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  • S. 11(4)(iii) of Act 2/65,
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  • S. 11(4)(iii) of Act 2/65,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The landlord (the revision petitioner) sought eviction of a tenant who had taken a shop room in 1961 for conducting business in aluminium/brass/copper vessels. By the time the eviction petition was filed in 1975 the tenant had significantly expanded his enterprise: he had put up a multi-storeyed building (referred to as the "Palace") where the business was carried on, obtained possession of other premises including godowns attached to his residence, and occupied a factory building near a railway over-bridge.

The Rent Control Court concluded that the tenant carried on business from the ground floor of the multi-storeyed "Palace" and that the disputed shop room was used only for storage. Relying on S.11(4)(iii) of Act 2/65 (allowing landlord to recover possession if the tenant already has or later acquires a building reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same town), the Rent Control Court ordered eviction.

The Appellate Authority reached a contrary conclusion, finding indicia that the disputed room was used for display (painted wall, aluminium vessels hung from the ceiling, a sentence in a commissioner's report) and held that the expanded business could not be carried on without that shop room; it set aside the Rent Controller's order and dismissed the eviction petition.

On revision under Section 20, the District Judge agreed substantially with the Appellate Authority's approach, reasoning that the tenant effectively used two rooms (the ground floor of the Palace and the disputed shop room) for trade and that the remaining premises were devoted to manufacturing, storage and allied purposes.

The court whose opinion is provided reviewed these findings and the legal interpretation of S.11(4)(iii) and ultimately set aside the revisional court's decision (R.C.R.P No. 6/79) and remitted the matter to the District Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. How should "reasonably sufficient for his requirements" in S.11(4)(iii) be construed — with reference to the nature and size of the tenant's business at the time the premises were let, or with reference to the nature and size of the business actually being carried on at the time the eviction petition is filed?
  2. Whether the tenant was in possession of two rooms belonging to the landlord from the outset (such that the disputed shop room is necessary to the tenant's business), or whether the tenant occupied only one room initially and moved thereafter.
  3. Whether factual findings (e.g., indicators that the disputed shop room was used for display rather than storage) made by the Appellate Authority and the revisional court were supported by the evidence and correctly applied to the legal test in S.11(4)(iii).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Landlord's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The Appellate Authority and the revisional court misconstrued S.11(4)(iii) by assessing whether alternate accommodation was "reasonably sufficient" based on the enlarged scope of the tenant's business at the time the petition was filed rather than the nature and size of the business at the time the premises were let in 1961.
  • Under the language of S.11(4)(iii), if a tenant already had in his possession an equally good room at the time of letting, the landlord could seek eviction even the next day; that suggests the relevant comparator may be the situation existing at letting (or acquisition) and not always the later-expanded business.
  • The revisional court erred in assuming the tenant had used two landlord rooms from the beginning; recorded evidence (Pw 1) indicates occupation of one room in 1957 and a shift to another room in 1961, undermining the theory that two rooms were required at all times.
  • The Appellate Authority improperly relied on stray sentences in Ext. C2 and on superficial observations (painted wall, vessels hung) without considering the report in its entirety or the Commissioner's explanation from the witness box.

Respondent / Tenant's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the tenant's legal arguments as distinct pleadings; rather, the courts' findings and the tenant's admissions in cross-examination are recorded and considered.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first set out the factual findings of the lower fora: the Rent Control Court found the tenant's main commercial activity took place on the ground floor of the multi-storeyed "Palace" and that the disputed shop room served principally as storage; the Appellate Authority and the revisional court reached opposite factual conclusions, treating the disputed room as a display area integral to the expanded trade.

The court then analysed the language and possible scope of S.11(4)(iii) of Act 2/65, which permits recovery of possession if "the tenant already has in possession a building or subsequently acquires possession of or puts up a building, reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same city town or village." The opinion emphasises that the clause contemplates both buildings the tenant already had at the time of letting and buildings subsequently acquired, and it questions whether "reasonably sufficient" should always be determined by reference to the tenant's business at the later date when the petition is filed.

The court observed that the lower courts had, in effect, measured sufficiency by the size and nature of the business as it had expanded by 1975, without examining the bearing of the first part of clause (iii) (possession at the time of letting). The opinion notes the practical consequences of this construction by offering a hypothetical: a tenant who already had an equally good room at the time of letting could give the landlord immediate grounds for eviction, suggesting that the temporal reference point matters and requires further examination.

Turning to the particular facts, the court recorded undisputed facts about location and sizes: the multi-storeyed "Palace", godown and other rooms were in the same town; the plinth area of the disputed shop room was about 518 sq. feet, while each floor of the Palace had a plinth area of about 574 sq. feet. The court also relied on evidence that the tenant had occupied one room in 1957 and shifted to another in 1961, contradicting the notion that he had required two landlord rooms from the beginning.

On the contested issue of use, the opinion notes that the Appellate Authority relied on certain observable indicia (blue-painted wall; vessels hung from the ceiling; a sentence in Ext. C2) to infer display use, while the revisional court thought the room was partly for storage and partly for trade. The reviewing court emphasised that the tenant had, in cross-examination (CPW I), apparently made a clear admission that the disputed room was being used for storage only; against that admission the inferences of display or mixed use appear unsupportable on the record as presented.

The court did not resolve all disputed factual or interpretative questions itself. Rather, it concluded that the matter required further examination by the District Court in the light of the observations made (notably the interpretative point about the relevant date for assessing "reasonable sufficiency" under S.11(4)(iii), and the contradictory factual inferences about the use of the disputed room). Consequently, the court set aside the revisional court's decision (R.C.R.P No. 6/79) and remitted the case for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The revision petition (C.R.P) is allowed; the decision in R.C.R.P No. 6/79 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the District Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The revisional court's order in R.C.R.P No. 6/79 (which had upheld the Appellate Authority and dismissed the eviction petition) is vacated.
  • The District Court must re-examine the matter, including the proper construction of S.11(4)(iii) (specifically, the temporal reference point for determining whether alternate premises are "reasonably sufficient") and the factual questions about the use of the disputed shop room and the tenant's prior possession of premises.
  • The parties are to bear their own costs in the present revision proceeding.

Broader legal effect: The court identified an interpretative question of statutory construction (whether sufficiency is to be gauged by reference to the time of letting or by reference to the tenant's subsequent expanded business) but did not authoritatively decide it in this opinion; instead it remitted the case for fresh consideration. The opinion therefore does not itself establish a new binding precedent on that point.

Disposition in the opinion: C.R.P allowed; matter remitted; parties to bear their own costs.

    Puthoor Rawathar v. Devasia Chacko

    1. Landlord in rent control proceedings is the revision petitioner. A shop room was let out to the 1st respondent tenant in 1961 apparently for the purpose of carrying on business in aluminium/brass/copper vessels. The petition for eviction was filed in 1975, and by this time the tenant had proposed and expanded his business. He had put up a three (or four) storeyed building very near the shop room in question, and had obtained possession of some other premises also. The Rent Control Court found that apart from the multi-storeyed structure where the tenant was carrying on business in the name and style of “Ambadan Vessels Palace”, he was in possession of two other buildings or rooms in the same municipality, besides godowns attached to his residence, and a factory building near the Railway over-bridge. Analysing the Commission reports (Exts. C1 and C2), the evidence of the Commissioner and the admissions made by the tenant himself as C. P.W I, the court came to the conclusion that the business as such was actually being carried on from the ground floor of the “Palace”, and that the shop room in question was being used only for storage purposes. Thus it held that the tenant was in possession of a building “reasonably sufficient for his requirements” within the meaning of S. 11(4)(iii) of Act 2/65, and on that ground, ordered eviction. The Appellate Authority however took a different view. It relied on two circumstances noticed by the Commissioner, Viz.,

    (i) the wall of the shop room in question was painted blue; and (ii) aluminium vessels were seen hung from the ceiling; to infer that the room was not being used for storage, but for “display of articles”. A stray sentence in Ext. C2 also indicated that the tenant was using both the ground floor of the place and the shop room in question for carrying on trade. Adverting to these and other circumstances, the Appellate Authority held that the tenant's expanded business could not be carried on without the disputed shop room also. Godowns, factory, storage rooms and display facilities were all necessary for a business of the type and magnitude the tenant was carrying on, and if possession of the shop room were to be given up the rest of the accommodation would not be reasonably sufficient. The authority set aside the Rent Controller's order on the above basis, and dismissed the petition for eviction.

    2. On revision under S. 20, the learned District Judge more or less agreed with the approach made by the Appellate Authority. It thought that even when the tenant had commenced his business in 1957 (or 1961) he was in occupation of two rooms belonging to the landlord. The ground floor of the palace and the shop room in question are the only two rooms now also available for trade; the other rooms and buildings are all taken up for manufacturing, storage and other purposes. The counter, the telephone, the weighing balance and other accessories for trade were all no doubt located in the ground floor of the palace; but sitting there, the tenant could see the vessels displayed in the disputed shop room and sell them by bringing them in whenever customers wanted to purchase them.

    3. Sec. 11(4)(iii) of the Act provides that a landlord could recover possession of building or room let out.

    “if the tenant already has in possession a building or subsequently acquires possession of or puts up a building, reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same city town or village.”

    4. There is no dispute that the multi-storeyed structure, the godown and the other rooms are all situated in the same town; and there is also no dispute that while the plinth area of the shop room is about 518 sq. feet. the plinth area of each of the three floors in the “Palace” alone is 574 sq. feet.

    5. The first contention of counsel for the petitioner landlord is that the Appellate Authority and the revisional court have both erred in construing S. 11(4)(iii). Obviously what they have taken into account for deciding whether the alternate accommodation available is reasonably sufficient for the tenant's requirements, is the nature and size of the business which is now being carried on by him, and not its size and nature at the time the shop room was let out in 1961. S. 11(4)(iii) speaks of a building which might have been in the possession of the tenant at the time of letting, or a building he may subsequently acquire. Suppose a tenant has in his possession a shop room with an area of 500 sq. ft.; but instead of doing business from that room, he takes out another of the same size on rent from a landlord and starts business. Going by the language of the Section, the landlord could apply the very next day for eviction on the ground that the tenant had an equally good room in his possession at the time of letting. In such a case, what could and would be taken note of is only the nature and size of the tenant's business at the time of letting. Can the position be different in a case of subsequent acquisition? In other words, is sufficiency to be determined with reference to the nature and size of the business the tenant had at the time of letting, i.e by assessing the magnitude and nature of the business the tenant had intended to carry on when the room was taken on rent, or is to be determined by taking note of the business he is actually carrying on at the time of filing the rent control petition. This aspect has not been examined by the revisional court; it has simply assumed that the crucial date is the date of filing the petition, and not the date of letting. I think the question requires further examination. The first part of clause (iii) and its bearing on the construction of the second part cannot totally be overlooked; nor could it be assumed, if the intention is to help the tenant, that his business would always flourish and expand.

    6. The next contention is that the revisional court has erred in assuming that the tenant was using for his business two rooms belonging to the landlord from the very beginning. The evidence of Pw 1 discloses that he was occupying one room in 1957 and that he shifted to another room in the same building in 1961. The theory that the tenant required two rooms for his business at all times is also therefore unsupportable.

    7. Again, the Appellate Authority inferred that the disputed shop room was not being used for storage, but for display; and the revisional court inferred that it was being used partly for storage and partly for trade. But the tenant is seen to have stated as follows in his cross-examination as CPW. I:—

    8. Against the above clear admission that the disputed room was being used for storage only, the inference noticed above also seems to be unsupportable.

    9. The petitioner has also a case that the appellate authority has relied on stray sentences in Ext. C2 report, without examining it as a whole in the light of the explanation given by the Commissioner from the witness box. I do not propose to go into these aspects because in my view, the matter has to go back to the District Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law, for the reasons already stated in the preceding paragraphs. I therefore set aside the decision in R.C.R.P No. 6/79 and remit the matter to the District Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made herein. The C.R.P is allowed as above. Parties will bear their own costs.

    10. Allowed.

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    Comments

    Puthoor Rawathar v. Devasia Chacko
    (Jun 25, 1980)