Macleod, C.J:— The appellant in this appeal is an insolvent who has filed his petition under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, in Bombay on the 27th November, 1914. As far as this Court is concerned, the insolvency proceedings came to an end on the 1st of October, 1918 when the insolvent got his discharge. One of the opposing creditors mentioned in the schedule, the respondent in this case, has obtained a decree for Rs. 2,834-4-0 in the Court of Sirohi State, in respect of the debt for costs in Bombay High Court Suit No. 581 of 1911. In the insolvency proceedings it had been alleged that the insolvent had succeeded as the heir of his brother to certain property in the Sirohi State, but he was able to prove that he was separate from his brother and that his brother's widow had adopted the insolvent's son. It would appear that the respondent still hopes to be able to attach that property. The appellant then took out a rule in this Court calling upon the respondent to show cause why he should not be restrained from proceeding in the suit filed by him against the insolvent in Sirohi State and from executing the decree passed in the said suit.
2. The rule was discharged on the 7th of October, 1919, by Mr. Justice Kajiji. The earned Judge in the course of his judgment said:—
“It is contended on behalf of the insolvent that under section 45 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act the discharge amounted to a release ad therefore there was no debt and no cause of ??? for the suit in Sirohi State. In my opinion section 45 of the Act only applies when a creditor ??? to recover property of the insolvent which is ??? British Territory or in foreign Country or ??? if such foreign Country or State will recognize the Official Assignee of Bombay and hand ??? the property belonging to the insolvent in under that it may be applied for the benefit of all ??? creditors and he may not be allowed to keep it. ??? in this case the Sirohi State has refused to recognize the Official Assignee and has refused to and over the property as appears from ??? 6 of the opposing creditor's affidavit of 33rd September, 1919, I therefore hold that there is thing in the Insolvency Act under these ??? to prevent a decree-holder from filing a ??? in a foreign Court and recovering his money in the property of the insolvent.”
3. The opposing creditor undertook not to arrest the insolvent personally and to give notice to the other creditors mentioned in the schedule of any property and money received in execution of the decree in order to enable them to claim rateable distribution. No doubt the point for argument before the learned Judge was whether the order of discharge is a complete release or not from the debts mentioned in the schedule. Such an order no doubt would be recognized by all Courts in the British Empire, but certainly there would be no obligation on Courts outside British India to recognize the order of discharge as a complete release from debts mentioned in the order. The real question is whether this Court has got jurisdiction to restrain a party from proceeding in an action in a foreign country and if it has, on what principle it will act in considering the question. This matter is discussed in Venechand v. Lakhmichand Manekchand (1) by Mr. Justice Pratt:—
“There is no doubt as to the jurisdiction of this Court to restrain a party within its jurisdiction from prosecuting a suit in a foreign Court. The principle on which this jurisdiction is exercised is set forth in the judgment of Lord Oran worth in the case of Carron Iron Company v. Maclaren, (2). It is that ‘the Court acts in psrsonam and will not suffer any one within its reach to do what is contrary to its notions of equity, merely because the act to be done may be, in point of locality, beyond its jurisdiction.’
4. Therefore if we think that the action of the opposing creditor in filing the, suit in the Sirohi State on the judgment of the Bombay High Court is contrary to our notions of equity, we should certainly restrain him from proceeding with that action. Of course that will not prevent him from continuing the action in the Sirohi State; but if he came within the jurisdiction of this Court, proceedings might be taken against him for contempt.
5. Now on the particular facts of this case, there is nothing as far as I can see which offends our notions of equity in the opposing creditor continuing his proceedings in the Sirohi State against the insolvent, who had filed his petition to get rid of the obligation to pay the costs decreed against him lit the suit I have referred to. He had no assets to hand over to the Official Assignee and as far as his obligations in British India were concerned, the order of discharge freed him from the liability to pay those costs. But if he has assets in the Sirohi State, there is no reason why the opposing creditor should not be at liberty to take proceedings in that State in order that he may recover his debt from any property he may discover situate in that State. Generally speaking, it would certainly be contrary to all ideas of equity that a party trading and incurring debts in Bombay, and having property in foreign territory, which the Official Assignee could not get hold of, should be able to completely get rid of all his liabilities as regards his creditors inside British India, and then proceed to enjoy his property out-side British India, free from all those liabilities. This case, in my opithree nion, does not come within any of the three classes of cases which ware referred to in Carron Iron Company v. Maclaren in which it would be considered that a party within the jurisdiction should be restrained from taking proceedings outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
6. I, therefore, think the appeal fails and it will be dismissed with costs.
7. Appeal dismissed.