Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter is a revision petition under section 103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, brought against an order of the appellate authority. The underlying proceedings arose from an application by the 1st counter-petitioner under sections 15 and 17 of the Act seeking resumption of land. The Land Tribunal, Ernakulam, after framing seven issues, allowed the application and granted resumption of an extent not exceeding one half of the holding, while leaving determination of the precise location and extent to be resumed, the rent payable over the retained portion, and the value of improvements to separate proceedings. The 1st counter-petitioner was permitted to take out a commission.

Revision petitioners (referred to as revision petitioners 1 and 2) appealed. They contended that the 1st respondent (the 1st counter-petitioner in the original proceedings) was not a small holder; revision petitioner 1 contended his kudiyirippu extended over the entire holding; revision petitioner 2 claimed a leasehold right over 22 cents of the holding. The appellate authority confirmed that the 1st respondent was a small holder and that revision petitioner 2 had not established tenancy rights. However, the appellate authority vacated the Land Tribunal's finding limiting the kudiyirippu to one half of the holding, observed that under the amended Act the tenant could opt for the portion he wished to retain, and remitted for fresh enquiry the questions of actual extent of the kudiyirippu, the value of improvements and the portion to be retained by the 1st revision petitioner. The appellate order expressly left those questions open and remitted them to the Land Tribunal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a revision under section 103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 is maintainable against the appellate authority's order that remits certain questions to the Land Tribunal (i.e., whether the order is a "final order" for the purposes of s.103).
  2. Whether the 1st respondent (the counter-petitioner) is a "small holder" within the meaning of section 2(52) of the Act.
  3. Whether the authorities erred in considering only the properties of the 1st counter-petitioner (and not properties of his wife and children) in deciding whether he is a small holder.
  4. Whether the 2nd revision petitioner has an independent leasehold right over 22 cents of the holding.
  5. Whether the onus of proof was wrongly cast or whether relevant documentary evidence was ignored by the authorities when determining the extent of the 1st counter-petitioner's interest.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioners' Arguments

  • The appellate order is not final and therefore the High Court cannot entertain a revision under s.103 (i.e., the decision sought to be revised was not a final order).
  • The 1st respondent is not a small holder and the authorities erred in treating him as such.
  • The authorities erred in taking into account only the land of the applicant (1st counter-petitioner) and should have included properties held by his wife and children in deciding whether he is a small holder.
  • The 2nd revision petitioner should have been held to be a lessee in independent right in respect of 22 cents of the holding.
  • It was further contended that the onus was wrongly cast and that documentary evidence produced by revision petitioners had not been considered, warranting interference under s.103.

1st Counter‑Petitioner's (Respondent) Arguments

  • Counsel for the 1st counter-petitioner contended that the revision petition was not maintainable because the appellate authority's order was not a final order and therefore not subject to revision under s.103.
  • The 1st counter-petitioner relied on the Land Tribunal's findings that he had an interest only in specific extents of land (71.7 cents interest; 74.07 cents actual possession) and that he had not established ownership of other properties; these factual findings were confirmed on appeal and should not be disturbed.
  • It was argued implicitly that properties of the wife and children were not to be aggregated with the applicant's holdings when determining whether the applicant alone qualifies as a small holder.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
V. M. Abdul Rahman and others v. D. K. Cassim and Sons and another (1933 P.C. 58) Authority for the proposition that an order remitting a matter for further enquiry or remand is not a final order and thus not ordinarily subject to appellate review intended for final orders. The court cited this Privy Council decision to support the view that the appellate authority's remand left the litigation "alive" and therefore the order was not final for purposes of s.103 revision.
Dr. Hari Ram Singh v. Emperor (1939 F.C. 43) Similar federal court authority endorsing that proceedings which remain "live" after an order (because further inquiry is required) do not give rise to final appeals/revisions. Used to reinforce the principle that non-final/remand orders are not revisable under the statutory provision invoked.
Mohammed Amin Brothers Ltd. and others v. The Dominion of India and others (1950 F.C. 77) Authority reflecting the same principle about finality of orders necessary for appeal/revision to higher courts. Relied upon to show consistency of the principle across appellate authorities and to support non-maintainability of the present revision.
Prakash Chand Agarwal and others v. M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. (AIR 1971 S.C. 2319) Supreme Court authority explaining that an appeal (by analogy, revision) is not contemplated from a judgment/order in which further proceedings are to be taken and that the order appealed from must put an end to the litigation between parties. The court invoked this decision (with reference to Article 133 in that case) to underline that s.103 requires a final order and to hold the present revision not maintainable.
M/s Fethanand and Sons v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1961) 3 SCR 754 (AIR 1961 SC 794) Recognised approval of the Privy Council view that appeals lie only from orders that finally dispose of litigation. Cited as part of the chain of authority confirming the finality principle applied to bar the present revision.
M/s Tarapore and Co., Madras v. M/s V. O. Tractors Export, Moscow and another (AIR 1970 SC 1168) Supreme Court decision reflecting the principle that appeal/revision does not lie from interim or remand orders which leave the suit or proceeding live. Relied upon by the court to support its conclusion that the appellate authority's remand meant the order was not final and the revision was not maintainable under s.103.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main stages: first, whether the revision was maintainable under section 103; and second, if maintainable, whether the impugned order was erroneous in law or omitted any question of law.

On maintainability, the court examined the language of s.103 and noted that revision lies only against a "final order" or on grounds that the appellate authority erred in law or failed to decide a question of law. The court relied on established authorities (including Privy Council, Federal Court and Supreme Court decisions cited in the opinion) which consistently hold that an order which remits issues for fresh enquiry or otherwise leaves the suit "live" is not a final order for purposes of appellate review. Applying that principle, the court found that although two findings in the appellate order were conclusive (that the 1st counter-petitioner is a small holder and that the 2nd revision petitioner has no independent right), the appellate authority expressly remitted several key matters (extent of kudiyirippu, the precise portion to be resumed, and value of improvements) back to the Land Tribunal for fresh determination. Because the order did not finally dispose of the litigation, it was not a final order under s.103 and the revision was not maintainable.

The court further addressed the petition on the merits by assuming, for argument's sake, that the order was final. It observed that the issues raised involved primarily findings of fact: the Land Tribunal found the 1st counter-petitioner had an interest in 71.7 cents and actual possession of 74.07 cents and had not established ownership of other properties. These factual findings were affirmed by the appellate authority. The court held that factual findings do not ordinarily give rise to a question of law for revision under s.103. The court rejected the contention that the onus was wrongly cast or that documentary evidence produced by revision petitioners had been overlooked; it found nothing "clinching" to overturn the concurrent findings of fact. The court also noted that the 2nd revision petitioner produced no evidence to establish an independent right over the 22 cents.

Finally, on the question whether properties of the 1st counter-petitioner's wife and children should be aggregated when deciding small-holder status, the court accepted the appellate authority's reasoning that where an individual is the applicant, it is that individual's properties which are to be taken into account. Because the tenant held only under the particular landlord (the 1st counter-petitioner), only that person and his properties were relevant for the small-holder determination.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding (core ruling): The petition for revision under section 103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 is not maintainable because the impugned appellate order is not a final order — it remitted material questions (extent of kudiyirippu, exact portion to be resumed and the value of improvements) to the Land Tribunal for fresh enquiry. Even on the alternative assumption that the order were final, the court found no error of law or omission of any question of law in the appellate decision and upheld the concurrent factual findings that the 1st counter-petitioner is a small holder and that the 2nd revision petitioner has not established independent rights over 22 cents.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The revision petition is dismissed and there is no order as to costs.
  • The appellate authority's remittal stands: the Land Tribunal must decide afresh the questions left open — namely the actual extent of the 1st revision petitioner's kudiyirippu, the part of the holding to be resumed and retained, and the value of any improvements.
  • The concurrent findings of fact affirmed by the appellate authority (that the 1st counter-petitioner is a small holder and that the 2nd revision petitioner has no independent right over 22 cents) remain undisturbed.

Broader implication: The court applied and reaffirmed existing authority that appeals or revisions under statutory provisions like s.103 are not maintainable against orders which do not finally dispose of the litigation; the opinion does not purport to set a new precedent beyond applying that established principle.

    Joseph v. Velayudhan Pillai

    1. This is a revision under s. 103 of the kerala land reforms act, 1963, For short, The act, By respondents 1 and 2 in an application by the 1st counter - petitioner herein under s. 15 and 17 of the act for resumption. The land tribunal, Ernakulam after framing seven issues on the contentions raised by the revision petitioners allowed the application and granted resumption of an extent not exceeding one half of the holding. The location and actual extent of the land to be resumed as well as the rent payable by the 1st revision petitioner over the extent of the holding to be retained by him and the value of improvements to be paid if any, Were directed to be determined in separate proceedings. The 1st counter - petitioner herein (the applicant) was permitted to take out a commission. Revision petitioners 1 and 2 appealed and contended that the 1st respondent was not a small holder. Revision petitioner 1 also contended that his kudiyirippu extended over the entire holding. The 2nd revision petitioner contended that she has a leasehold right over a portion of 22 cents of the holding. The appellate authority confirmed the findings of the land tribunal that the 1st respondent is a small holder and also held that the 2nd revision petitioner has not established that he is a tenant of any portion of the holding. On the other point raised by the 1st revision petitioner while finding that the ist revision petitioner has kudiyirippu right in the holding, The finding entered by the land tribunal that this kudiyirippu will not extend beyond one half of the holding was vacated. It was also noticed that under the amended provision in the act, The tenant has a right to opt for the portion of the property which he wishes to retain and that the value of improvements had also yet to be determined. The appellate authority therefore felt that the above questions required fresh enquiry by the land tribunal. It accordingly left open all these questions, Namely the actual extent of the land occupied by the 1st appellant's kudiyirippu, The value of improvements to be paid and the portion of the holding to be retained by the 1st revision petitioner. The order concluded in these terms:

    "in the result, I find thai the 1st respondent is a small holder entitled to resumption under s. 17 and 22 of the land reforms act and the question regarding the actual extent of property which he can resume and the value of improvements and other connected rights are left open to be decided by the land tribunal the land tribunal will decide those questions afresh. This appeal is disposed of accordingly."

    2. In this revision petition, The contentions raised are that the 1st respondent is not a small holder, That the authorities went wrong in holding that the land of the applicant alone be taken into account in deciding whether he is a small holder and that the second revision petitioner should have been held to be a lessee in independent right in respect of 22 cents of land in the holding.

    3. On behalf of the 1st counter - petitioner in this revision petition his counsel contended that this revision petition is not maintainable as the order sought to be revised is not a final order and so a revision under s. 103 of the act is not permissible. The relevant part of s. 103 of the act is in these terms:

    "103. Revision by high court: (1) any person aggrieved by

    (i) any final order passed in an appeal against the order of the land tribunal; or

    (ii) may, Within such time as may be prescribed, Prefer a petition to the high court against the order on the ground that the appellate authority or the land board or the taluk land board as the case may be, Has either decided erroneously, Or failed to decide, Any question of law, Or

    (2) the high court may, After giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, Pass such orders as it deems fit and the orders of the appellate authority or the land board or the taluk land board as the case may be, Shall, Wherever necessary, Be modified accordingly.

    (3). ~~~ ~~~ ~~~

    (4). ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~

    it is clear from the section that the ground on which revision petitions can be taken is that the decision is erroneous in law or that the decision has failed to decide any question of law and the revision petition can only be against a final order.

    4. This court in crp. Nos. 28 and 29 of 1967 held that an order of remand passed by the appellate authority setting aside the decision of the land tribunal is not a final order and no revision under s. 103 (1) of the act would lie. The same is the view taken in the decision in kothamma v. Kunjihetti 1973 klt. 390. We consider that the order sought to be revised is not a final order for the purpose of s. 103 of the act though there are two findings in that order which are conclusive. The appellate authority has concurred with the land tribunal that the 1st counter - petitioner is a small holder. It has also found that the 2nd revision petitioner has no independent right in the holding. These findings however do not dispose of the matter and the appellate authority has remitted the question of determination of the extent of the kudiyirippu of the 1st revision petitioner, The decision of the exact portion of the holding sought to be resumed and its extent, And the value of improvements to be paid for, If any, To the land tribunal. The 1st revision petitioner has also been given the option to decide which portion of the holding he would like to retain. It is thus clear that the order does not finally dispose of the matter. In that sense the order is not final and though it is conclusive in relation to the decision on two of the issues raised in that case on the wording of s. 103 of the act, The order, We think, Cannot be said to be a final order. This view is supportable on the basis of the decisions of the privy council in v. M. Abdul rahman and others v. D. K. Cassim and sons and another air. 1933 p. C. 58 and of the federa court in dr. Hari ram singh v. Emperor air 1939 f. C. 43 and mohammed amin brothers ltd. And others v. The dominion of india and others air. 1950 f c. 77. The supreme court in the decision in prakash chand agarwal and others v. M/s hindustan steel ltd. Air. 1971 s. C. 2319 observed with reference to art. 133 of the constitution:

    "it does not contemplate bringing an appeal in a suit which is still a live suit and in which further proceedings are to be taken. This has been the consistent view not only of this court but also of the privy council. The leading case from the privy council is v. M. Abdul rahman d. K cassim and sons, (1933) 60 ind. App. 76 (air. 1933 pc 58). There is a catena of cases in the high courts and also in this court that the judgment, Decree or order from which appeal is brought to this court must put an end to the litigation between the parties. This was reaffirmed in m/s fethanand and sons versus state of uttar pradesh, (1961) 3 scr 754 air 1961 sc 794) approving the view of the privy council referred to. Indeed, We could cite on this aspect of the case quite a large number of precedents from various courts in india."

    the same is the view taken by the supreme court in m/s tarapore and co., Madras v. M/s v. O. Tractors export, Moscow and another air. 1970 sc. 1168

    5. We think the principle of these decisions must apply in the interpretation of s. 103 of the act and that this revision is not maintainable.

    6. Apart from the fact that the revision is not maintainable, We must add that even assuming that this is a final order that is sought to be revised, We have to hold that the order sought to be revised is not erroneous in law nor has it omitted or failed to decide any question of law. Whether an applicant is a small holder or not would depend upon the fact whether he satisfies the definition of "small holder" under s. 2 (52) of the act. A glance at s. 2 (52) of the act would show that it is the extent of the land in which the applicant has an interest in any of the capacities mentioned in that section that would decide whether the particular applicant is a small holder or not. The land tribunal has found that the 1st counter - petitioner in this revision petition has interest only in 71. 7 cents of land and that he had actual possession of 74. 07 cents it also found that the 1st counter petitioner "has not succeeded" in establishing the applicant's ownership in other properties other than those disclosed in para. 5 of the application supplemented by the statement attached to the petition dated 5th october 1966. This finding has been confirmed by the appellate authority. These findings pertain to a finding on the question of fact and no question of law can arise in regard to this matter but it was contended by counsel for the revision petitioner that the onus bad been wrongly cast, That the evidence furnished by several documents, Had not been adverted to or considered by the authorities and that therefore the findings are liable to be interfered in proceedings under s. 103 of the act. We do not think that the onus had been wrongly cast. The applicant has given full details regarding the properties possessed and owned by him and in which he has any interest. His version has been accepted by the two authorities. Nothing clinching by way of evidence or material had been produced by the revision petitioners which would necessitate the rejection of the evidence furnished by the applicant we therefore see no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact that the 1st counter - petitioner is a small holder. The 2nd revision petitioner has produced no evidence at all to show that he has any independent rights over the 22 cents of the holding. This finding too must therefore stand.

    7. The other argument advanced was that the properties held by the 1st counter petitioner's wife and children must also be taken into account in deciding whether the 1st counter - petitioner is a small holder. An individual can be a a small holder and when an individual is the applicant it is only his properties that had to be taken into account in deciding whether he is a small holder or not. It had not been contended that the revision petitioner was not holding under the 1st counter - petitioner. The appellate authority has observed that

    "since the tenant holds only under the said person, The landlord, The particular person alone could constitute the landlord and the said person and his properties alone could be taken into consideration in deciding the question whether he is a small bolder or not"
    . We are in agreement with the view expressed by the appellate authority.

    8. In the light of the above, We dismiss this petition. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Joseph v. Velayudhan Pillai
    (May 28, 1975)