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AMICUS AI
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citation codes
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Acts
  • Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951, (Act No. XXIII of 1951) (hereinafter called the Act).2.
  • rule 6 of the Rajasthan Town Municipal Election Rules, 195, (hereinafter called the Rules).
  • sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951,
  • sec. 64 A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • rule 11(3) read with rule 7(1).
  • rule 7(1) of the Rules
  • rule 7 of the Rules.
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951, (Act No. XXIII of 1951) (hereinafter called the Act).2.
  • rule 6 of the Rajasthan Town Municipal Election Rules, 195, (hereinafter called the Rules).
  • sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951,
  • sec. 64 A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • rule 11(3) read with rule 7(1).
  • rule 7(1) of the Rules
  • rule 7 of the Rules.
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Mukandgarh Municipal Election (Modi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ application under Article 226 was filed by the petitioners, who were voters and candidates, challenging the general municipal election held at Mukandgarh on 23rd December 1958 under the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951. Respondents Nos. 2 to 9 were declared successful and became members of the municipal board; Respondent No. 1 was the Returning Officer; Respondent No. 10 was the municipal board itself.

The petition alleged multiple defects in the election; the principal grounds debated in Court were: (a) the Returning Officer illegally entrusted preparation of the voters' list to the municipal board (alleged contravention of Rule 6 of the Rajasthan Town Municipal Election Rules); (b) the voters' list was not published as required by Rule 7(1) and, after finalization, not published in accordance with Rule 11(3) read with Rule 7(1); and (c) by amendment (filed 11th April 1960) that neither the Government nor the Collector had issued a notification under section 10 of the Act fixing the total strength and composition (elected vs nominated) of the board or the mode of election (single constituency or wards).

Procedural timeline (as stated in the opinion): writ petition filed 30th January 1959; amendment seeking to add the sec.10 ground filed 11th April 1960; interlocutory directions and listing occurred (including an order of Jagatnarain, J. dated 2nd May 1960 that the amendment would be considered at hearing). The Court first heard the matter on 13th October 1960, requested the Collector's file, received it on 22nd March 1961, and again heard the case on 14th April 1961.

Factual material included admissions and affidavits: the municipal board admitted that it prepared the voters' list at the Returning Officer's request; a librarian's affidavit (Murlidhar Sharma) stated lists received were kept locked in an almirah and shown only on request — not displayed publicly.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Returning Officer acted illegally in entrusting the preparation of the voters' list to the municipal board (alleged contravention of Rule 6 of the Rules).
  2. Whether the voters' list and the final electoral roll were published in accordance with Rule 7(1) and Rule 11(3) read with Rule 7(1) such that the publication requirements of the Rules were satisfied.
  3. Whether the failure of the Government or the Collector to issue a notification under Section 10 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951 — specifying total number of members, elected vs nominated composition, and electoral mode (single constituency or wards) — renders the 1958 election void because it goes to the foundation of the board's constitution.
  4. Whether the petitioners should be permitted to amend their writ to raise the Section 10 point despite delay in filing that amendment.
  5. Whether the proper remedy for the petitioners was an election petition before an Election Tribunal under Section 19 of the Act rather than a writ under Article 226.
  6. Whether the petitioners, having contested the election, are estopped from challenging it afterwards in a writ petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Returning Officer illegally delegated preparation of the voters' list to the municipal board in contravention of Rule 6.
  • The voters' list and the final electoral roll were not published as required by Rule 7(1) and Rule 11(3) read with Rule 7(1); publication practices (lists locked in a library almirah) frustrated public inspection.
  • There was no notification under Section 10 issued by the Government or the Collector fixing the total membership, the elected/nominated proportion, or the constituency/ward arrangements; this failure vitiates the election as it goes to the very foundation of the board's constitution.
  • They sought leave to amend the petition to add the Section 10 ground after learning of relevant judicial decisions and after searching official records and Rajpatra and finding no such notification.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The voters' list was properly prepared by the Returning Officer, with assistance from municipal staff; the preparation was therefore in order.
  • A copy of the voters' list was published at the municipal office and placed in the public library, and the electoral roll after finalization was likewise published (respondents contended compliance with Rule 7); publication was said to be adequate and not in contravention of the Rules.
  • The application to amend to add the Section 10 ground was belated and should be refused; the ground raised was, they contended, one of fact rather than law and too late to be permitted.
  • They contended the absence of the Section 10 notification did not go to the very root of the election and therefore should not invalidate it.
  • They argued that the 1951 Government notification (regarding seats and single constituency) remained applicable and supplied any lacuna, and therefore no fatal defect existed for the 1958 election.
  • They relied on authority (Kapurchand v. State of Rajasthan) supporting the view that an election petition under Section 19 before an Election Tribunal, rather than a writ, was the appropriate remedy.
  • They argued petitioners, having contested the election and been defeated, should not be permitted to challenge it by a writ now (an estoppel-like contention).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Qurab Ali v. Govt. of Rajasthan Held that failure to issue a notification under Section 10 (fixing total strength, elected/nominated composition, and mode of election) goes to the very foundation of the constitution of a municipal board and that an election held without such notification is void. The Court treated Qurab Ali as the first pointed consideration on the Section 10 question and relied on it as binding in holding that non-compliance with Section 10 vitiates the election; this case formed primary authority for quashing the 1958 election.
Jaiwant Rao v. The State of Rajasthan (Full Bench Civil Reference No. 10 of 1960) Full Bench approval of the principle in Qurab Ali that breach of Section 10 affects the foundation of municipal elections. The Court noted Full Bench approval and treated the principle as well settled and dispositive of the Section 10 issue in the present case.
Arunachalam Pillai v. Southern Roadways Ltd. (Supreme Court) Permitted a litigant to raise a point at hearing which was not originally pleaded where intervening judicial decisions had clarified the law, and where the new point went to the root of the matter. The Court applied this reasoning analogically to allow the petitioners' belated amendment raising Section 10: because the law was clarified by subsequent decisions, the amendment was permitted in public interest despite delay.
Mahavir Prasad v. Chiranjilal (S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 89 of 1959) Example of a municipal election in the same district being quashed for proceeding without a notification under Section 10. The petitioners relied on learning of this decision as the impetus to investigate and add the Section 10 ground; the Court cited it as part of the factual context supporting timely discovery of the defect.
Jagan Nath v. Jaswantsingh Principle that elections should not be lightly set aside but that purity and regularity of the election process must be safeguarded. The Court invoked this authority to balance the reluctance to set aside elections against the need to invalidate elections when there are flagrant breaches of law affecting their foundation.
Kapurchand v. State of Rajasthan (D.B.) Authority relied on to suggest election matters should be pursued by election petition before an Election Tribunal rather than by writ. The Court distinguished this precedent: it held Kapurchand inapplicable where pre-election deficiencies were committed by the Government or Collector (as here under Section 10), and therefore refused to exclude writ jurisdiction on that basis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court adopted a structured approach. It first identified the Section 10 point as fundamental and therefore addressed it first.

  1. Reliance on prior authority: The Court treated Qurab Ali (and the subsequent Full Bench approval in Jaiwant Rao) as settling that failure to fix the board's total strength and composition under Section 10 goes to the “very foundation” of the board, and any election held without such notification must be struck down. The Court accepted that this principle was well settled for the High Court.
  2. Whether amendment should be allowed despite delay: The Court considered the delay in seeking leave to amend (application filed c. 15 months after the writ) but concluded that because the law on Section 10 had been clarified after the filing (Qurab Ali decided 28th July 1959) and because the point was vital and affected public interest, the amendment should be permitted. The Court explicitly relied on the reasoning in Arunachalam Pillai (Supreme Court) to permit raising a new point at hearing when subsequent judicial decisions changed the law; it noted respondents would suffer no surprise since they admitted no notification existed.
  3. Factual inquiry into notification history: The Court examined the documentary and chronological record of notifications. It set out the 1951 Government notification which fixed seats (10: 8 elected, 2 nominated) and single constituency for Mukandgarh. It then examined a 16th December 1954 Government notification which, under Section 10, ordered that the 1955 election be held on a ward-wise basis (8 wards; 10 members, 8 elected and 2 nominated; one member from each ward).
  4. Effect of successive notifications: The Court reasoned that the 1954 notification replaced the 1951 arrangement for the ensuing election (1955), and was not a partial supersession. Because the 1954 notification was expressly for the “ensuing Municipal General Elections” and changed the mode from single constituency to ward-wise, it necessarily displaced the 1951 notification. As a result, by the time of the 1958 election there was a hiatus — no fresh Section 10 notification had been issued for the 1958 election fixing strength, composition and mode. The Court concluded there was a "complete failure" to issue the necessary Section 10 notification for the 1958 election.
  5. Rejection of respondents’ alternative contentions:
    • The Court found the contention that the 1951 notification still governed the 1958 election to be untenable because of the intervening 1954 notification which expressly changed the mode for the ensuing election and thereby superseded the earlier notification.
    • The Court rejected the argument that the petitioners should have proceeded by an election petition under Section 19 (Kapurchand) on the ground that Kapurchand did not involve foundational pre-election defects committed by the Government/Collector; where such pre-election deficiencies exist, writ jurisdiction remains appropriate.
    • The Court rejected the estoppel contention (petitioners having contested the election) because there cannot be estoppel against the statute and because respondents’ positions were not shown to have been altered by petitioners’ conduct; Qurab Ali was cited as support for that rejection.
  6. Ancillary matters: The Court observed shortcomings in the manner of preparation and publication of the electoral list (e.g., lists kept locked in library almirah and not displayed) but considered it unnecessary to decide those grounds once the Section 10 deficiency disposes of the case.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Court allowed the writ application and held that the impugned municipal election of 23rd December 1958 is void for want of compliance with Section 10 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951; accordingly respondents Nos. 2 to 9 are not the duly appointed members of the municipal board and shall not function as such.

Implications and Consequences

  • Direct effect on the parties: The election is quashed; the declared members (respondents 2–9) are not entitled to act as members of the municipal board.
  • Costs: Because much of the trouble arose from the Collector's failure to issue the Section 10 notification, the Court made no order as to costs.
  • Administrative and public-interest implications: The Court issued a cautionary observation to officials responsible for electoral preparations to strictly comply with statutory requirements (including proper preparation and publication of electoral lists), emphasizing that flagrant breaches of electoral law cannot be overlooked.
  • Precedential effect within the Court's jurisdiction: The decision applied and relied on earlier decisions (Qurab Ali and Full Bench approval in Jaiwant Rao) and therefore followed settled law rather than announcing a new principle; the Court treated the rule that non-compliance with Section 10 vitiates an election as settled for this Court.

This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or assume factual or legal details not present in that text.

    Hari Prasad v. Returning Officer, Nawalgarh

    Modi, J.:— By this writ application under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners who are voters in the municipality of the town of Mukandgarh, District Jhunjhunu, seek to challenge the general election last held/or this municipality on the 23rd December, 1958, under the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951, (Act No. XXIII of 1951) (hereinafter called the Act).

    2. It is common ground that the petitioners were among the candidates who offered their candidature for the impugned election. Respondents Nos. 2 to 9 are members of this municipal board having been declared successful at this election. Respondent No. I is the Returning Officer, who conducted the election, while respondent No. 10 is the municipal board Mukandgarh. The petitioners have taken up a large number of grounds in their writ application which according to them vitiated this election: but it is necessary to mention only those which were debated at the bar of this Court, the rest having been given up. These grounds may be summarised as follows: First, the Returning Officer acted illegally in entrusting the preparation of the voters' list to the municipal board and in doing so he contravened rule 6 of the Rajasthan Town Municipal Election Rules, 195, (hereinafter called the Rules). Secondly, the voters' list was not published in accordance with rule 7(1) of the Rules and further it was also not published after its finalization in accordance with rule 11(3) read with rule 7(1). A third ground of attack was also raised by an application for amendment dated the nth April, 1960, and this was that neither the Government of Rajasthan nor the Collector who had authority delegated to him in this connection had issued any notification under sec. 10 of the Act determining the total number of members of this municipal board or whether this board would consist of wholly elected or partly elected and partly nominated members and in the latter event what was to be the proportion of the members to be nominated to those elected, and, lastly, whether the election shall be on a single constituency basis or otherwise. The contention was that the failure of the Government or the Collector to issue such a notification affected the very foundation of the election, and, therefore, it should be declared to be void. A reply was filed on behalf of the municipal board before respondents Nos. 2 to 9 took office. In this reply it was admitted that the Returning Officer had asked the municipal board to prepare the list of voters and so it had prepared the same. As for the publication of the said list it was submitted that the list was placed in the municipal office “under the custody of office staff with instructions to show it to any body who wants it to see during office hours. No such list was published by affixing it on the notice board of municipal office or at any other place in municipal office or municipal area as there were no such instructions of the Returning Officer.” It was further submitted in this connection that in accordance with the instructions received from the Returning Officer on the 3rd September, 1958, this list was also sent to the public library situate within this municipality and that it was for the librarian thereof to say how he had kept the list for inspection. According to the municipal board, the same procedure was followed in the publication of the electoral roll after it was finalised. We have an affidavit on the record filed by Murlidhar Sharma who was working as librarian of the library at the relevant time. According to this affidavit, the list of voters had been received by him on the 3rd August, 1958, through a messenger of the municipal board and he put it in an almirah of the library under lock and key thinking that “the said list was important and valuable document.” He was avowedly under the impression that this was to be taken out and given for reading as and when any person demanded and as no one made such a demand, it was not shown to any body and was returned to the municipal hoard on demand. As for the publication of the electoral roll as finalised, Murlidhar's version is that he received it from the board on the 21st November, 1958, with a covering letter and that this electoral roll was also put by him in the almitah of the library under his lock and key. His version further is that some three or four persons did requisition to see this roll and he allowed them to see it and every time after inspection he kept it under lock and key. He has dearly deposed in his affidavit that neither the list of voters nor this electoral roll had been displayed inside or outside the library for free inspection.

    3. Another reply was filed by respondents Nos. 2 to 9 after, they took office. According to them, the voters' list was prepared by the Returning Officer though he had taken the assistance of the municipal staff for this purpose and, therefore, the preparation of the voters' list was in order. On the point of publication, the reply was that a copy of the voters' list was published both at the office of the municipal board and the public library in Mukandgarh. It was further submitted in this connection that the list was kept on a table outside the office of the municipal board's and was easily accessible and open to inspection to every member of the public. It is significant, however, that this reply does not make it clear whether the list was kept on a table presumably in the compound of the office of the municipal board during office hours only or outside such hours also. As for publication of the list in the public library, all that is said is that the same had been put in the public library and that there was 110 contravention of rule 7 of the Rules. Although the affidavit of the librarian Murlidhar Page: 59Sharma had been put in earlier and it showed that he had kept the voters' list under lock and key to be offered for inspection only on demand by the visitors to the library, there is no contradiction of this at all. So far as the publication of the electoral roil under rule 11(3) is concerned, all that the respondents have said in their reply is that the roll was published in the manner provided in rule 7 of the Rules, and there is 110 specific denial of the allegations made by the petitioners in this connection. As regards the alleged infirmity of the election in question owing to the failure of the Government or the Collector to issue the notification under sec. 10 of the Act fixing the composition of the board, the respondents vehemently argued that permission to raise this additional ground should not be accorded to the petitioners as the prayer was highly belated and that the question sought to be raised was not one of law but of fact. It seems to have been further contended in paragraph four of their reply that the absence of the notification did not go to the very root or foundation of the election, and, therefore, also this additional ground of attack should not be allowed.

    4. It is in this state of pleadings that the question as to the validity of the impugned election falls for determination before me. In view of its obvious importance, I propose to take the third ground first.

    5. I may state at once that to me it appears to be perfectly futile to contend at this date in our Court as to what the effect of the failure on the part of the competent authority to issue a notification under sec. 10 of the Act would be. The point first directly arose in Qurab Ali v. Govt. of Rajasthan(1) to which I was a party. In that case, one of the grounds on which the election to the Pali Municipality was challenged was that the composition of the board had not been fixed either by the Government or by its delegate the Collector as required by sec. 10 of the Act. All that the Collector did there as seems to have been done in this case was that he ordered the municipality to go to polls and appointed a Returning Officer for the purpose and he had done so without determining what was to be the total strength of the board and whether all the members thereof were to be elected or a few could be nominated also and if so what was to be their proportion to the members elected. (See the order of the Collector dated the 9th July, 1958, in this case which is on the file of the Collector). On these facts, I held (and Bhandari J. concurred in this conclusion) in Qurab Ali's case that the municipal board was improperly constituted and could not be allowed to function as a proper foundation for its membership had not been laid. This case latter came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Jaiwant Rao v. The State of Rajasthan (Full Bench Civil Reference No. 10 of 1960 decided on the 17th August, 1960, still not reported) and was approved. The law, therefore, may be taken to be two well settled at this date to admit of any doubt or dispute so far as our Court is concerned, that a breach of sec. 10 of the Act in the sense that the total strength of a Board has not been fixed or that the character of its membership, that is, whether it is to consist of wholly elected members or partly elected and partly nominated, and if so, what is to be proportion of one to the other, has not been determined goes to the very foundation of the constitution of the board and an election held in the absence of such a notification cannot but be struck down as illegal. The contention of the respondents, therefore, as raised in their reply dated the 20th September, 1960, that a failure like this would not go to the very root of the case cannot possibly be countenanced. That being so, the only other question which arises for consideration is whether under the circumstances the petitioners should be allowed to raise the point at all.

    6. It is necessary to state a few facts in this connection. The present writ application was filed on the 30th January, 1959. The amendment application seeking permission to introduce this additional ground of attack was filed 011 the nth April, 1960, that is about a year and three months after the filing of the writ petition. Qurab Ali's case (Supra) came to be decided by a bench of this Court on the 28th July, 1959, wherein, as already stated the effect of a failure on the part of the competent authority to issue a notification fixing the composition of the Board under sec. 10 of the Act came up for the first time for a pointed consideration and pronouncement of the law on the subject. This decision was reported in the November Part of our Official Reporter for 1959. It has further been pointed out by the petitioners in their affidavit in this connection that the general election in the case of another municipality in their own district was struck down by this Court on the ground of it having proceeded to the polls without proper foundation having been laid for the same by the issue of a notification under sec. 10 of the Act and that they had heard of the same in the beginning of April, 1960, (See Mahavir Prasad v. Chiranjilal, S.B Civil Misc. Appeal Page: 60No. 89 of 1959, decided on the 3rd March, 1960) quashing the general election of the Surajgarh Municipality, District Jhunjhunu), and then it occurred to them to find out whether a notification under the said section had been issued by the Government or the Collector in the case of the impugned election and thereafter they made a thorough search and came to know that there was no such notification either in the Rajpatra or in the office of the Collector or the Returning Officer or the Municipal Board. As already stated, the application for amendment seeking permission to introduce this fresh ground was submitted it this Court on the nth April, 1960. By an order dated the 2nd May, 1960, of Jagatnarain Justice before whom the case was placed then, it was ordered that the application would be considered at the time of the hearing of the mam petition. The case was thereafter placed before me for hearing for the first time on the 13th October, 1960. I thought it proper under the circumstances to ask the Collector, Jhunjhunu, to send the file regarding the composition and formation of wards etc. of this municipality in connection with the election in question. This record was received on the 22nd March, 1961, and the case was again placed before me for hearing 011 the 14th April, 1961. In the meantime a reply had been filed by the respondents on the 10th September, 1960, praying that the amendment application be summarily rejected. It is conceded before me on behalf of the contesting respondents and indeed there is no getting out of this position, that there was a complete failure on the part of the authorities concerned to ??? notification in this case under sec. 10 of the Act. No elaborate investigation into facts was perhaps necessary and all that has to be seen in this connection was the Rajasthan Rajpatra for the relevant period or the relevant file of the Collector or the Returning Officer pertaining to this Municipal Board.

    7. In these circumstances, the question is would this Court be justified in refusing permission for this point to be raised. I have deeply pondered over the matter and have come to the conclusion, though not without some reluctance, that the point has to be allowed in public interest. The point is vital. It affects the very foundation of the general election which is impugned before me. In this connection I am fully conscious of the general principle that an election must not be lightly set aside; but at the same time it is equally important to remember that the purity and the regularity of the election process has to be safeguarded and flagrant breaches of the law relating to election cannot be allowed to go unnoticed or their inevitable consequences glossed over. See Jagan Nath v. Jaswantsingh(2). Learned counsel for the respondents candidly conceded that if the point had been raised by the writ petition in the first instance he could have had no legitimate objection to its being considered and given effect to. This is indeed as it should be. The only ground, however, on which learned counsel relies in his support is that the application for amendment was made after considerable delay. There is a certain amount of truth in this complaint. But mere delay, in my judgment, cannot be a valid ground for refusing an amendment irrespective of all other considerations. I feel strongly supported in the conclusion to which have come by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Arunachalam Pillai v. Southern Roadways Ltd.(3). That case arose under the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellant held a permit to ply his bus on a certain route. He applied to the Regional Transport Officer concerned for variation of his route. That Officer notified his application and invited objections. Eventually he rejected the application. The appellant went in revision before the Government of Madras under sec. 64 A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Madras Government set aside the order of the Regional Transport Officer and allowed the variation as prayed for. Thereafter the respondent, namely, the Southern Roadways Ltd. filed writ application under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Madras High Court with a prayer that the order of the Madras Government be quashed. In this writ application the point had not been taken that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to grant the variation asked for or that the Government had likewise no such jurisdiction so grant in revision what the Regional Transport Officer himself could not have granted. This pica was however sought to be raised before the High Court at the time of hearing. It was urged 011 behalf of the respondent that the plea was being raised on account of a Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in another writ petition which had been decided since the petition had been filed and wherein it was held that the Regional Transport Officer had 110 jurisdiction to deal with an application for variation of the conditions of a permit. The High Court relying on the bench decision let aside the order of the Government of Madras without going into the other contentions raised by the respondent. The appellant went in letters patent appeal which was dismissed. In these circumstances a strong plea was raised before their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the respondent having failed in his writ application to raise the objection that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction Page: 61to very the conditions of the permit, the High Court had acted erroneously in allowing him to urge this point at the time of the hearing. This is how their Lordships repelled this objection:

    “It was not until the decision of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955 that it became the considered view of that Court that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to make any such variation. When the law was so declared by the High Court, it could not reasonably be said that the High Court erred in allowing the respondent to take this point although in its petition under Art. 226 the point had not been taken. This was obviously because the decision of the High Court to writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955 had not been given at the time of the filing of the petition. Since the question went to the rat of the matter and it involved the question whither the Regional Transport Officer had jurisdiction to vary the conditions of a permit the High Court faced with a Division Bench decision of its own on the matter, could not very well refuse permission to the respondent to rely of that decision in support of its petition questioning the validity of the order of the Government of Madras made under sec. 64 A of the Act.

    (The italics is mine)

    8. With great respect, these observations apply with full force to the case before me, a may say so, the present case stands on a stronger footing so far as procedure goes. The present writ application was filed, as already stated on the 30th January, 1959, and Qurab Ali's case (Supra) in which the question of consequences of non-compliance with the provisions of sec. 10 of the Act first came up for an elaborate consideration and a pointed decision was not decided at that time and it came into existence on the 28th July, 1959. It is also remarkable that even though an application for amendment of the grounds of petition as such does not appear to have been made before the learned single judge in the High Court of Madras, the petitioners here did take the precaution of filing such an application before it came up for hearing. The contesting respondents have had an ample opportunity of testing the truth of the allegation made therein and have indeed felt compelled to admit that 110 notification under sec. 10 was issued by the Government or the Collector in the present case. It cannot, therefore, be argued for a single moment that by the allowance of the amendment the respondents would be subjected to any surprise or prejudice on that account. To adopt the phrageology of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Madras case to the case before me, since the question of the non-compliance with the provisions of sec. 10 goes to the root of the election and I am faced with a Division Bench decision delivered subsequently which in its turn was approved by a Full Bench of this Court, I cannot very well refuse permission to the petitioners to rely on that decision in support of the petition questioning the validity of the election. I would, therefore, allow the amendment.

    9. Once the amendment is allowed, I do not think the impugned election can be sustained and must be quashed.

    10. At this stage it remains for me to dispose of three subsidiary contentions raised on behalf of the contesting respondents. The first contention is that even though a fresh notification fixing the total strength of this municipal board and determining the relative strength of the elective element therein to the nominated was not issued before the impugned election was held or the 24th December, 1958, this lacuna was adequately supplied by the notification issued by the State Government 011 the 14th May, 1958, and published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra in due course. This notification reads as follows:—

    “NOTIFICATION

    Jaipur the 14th May, 1951.

    No. F1(b) 14 LSG-A/51. It is hereby notified for general information that as the population of the Mukandgarh Town is below 10,000 souls the Government have, in pursuance of the policy in vogue, been pleased to fix the number of seats as 10 (8 elected and 2 nominated). The election will be held on single constituency basis.

    The Tehsildar Jhunjhunu (Administrator of the Board) is appointed as Returning Officer to conduct the elections.

    By order of

    His Highness the Rajpramukh,

    Karma Prasad

    Secretary to the Government

    11. It was pointed out in this connection that the impugned election was held exactly on this basis. This argument might have possibly had some force were it not for certain events which happened in between. The Board of 1951 finished its term on the 13th November, 1954, and thereafter its life was extended upto the 30th June, 1955, as a fresh general election could not be arranged upto that time. Then a further notification was issued by the Government dated the 16th December, 1954, which reads as follows:—

    Jaipur December 16, 1954.

    No. 17739.F. I(n)(14) LSG/51-II— In exercise of power conferred by sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951, ‘the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to order that for the purposes of the ensuing Municipal General Elections of Mukandgarh:—

    (a) there shall be 8 wards;

    (b) there shall be 10 members—8 elected and 2 nominated, and

    (c) that one member shall be elected from each ward.”

    12. It would be at once seen that the mode of election which was adopted at the election of 1951 was definitely ordered to be given up by the notification of 1954 for the election to be held in 1955 and instead of this municipality going to the polls or the single constituency basis, elections were ordered to be held on ??? ward-wise basis and each one of the wards was to return one member to the Board. What happened then at the end of the term of this Board in 1958 was that the Collector by his order dated the 9th July, 1958, referred to above, appointed respondent No. I as the Returning Officer to carry out the general election for this Board and thereafter the Returning Officer issued a programme of election. In this programme of election, he announced that the election would be held of a single constituency basis, that being a clear departure from the last general election of 1955 and a reversion to the mode followed in 1951. No care was taken on the part of the competent authority to fix the composition of the Board or even to say that it would be as before. In these circumstances, I have 110 hesitation in saying that learned counsel for the contesting respondents makes a rather tall proposition when he asks me to read the notification of 1951 as still alive when the general election of 1955 was going to take place or that notification would still govern the impugned election. An insuperable difficulty in the way of learned counsel is the notification of December, 1954, which I have already set out above. Undoubtedly it was issued for the ensuing municipal general election, that is of 1955; but in so far as it did so the inevitable position to which we come is that it completely superseded the notification of 1951. Let it be remembered that the notification of 1954 was not issued as being in partial supersession of the earlier one. Therefore by the sheer logic of events, the correct conclusion would be that once the notification of 1954 came into existence it necessarily displaced the earlier notification of 1951, and it is just a short but irresistible step from this to hold that inasmuch as the notification of 1954 was in terms limited to the ensuing general election, there was a complete hiatus as to the total strength of the board or the character of its composition and the proportion of the elective and the nominative element therein so far as the election of 1958 which is the election impugned before me goes. The inevitable position then is that no foundation was laid for the holding of the election of 1958 by the issue of a notification under sec. 10 of the Act, and, therefore, the entire super-structure must tumble down.

    13. The second contention of learned counsel for the respondents was that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file an election petition under sec. 19 of the Act before an Election Tribunal instead of a writ application to this Court, and strong reliance is placed in this connection on the bench decision of this Court in Kapurchand v. State of Rajasthan (D.B Civil Writ petition No. 165 of the 31st July, 1957) an unreported decision to which reference has been made in Qurab Ali's case as well as the Full Bench case referred to above. With all respect, this argument seems to me to be specious but has no substance in it. In Qurab Ali's case (Supra) I held that this other case was distinguishable on facts and that it would not be attracted into application where the irregularities on the strength of which the election was sought to be set aside were committed by the Collector or the Government and not by the Returning Officer. I may also point out with all respect, that it does not seem to have been ever contended before the learned Judges who decided that case that there was a breach of the basic requirements for the holding of a general election as provided in sec. 10 of the Act, and the entire emphasis in that case was laid on certain errors committed by the Returning Officer. As I understand the entire law, that has been developed as a result of the various decisions in our Court, the analogy of Kapoorcliand's case (Supra) cannot be rightly held to be applicable where the deficiencies vitiating an election are more fundamental than mere errors committed by a Returning Officer in the conduct of an election, and it seems to me to be too late in the day to hold that such vital and if I might so characterise them, “pre-election deficiencies cannot be brought to this Court for rectification in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the present petition cannot be thrown out on the ground that the petitioners should have gone to an election tribunal and that they have acted wrongly in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

    14. The last point raised on behalf of the respondents was that the petitioners having set up their candidature at the election in question and having fought it on the basis of the electoral arrangements such as they happened to be and having been defeated thereat should not be allowed to turn round and challenge the same by a writ application in the manner proposed. A complete answer to this is furnished by Qurab Ali's case (Supra) where I rejected a similar plea, because, firstly, there cannot be any estoppel against the statute, and, secondly, because is cannot be justly postulated that the position of the respondents was in Page: 63any manner altered or adversely affected by reason of something done or omitted to be done by the petitioners. This contention is, therefore, without any merit and of over-rule it also.

    15. The result thus is that my finding on the point of non-compliance with the mandatory and foundational provisions of sec. 10(a)(b) and (c) of the Act is sufficient to dispose of the present application, and for the reasons which I have set out above at length, I have come to the conclusion, though not without considerable regret, that the impugned election be sustained in law and has to be quashed. As I have come to a firm conclusion on this vital point in the case which goes to the very root of it, I consider it entirely unncessary to deal with the other contentions canvassed by the petitioners before me. I should, however, like to mention, in passing, that the mode of preparation of the electoral list and its publication, both before and after finalization left a lot to be desired in the present case; and I would take this opportunity of sounding a strong note of caution to those responsible that they would be well advised 10 carefully study and strictly comply with the provisions of the statute in these and like respects so that the labour and money of candidates who happen to be declared successful at such elections are not helplessly thrown away for want of due compliance with the various important provisions of the law relating to election, and likewise the time of this Court may nor have to be spent on the decisions of questions which need not arise at all or at any rate with the frequency with which they do arise if only a little more care and a little greater attention were bestowed on the fundamental of the electoral procedure at the proper time by those upon whom the Legislature has imposed a duty to supervise and conduct these elections from time to time. It is earnestly to be hoped that this caution will not go unheeded.

    16. In the result this application succeeds and I hereby allow it and hold that respondents Nos. 2 to 9 are not the duly appointed members of the municipal board and shall not function as such. As much of the trouble that has arisen in this case is due to the fault of the Collector whose duty it was to issue a notification under sec. 10 of the Act, but which he signally failed to issue, I would make no order as to costs.

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    Hari Prasad v. Returning Officer, Nawalgarh
    (Apr 28, 1961)