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  • S.18, Easements Act (5 of 1882).
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  • S.18, Easements Act (5 of 1882).
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs, suing on behalf of the Hindus of Basim (Berar), brought suit against a number of Muslim defendants representing the Mahomedan community of Basim, seeking injunctions restraining immersion of tazias at specified ghats of the Padmatirtha (Padma-Teerth) tank. An order under Rule 8 of Order I of the Code authorized the representative suit. The plaint, filed in the Subordinate Judge's Court at Basim on 20 June 1929, alleged that the tank was Hindu property, admitted permissive immersion from ghats 1 and 2 since about 1919, and complained of damage to sacred trees in 1925. It sought injunctions preventing immersion from (a) ghats 1 and 2, (b) ghats 3, 7 and 10, and (c) ghats 8 and 9.

The defendants denied Hindu ownership (claiming ancestral ownership by a defendant) and alternatively asserted a customary, immemorial right to immerse tazias from all ghats. The trial before the Subordinate Judge (after hearing many witnesses) resulted in a decree dated 28 March 1933 restraining the defendants "from using any of the steps of the tank for immersion of tazias" and finding the tank belonged to the Hindus. The trial Judge held immersion from ghats 1 and 2 prior to 1919 was permissive; the earliest reliable user evidence extended only from about 1910; and any claimed customary right under S.18, Easements Act (5 of 1882) was not proved.

The defendants' first appeal to the District Judge (dismissed 7 February 1935) upheld the trial Court's findings as to ownership and the insufficiency of user to establish a customary right. On second appeal the High Court (Pollock J.) on 20 October 1937 modified the injunction by excluding ghats 1 and 2 and declared that the Mahomedans had a customary right to immerse tazias from ghats 1 and 2. An irregular certificate for appeal to His Majesty in Council was granted by the High Court on 13 April 1939; the Board permitted the appeal to stand over to enable special leave to be obtained, and special leave was granted by Order in Council dated 1 July 1942.

The Privy Council (their Lordships) heard the appeal with no advocate appearing for the defendants before the Board, and confined the issues to the correctness of the High Court's finding as to customary right for ghats 1 and 2.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. The central question before the Board: whether the defendants (Mahomedans) had established a customary right to immerse tazias from ghats 1 and 2 of the Padmatirtha tank.
  2. Whether the High Court transgressed the limits of its jurisdiction under Sections 100 and 101 of the Code by disregarding findings of fact of the lower appellate court (this was raised by the appellants, though the Board did not decide the procedural point and proceeded on merits).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The Padmatirtha tank was the property of the Hindu community of Basim.
  • Immersion of tazias at ghats 1 and 2 had occurred by permission (admitted use since about 1919) and therefore did not amount to a customary right.
  • Damage to certain trees sacred to Hindus occurred in 1925, evidencing conflict and preventing a peaceful immemorial or customary user.
  • They sought injunctions preventing immersion from specific ghats (1–2; 3,7,10; and 8–9) as a protection of their property and sacred amenities.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants denied the plaintiffs' claim of Hindu ownership, asserting alternative ownership by an ancestor of defendant 1.
  • Alternatively, the defendants claimed that the Mahomedan community had, from time immemorial and as of right, immersed tazias from all the ghats of the tank (a customary right).
  • A further plea asserted an unobstructed right of immersion; branches of trees obstructing passage, it was said, were cut without objection to permit immersion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kuar Sen v. Mamman (leading case cited with references: ('95) 17 All 87; 1895 AWN 10; on appeal from 16 All 178; 1894 AWN 12) — reported judgments by Sir John Edge and Sir Pramada Charan Banerji. The principle that a custom must be proved by reliable evidence of repeated acts openly done, assented to and submitted to, leading to the conclusion that such usage has become the local law of the place. Also the statement that no fixed statutory period of enjoyment is prescribed but long and reliable usage is necessary. The Board relied on the exposition in this case to emphasise the evidentiary standard for establishing a local/customary right and to conclude that the user proved (1910–25) was insufficient to establish a customary right in the present case.
Mt. Subhani v. Nawab (cited as ('41) 28 AIR 1941 PC 21; 193 IC 436; ILR (1941) Lah 154; ILR (1941) Kar PC 22; 68 IA 1 (PC)). The proposition that the antiquity required to establish a custom depends on the circumstances of each case; what must be proved is such long and invariable practice that it shows submission by common consent to a governing rule of the particular district. The Board cited this precedent to support the proposition that in India a custom need not be immemorial but must be of sufficiently long and invariant use to displace the ordinary rights of the owner; applied this to evaluate the adequacy of the 1910–25 period of user.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Board's analysis proceeded in clear steps, confined to the facts proved in the record:

  1. Burden of proof: The Board reiterated that the burden lies on a party asserting a custom that derogates from the ordinary rights of an owner to give "clear and positive proof" of the user relied on.
  2. Antiquity of user: The evidence did not establish user before about 1910; hence the period of user reliably proved began circa 1910.
  3. Effect of later events (1925–1929): Events after 1925 (including 1927–28) relied upon by the defendants were largely attributed to police interposition to prevent breach of the peace rather than to acquiescence by the Hindu owners; consequently these years carried little weight as evidence of a customary right founded on private consent.
  4. Useful period of user: The user of service to the defendants was effectively the period 1910–1925 (as the District Judge found), and the Board considered whether this period sufficed to establish a customary right.
  5. Uniformity and certainty: Variation in the number and identity of tazias immersed and the increasing use of the tank raised difficulties as to the uniformity and invariability of the practice — factors material to proving a custom — though the Board acknowledged that such variation alone would not be fatal if other elements were sufficiently established.
  6. Precedent application: The Board relied on earlier cases (Kuar Sen v. Mamman and Mt. Subhani v. Nawab) to frame the legal test: custom need not be immemorial but must be of such long and invariable practice as to indicate submission by common consent to a governing rule. Applying that test, the Board found the 1910–25 practice insufficient.
  7. Conclusion on merits: Considering the insufficiency of antiquity and the lack of acquiescence in the crucial later years (because of police protection), the Board concluded that the evidence did not establish a customary right for ghats 1 and 2.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED

The Board advised His Majesty that the appeal be allowed. The decree of the High Court (which had declared a customary right to use ghats 1 and 2) was set aside, and the decree of the trial Court dated 28 March 1933 (restraining the defendants from using any of the steps of the tank for immersion of tazias) was restored.

Consequences and costs:

  • The orders of the District Judge as to costs of the trial Court and of the first appeal were to remain in force.
  • The costs incurred by the plaintiffs in the High Court and their costs of this appeal (to the Privy Council) were ordered to be paid by the respondents (defendants).

The Board emphasized the decision's basis on the specific facts and evidence before it and did not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying established tests for proving local custom; the decision therefore resolves the parties' rights in this case without announcing a novel precedent.

    Baba Narayan Lakras And Others v. Saboosa And Others

    Sir George Rankin.:-

    This appeal is preferred by the plaintiffs in a suit brought on behalf of the Hindus of a place called Basim, situated in Berar, against a number of Muslim defendants as representing the whole Mahomedan community of Basim. An order under R.8 of O.1 of the Code was duly made and the defendants contested the suit in three Courts in India. Their Lordships much regret, however, that they have not had the advantage of any argument for the defendants as no one appeared to represent them at the hearing before the Board. The dispute is as to the right of the Muslims at the time of Muharram to immerse tazias in a tank called the Padmatirtha tank which lies to the North West of Basim. This tank is described as a large area of water and as having ten ghats. The relief claimed by the plaint, which was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Basim on 20th June 1929, was an injunction restraining the defendants from immersing tazias (a) from ghats 1 and 2; (b) from ghats 3, 7 and 10 and (c) from ghats 8 and 9. The plaint alleged that the tank was the property of the Hindus : it admitted that for about ten years-that is since about 1919-tazias had been immersed from ghats 1 and 2 but stated that this use was by permission of the Hindus. It complained that in 1925 damage had been done to certain trees sacred to the Hindus and that since 1925 all the ghats had been used, except ghats 8 and 9, in 1926. It alleged quite truly, that what was done in 1927 and 1928 was covered by orders made by the District Magistrate to avoid a breach of the peace. The written statement denied that the ownership of the tank was in the Hindus claimed that it belonged to an ancestor of defendant 1, and set up an alternative case that the Mussulmans had from time immemorial and as of right immersed tazias from all the ghats. The allegation of damage done to trees was met by a plea-both illadvised and groundless-that the Mussulmans have unobstructed right of immersing tazias in the tank. If branches of any tree come in the way, they are always cut, in order to allow a free passage, without any objection.

    On 28th March 1933, the trial Judge, after hearing a large number of witnesses on both sides, restrained the defendants "from using any of the steps of the tank for immersion of tazias." He found that the tank was the property of the Hindus, observing that it had been held in many cases that a fluctuating body of persons, such as a village community or a particular community, is capable of owning property. On the question of user he held that before 1919 some tazias were immersed from ghats 1 and 2 as a matter of permission and not as of right, but that the first year in which all the ghats were used was 1925. Having negatived the existence of any easement, he considered whether the defendants had shown any customary right, such as is contemplated by S.18, Easements Act (5 of 1882). He found that such a right had not been made out, the user proved being inadequate in point of uniformity, continuity and certainty. He held further that the alleged custom was not reasonable.

    The defendants' appeal to the Court of the District Judge was dismissed on 7th February 1935. The learned First Additional District Judge of Akola confirmed the trial Judge's finding that the tank belonged to the Hindus. He held that before 1925 there had been peaceful immersion but only from ghats 1 and 2: that immersion had taken place since 1925 from all the ghats but had been accompanied by dispute and not peaceful. He agreed with the trial Judge in rejecting the defendants' evidence that all the ghats had been used from before 1925. As regards ghats 1 and 2, he noted that the plaintiffs had in the course of the trial admitted that the use of these two ghats had begun about 1915. He referred to the evidence of D. W. 125-Mr. C.E. Middleton Stewart-who had been Assistant Superintendent of Police at Basim from the end of 1909 until 1912 and on whose evidence the trial Judge had relied. In a passage which summarises his findings he said :

    To me it appears that there was no immemorial practice but that the Padma-Teerth attracted the Mussalmans sometime about 1910 and one or two Tajias began to come for immersion. The Hindus did not object and so the practice went on growing till 1919 from which year all the Tajias began to come to Padma-Teerth for immersion. The origin of this practice prior to 1910 is not proved. From 1919 to 1924 there was peaceful immersion of all the Tajias from Ghats Nos. 1 and 2 only. I, therefore, uphold the finding of the lower Court that some Tajias used to come to the tank prior to 1919 probably from 1910, that all the Tajias are immersed in the tank from 1919 but from Ghats Nos. 1 and 2 only and that since 1926 they are immersed from all the Ghats though in 1926 Ghats Nos. 8 and 9 were not used.

    On the view that user before 1910 had not been proved and that after 1924 it was not peaceful he considered that no customary rights to immerse tazias from ghats 1 and 2 had been established, the user proved being insufficient in point of antiquity. He further held that from 1910 to 1919 the custom was not uniform as all the tazias did not come to Padmatirtha : "Only some came and it is not proved that the same came in all the years." He found that the use of ghats 1 and 2 had been permissive. In the High Court on second appeal the case came before Pollock J., who found once more that the tank belonged to the Hindu community. He said that it was not proved that 1910 was the first year in which tazias were immersed, and as regards ghats 1 and 2 considered that there was no objection on the part of the Hindu community until 1929. On this footing he held that :

    The length of time during which the tazias have been immersed in ghats 1 and 2 is such as to suggest that this usage has become the customary law of the place, and that therefore the Mahomedans have a customary right to use these two ghats in that way.

    He rejected the contention that the right claimed was not sufficiently certain and invariable, but agreed that :

    The number of tazias may have increased slightly though this is not clear, and it may be that the same tazias are not always immersed from the same ghats.

    By his decree of 20th October 1937, he modified the injunction granted by the trial Court so as to exclude from its scope ghats 1 and 2, and he declared that the Mahomedans have a customary right to immerse tazias from ghats 1 and 2. From this decree a certificate that the case was fit to be taken on appeal to His Majesty in Council was on 13th April 1939, granted to plaintiffs by a bench of the High Court at Nagpur purporting to act under s. 109 of the Code. This being contrary to S. 111 of the Code, the present appeal was permitted by the Board to stand over to enable the plaintiffs to obtain special leave to appeal, and by Order in Council dated 1st July 1942, such leave was granted. The sole question now before the Board is as to the correctness of the finding that the defendants have shown a customary right in respect of ghats 1 and 2. The appellants complain that the learned Judge of the High Court has transgressed the limits set to his jurisdiction by Ss. 100 and 101 of the Code in that he disregarded the findings of fact arrived at by the lower appellate Court when he treated the user of these two ghats as having begun before 1910 and as having been peaceful and without objection between 1925 and 1929. Their Lordships do not think it necessary or desirable however to decide this case upon grounds which though not unimportant relate to procedure rather than to merits. They are, moreover, prepared to assume-without giving any decision upon the point - that the existence of a custom may in this case be regarded as a question of the proper interpretation of the specific facts proved and thus as a question of law which was open in second appeal.

    The burden lies upon one who sets up a custom in derogation of the ordinary rights of another as the owner of immovable property to give clear and positive proof of the user relied upon to substantiate the custom; and, in the present case, the proof does not extend to any period before 1910. Again, the events of 1925 and of the subsequent years before suit (1925-1929) are almost wholly without force as evidence of customary right, since the interposition of the police authorities and not the acquiescence of the Hindus accounts for what took place at these two ghats as at the others, and protected the Muslims from interference in view of the danger of a breach of the peace. The user which can be of service to the defendants extends as the District Judge found from 1910 to 1925. It may perhaps be said that the history of the matter suggests that had the immersion of tazias been confined, in 1925 and afterwards, to ghats 1 and 2 thereby avoiding all temptation to damage sacred trees, the practice might well have continued without arousing objection. Unfortunately, events did not take that course, and, it has now to be determined whether a practice which cannot be traced back further than 1910 had by 1925 ripened into a customary right or continued long enough to afford proof of such a right. The variation in the tazias or in the number of the tazias which were immersed and the evidence that the user of the tank for this purpose was increasing raises a difficulty about the uniformity of the practice which impressed the District Judge, but their Lordships are not satisfied that the alleged custom could or should be rejected on this ground if it were otherwise established. A clear and useful statement of the law was given in the leading case in ('95) 17 All 87: 1895 AWN 10 on appeal from 16 All 178 : 1894 AWN 12, Kuar Sen v. Mamman by Sir John Edge and Sir Pramada Charan Banerji in a case very close to the present : there as here the District Judge had found against the custom; the right claimed there was of stationing tazias and alums at the time of Muharram; and the user proved extended for a period of about twenty years. The Appellate Bench found against the custom, saying :

    The custom must be proved by reliable evidence of such repeated acts openly done, which have been assented and submitted to, as leads to the conclusion that the usage has by agreement or otherwise become the local law of the place in respect of the persons or things which it concerns.. The statute law of India does not prescribe any period of enjoyment during which, in order to establish a local custom, it must be proved that a right claimed to have been enjoyed as by local custom was enjoyed.

    This exposition of the law of India given by the High Court of Allahabad in 1894 was in substance repeated by the Board in ('41) 28 AIR 1941 PC 21 : 193 IC 436 : ILR (1941) Lah 154 : ILR (1941) Kar PC 22 : 68 IA 1 (PC), Mt. Subhani v. Nawab:

    It will depend upon the circumstances of each case what antiquity must be established before the custom can be accepted. What is necessary to be proved is that the usage has been acted upon in practice for such a long period and with such invariability as to show that it has by common consent been submitted to as the established governing rule of the particular district.

    While these judgments both show that in India a custom need not be immemorial, the requirement of long usage is essential since it is from this that custom derives its force as governing the parties' rights in place of the general law. In this case the tank was not in individual ownership and the use made of it by immersing tazias involved a minimum of interference with the rights of its owners or their enjoyment of its amenities. It took place only once a year and then in connexion with religious ceremonies which though distinctively Islamic and intended to commemorate tragic events in the history of Islam would not fail to attract sympathetic attention on the part of non-Muslims. Ordinarily, there could be little motive for any churlish objection to a harmless and colourful ceremony on which much sentiment is centred. Communal tension or religious bigotry might supply such a motive but though at times it may take but little to bring such forces into play, it would be unwarranted as it would be invidious to postulate them as abiding features of life in Basim from 1910 onwards. It is by no means conclusive against a claim to customary right that the practice should have begun by permission or agreement, but it must be shown to have continued in such circumstances and for such length of time that it has come to be exercised as of right. In their Lordships' view what is proved to have taken place on ghats 1 and 2 annually at the time of Muharram between the years 1910-25 is an insufficient basis for a finding of customary right, and they see no reason to disagree with the findings of the learned District Judge, still less to hold that he was bound in law on the evidence before him to affirm the custom. That the Padmatirtha tank should not be available for the Muharram ceremony is a matter of regret to their Lordships as it will doubtless be to many inhabitants of the locality whose sentiments are entitled to respect. Their Lordships would be glad to think that some arrangement for permissive use might be arrived at in some future year as a matter of good will between Hindus and Muslims. Indeed their Lordships venture to hope that this will be so; but at the moment their only duty is to declare the rights of the parties.

    They will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, the decree of the High Court set aside, and the decree of the trial Court dated 28th March 1933, restored. The orders of the District Judge as to the costs of the trial Court and of the first appeal will stand. The costs incurred by the plaintiffs in the High Court and their costs of this appeal must be paid by the respondents.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Baba Narayan Lakras And Others v. Saboosa And Others
    (Apr 15, 1943)