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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the original defendants against the decree in Special Civil Suit No. 70 of 1974 entered by the Civil Judge (S.D.), Rajkot. By that decree the trial court directed the defendants to deposit Rs. 2,76,309.97 with the court by specified dates together with interest: 12% per annum from the date of the suit until the date of the decree and 6% per annum on the decretal amount from 31-12-1975 (date of judgment) until 31-6-1976 or any earlier date of deposit. The decree provided that on failure to pay, the mortgaged property would be sold and proceeds applied to the debt; plaintiffs were also declared entitled to interest at 6% per annum until realisation and were awarded costs.

The plaintiffs had sued to realise dues by sale of mortgaged property. The mortgage deed (Exhibit 24) dated 17-6-1969 secured a loan of Rs. 1,50,000. The contract provided for interest/rent at 12% per annum, payable every three months, and specifically provided that unpaid rent/interest would be added to principal and attract interest at 12% thereafter. On the date of suit the plaintiffs claimed Rs. 2,76,309.97. The mortgage was executed by the now deceased Ramniklal Sunderji; the suit was thus against his heirs and legal representatives.

There were twelve defendants. Defendants Nos. 9–12 were minors (aged 17, 16, 12 and 12 at institution). Summons for the minors were served on their mother (defendant No. 1), who engaged counsel and filed a written statement (Exhibit 16) dated 21-7-75 on behalf of herself and the minors. No formal application for appointment of a guardian ad‑litem was made.

The written statement admitted the mortgage and the contractual interest (Rs. 1,500 per month) but disputed the computation of total liability; the defendants claimed the liability on suit date did not exceed Rs. 2,38,500 after credit for the first month's interest. The trial court framed two issues: (i) To what interest plaintiffs are entitled; and (ii) What order and decree should be passed. The trial judge accepted the plaintiffs' claims and entered decree as described above. The defendants appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree is vitiated as against the minor defendants (Nos. 9–12) for failure to appoint a guardian ad‑litem.
  2. Whether, in a suit for sale of mortgaged property, a preliminary decree under Order 34, Rule 4 (Form 5, Appendix D) was mandatorily required and whether the trial court's decree, though termed final, is valid.
  3. Whether compound interest (interest on interest) could be awarded where the mortgage contract expressly provided for addition of unpaid interest to the principal and charging interest thereafter.
  4. Whether the plaintiffs were required to give oral evidence to prove the amounts claimed when the basic contract and facts were admitted.
  5. Whether a reported deposit of Rs. 25,000 in court by defendants should be credited and, if so, whether it should be applied to principal or interest.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • No guardian ad‑litem was formally appointed for the minor defendants; hence the decree is a nullity as to those minors.
  • The decree should have been preliminary under Order 34, Rule 4 (Form 5); a final decree was inappropriate and void where the preliminary-step formalities were not followed.
  • Compound interest (i.e., interest on interest) should not have been awarded despite the contractual clause.
  • The plaintiff should have been required to give evidence to prove the amounts claimed rather than the court accepting calculations without oral proof.
  • Interest should have been calculated by reference to the Gregorian calendar rather than the Hindu calendar.
  • Taxes were wrongly claimed by the plaintiffs (allegation raised).
  • An asserted deposit of Rs. 25,000 in court should be deducted from the decretal amount and treated as payment towards principal (as urged by Mr. Gandhi).

Respondents' Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The mortgage and the contractual rate of interest were admitted in the written statement; only computation was in dispute.
  • The minors' interests were represented by their mother, who engaged counsel and filed a written statement on their behalf.
  • Where the contract specifically provided that unpaid interest is added to principal and carries interest thereafter, compound interest follows the contract and is recoverable.
  • There was either no proper intimation of any deposit made in court to the plaintiffs or no sufficient documentary proof; during hearing a defendants' counsel was said to have deposited Rs. 25,000 “at the fag‑end” and the respondents' counsel (Mr. Mehta) volunteered that Rs. 25,000 be deducted from the total amount towards arrears of interest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rangammal v. Minor Appasami, AIR 1973 Madras 12 Where the natural guardian has adequately represented the minor and participated in proceedings, failure to make a formal order of appointment of guardian ad‑litem does not vitiate the decree. The court agreed with this principle and applied it to hold that the minors were substantially represented by their mother and counsel, no prejudice resulted, and therefore the decree was not vitiated for want of a formal guardian ad‑litem appointment.
Brij Kishore Lal v. Satnarain Lal, AIR 1954 Allahabad 599 Formalities for appointment of guardian may be overlooked; if the guardian agreed to act and has done something in the suit showing acceptance, mere lack of formal order will not vitiate proceedings provided no prejudice to the minor. The court relied on this authority to reinforce that the mother's active participation and engagement of counsel amounted to substantial representation of the minors, negating any claim of prejudice.
Ram Chandra Arya v. Man Singh, AIR 1968 SC 954 Decree against a lunatic without appointment of a guardian is a nullity and sale under it may be void ab initio (case involving a lunatic defendant). The court distinguished that case: the present defendants were minors represented by their natural guardian (mother), unlike the lunatic defendant in Ram Chandra Arya, so that authority did not compel invalidation of the decree here.
Dhami Navnitbhai v. Bhagvanlal Chhaganlal, 19 GLR 420 Illustrates that a decree may be preliminary even if termed final where further proceedings (e.g., sale in execution) remain necessary; Section 2 CPC defines when a decree is preliminary. The court used this precedent to support treating the trial court's order as, for practical purposes, a preliminary decree (time given to pay, and further steps such as sale would follow if payment not made).
Ramji Bapuji Patel v. Pandharinath Ravaji, AIR 1918 Bombay 1 Addressed whether a decree nisi in a suit for redemption operates as an absolute decree and the consequences for subsequent redemption actions (Full Bench issue). The court held the citation was inapposite to the present question and that the point before that Full Bench was different from the issues in this appeal.
Patel Narharilal Kuberdas v. Firm Bogilal Amratlal, AIR 1963 Gujarat 253 Referenced for the proposition that in suits to recover amounts by sale of charged property a preliminary decree is necessary (as cited by the parties). The court noted the authority but observed that, in substance, the decree before it operated as a preliminary decree and thus was consistent with the general principle.
Suresh Chandra v. United Bank of India, AIR 1961 Calcutta 534 Holds that a final decree should be passed after hearing both sides and not ex parte (as referenced in argument). The court remarked that the Calcutta judgment's point was limited to the necessity of hearing both sides before a final decree; it did not alter the court's conclusion that the challenged decree was effectively preliminary.
AIR 1954 Nagpur 135 Principle cited in the course of argument (specific rule or proposition not elaborated in the opinion). The judgment was referenced among others; the opinion does not specify the precise principle taken from this authority beyond its citation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the arguments in a structured manner and applied legal principles to the facts as follows:

  1. Guardian ad‑litem for minors: The court accepted that no formal application or order appointing the mother as guardian ad‑litem had been made. However, relying on precedents (Rangammal and Brij Kishore Lal), it concluded that the defect was formal and technical only because the natural guardian had actively represented the minors (engaged counsel, filed the written statement on their behalf) and there was no conceivable prejudice to them. Two of the minors had become major by the time judgment was delivered. The court distinguished Ram Chandra Arya (which involved a lunatic) and held that the circumstances here did not render the decree void.
  2. Preliminary vs. final decree under Order 34, Rule 4: Appellants argued a preliminary decree was mandatory. The court examined the operative terms of the judgment and Form 5 (Appendix D, CPC) and found that although the trial judge called the decree final, substantively it operated as a preliminary decree: the court fixed the amount due, no accounting or commissioner's appointment was necessary (property was always in mortgagors' possession and there were no disputed accounts), and the judgment gave defendants six months to pay (with possibility of extension). The court relied on Dhami Navnitbhai to show that a decree may be preliminary for practical purposes even if labeled final. The court therefore rejected the appellants' contention that the decree was void for not following the preliminary decree formality.
  3. Compound interest: The court found that the contract expressly provided that unpaid interest would be added to the principal and attract interest thereafter. Given this contractual stipulation and the background (mortgagor remained in possession and derived rents), the court saw no reason to deny compound interest and endorsed the trial judge's reasoning permitting it.
  4. Evidence and calculation: Because the mortgage instrument and the basic facts were admitted in pleadings and only arithmetic remained in dispute, the court held that oral evidence from the plaintiff was not necessary. The court had the accounts written out and confirmed that the claimed amount tallied precisely.
  5. Calendar for interest calculation: The contract specified calculation according to the Hindu calendar. The court rejected the appellants' contention that interest had to be computed using the Gregorian calendar, noting there is no statutory rule (unlike a provision in the Bombay Rent Act) precluding the parties from contracting for computation by the Hindu calendar.
  6. Alleged taxes: The court observed that taxes were not claimed by plaintiffs; therefore the argument had no relevance.
  7. Deposit of Rs. 25,000: The court found no documentary evidence that a formal intimation of deposit had been given to the plaintiffs; remarks during the hearing that defendants had deposited Rs. 25,000 were described as coming "from other sources." Respondents' counsel conceded the amount had been deposited late and volunteered that Rs. 25,000 be deducted from the decretal amount towards arrears of interest. The court accepted a deduction for Rs. 25,000 towards arrears of interest and explained that because interest had been added to principal, characterization as principal or interest was immaterial.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and practical implications (as stated or directly implied in the opinion):

  • The trial court's decree (ordering deposit of Rs. 2,76,309.97 with specified interest and providing for sale on non‑payment) stands, subject to the minor amendment that Rs. 25,000 is to be deducted towards arrears of interest as acknowledged during the hearing.
  • The appellants (defendants) were ordered to pay the costs of the plaintiffs; the appeal was dismissed save for the minor amendment mentioned.
  • The court treated the operative decree as, for practical purposes, a preliminary decree (i.e., further execution steps, including sale, could follow if payment was not made), and it remained open to the defendants to seek an extension of time under Section 148 CPC or otherwise apply to the executing court for appropriate relief (for example, seeking sale of a part of the property if that would suffice to satisfy the claim).
  • The absence of a formal guardian ad‑litem appointment did not vitiate the decree because the minors had been substantially represented and no prejudice was shown.

The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle; it applied and relied upon existing authorities to resolve the contested points and disposed of the appeal on the facts and law as applied above.

    Lilaben Ramniklal And Others v. Vithaldas Tulsidas And Others

    Bhatt, J.:— This is an appeal preferred by the original defendants of the Special Civil Suit No. 70 of 1974 decreed against them by the learned Civil Judge (S.D) Rajkot, who by his judgment and decree directed these appellants-defendants to deposit with the court on or before 30-6-75 Rs. 2,76,309.97 along with interest on this amount at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the suit till the date of the decree and interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the decretal amount from 31-12-1975 (the date of the judgment) till 31-6-1976 or any prior date of the deposit, if any. The learned Judge further ordered that if the defendants failed to deposit money as ordered, the mortgaged property would be sold and the proceeds would be applied towards the payment of the debt, as said above. The learned Judge also stated that the plaintiffs were entitled to interest at 6% per annum till the date of realisation of the money subsequent to the above dates. The defendants were also saddled with the costs of the suit of the plaintiff.

    2. The plaintiffs had filed the aforesaid suit to recover the aforesaid amount by the sale of the mortgaged properly. The mortgage deed is to be found at Exhibit 24 and it is dated 17-6-1969 securing loan of Rs. 1,50,000/-. As per the terms of the agreement, rent was to be paid at the rate of 12% per annum every three months because the mortgagors were entitled to receive rent from the tenants occupying various parcels of this mortgage property and, therefore, it was, provided that if the defendants failed to make such payments of rent every three months, the said rent due was liable to be added to the principal amount and interest at the rate of 12% per annum on that amount was to be calculated onwards. Thus, on the date of the suit, the total amount of Rs. 2,76,309.97 was claimed to be due along with the initial principal amount of Rs. 1,50,000/-. The mortgage was executed by deceased Ramniklal Sunderji who had died after that transaction and so the suit was filed against his heirs and legal representatives. Out of 12 defendants, the defendants Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12 were stated to be minors, being aged 17, 16, 12 and 12 respectively. The summons for the minor defendants had come to be served on the natural guardian, that is, their mother, the defendant No. 1. She had engaged a lawyer specifically and expressly for herself and the minors also and she had filed the written statement, Exhibit 16, also for herself and on behalf of her children referred to above. The written statement, Exhibit 16, is dated 21-7-75 whereas the suit had come to be, filed on 1-8-74. Curiously enough, there was no specific application for getting the mother appointed as the guardian adlitem for those minors. At least some of them, i.e the defendants Nos. 9 and 10 would have become major very shortly after the institution of the suit, as they were aged 17 and 16 on the day the suit had come to be filed. The suit went on. In the written statement, Exhibit 16, filed by all the defendants, including the mother acting for and on behalf of the above-mentioned minor defendants, the mortgage transaction was specifically admitted in paragraph 4 nor was it disputed that the plaintiffs were entitled to claim interest at the rate of 1% per month, making the monthly liability by way of interest at Rs. 1,500/-. All that they contended was that their liability on the date of the suit could not exceed Rs. 2,38,500/- after giving credit for payment of the first month's interest after the execution of the mortgage deed. So, the only question was the matter of calculation of interest and whether interest on the amount of interest due could be claimed or not. The learned trial judge raised only two issues because of the above said state of pleadings. The issues were—

    (i) To what interest plaintiffs are Entitled to?

    (ii) What order and decree should be passed?

    3. The learned judge ultimately upheld the plaintiffs' contentions and decreed the suit. We, however, quote certain findings of his, in order to highlight some of the controversies that were raised before us:

    “Only contest between them was in relation to interest, which the plaintiffs can legally recover and even though the defendants had filed Application under Section 30 of the Bombay Moneylenders Act, the plaintiffs have rushed to the court and so no costs of the suit should be awarded. This argument could have been available if the defendants had deposited the amount of the debt in the court, but the learned advocate Shri N.B Dave has submitted that no amount is deposited in court under intimation to the plaintiffs and on condition that the plaintiffs may withdraw the same. There is no evidence that the plaintiffs deposited the debt in the court under intimation to the plaintiffs. The learned advocate Mr. N.B Dave stated that he learnt from other sources that the defendants had deposited Rs. 25,000/- but that is only a small fraction of the debt due to the plaintiffs. Moreover, no intimation is given to the plaintiffs that they can withtraw the amount deposited even as per the written statement interest of Rs. 90,000/- is in arrears. Defendants have neither deposited principal nor interest. So, there is no justifiable cause why the plaintiffs should be deprived of their costs. The learned advocate Shri C.H Bhimani stated that the interests of minors were concerned. The defendants Nos. 9 to 12 are minors but at the same time, it is to be noted that in violation of the terms of the contract, the mortgaged premises are leased by the defendants and the rent is taken by them and the interest is not paid to the plaintiffs. In these circumstances, I have allowed costs to the plaintiffs.”

    4. Mr. Gandhi, the learned counsel appearing for appellants, raised before us many contentions, the foremost of which was that the decree was a nullity against the defendants Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12 because no guardian ad-litem was appointed for them. We propose to take up this contention first. As a matter of fact, it is to be accepted that no application for appointment of a guardian for those minors-defendants was made and there was no such appointment order made. The question, however, is whether because of this want of formality of appointing the mother, the natural guardian, as a guardian ad-litem, the decree stands vitiated or not. We find that, this is, in the facts and circumstances of the case, a sheer formal or technical lacuna, which does not vitiate the solemn judgment and the decree. In the case of Rangammal v. Minor Appasami AIR 1973 Madras 12, the learned judge of that court, relying upon some earlier judgments, clearly held that if the minor's interests had been adequately safeguarded in the suit by the natural guardian of the minor by representing him and taking part in the proceedings in the court, the mere fact that formal order was not passed will not vitiate the decree because there has been a substantial representation of the minor in the suit. We are in full agreement with the view expressed by the Madras High Court in this connection Similar is the view of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Luknow Bench) in the case of Brij Kishore Lal v. Satnarain Lal, AIR 1954 Allahabad 599. The learned Judges clearly lay down that “if some formalities for the appointment of a guardian have not been observed, but if the guardian has agreed to act as guardian and has done something in the suit to show that he accepted his appointment as a guardian, the mere fact that some formalities were overlooked or not observed, or there was no formal order of appointment would not vitiate the proceedings or would not affeect the result of the suit provided there has been no prejudice to the minor.” In the case on hand, there was a registered document deed executed by the predecessor-in-title of these minors. The mother had engaged an Advocate not only for herself, but specifically for her minor children also. She had filed the written statement also even on their behalf. The mortgage being a registered one and executed by the deceased's predecessor-in-title, there was not anything that could be challenged by the minors. So, we, find that no prejudice whatsoever could have been conceivably caused to the minors, at any rate two of whom had become major by the time the judgment came to be delivered by the learned Judge on 31-12-1975, We say no prejudice has been caused because even before us, there was no controversy about the mortgage liability and non-payment of any interest, except the first month's interest of Rs. 1500/-. We, therefore, (which payment is acknowledged) do not see any strength in this argument. Mr. Gandhi, however, had placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chandra Arya v. Man Singh, AIR 1968 SC 954. It was a case against a lunatic without appointment of a guardian and the court held that the decree was a nullity and sale held in execution of that decree was void ab initio. In that case, the sole judgment-debtor Ram Lal was sued and proceeded against. Thereafter there came to be filed a suit No. 552 of 1946 and the suit was contested on the ground that Ram Lal was a lunatic and the earlier suit (in which the decree had come to be passed) namely, suit No. 354 of 1939 had been instituted against Ramlal without appointment of a guardian ad-littm. In the case on hand, the suit is not only against minors. The minors were represented by their mother, who was their natural guardian. From the very nature of things, the mother, who was one of the heirs of deceased Ramniklal, could not conceivably have any conflicting interest with those of four minors. There was no scope for any other contention to be advanced. It is perhaps because of this that despite the knowledge that four minors were there, this point was not urged before the learned trial judge. It is only the belatedly developed ingenuity that has brought about this point before us.

    5. The second contention that was vigorously put forward by Mr. Gandhi before us, was that this being a suit for sale for the purpose of realising the mortgage dues, a preliminary decree under Order 34, Rule 4 was mandatorily required to be passed and that having been not done, the forthwith passed final decree was contrary to the provisions of law and, therefore, void. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the decree, that has been passed by the learned judge, though specifically stated to be a final decree and not a preliminary decree, for all practical purposes is a preliminary decree. The first reason that prompts us to say so is that the learned trial judge has arrived at the amount, which will be there at the foot of the accounts. This is a case where no accounts were required to be taken. The property was throughout in possession of the mortgagor's heirs, who enjoyed the usufruct all throughout. Barring payment of interest of Rs. 1500/- for the first month after the mortgage, nothing was admittedly paid. So, there is no question of taking any accounts. The form 5 of Appendix D appended to the Civil Procedure Code is the form for the preliminary decree for sale. Clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) deal with the question of accounts. No question of accounting whatsoever had arisen in this case. So that part was redundant and, therefore, appointment of a Commissioner also was absolutely uncalled for. Paragrath 4 of said Form 5 deals with the court's order and direction that the defendant do pay into the court on or before a specified day or any later date upto which time for payment may be extended by the court together with costs awarded to the plaintiff and that on such payment, the property could be put to auction, sale. The operative part of the order of the learned judge in his judgment complies with this requirement. The words of para 11 of the judgment read as follows:

    “The defendants shall deposit in the court on or before 31st June, 1976, (i.e after six months from the date of the decree) Rs. 2,76,309.97 along with interest on this amount at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the suit to the date of the decree….”

    6. This means that six months time is given. If for some reasons the defendants so required, they could apply for extension of time. The learned judge has not prohibited them from doing so. We, on our part, fail to see any justification on the part of these defendants, who had not paid interest except for the initial month, to ask for such an extension, but even if any conceivable ground could be found out by these debtors, there was nothing to prevent them from doing so. As a matter of fact, right from the time the judgment had come to be pronounced on 31-12-1975 till we deliver this judgment today, i.e on 27-4-1984, i.e about a little less than nine years' period, the defendants have been enjoying the usufruct all throughout without caring to pay anything to the judgment creditors. Still, however, if they can evolve and find out some rational grounds for seeking time for making the payment hereafter, they can certainly do so under Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code, or in view of what we have interpreted of the final order in the judgment. We reiterate that there is no prohibition against seeking time and so the decree in question for all practical purposes is a preliminary decree. Mr. Gandhi, however, urged that had the preliminary decree been passed, they could have urged the learned judge of the executing court or the learned judge himself at the time of passing of the final decree that not the whole property, but a part of it should be put to sale on the ground that sale of that part would be sufficient to bring the consideration, which would meet the liabilities of the mortgage debts. It is open to the appellants-defendants to request the learned judge to so apply and if they succeed in this prolonged litigation to show that there is a remote justification for such a prayer on their part, the learned judge would certainly consider the same.

    7. Whether a decree could be treated as a preliminary decree inspite of what is stated in the body of the judgment is answered by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Dhami Navnitbhai v. Bhagvanlal Chhaganlal, 19 GLR 420. In paragraph 12, the ratio of the judgment in that connection could be found as follows:

    “The suit indisputably in this case was one for sale of mortgaged property for recovering the amount payable under the mortgage and also for passing personal decree if the sale proceeds are insufficient to satisfy the amount, due to the mortgagee. The suit ended in a consent decree. Controversy is whether it is a preliminary decree or final decree or partly preliminary and partly final decree. Section 2 of the Code defines ‘decree’ to mean the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. Explanation annexed to the definition provides that a decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It further provides that decree may be partly preliminary and partly final. The suit ended in a consent decree on 19-11-1962. This is a decree in a suit brought by a mortgagee for sale of mortgaged property. By the decree the mortgagors were required to pay Rs. 18,000/- within six months with running interest at 6% per annum, further providing that if the mortgagors fail to pay amount within the time prescribed by the court, the mortgagee would be entitled first to bring the mortgaged property to court auction and recover the amount from the sale proceeds and if the sale proceeds are found to be insufficient to satisfy the decretal debt, the balance may be recovered from person and other property of the mortgagors. To the extent that mortgagors were given time to pay Rs. 18,000/- within six months this decree is indisputably a preliminary decree, because if the mortgagors failed to pay the amount within such extended time, as the court may grant, the plaintiff mortgagee will have to take further steps, namely, to seek the final decree for bringing the property to court sale. To this extent, the decree is a preliminary decree.”

    (Emphasis supplied.)

    8. Mr. Gandhi, however, in this connection placed reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ramji Bapuji Patel v. Pandharinath Ravaji, AIR 1918 Bombay 1. To us, it appears that the whole reference to that judgment is wide the mark. The point that was there before the Court was whether a decree nisi in suit for redemption operates as an absolute decree or operates as an absolute order, and if it operated as former, a subsequent suit for redemption would not lie. That was exactly the question before the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court. The Full Bench held that “a mortgagor, who has brought a suit for redemption and obtained a decree nisi, which neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee has applied to be made absolute, can, after the execution of that decree is time barred, being a fresh suit for redemption”. We do not find any relevance of this citation with the point on hand. Mr. Gandhi had also invited our attention to the judgment of this Court in the case of Patel Narharilal Kuberdas v. Firm Bogilal Amratlal, AIR 1963 Gujarat 253, the case of Suresk chandra v. United Bank of India, AIR 1961 Calcutta 534 and also the judgment of the Nagpur High Court reported at AIR 1954 Nagpur 135. The Calcutta judgment lays down only this much that a final decree is to be passed after hearing both the sides and not ex-parte for the reasons stated therein. The judgment of the Gujarat High Court mentions that in a suit to recover certain amount by sale of the property charged in a suit, the preliminary decree is necessary. We have stated that for all practical purposes, the decree in question is a preliminary decree, though the learned Judge has called it a final decree. We have already explained above how it is a preliminary decree.

    9. It was then alleged by Mr. Gandhi that compound interest could not be given. When there is a specific contract reached for good reasons, we see no reason why the compound interest be not ordered to be given. The original mortgagee had advanced a substantial amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- as back as in the year 1969. The mortgagor continued to remain in possession of the property and was entitled to recover rent from various tenants. It is because of this that he had agreed that every month he would go on paying Rs. 1,500/- by way of interest and it is specifically stipulated between the parties that if the mortgagor failed to pay the interest, as was agreed upon, it will be treated as the amount added to the principal. The learned trial judge has assigned good reasons while rejecting this contention and without burdening this judgment with the same observations, we say that we endorse the reasoning in that connection.

    10. Mr. Gandhi then insisted that the plaintiff was required to step into the witness box to prove the amounts. When the basic facts were admitted., when the basic contract was admitted and when there was no contention about any payment having been made except the initial payment of interest for the first month after mortgage, it was a matter of sheer calculation and we find that no evidence on that score was necessary. Still, to satisfy ourselves, we had got that account written and we find that the amount claimed tallies even to a paisa. It was, however, urged that interest should have been calculated according to the Gregorian calendar and not according to the Hindu calendar. The contract is specifically providing for paying the interest according to the Hindu calendar. Unlike the provision in the Bombay Rent Act, where the rent is to be calculated according to the Gregorian calendar irrespective of the contra rt to the contrary, there is no such provision in any law under which we can say that there is a legal prohibition against calculating the interest on the basis of the Hindu calendar.

    11. It was then alleged that taxes were wrongly claimed by the plaintiffs. We find that taxes are not at all claimed and so there is no relevance of this argument. The last was the contention about the payment of Rs. 25,000/- made into the court. The learned judge has examined this question in paragraph 10 of his judgment. The learned judge stated that there was no evidence that the plaintiffs (it should be defendants) deposited the debt in the court under intimation to the plaintiffs. Mr. Gandhi invited our attention to Exhibits 18 and 46 on the record of the case, but they do not specifically speak of any such deposits, but during the course of the hearing, the plaintiffs' advocate Mr. N.B Dave had stated that he had learnt “from other sources” that the defendants had deposited Rs. 25,000. Mr. Mehta appearing for the respondents agreed that this amount was deposited at the fag-end of the trial before the court and he, therefore, volunteered that Rs. 25,000/- be deducted from the total amount of Rs. 2,76,309.97. This amount of Rs. 25,000/- is to be deducted towards the arrears of interest. Mr. Gandhi states that this amount should be deducted towards the principal amount, but when interest is being added to the principal amount every three months, the amount of interest also becomes the amount of principal and it makes no difference.

    12. The result is that barring the above-mentioned minor amendment in the final order, the appeal fails and to that extent stands dismissed. The appellants shall pay costs of the plaintiffs. We cannot accept the argument of Mr. Gandhi that parties should be left to bear their own costs, particularly when all these years right from 1969 till this day, they have enjoyed the amount lent by the plaintiffs, and also income from the proprety.

    13. Appeal dismissed.

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    Lilaben Ramniklal And Others v. Vithaldas Tulsidas And Others
    (Apr 27, 1984)