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  • Sec. 5 and 11 of the Arbitration Act. 2)
  • S. 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act
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citation codes
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  • Sec. 5 and 11 of the Arbitration Act. 2)
  • S. 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the contractor (the appellant) against an order of Jaswant Singh J. sitting singly, which rejected the appellant's prayer to remove the arbitrator under Sections 5 and 11 of the Arbitration Act.

The appellant had a contract to construct a platform for the water conductor of water channel No. RD 37000 to 382000 under terms set out in an agreement with the department. After work commenced, multiple disputes arose between the parties leading to a series of correspondence. On 15-1-68 the appellant served a notice under Section 80 (through counsel) on the Secretary to the Government Works and Power, setting out his claim and alleging breaches by the department. The notice was referred to the department, which, after consideration, sent a letter dated 15-3-68 from the Chief Project Engineer (Chenani Hydel Project) to the Secretary. The department's main position was that under the agreement all disputes were to be referred to arbitration by the Chief Project Engineer and should be considered in arbitration proceedings.

On 18-9-68 the appellant applied to the court seeking removal of the Chief Project Engineer as arbitrator and appointment of a fresh arbitrator. The respondents objected. The learned single judge examined witnesses including a head clerk and the Chief Project Engineer (Mr. Pandita) and concluded that no positive bias had been proved and therefore no cogent ground for removing the arbitrator existed. The appellant appealed that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Chief Project Engineer, appointed as arbitrator under the contract, should be removed from that role on the ground that his prior expressions and conduct show a probability of bias or predisposition sufficient to revoke his authority under the Arbitration Act.
  2. Whether the expressions in the arbitrator's letter of 15-3-68 (and related recommendations) amounted to such pre-judgment or misconduct as to make it improper for him to act fairly as arbitrator in the dispute between the parties.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Chief Project Engineer had expressed himself strongly on the merits against the appellant in correspondence (notably the letter dated 15-3-68 and the para-wise answers to the Section 80 notice), indicating he had made up his mind against the appellant.
  • Because of these expressions, it would be a serious travesty of justice to permit him to act as arbitrator; the appellant relied on authority that a party need not prove actual bias if circumstances create a probability of bias sufficient to relieve the party from its bargain to accept a particular domestic tribunal.

Respondent's / Arbitrator's Arguments

  • The respondents filed objections to the removal application. The Chief Project Engineer explained to the single judge that the departmental reply (letter of 15-3-68) had been drafted by his Executive Engineer and suggested he had not applied his own mind to it.
  • The learned single judge accepted that there was no positive bias proved and therefore refused the application to remove the arbitrator.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Messrs Amar Chand v. Ambica Jute Mills, AIR 1966 SC 1036 The court should grant leave to revoke an arbitrator's authority only where refusal would cause a substantial miscarriage of justice; parties referring to arbitration should not be lightly released from their bargain. Grounds for revocation include excess/refusal of jurisdiction, misconduct, disqualification, fraud, and exceptional cases. The court relied on this authority to reiterate that relief from a chosen tribunal is exceptional, but that a probability of bias can suffice to justify revocation when the circumstances demonstrate likely unfairness.
U.P. Cooperative Federation v. Sunder Bros., (cited as AIR SC 249, 252) The court will not stay court proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act if there is good ground to apprehend the arbitrator will not act fairly or it is improper for him to arbitrate between the parties. The court used this principle to state the crux: there must be good grounds for apprehending that the arbitrator would not act fairly before the court exercises its discretion to revoke an arbitrator's authority.
Fertilizer Corporation of India v. D E Installation, AIR 1970 All. 31 (Allahabad High Court) A party is entitled to be released from agreeing to a particular arbitrator where it can be shown the selected arbitrator was likely to show bias or there was sufficient reason to suspect he would act unfairly. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that probable bias or reasonable apprehension of unfairness warrants relieving a party of its agreed arbitrator.
AIR 1952 Cal. 294 (Banerji J.) It is a fundamental principle of justice that a judge or tribunal should not decide a dispute if there is a probability that he would be biased in the case. The court invoked this fundamental principle to reinforce the conclusion that a probability of bias disqualifies a tribunal member from deciding the dispute.
Corpus Juris Secundum (CJS), Vol. VI (cited) The fact that an arbitrator has previously formed and expressed his opinion on the matter submitted may be a ground for setting aside an award (citing Conrap v. Masasoit Ins. Co.). The court relied on this authority to underline that prior expressions of opinion by an arbitrator can indicate prejudgment and justify removal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytic steps, relying only on the material presented in the opinion:

  1. Identification of the arbitrator's position and role: the Chief Project Engineer was both the arbitrator named in the agreement and the Chief Controlling Authority of the departmental unit that sanctioned the contract.
  2. Examination of the relevant documentary and testimonial material: prior to the court proceedings, the appellant had given a Section 80 notice; the arbitrator had opportunity to study the notice and furnished a para-wise reply/recommendation to the Government dated 15-3-68, which contained clear expressions on the merits adverse to the appellant.
  3. Close reading of the arbitrator's expressed views: the court quoted passages from the arbitrator's letter (para 15-3-68 and paras 8, 11 and 15 of that letter) showing the arbitrator described the contractor's claim (for Rs. 82,945-20) as "baseless", characterized the claim as an attempt to involve the department in litigation, stated the contractor had "no cause of action", and recommended that the case be contested and jurisdiction be examined.
  4. Assessment of whether those expressions amounted to prejudgment: the court concluded that these expressions evidenced that the arbitrator had "made up his mind" about the merits and therefore rendered himself incapable of acting impartially as arbitrator.
  5. Evaluation of the single judge's contrary findings: the learned single judge accepted the arbitrator's oral assertion that the reply had been drafted by his Executive Engineer and that he had not applied his mind. The appellate court reviewed the evidence (including the head clerk K. Dutta's statement that the draft was placed before the Chief Project Engineer who approved it and added para 15) and found that the Chief Project Engineer did apply his mind and personally approved and modified the reply.
  6. Application of legal standards from authority: the court applied the cited authorities (Supreme Court and High Court decisions, and CJS) to determine that while parties should generally be held to their agreement to a chosen domestic tribunal, relief is available where there are good grounds to apprehend the arbitrator will not act fairly — and that a probability of bias from prior expressions suffices.
  7. Conclusion on facts and law combined: on the established facts (the arbitrator's documented adverse expressions, his role as controlling authority, and the evidence of his personal approval of the reply) and the applicable legal standards, the court concluded there was a serious probability of bias and that permitting him to arbitrate would be a miscarriage of justice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The court set aside the order of the learned single judge rejecting the appellant's application to remove the arbitrator, and remitted the matter to that judge to dispose of the application afresh and to appoint another arbitrator after consulting the parties. There is no order as to costs.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Chief Project Engineer (who had been appointed arbitrator under the contract) must not act as arbitrator in this dispute; the single judge is to reconsider and appoint another arbitrator in consultation with the parties. The opinion applies established principles (as cited) that a party may be relieved from an agreed arbitrator where there is a reasonable apprehension or probability that the arbitrator will not act impartially. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal precedent beyond applying these existing principles to the facts before the court.

    Handa & Co. v. State Of J & K

    Ali C. J.:-

    This is an appeal by the contractor against an order of Jaswant Singh J. sitting singly rejecting the prayer of the appellant for removing the arbitrator under Sec. 5 and 11 of the Arbitra­tion Act.

    2) It appears that the appellant was given a contract to construct a platform for the water con­ductor of water channel No. RD 37000 to 382000 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the agree­ment entered into between the contractor and the department. The appellant commenced the work, but before it was completed a number of disputes arose between the parties in connexion with the terms and conditions of the agreement resulting in a series of correspondence between the parties When the dispute assumed serious proportions, the appel­lant sent a notice under S 80 indicating his claim against the department and alleging further that the department had committed various breaches of the contract. This notice was given on 15-1-68 to the Secretary to the Government Works and Power and was referred to the department. The department after processing and analysing the notice sent by the appellant sent a letter dated 15-3-68 addressed by the Chief Project Engineer Chenani Hydel project to the Secretary to the Government Works and Power. The main stand taken by the Chief Engineer in his reply to the notice of the appellant was that as under the terms and conditions of the agreement all disputes had to be referred to the arbitration of the Chief Pro­ject Engineer, these disputes could only be consider­ed in the aforesaid arbitration proceedings. There­after the appellant made an application to the court on 18-9-68 praying that- the Chief Project Engineer who was appointed as arbitrator under the agreement between the parties be removed and the appellant be relieved from his bargain and a fresh arbitrator may be appointed. The respondents filed their objections and the learned judge examined a head clerk of the department as also Mr. Pandita, Chief Engineer himself and after considering the relevant materials came to the conclusion that as there was no positive bias proved against the Chief Engineer, no cogent ground for removing the arbitrator had been made out. Hence this appeal.

    (3) In support of the appeal the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the ar­bitrator had expressed himself rather too strongly on the merits of the case against the appellant and therefore it would be a serious travesty of justice to allow the Chief Project Engineer to be an ar­bitrator to decide the dispute. It is no doubt well settled that where the parties have agreed to entrust their disputes to a particular domestic tri­bunal, they should not be lightly released from their bargain unless special circumstances showing bias or miscarriage of justice are proved to the satisfaction of the court. Even for the purpose of proving bias it is not necessary to show actual bias in the mind of the arbitrator, but if, the circum­stances lead to a probability of the presence of bias in the mind of the arbitrator, that may be sufficient to relieve the party of its bargain. In Messrs Amar ChandVs Ambica Jute Mills, AIR 1966 SC 1036, 1042 the matter was considered at length by their Lordships of the Supreme Court who observed as follows :-

    ''We now turn to the legal position which seems to us to be quite clear. Before the court exercises its discretion to give leave to revoke an arbitrator's authority, it should be satisfied that a substantial mis­carriage of justice will take place in the event of its refusal. In considering the exercise by the court of the power of revocation it must not be forgotten (hat arbitration is a particular method for the settlement of disputes. Parties not wish­ing the law's delays know or ought to know, that in referring a dispute to ar­bitration they take arbitrator for better or worse and that his decision is final both as to fact and law- In many cases the parties prefer arbitration for these reasons. In exercising its' discretion cau­tiously and sparingly, the court has no doubt these circumstances in view and considers that the parties should not be relieved from a tribunal they have chosen because they fear that the arbitrator's decision may go against them (See Russel) on Arbitration 16th edn. page 547. The grounds on which leave to revoke may be given have been put under five heads :-

    1. Excess or refusal of jurisdiction by ar­bitrator.

    2. Misconduct of arbitrator.

    3. Disqualification of arbitrator.

    4. Charges of fraud.

    5. Exceptional cases.

    (4) To the same effect is another decision of the Supreme Court in UP Cooperative Federation V. Sunder Bros. Delhi AIR SC 249, 252 where in it has been held :-

    "The legal position is that an order of stay of suit under S. 34 of the Indian Arbi­tration Act will not be granted if it can be shown that there is good ground for apprehending that the arbitrator will not act fairly in the matter or that it is for some reason improper that he should arbitrate in the dispute between the parties. It is of course the normal duty of the court to hold the parties to the contract and to make them present their disputes to the forum of their choice but an order to stay the legal proceedings in a court of law will not be granted if it is shown that there is good ground for app­rehending that the arbitrator will not act fairly in the matter or that it is for some reason improper that he should arbitrate in the dispute."

    (5) It would thus appear that the crux of the matter is that there should be good ground for apprehending that the arbitrator would not act fairly in the matter or that he was guilty of miscon­duct before the court exercise could its discretion in revoking the authority of the arbitrator.

    (6) In this case the Supreme Court allowed the prayer of the appellant because it found that the arbitrator who was the Registrar of the Co-operative Society was the Chief Controller and supervising officer in the society and therefore their Lordships thought that he may not act fairly in the matter.

    (7) In the instant case also the arbitrator is the Chief Project Engineer and the Chief Controlling Authority of the department under which the contract was sanctioned.

    (8) Before the matter came up to the Court, a notice under S. 80 Civil P. C. had been given by the appellant through his counsel and the arbitrator himself had an occasion not only to study and analyze this notice but also to answer it para-wise in his recommendation to the Govern­ment. In doing so, the arbitrator expressed him­self very clearly against the appellant on the merits of the case and has thus, in our opinion, rendered himself incapable of acting as an arbitrator. A perusal of the manner in which the arbitrator has answered the notice of the appellant clearly shows how his mind has been made up. In his letter to the Government dated 15-3-68 which is signed by the arbitrator namely the Chief Project Engineer the arbitrator has expressed himself thus :-

    ''It is thus clear that contractor neither wanted to see to reason nor respond to offer of extension by Chief Project Engineer made vide No. CP/N/7674-78 dated 8-1-68 but to evade work by involving the department in legal manouvres. The claim for Rs. 82, 945-20 is baseless."

    (9) In para 8 of the arbitrator commenting upon the nature of the claim of the contractor wrote thus :-

    "Now since the contractor apprehends that in the event of the work being got done through other agency at his risk and cost and other action in terms of clause 3 of the, agreement, he will be bound to make good the excess amount which the department might incur on this account, he has preferred this unjustified claim in a vain attempt to involve the depart­ment in litigation and elicit cheap sympathy."

    (10) Similarly in para 11 of the Chief Engine­er has clearly mentioned that the contractor had no cause of action against the department and has written thus : -

    "Para 11 of the notice is incorrect. In view of the facts narrated above, the con­tractor has no cause of action against the department. On the contrary the contractor has caused the breach of the agreement as explained in para 3 above. It is the contractor who will have to make good the loss that the department might incur oh account of getting this work completed at his risk and cost."

    (11) In para 15 the arbitrator has concluded his recommendations in the following words :--

    ''In view of the above the 'case is recom­mended to be contested. But the question of jurisdiction of an appropriate court may kindly be got examined by the Law Department, as well It is also to be seen whether it is not incumbent upon the contractor to come up in arbitration instead of going straight to the court."

    (12) Thus a perusal of the aforesaid clear expression of opinion of the arbitrator on the merits of the claim of the appellant goes to show that he has already made up his mind and has decided that the appellant's claim is absolutely baseless and that the appellant has got no cause of action against the Government. It is true that in the agreement the Chief Project Engineer was appointed as an arbitrator, but there was absolutely no necessity for him to stress this fact in the con­cluding portion of his letter (Supra) which shows that after having characterised the appellant's claim as false arid baseless, he was very anxious to see that the matter is sent for arbitration and is not allowed to go to the courts. The learned judge has relied greatly on the evidence of the Chief Project Engineer for the purpose that the reply given by him was actually drafted by his Executive Engineer and that the Chief Project Engineer did not apply his mind properly. We have gone through the statement of the Chief Project Engineer, and we are not satisfied that although he is the author of the letter dated 15-3-68, yet he signed the letter without understanding the contents thereof. On the other hand the head clerk K. Dutta has said in his statement that the draft reply was put up to she chief Project Engine­er for approval and he approved of the same arid added para 15 himself and thereafter the reply was sent to the Secretary Works" and1 Power Department. This shows that the Chief Project Engineer did apply his mind to the facts mentioned in the letter before giving his final approval The oral assertion of the arbitrator before the learned judge that he did not apply his mind cannot be taken seriously because be did not want that his authority should be revoked The learned single judge does not appear to have considered the strong expression of opinion given by the arbitrator in his letter dated 15-3-63

    (13) In a recent decision of the Allahabad High Court in Fertilizer Corporation of India v DE Installation, AIR 1970, Alld. 31 it was

    observed:-

    “It is clear from the above decision of the Supreme Court (AIR 1967 Sc 249) that a party is entitled to be released from a bargain of this nature if he could show that the selected arbitrator was likely to show bias or by sufficient reason to suspect that he would act unfairly or that he had been guilty of continued unreason­able conduct.''

    (14) In AIR 1952 Cal, 294 Banerji J. observ­ed that it was the most fundamental principle of justice that a judge or a tribunal should not decide a»dispute if there is a probability that he would be biased in the case.

    (15) In the present case from the strong expres­sion of opinion made by the arbitrator in his letter (Supra) it is manifest that there is a serious proba­bility that he is biased against the appellant and it would be a miscarriage of justice if in view of his expression of opinion he is still allowed to arbitrate on the claim of the appellant. We are fortified in our view by the following observations made in Corpus Juries Secundum Vol. VI (VI CJS) 187.

    The fact that an arbitrator has previously formed and expressed his opinion on the matter submitted may be a ground for setting aside the award, See Conrap V. Masasoit Ins Co: 4 Allen (Mass) 20-5 C. J, Page 66 note 58"

    (16) The learned judge has cited a number of authorities by which the court should be guided in exercising its discretion to revoke the authority of an arbitrator. We do not have any quarrel with the propositions adumbrated by the learned judge as indicated in the authorities, but in each case it will be a question of fact as to whether or not a case for revoking the authority of an arbitrator has been made out. By and large the main question that has to be seen is as to whether or not either due to his immediate interest or on account of having expressed his opinion on the merits of the case and prejudged the issue, the arbitrator is expected to act fairly and without any bias. Where the court is satisfied that the arbitrator is not expected to get fairly for any of the reasons given above, the court has ample discretion to relieve the party from its bargain and remove the arbitrator. In the instant case we are satisfied that such a case has been made out and we do not agree with the learned judge that no cogent grounds for removing the arbitrator have been established.

    For the reasons given above, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned single judge rejecting the application of the applicant and remit the matter to him for disposal of the application afresh and appointing another arbitrator after consulting the parties. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.

    Sd/- S. M. F. Ali. Chief Justice

    I agree, Sd/-J. N. Bhat. Judge.

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    Comments

    Handa & Co. v. State Of J & K
    (Mar 9, 1970)