Mitra, J.:— The question raised in this case is one of some nicety and my attention has not been drawn to any precedent directly bearing on it.
The Plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of two plots of land bearing two different towzi numbers in the Collectorat of Dacca; that he was dispossessed by the Defendants of both the plots of land in or about the same time; and he asked for declaration of his title to and for recovery of possession of the same.
It appears that previously, the Plaintiff had instituted a suit, alleging the same cause of action with respect to plot No. 2 only. He did not, however-proceed with the suit, and asked for permission to withdraw it with liberty to bring a fresh suit. On the 9th August 1901, the Court granted the Plaintiff permission to withdraw the suit, with liberty to bring a fresh suit provided he paid the Defendants' costs within one month from that date. For reasons which it is unnecessary for me to enter into now, the costs were not paid within one month as provided in the order. The result, therefore, was that the Plaintiff was not entitled to avail himself of the liberty to bring a fresh suit, as provided for in the order of the 9th August 1901. The suit, therefore, so far as plot No. 2 is concerned must be dismissed, having regard to the provisions of the second clause of sec. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The lower Courts have agreed in dismissing the suit with reference to plot No. 1 as well, on the ground that sec. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure puts in a bar to its institution.
The question argued before me is that there is no such bar as has been erroneously held by the lower Courts.
Sec. 43, no doubt, directs that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the Plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; and that if he omits to sue in respect of any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards be entitled to sue in respect of the portion so omitted. I shall assume for the purposes of the present case that the cause of action with reference to plot No. 1 is the same as the cause of action with reference to plot No. 2, though speaking for myself I have grave doubts on the matter. The Plaintiff, it is true, omitted to bring a suit in respect of plot No. 1 when he brought the first suit. But what is the effect of sec. 373, with reference to property which was sued for? Sec. 373 enables the Court to allow a Plaintiff to withdraw a suit or to abandon a part of his claim, but unless he gets a special permission “he shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit for the same matter or in respect of the same part.” The permission to withdraw the suit places the Plaintiff in the position of a person who did not institute a suit. The section prevents the institution of a fresh suit; but except for that the effect of the withdrawal is as if there was no suit before the Court. If that is so, it seems to me that sec. 43 would not be a bar to the institution of a suit in respect of a property covered by the same cause of action if it was not covered by the previous suit.
In Venkata Shetti v. Ranga Nayak(1), a question arose before the Madras High Court with reference to the construction of secs. 43 and 373 of the Code. The Plaintiff in that case having at first sued for interest but not for the principal, subsequently withdrew his claim with liberty to bring a fresh suit and then brought a suit for principal as well as interest. It was contended for the Defendants in the later case that sec. 43 was a bar to the suit as regards the principal. Looking at the words of sec. 43 only without reference to sec. 373, there could be no doubt that the Defendants' contention was correct in so far that there had been a suit instituted and therefore a fresh suit for the principal sum would not be maintainable. The learned Judges of the Madras High Court, however, held “as to the argument in appeal that the statutory bar to a second suit brought in respect of a portion of a claim, a portion of which a party has omitted to sue in respect of, in a former suit, subsists notwithstanding that such former suit has been withdrawn by permission of the Court with leave to institute a fresh suit founded on the same cause of action; if this construction be put upon the two sections it is not possible for them to stand together, but the sections must be reasonably construed together, so that they may if possible both stand, and we are of opinion that it is not necessary to hold that sec. 43 applies in the case of a suit withdrawn by permission under sec. 373, but that the effect of such an order is to leave matters in the position in which they would have stood had no such suit been instituted.”
The same view was taken by the High Court of Allahabad in Behari Lal Pal…(Defendant); v. Srimati Baran Mai Dasi…(Plaintiff).*(2). There is, however, an observation in the latter case, which has been relied on by the learned vakil for the Respondent. At page 54 of the report, the learned Judges say: “It appears to us that if the prior suit had been withdrawn without permission granted under the first paragraph of sec. 373 of Act XIV of 1882, sec. 43 of that Act would have applied and would have barred any remedy in the present suit for rent for 1299, Fusll.” With the greatest respect to the learned Judges who pronounced the judgment., I am of opinion that the observation was not only not called for, so far as the decision in the case was concerned but it went too far. I do not see what distinction can be drawn between a suit withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit and a suit withdrawn without liberty to bring a fresh suit. In the latter case there is a statutory bar to the institution of a fresh suit.
No question that may be raised under sec. 13 of Code of Civil Procedure can arise on the withdrawal of the suit under sec. 373, without liberty to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action. There is only a statutory bar to the institution of a fresh suit, the effect of the withdrawal remaining otherwise the same.
In the view I take the principle of the decision of the Madras High Court would apply even if there was no permission to bring a fresh suit or that for some reason or other, permission would not be given effect to. In the case before the Madras High Court it is true that there was permission given to institute a suit, but as I have said, whether there was permission to bring a fresh suit, or not, the effect would be the same.
The case must, therefore, go back to be dealt with on its merits with reference to plot No. 1 only.
I make no order as to the costs of this appeal.
[The Defendants appealed under sec. 15 of the Letters Patent].
Babu Harendra Narayan Mitter for the Appellants.
Babu Rani Gharan Mitter and Moulvi Serajul Islam, for the Respondent.
The Judgments of the Court were as follows:—
Maclean, C.J:— This case is not free from difficulty. The short facts are these. The action is one practically for declaration of the Plaintiff's title to two plots of land, and for khas possession. Those plots may be referred to as plots Nos. 1 and 2. It appears that in respect of plot No. 2, the Plaintiff had brought an action previous to the present, not including in that action any claim in respect of plot No. 1. Under the provisions of sec. 373, C.C.P, the Plaintiff was permitted to withdraw from that suit, on condition of paying the costs. He did not, however, pay the costs and, in consequence, not having complied with the terms upon which the withdrawal was allowed, he must be taken to have withdrawn without the permission of the Court, in which case he would be liable for such costs as the Court might award, and be precluded from bringing a fresh suit for the name matter. In my opinion when a Plaintiff withdraws without permission, the suit, having regard to the language of the section, must be regarded as practically dismissed.
The Plaintiff then brought the present suit in respect of both plots Nos. 1 and 2 and it is urged, on behalf of the Defendants, that the Plaintiff cannot succeed in respect of either of these plots on the following grounds. In respect of plot No. 2, it is said that, inasmuch as it was the subject-matter of the previous suit, and that suit was withdrawn without permission, he cannot bring a fresh suit for plot No. 2. The Courts below have adopted this view, as did Mr. Justice Mitra and in that view we concur. In respect of plot No. 1, the objection is that the Plaintiff ought to have included that claim in the previous action and, as he did not do so, and that action must be treated as dismissed, he cannot, having regard to sec. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now sue in respect of plot No. 1. This view has been adopted by the Courts below, but, on appeal, Mr. Justice Mitra has held that the suit may proceed in respect of plot No. 1.
With great respect I am unable to take that view. If the previous suit had been withdrawn with the permission of the Court under sec. 373, which as already pointed out, was not the case, I should have concurred in Mr. Justice Mitra's view, because the previous suit, in these circumstances, must be treated as, in effect, having been no suit at all: nothing was decided in it. But, inasmuch as the previous action in respect of plot No. 2 must be taken, in the circumstances, to have been practically dismissed, the Plaintiff cannot, having regard to sub-sec. 2 of sec. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, bring an action for plot No. 1, the claim for which be ought to have included in the former suit, which suit has been practically dismissed. I think, therefore, that the appeal must be allowed, and the decision of the Subordinate Judge restored with costs.
Pratt, J.:— I am of the same opinion. Even if the Plaintiff had prosecuted his former action to a successful issue and had obtained a decree for plot No. 2, it is clear that he would have been debarred by sec. 43, C.C.P, from suing to recover plot No. 1. It would be very anomalous if he could place himself in a better position than that of a successful litigant by withdrawing the first action without the leave of the Court. Such a withdrawal entails a statutory disability as expressed in sec. 373 and cannot, I think, have the effect of relegating him to the status quo ante which alone would entitle him to sue upon the entire cause of action covering both plots of land.
N.G
Appeal allowed.