed over the books of account and seized material, thus, the issue, which falls for consideration in this appeal, in fact, did not arise for consideration in the said appeal. In any case, the case at hand being squarely covered by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, as already referred, the reliance placed by Sri Agrawal on the aforesaid judgment does not cut much ice.

    37. In view of the above discussion, we find that no substantial question of law arises in the instant appeal warranting interference with the impugned judgment under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It is accordingly dismissed.

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