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Case Summary — Second Appeal on Promissory Note

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued on a promissory note (Ext. A1) purporting to be executed on 18-3-1949 by the defendant for Rs. 500 (Rs. 300 alleged earlier borrowing and Rs. 200 a present advance). The document was written on a half sheet of paper and bore the defendant's signature and thumb impressions. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had, through counsel, issued Ext. B1 notice on 20-6-1949 asserting that a blank sheet with the defendant's thumb impression had been entrusted to the plaintiff for a particular purpose and called for its return, thereby suggesting a manipulation of the promissory note; the promissory note was filed and the suit commenced on 28-6-1949.

The defendant denied execution of Ext. A1 and receipt of any consideration, pleading that he had entrusted to the plaintiff a blank half sheet with his thumb impression to be used as a Kychit (for intervention regarding a lease), that the proposed arrangement was not accepted by the third party (Dw.2) and the blank paper remained with the plaintiff, and that, later, because of a family dispute, the plaintiff had filled the sheet up as the promissory note.

Issues were framed in the trial court as: (1) whether the promissory note is not genuine, and (2) whether it is not supported by consideration. The Munsiff found both issues for the plaintiff and decreed the suit. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge found both issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff brought this Second Appeal against that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the promissory note (Ext. A1) is genuine.
  2. Whether Ext. A1 is supported by consideration (i.e., whether money was actually advanced).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The lower court (Subordinate Judge) adopted an improper procedure by disposing of the case mainly on the basis of burden of proof despite both parties having led all their evidence.
  • The burden was wrongly cast on the plaintiff; the admission by the defendant as to the thumb impression and signature on the paper should have shifted the burden to the defendant to explain.
  • By formally swearing to his case, the plaintiff contended that the onus should be deemed to have shifted onto the defendant.

Defendant's (Respondent's) Case / Defence

  • Denied execution of Ext. A1 and denied receipt of any part of the alleged consideration.
  • Pleaded that he entrusted a blank half sheet with his thumb impression to the plaintiff for a particular purpose (to be filled as a Kychit) while he was travelling; the blank was not returned because the third party (Dw.2) refused the arrangement.
  • Alleged that the plaintiff later filled the blank sheet as a promissory note out of enmity arising from a family dispute.
  • In testimony (D.W.1) admitted that the blank paper with his thumb impression also contained his signature and that the signature used the same ink as the body of the promissory note — an admission inconsistent with earlier pleadings/notice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajeshwar Bali v. Kishun Bali, AIR 1933 Oudh 394 (2) (A) Held that where a promissory note's execution and consideration are denied, the plaintiff must produce evidence on both issues, including whether the thumb impression was obtained by fraud and whether the note was without consideration. The court referred to this case to support the proposition that the onus of proving execution and consideration rests on the plaintiff.
Pirbhu Dayal v. Tularam, 68 Ind Cas 809 : AIR 1922 All 401 (2) (B) Held that when a defendant asserts a document was only a blank paper on which he was asked to affix signature and thumb impression, the burden of proof of its execution lies on the plaintiff. The court relied on this authority to reinforce that the plaintiff must prove execution where the defendant denies it.
Sahdeo Mauar v. Pulesar Nonia, AIR 1930 Pat 598 (C) In that case the defendant admitted placing his thumb impression on a blank intended for a Kabuliyat, and the single judge (Ross J.) treated that as a clear admission that the hand note bore the defendant's thumb impression, placing onus on the defence to explain the document's existence. The present court noted that while that decision placed the burden on the defence to explain how the document came into existence, it is not authority for saying the plaintiff need not still prove due execution of the document.
Dalchand Mulchand v. Hasanbi, AIR 1938 Nag 152 (D) Relied on Section 114 of the Evidence Act: the mere fact that a document bears a signature and comes from proper custody may raise an inference it was signed with intention of execution; but the presumption arises only if nothing else is known and the initial burden of proving execution lies on the person alleging it. The court observed that this case supports the limited proposition that Section 114 creates a permissive presumption, but does not displace the initial burden on the plaintiff when execution is denied.
Ramlakhan Singh v. Gog Singh, AIR 1931 Pat 219 (E) Held that proof of the identity of a thumb impression alone does not discharge the onus; it must further be proved that the thumb impression was given after the document had been written out and completed. Also emphasized that Section 114 is permissive. The court quoted and relied on this authority to show that identity of thumb impression is insufficient without additional proof that it was affixed after completion of the document, and to support the view that Section 114's presumption is not mandatory.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court evaluated the evidence and the competing factual findings of the lower courts. Key points in the court's analysis were:

  1. Identification of the primary onus: The court held that, in this type of suit, the burden (onus) is on the plaintiff to prove both the execution of the promissory note and the advance of consideration. The court explained that an admission by the defendant that his thumb impression and signature appear on a blank paper does not amount to an admission of execution of the completed promissory note (Ext. A1) nor does it permit drawing an inference that consideration passed.
  2. Assessment of evidentiary effect of defendant's admission: Although the defendant admitted at trial (D.W.1) that the blank paper bore his signature and that the signature was in the same ink as the body of the note — a discrepancy the Munsiff accepted as supportive of genuineness — the appellate court analysed the limitations of that admission. The court noted that only a small portion of the signature lay on the stamp and that no explanation was provided as to why a literate defendant would provide a thumb impression on the document or allow the date to be put down by the scribe. Therefore, the admission did not conclusively advance the plaintiff's case.
  3. Weight of evidentiary omissions: The Subordinate Judge's emphasis on the plaintiff's scant evidence and the omission to examine the document-writer (scribe) was considered a legitimate basis for not accepting the plaintiff's claim. The appellate court accepted that such evidentiary gaps could justify the finding that the plaintiff had not proved execution or consideration.
  4. Role of presumptions (Section 114 Evidence Act): The court considered authorities that discuss presumptions arising from a document bearing a signature and coming from proper custody. It concluded that Section 114 creates only a permissive (not mandatory) presumption which a court may or may not draw depending on the circumstances; importantly, the initial burden remains on the party alleging execution when it is denied.
  5. Use of precedent: The court cited multiple earlier decisions to show the consistent principle that identity of a thumb impression or signature alone is generally insufficient to prove due execution unless accompanied by evidence that the impression/signature was affixed after the document had been written and completed, and that fraud or alternative explanations must be addressed.
  6. Conclusion from combined analysis: Applying these principles to the facts and evidence (including the sparse plaintiff evidence, the defendant's explanation about a blank entrusted paper, and the absence of corroboration such as the scribe's testimony), the appellate court found no reason to disturb the Subordinate Judge's finding against the plaintiff.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Second appeal dismissed.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The Subordinate Judge's finding that the plaintiff failed to prove both execution of Ext. A1 and the passing of consideration is upheld.
  • The second appeal does not succeed; the plaintiff's suit remains dismissed as per the appellate court's affirmation of the lower appellate court's conclusions of fact.
  • The parties were ordered to bear their own costs throughout (i.e., each party will bear their costs).
  • No new legal principle or precedent was laid down; the decision applies existing principles about onus of proof, the limits of admitting a signature/thumb impression, and the permissive nature of Section 114 of the Evidence Act to the facts before the court.
V.S.B

Order dated: Appeal dismissed.

    Seithammarakkath Mammad v. Koyommatath Mammad .

    1. This Second appeal is by the plaintiff in a suit on a promissory note which was decreed by the Munsiff but dismissed by the Subordinate Judge in appeal by the defendant. The promissory note in suit purports to be executed on 18-3-1949 by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff or his order and is for a sum of Rs. 500/-. It is recited that Rs. 300/- out of the sum was borrowed on a previous occasion and the balance of Rs. 200/- was a present advance. It is written in the bottom portion of a half sheet of foolscap paper and contains not alone the signature but also the thumb impressions of the executant.

    2. The plaint averred that the defendant falsely issued Ext. Bl notice through counsel on 20-6-1949 alleging entrustment with the plaintiff by the defendant of a blank sheet of paper containing the defendant's thumb impression for particular purpose and calling back for its return because the purpose was unfulfilled evidently suggesting that the promissory note was a manipulation and with a view to forestall this suit. The promissory note was filed as Ext. A1 and the suit was laid soon after on 28-6-1949.

    3. The defendant, by his written statement denied both execution of Ext. A1 and also the receipt of any portion of the consideration. He pleaded that he had sought the good services of the plaintiff to intervene on his behalf with Mohammad Kunhi examined in the case as Dw. 2, for grant of a lease of immoveable property and had, while he was urgently entraining for Madras, entrusted with the plaintiff a blank half sheet of paper with his thumb impression for being filled up as a Kychit for the purpose, as the plaintiff had desired.

    4. Dw. 2 however refused to accept any such make shift arrangement. So the blank paper remained with the plaintiff, the defendant not having claimed it back. Subsequently in or about July 1949 the plaintiff fell out with the defendant's family on account of the refusal by the defendant's elder brother to consummate his marriage with the plaintiff's niece. And the plaintiff in his enmity had taken advantage of the existence of the blank sheet with him to fill it up as the promissory note herein.

    5. Even though the defence consisted in a denial of execution and consideration as above the issues in the case were framed as if the burden lay entirely with the defendant as follows:—

    (1) Whether the suit pronote is not genuine, and

    (2) Whether it is not supported by consideration.

    6. The plaintiff examined only himself as Pw. 1 while the defendant on his side examined himself as Dw. 1 and also Dw. 2. On this evidence the Munsiff found both the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit while the Subordinate Judge found exactly the contrary and dismissed the suit. Hence this Second Appeal by the plaintiff as abovesaid.

    7. During the course of his evidence as D.W 1, the defendant admitted that the blank paper with the thumb impression which he alleged he had entrusted to the plaintiff, contained his signature also and further that the signature was in the same ink as the body of the promissory note. This was inconsistent with the points taken by him in Ext. B1 notice and also the written statement.

    8. Laying great store by this discrepancy it was, that the Munsiff found in favour of the genuineness of the promissory note. The learned Subordinate Judge, on the other hand, laid emphasis on the fact that the evidence let in by the plaintiff was too scanty to uphold the execution of Ext. A1 by the defendant or the advance of consideration thereunder and commented in this connection on the plaintiff's omission to examine the document-writer who was alleged to have written Ext. A1.

    9. The defendant's admission as to the signature did not really advance the plaintiff's case for it was only a small bit of the tail end thereof that was on the stamp and there was no explanation again as to why, when the defendant was admitted to be literate, his thumb impression was obtained on Ext. A1 and the date on the stamp was allowed to be put down by the scribe.

    10. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff, special appellant urged before me that the court below had adopted improper procedure in seeking to dispose of the case mainly on basis of burden of proof when both parties had let in all their respective evidence in the case. He also took the point that the burden had been wrongly cast by the lower appellate court on the plaintiff in spite particularly of the defendant's admission in the case as to the thumb impression and the signature and he argued that even otherwise the burden must be deemed to have shifted on to the defendant when the plaintiff formally swore to his case.

    11. It appears to me, however, that the onus, in a case of this type, rests on the plaintiff to prove both the fact of execution and the advance of consideration. For, the admission by the defendant, as to his having affixed his thumb impression as well as signature in a blank paper without stamp cannot amount to an admission as to the execution of the promissory note, Ex. A1, nor can it enable the plaintiff to go on from there to ask for an inference that consideration has also passed.

    12. Reference may be made in this connection to — ‘Rajeshwar Bali v. Kishun Bali’, AIR 1933 Oudh 394 (2) (A), where the plaintiff brought a suit on the basis of a promissory note purporting to have been executed by the defendant and the defendant as here, denied both the execution and the borrowing of money and it was held that it was for the plaintiff to produce evidence on both the issues as to whether the thumb impression of the defendant was obtained by fraud as alleged by the defendant and whether the promissory note was without consideration.

    13. Similarly in ‘Pirbhu Dayal v. Tularam’, 68 Ind Cas 809 : (AIR 1922 All 401 (2) (B)), where the plaintiff sued relying on a document which the defendant affirmed was only a blank piece of paper to which he was asked to affix his signature and thumb impression, it was held that the burden of proof of its execution lay on the plaintiff.

    14. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to — ‘Sahdeo Mauar… v. Pulesar Nonia…Opposite Party.’, AIR 1930 Pat 598 (C); and — ‘Dalchand Mulchand v. Hasanbi’, AIR 1938 Nag 152 (D), in support of his argument. In the former of these cases the defendant while denying that he had signed or made thumb impression upon any hand note admitted that he had put his thumb impression on a blank piece of paper upon which it was intended that a Kabuliyat should be written out and that may be the thumb impression and paper which had been utilised for the hand note in suit.

    15. Ross J., sitting in single Judge held that it was a clear admission that the hand note on which the suit was brought bore the thumb impression of the defendant and the burden of proof was on the defence to explain how the document bearing the defendant's thumb impression came into existence. But this case is no authority for the proposition that the plaintiff in such case has not to prove the due execution of the document.

    16. The admission by the defendant did not establish the plaintiff's claim and if there was nothing on the pleadings besides the plaint and the defendant's denial the suit must fail. It may be that the fact that the defendant's signature is on the note is of great evidentiary value and in many cases might be sufficient corroboration of evidence given by the plaintiff himself to establish his case. I might in this connection refer to the Bench case in — ‘Ramlakhan Singh… v. Gog Singh….’, AIR 1931 Pat 219 (E), where Fazl Ali J., delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench, observed:

    “where the law places the onus on the plaintiff to prove that a document is duly executed, the onus cannot be discharged be merely proving the identity of the thumb impression, but it must be further proved that the thumb impression was given on the document after it had been written out and completed”

    and the learned Judge was careful also to say lower down;

    “But the fact remains that if the evidence offered by the plaintiff to prove that the document was duly executed, or in other words, that the thumb impression was given on the document after it had been written out and completed is found to be unreliable, he cannot be deemed to have discharged the onus properly and no onus is necessarily thrown on the defendant merely by reason of the fact that the defendant asserts that the thumb impression was given on a blank piece of paper.”

    17. The later case of AIR 1938 Nag 152 (D), to a certain extent, no doubt supports the appellant when it says relying on Section 114 of the Evidence Act:

    “The mere fact that a document is admitted to bear a certain signature and that it comes from proper custody ought to be enough to raise an inference that it was signed with the intention of execution.”

    18. But the learned Judges themselves say that the presumption will arise only if nothing else is known and further that:

    “The initial burden of proving execution of a document when it is denied is upon the person alleging execution”.

    19. Again as observed in AIR 1931 Pat 219 (E), at p. 222.

    “Section 114 is a permissive and not a mandatory section and the court may, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, refuse to raise a presumption in that case under that section, although in other cases such a presumption may be properly raised.”

    20. It follows therefore that the learned Subordinate Judge was not wrong when he proceeded to dispose of the case on the basis that the plaintiff to succeed must prove both the execution of the promissory note and the passing of consideration thereunder. And having heard learned counsel and also gone through the papers, I do not see any reason to differ from the conclusions of fact arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff has not succeeded in either. The second appeal fails in the result and is therefore dismissed. But in the circumstances the parties will bear their costs throughout.

    V.S.B

    21. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Seithammarakkath Mammad v. Koyommatath Mammad .
    (Feb 18, 1957)