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  • 1923.12. Section 145(1)
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  • 1923.12. Section 145(1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Proceedings under Section 145 CrPC (M.C. No. 117 of 1967)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners sought quashing of proceedings in M.C. No. 117 of 1967 before the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate (J), Sankari. The respondent filed a petition dated 30‑8‑1966 under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) claiming ownership and possession of certain lands and alleging that the petitioners had encroached upon that possession. The Sub‑Inspector of Police, Sankari, submitted a report to the Court on 7‑10‑1966.

A First Class Magistrate issued a preliminary order under Section 145(1) CrPC and served notices on 10‑4‑1967 — about six months after the police report. The petitioners then filed M.P. 414 of 1967 before the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate praying that proceedings be dropped because the preliminary order did not state that the Magistrate was satisfied as required under Section 145(1). The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate dismissed that application and on 12‑9‑1967 issued a fresh preliminary order calling for written statements from the parties. The present petition challenges the preliminary order made on 12‑9‑1967.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a preliminary order under Section 145(1) CrPC is valid when it does not state the grounds on which the Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists (i.e., whether the requirement to state grounds is mandatory).
  2. Whether a preliminary order that is based on an earlier police report, without any fresh information or enquiry and made long after that report, satisfies the requirement that the Magistrate be satisfied on the date of the preliminary order that a likelihood of breach of the peace exists.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate's second preliminary order (12‑9‑1967) is vitiated because it fails to state the grounds for the Magistrate's satisfaction as required by Section 145(1) CrPC; that requirement is mandatory.
  • The preliminary order relied upon a police report dated 7‑10‑1966, nearly one year before the order was passed, and there is nothing in the order to show the Magistrate was satisfied that the likelihood of breach of the peace existed on the date of the preliminary order.

Respondent's Argument (as described in the opinion)

  • The respondent's counsel relied upon the decision in Kamal Kutti v. U. Raja Valia Raja (23 Mad LJ 499) to support the validity of the preliminary order despite omission to record grounds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nagammal v. Mani, 1966 Mad LW Crl 101 Held that where a preliminary order is drawn merely on police information, the Magistrate must be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace exists and must state the grounds of that satisfaction (i.e., must show application of judicial mind). The Court agreed with this view and treated it as authority for the mandatory character of stating grounds in the preliminary order; the opinion cites and follows Nagammal.
Khudiram Mandal v. Jitendranath, AIR 1952 Cal 713 Where the preliminary order under Section 145(4) CrPC does not state grounds of satisfaction, the order is defective and, if challenged in proper time (about when written statements are required or when evidence is led), it can be corrected or set aside. The Court noted this decision supports quashing a preliminary order if objection is taken at the earliest stage; it treats such omission as a defect that can justify setting aside the preliminary order when timely challenged.
China Kondappa v. Ram Row, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 168 (1964‑1 Andh WR 24) If there is no preliminary order at all, subsequent proceedings culminating in a final order are vitiated; if there is a preliminary order, however defective, the defect is not fatal unless it resulted in prejudice. The Court distinguished this decision as dealing with final orders and noted it does not control the present case where an objection was taken at the earliest stage; the Court relied on its distinction to justify quashing the defective preliminary order.
Kamal Kutti v. U. Raja Valia Raja, 23 Mad LJ 499 Held that omission to record grounds in the preliminary order is not a defect of jurisdiction; the decision proceeded on the footing that revision did not lie against the Section 145 order at that time. The Court observed that this decision was rendered before an amendment (the omission of Section 435(3) in 1923) and that it is no longer good law; the respondent's reliance on it was therefore rejected or distinguished.
Anandilal v. Sukhchand, AIR 1930 Cal 715 It is necessary for the Magistrate, at the time of drawing up the proceedings, to be satisfied that a likelihood of breach of the peace then exists; an order made months after the report on which it purports to be based cannot be supported. The Court respectfully agreed with this Division Bench view and relied on it to conclude that a preliminary order made long after the police report, without further information, is unsustainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out and interpreting Section 145(1) CrPC, which requires that when a Magistrate is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists, he "shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied" and require the parties to attend and file written statements. From the language of the provision the Court concluded that both the requirement to make the order in writing and the requirement to state the grounds of satisfaction are mandatory.

The Court explained the rationale for requiring stated grounds: without a statement of grounds in the order itself, it is difficult to test the correctness of the Magistrate's conclusion or to determine whether the Magistrate applied his mind. Thus the preliminary order must clearly show the reasons and grounds on which the Magistrate relied.

The Court surveyed and applied authorities:

  • It endorsed Nagammal v. Mani for the proposition that the Magistrate must apply judicial mind and state grounds rather than act merely on a police report.
  • It relied on Khudiram Mandal to the extent that omission to state grounds makes the preliminary order defective and, if objected to at an early stage, can be quashed or set aside.
  • It distinguished China Kondappa as addressing a situation where final orders were passed; that decision indicates defects may be non‑fatal unless prejudicial, but it does not control cases in which the defect is objected to before final orders.
  • It stated that Kamal Kutti is no longer good law after a statutory amendment and therefore cannot sustain the respondent's position.
  • It relied on Anandilal v. Sukhchand to reaffirm that the Magistrate must be satisfied at the date of making the preliminary order; an order based on an earlier police report months old, without fresh information or inquiry, cannot stand.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court examined the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate's preliminary order of 12‑9‑1967. That order:

  • recited that information had been laid before the Revenue Divisional Officer by the Sub‑Inspector of Police on 7‑10‑1966;
  • stated the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate was "satisfied" that a prima facie dispute likely to cause breach of the peace existed; but
  • did not state the grounds on which the Magistrate was so satisfied, did not say that the Magistrate had perused the police report, and did not indicate any fresh information or enquiry subsequent to the police report that would justify satisfaction on 12‑9‑1967.
The Court emphasized that the preliminary order was made nearly one year after the police report and that the Magistrate had not called for or relied upon any fresh report or information. On these grounds, and in light of the authorities, the Court concluded the preliminary order was defective and unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court quashed the preliminary order passed by the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate on 12‑9‑1967 and allowed the petition.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The immediate effect is that the preliminary order in M.C. No. 117 of 1967 is set aside and the petitioners' challenge succeeds.
  • The Court observed that the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, if he so chooses, may go into the matter afresh and, after making enquiries, if he is satisfied that a likelihood of breach of the peace then exists with respect to the dispute over the land, he may take appropriate proceedings under Section 145 CrPC.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond application and clarification of existing authorities: it enforces the mandatory requirements of Section 145(1) CrPC and applies previously stated principles to the facts before it.

RSK/D.V.C

Disposition stated in the opinion: "Petition allowed."

    Peria Mannadha Goundar And Others v. Marappa Goundar .

    1. The petitioners have filed this petition for quashing the proceedings in M.C No. 117 of 1967 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (J) Sankari for the reasons mentioned in the affidavit filed by one of the petitioners. The facts which arise on this application are these:

    The respondent moved the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ex. Officio, Sankari, by a petition dated 30-8-1966 under Section 145 of the Cr PC claiming that certain properties described in the petition belonged to him, that he was in possession of the lands and that the petitioners herein encroached upon his possession.

    2. In pursuance of the said petition, the learned Magistrate called for a report from the police and the Sub-Inspector of Police, Sankari, submitted a report on 7-10-1966.

    3. The learned First Class Magistrate, Sankari, passed a preliminary order under Section 145(1) of the Cr PC and issued notice to both the petitioners and the respondent on 10-4-1967, six months after the report was placed before the Court by the police regarding the likelihood of breach of the peace. Thereupon, the petitioners filed a petition before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sankari (to whose Court the matter has been transferred) in M.P 414 of 1967, praying that the proceedings may be dropped in View of the fact that the learned Magistrate who issued a preliminary order under Section 145(1) of the Cr PC had not stated that he was satisfied regarding the likelihood of breach of the peace. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate dismissed the application filed by the petitioners and issued a fresh preliminary order on 12-9-1967 calling upon both the parties to put in written statement of their respective claims. It is against this order, this petition has been filed.

    4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the second preliminary order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sankari, is vitiated as he has not stated the grounds for his satisfaction as required under Section 145(1) of the Cr PC and that the said provision is mandatory and further contended that the preliminary order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 12-9-1967, on the report submitted by the police to the Ex. Officio First Class Magistrate, Sankari was nearly about one year before the order was passed and that it cannot be raid from the order that the learned Magistrate was satisfied that breach of the peace existed on the date of passing of the preliminary order.

    5. To appreciate both the points raised by the learned counsel, it may be necessary to refer to Section 145(1) of the Cr PC which is as follows:—

    “Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, within a time to be fixed by such Magistrate, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute and further requiring them to put in such documents or to adduce, by putting in affidavits, the evidence of such persons, as they rely upon in support of such claims.”

    6. It is, therefore, necessary under Section 145(1) of the Cr PC, that the Magistrate having jurisdiction shall make an order in writing that he is satisfied either from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists and state the grounds of his satisfaction before requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court and put in written statements. This provision of making the order in writing and stating the grounds of his satisfaction appears to be mandatory. The words “shall make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being so satisfied” would clearly indicate that the order must be in writing and the grounds for satisfaction also must be stated. Unless the grounds are stated in the order itself, it will be difficult to test the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Magistrate. So, the preliminary order should state clearly the reasons and grounds on which the satisfaction is based and that the Magistrate had applied his mind in passing the preliminary order.

    7. In Nagammal v. Mani, 1966 Mad LW Crl 101, Anantanarayanan Offg. C.J as he then was, held that where the preliminary order was drawn by the Magistrate merely on the information laid by the Inspector of Police about the dispute, he must be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace exists; and it is mandatory that he should state ‘the grounds of his being so satisfied’ or language to similar effect must be employed to indicate that the Magistrate had applied his judicial mind to the information in coming to the conclusion that he should take action under Section 145(1) of the Cr PC The learned Judge further; observed that Magistrate should not take action merely on a police report. With respect, I agree with the view expressed in this decision.

    8. In Khudiram Mandal v. Jitendranath, AIR 1952 Cal 713, a Division Bench held as follows:—

    “Where the preliminary order under Section 145(4) of the Cr PC does not state the grounds of satisfaction as to the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace the order is undoubtedly a defective order and if challenged in proper time, i.e about the time when written statements are required to be filed or evidence led, it will be corrected or set aside.”

    9. This decision takes the view that the validity of the final order under Section 145 of the Cr PC could not be set aside because of omission to state the grounds in the preliminary order as such omission will be only an irregularity. But from this decision, it is clear that if an objection is taken as in the instant case, at the earliest point of time, the preliminary order can be quashed.

    10. In China Kondappa v. Ram Row, 1964-1 Andh WR 24 : (AIR 1964 Andh Pra 168) the question that arose for consideration was whether the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in passing the final order under Section 145 of the Cr PC even though there was no preliminary order passed under Section 145(1) of the Cr PC It was held that it was well settled that if there was no preliminary order made at all, the subsequent proceedings culminating in the final order are vitiated and that on the other hand, if there is a preliminary order, however defective it may be, the defect would not be fatal unless it has resulted in prejudice. As observed already, this decision deals with a case where the final orders under Section 145 of the Cr PC were passed. That was not a case where the objection was taken at the earliest stage, before the final orders were passed.

    11. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon a decision in Kamal Kutti v. U. Raja Valia Raja, 23 Mad LJ 499. It was held in that decision that an omission to record grounds in the preliminary order is not a defect of jurisdiction. That decision mainly proceeds on the footing that the revision itself did not lie against the order passed under Section 145 of the Cr PC The decision was rendered before the amendment of Section 145, Cl. (3), when revision would not lie against the order under Section 145 of the Cr PC Further, the petition in that case was filed to quash the preliminary order, after the final orders under Section 145(4) of the Cr PC were passed. This decision is no longer good law after the amendment of Section 435(3) of the Cr PC by its omission in 1923.

    12. Section 145(1) of the Cr PC makes it also clear that the Magistrate passing a preliminary order must be satisfied that the likelihood of the breach of the peace exists on the date of the preliminary order. If the preliminary order is based upon an earlier report, long before the preliminary order was passed and without any further fresh information received in respect of the dispute, it cannot be said that the Magistrate is satisfied that the likelihood of the breach of peace existed on the date of the preliminary order.

    13. The preliminary order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is as follows:—

    “Whereas information has been laid before the Revenue Divisional Officer by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Sankari, that a dispute likely to cause imminent breach of peace exists concerning the land in S. Nos. 186/5, 186/11, 186/12 and 186/14, of Chinnagoundanur village, Sankari taluk, which is owned by the A party within the local limits of this Court's jurisdiction by reason of both A and B parties claiming the ownership of the lands; I Sri T. Balakrishnan B.A.B.L, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sankari after satisfying myself that there exists prima facie dispute regarding immoveable properties between the parties which is likely to cause breach of the peace do hereby require you both A and B parties under Section 145(1) of the Cr PC to attend my Court in person on…9-1967 at 11 a.m and put in written statement of your respective claims as respects the actual right of ownership and of the land in question.”

    This order shows that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate relied upon the report submitted by the Inspector of Police before the Revenue Divisional Officer for satisfying that a breach of the peace existed on the date of passing the preliminary order. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate himself did not call for a report from the police at the time of passing the order though he found that the preliminary order passed by the Ex. Officio First Class Magistrate was defective. He again had fallen into an error, in perusing the report submitted by the police officer on 7-10-1966. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate has not even stated that he perused the report and was satisfied with the existence of breach of peace. It is significant to note that the preliminary order by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was passed on 12-9-1967, nearly about one year after the police report was submitted. The preliminary order does not say that he had any further information subsequent to the report submitted by the police that the likelihood of a breach of peace continued and on the date of the preliminary order the dispute existed. A preliminary order passed long after the information the Magistrate had in respect of the breach of the peace cannot be sustained unless the Magistrate was satisfied from any further information or enquiry that a breach of the peace existed on the date of the preliminary order.

    14. In Anandilal v. Sukhchand, AIR 1930 Cal 715, a Division Bench held that it was necessary for making an order under Section 145 that the Magistrate should be satisfied at the time of drawing up the proceedings that there is then existing a likelihood of breach of the peace arising from the disputes between the parties with regard to the land in question. The making of an order, therefore, some months after the report on which it was purported to be passed, cannot be supported. In that case, the report by the police in respect of the breach of the peace was made on 18-1-1926. The preliminary order was passed in July 1926 about six months later. I respectfully, agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench.

    15. The result is that the preliminary order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has to be quashed and accordingly it is quashed. The petition is allowed.

    16. If necessary, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate can go into the matter again and after enquiry, if he is satisfied that a likelihood of the breach of the peace exists in respect of the dispute over the land, he can take appropriate proceedings.

    RSK/D.V.C

    17. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Peria Mannadha Goundar And Others v. Marappa Goundar .
    (Mar 15, 1968)