Gupta, J.:— These two writ petitions arise out of the same subject matter and as such it would be proper to dispose them of by a common order.

2. The facts in which these writ petitions arise may be briefly stated. There is a bus route from Gangapur to Deogarh via Raipur and Kareda (hereinafter referred to as ‘the route’) which lies in the Udaipur region of the State of Rajasthan. The route is 55 miles long and ‘A’ class. The petitioner applied for the grant of a non-temporary stage carriage permit on the route and according to the case of the petitioner no objections were filed against his application for the grant of a permit on the route, as a copy of any such objection was not received by the petitioner, as required under Section 57(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The matter regarding the consideration of the application of the petitioner for grant of a permit on the route came up before the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the R.T.A’) on April 22, 1969. Amar Singh respondent No. 3 (in S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 896 of 1973) and another person Nathulal Dad appeared as objectors before the R.T.A and contested the opening of the new route from Gangapur to Deogarh via Raipur and the grant of a permit to the petitioner on the route. The R.T.A by its resolution dated April 22, 1969 decided to open the afore said new route and also by the same resolution decided to grant a non-temporary stage carriage permit on the route to the petitioner for a period of three years. In consequence of the aforesaid resolution of the R.T.A a permit was issued to the petitioner on June 6, 1969. One Bhagwatilal, who was an existing operator of Gangapur-Deogarh route, filed a revision petition before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’) on July 21, 1969. Amar Singh respondent No. 3 (in writ petition No. 896 of 1973) filed an appeal before the Tribunal on January 18, 1972 against the very same resolution of the R.T.A dated April 22, 1969 granting a permit to the petitioner on the route. The appellant Amar Singh explained in his memo of appeal that he had applied for a certified copy of the resolution of the R.T.A in question on April 23, 1969 but as the copy of the same was not supplied to him, so he again applied for a certified copy of the said resolution of the R.T.A on December 2, 1971 and that the certified copy of the impugned resolution of the R.T.A Page: 203was thereafter supplied to him on December 29, 1971 and as such the appeal was filed by him on January 18, 1972 before the Tribunal. The aforesaid appeal of Amar Singh was registered by the Tribunal subject to the decision of the question of limitation. The petitioner filed written objections in respect of the aforesaid appeal and the revision petition before the Tribunal and specifically raised two grounds, namely that the appeal and revision petition filed by Amar Singh and Bhagwatilal respectively were not maintainable in law, inasmuch no foundation was laid for filing an appeal under Section 64(f) of the Act by Amar Singh as he did not supply a copy of his alleged objections to the petitioner within the time limited by the provisions of Section 57(4) of the Act and that a revision petition could not have been filed in the matter of grant of a stage carriage permit, in respect of which an appeal was maintainable under Section 64 of the Act. Bhagwatilal could not maintain an appeal as well because he did not file any objection or representation within the meaning of Section 57(4) of the Act. Secondly, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner before the Tribunal that the appeal filed by Amar Singh before it was barred by time. The Tribunal heard the appeal and by its order dated June 20, 1973 allowed both the appeal as well as the revision petition. The Tribunal held that the R.T.A was not empowered to grant a permit to the petitioner by the same resolution by which a limit of permits was fixed on the route under Section 47(3) of the Act and that the limit of permits should have been fixed by the R.T.A earlier by a separate resolution, before it proceeded to grant a permit to the petitioner on the route. It may also be mentioned here that during the pendency of the appeal, although an exparte stay order was passed by the Tribunal, yet the same was vacated when the Tribunal came to know that the petitioner was continuing to ply his vehicle on the route on the basis of the permit issued to him by the R.T.A on June 6, 1969.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised three submissions before me in these two writ petitions filed against the order of the Tribunal dated June 20, 1973 by which the appeal and revision petition of Bhagwatilal and Amar Singh were allowed. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that no objections were filed or at any rate a copy of such objections was not supplied to the petitioner simultaneously along with the filing of the objections before the R.T.A as required under Section 57(4) of the Act and as such the alleged objections could not have been taken into consideration by the R.T.A and therefore the respondent Amar Singh was not competent to prefor an appeal against the impugned resolution of the R.T.A granting a permit to the petitioner on the route, as he did not lay a proper foundation for preferring an appeal under Section 64(f) of the Act. In the second place, it was argued that the appeal was filed after the lapse of more than 2½ years and as such it was barred by time and the Tribunal could not have passed an order on the basis of such a belated appeal. The third submisssion of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that at any rate the R.T.A had subsequently fixed the limit of permits on the route by its resolution dated November 21, 1973 and thereafter also granted two permits to two other persons and as such there was no reason to interfere with the grant of permit in favour of the petitioner.

4. As regards the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the contesting respondent has produced in writ petition No. 896 of 1973 a certified copy of the objections alleged to have been sent by him to the Secretary R.T.A in respect of the application of the petitioner for grant of a permit on the route along with a certified copy of a certificate of posting, under which the alleged copy of objections is said to have been forwarded to the petitioner by Amar Singh. It is not disputed that the address given in the certificate of posting is the same which has been given in the permit issued to the petitioner, a copy of which is Ex. P/2 on record. It could not be contested, in these circumstances, that the address mentioned in the certificate of posting was the correct address of the petitioner. It would, therefore, be proper to presume that the representation Annexure B/1 was submitted by the respondent Amar Singh before the R.T.A and further that a copy thereof was sent to the petitioner under the certificate of posting Annexure B/2 dated August 16, 1968. This inference further supported by the fact that in the resolution of the R.T.A dated April 22, 1969 granting a permit to the petitioner on the route, the presence Page: 204of the respondent Amar Singh has been recorded as an objector and it appears that he was also afforded an opportunity of hearing by the R.T.A in the matter of grant of a permit on Gangapur-Deogarh route. The petitioner does not appear to have raised any objection before the R.T.A that the copy of the representation alleged to have been sent by Amar Singh to him, was not received by the petitioner and that Amar Singh could not be heard by the R.T.A in the matter in view of the provisions of Section 57(5) of the Act. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, repelled and it cannot be held that Amar Singh did not file objections or representation or that he did not supply a copy thereof to the petitioner within the stipulated time.

5. As regards the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appeal preferred by Amar Singh was not filed within time, there can be no two opinions that the appeal was filed after a lapse of 2 years, as the resolution of the R.T.A was passed on April 22, 1969 and the appeal was preferred on January 18, 1972. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 Amar Singh (in writ petition No. 896 of 1973) was that the said respondent submitted an application on April 23, 1969 for obtaining a certified copy of the resolution of the R.T.A against which an appeal was to be preferred by him but as no copy was supplied to him, he submitted another application for the same on November 19, 1971 and yet another application on December 2, 1971 and it was on the last mentioned application that the certified copy of the resolution of the R.T.A was supplied to him on December 29, 1971, and that the appeal was filed before the Tribunal within time after the receipt of the certified copy of the resolution of the R.T.A by the respondent No. 3. The objection that the appeal was filed before the Tribunal beyond the period of limitation provided by law for filing of an appeal was thus apparent on the face of the record and it was on this ground that the Tribunal admitted the appeal subject to the objection about limitation. It is admitted by both the contesting parties that the Tribunal had called for the recorded of the R.T.A and perused the same in respect of the question of limitation, but it is surprising that while deciding the appeal the Tribunal did not consider it proper to decide the question of the appeal being barred on the ground of limitation. It is difficult to accept that Amar Singh, having applied for a certified copy on April 23, 1969 did not think it necessary to approach the R.T.A for obtaining a copy of the impugned resolution upto 19-11-1971 for a period of almost 21 years. A copy of the application for obtaining a certified copy alleged to have been submitted by Amar Singh in the office of the R.T.A on April 23, 1969 has not been produced before this Court and it has been stated that the original application for certified copy was missing from the record of the R.T.A However, an extract copy from the receipt register of the office of the R.T.O Udajpur has been produced from which only this much can be said that an application for a certified copy of the impugned resolution of the R.T.A was submitted by Amar Singh on April 23, 1969. But it does not appear from the extract copy of the aforesaid register as to whether the said copy was issued or not or what happened in the matter thereafter. It is surprising that Amar Singh is said to have taken no steps at all for obtaining the certified copy applied for by him even after lapse of 2½ years. In these circumstances, there appears to be no doubt that the appeal filed by Amar Singh before the Tribunal was filed beyond the statutory period of thirty days limitation and the same was, therefore, barred by time. It is the duty of the person who applies for obtaining a certified copy to approach the authority concerned within reasonable time for obtaining the certified copy applied for by him and he cannot allow it to lie by for an enormously long period of 2½ years. It would be proper for the State Government to frame Rules for the purpose of regulating the issuance of certified copies by the transport authorities, similar to those which govern the issuance of certified copies by civil courts in the State so that such anomolous situations may not arise, as has come to light in the present case.

6. As regards the third submission of the learned counsel, it may be observed that any subsequent determination of the limit of permits on the route by the R.T.A cannot have the effect of validating the permit granted earlier in favour of the petitioner. In R. Obliswami Naidu v. Addl. State Transport Appellate Tribunal Madras Page: 205(1) their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the R.T.A could not decide the matter regarding fixing the limit of permits to be granted on a route while considering the applications for grant of permits on that route under Section 48 of the Act because in case the R.T.A is allowed to determine the number of permits to be granted on the route while considering the applications for grant of permits on that route, then those persons who happened to apply first would be in a commanding position and the R.T.A would have no opportunity to choose between competing candidates and public interest would thereby suffer. Now it is settled law that the determination of the limit of permits to be granted on a route under Section 47(3) of the Act must precede the consideration of the merits of the applicants for grant of permits, under Section 48 of the Act.

7. However, Mr. Maheshwari learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 (in writ petition No. 896 of 1973) urged that in case the order of the Tribunal is set aside on the ground that the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 3 before the Tribunal was barred by time it would result in this Court perpetuating the illegal order passed by the R.T.A in granting a permit to the petitioner on the route, without prior fixation of the limit of number of permits on the route. A perusal of the resolution of the R.T.A no doubt shows that the R.T.A while considering the application of the petitioner for the grant of a permit on the route also considered the question regarding opening of a new route and also granted a permit to the petitioner on the route by the same resolution. This procedure, which was adopted by the R.T.A in the present case, was patently erroneously in view of the several decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court on the point. In Mohammed Ibrahim etc. v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal Madras (2) it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court:—

“It is, therefore, established that the determination of limit of number of permits is to be made before the grant of permits. That is why Section 48 of the Act is prefaced with the words ‘subject to the provisions of Section 47 of the Act’ meaning thereby that the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority to grant permits is subject to the determination of the limit of number of permits under sec. 47(3) of the Act”.

8. Thus it is absolutely clear that the R.T.A was required under the law to first fix the limit of number of permits under Section 47(3) of the Act and after having done so, it could have proceeded to the next step of considering the applications for grant of permits on the route, along with representations submitted in connection thereof, in accordance with the procedure laid down under Section 57 of the Act.

9. This Court, while granting a writ of certiorari, would not exercise its discretion in such a manner which would have the effect of restoring an illegal order passed by the R.T.A Thus as the effect of removing the order passed by the Tribunal by a writ of certiorari in the present case, would be of restoring the invalid order passed by the R.T.A of granting a permit to the petitioner simultaneously along with the opening of a new route and even without prior fixation of limit of permits on the route, obviously the discretionary power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be used for such a purpose Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Godde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (3). In that case the State Government had received its previous order passed under sec. 72 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act and their Lordships of the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the State Government had no power under sec. 72 of the aforesaid Act to review its previous order, but their Lordships refused to interfere with the order passed by the State Government upon such review on the ground that the quashing of that order would lead to the restoration of an illegal order passed earlier by the State Government. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India in the aforesaid circumstances.

10. In A.M Allison & H.P Brigg v. B.L Sen & Others (4) it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court:—

“The High Court of Assam had the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was no failure of justice, and in these appeals which are directed against the orders of the High Court in applications under Art. 226 we could refuse to interfere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the case requires it. But we are not so satisfied. We are of opinion that, having regard to the merits which have been concurrently found in favour of the respondents both by the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the High Court, we should decline to interfere.”

11. In the present case, as I have already observed above, the result of setting aside the appellate order of the Tribunal would lead to the restoration of the order of the R.T.A which is patently erroneous. I, therefore, think it proper, in the circumstances of the present case, to decline to exercise the dtscretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, in the matter of the grant of a non-temporary stage carriage permit to the petitioner on the route. Moreover, it would be proper in the present case to direct the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur to consider afresh within reasonable time the applications for grant of permits on the route including that of the petitioner. It would also be proper, in the circumstances of the present case, that the petitioner who is plying his vehicle on the route since the year 1969 be allowed to continue to ply his vehicle on the route till the matter relating to the grant of permits on the route is decided afresh by the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur, so that inconvenience may not be otherwise caused to the travelling public owing to the consequent discontinuation of the bus service, at present provided on the route by the petitioner.

12. Writ petition No. 896 of 1973 is directed against the very same order of the Tribunal dated June 20, 1973 allowing the revision petition of Bhagwati Lal. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 was unable to show as to how a revision petition was maintainable against the resolution of the R.T.A granting a permit to the petitioner on the route. Bhagwatilal admittedly did not file any objections or representation in respect of the application of the petitioner for grant of a permit on the route within the meaning of Section 57(4) of the Act and as such he was neither entitled to oppose the application of the petitioner for grant of a permit before the R.T.A when the matter relating to the grant of a permit to the petitioner on the route was considered on April 22, 1969 nor was he entitled to file an appeal or revision in the matter of the grant of a permit to the petitioner on the route. As an appeal could be filed under Section 64(f) of the Act in case a foundation for preferring the same would have been properly laid in the matter of grant of permit to the petitioner on the route, the revision petition under Section 64A is not maintainable. Section 64A very clearly provides that a revision petition could be preferred before the Tribunal only in a case in which an appeal under Section 64 did not lie. But as in the present case an appeal could lie, if a proper foundation therefor would have been laid by Bhagwatilal, as such the revision petition filed by him before the Tribunal was not maintaiaable. The view that I have expressed above was also taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Hardutt Singh v. State Transport Authority (5). Thus the order of the Tribunal allowing the revision petition of Bhagwatilal deserves to be set aside, as the revision petition preferred by him was not maintainable in law.

13. In the result, the writ petition No. 897 of 1973 is allowed and the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur dated June 20, 1973 is set aside so far as the revision petition filed by Bhagwatilal was allowed by it. The writ petition No. 896 of 1973 is partly allowed to the extent that the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur is directed to decide afresh the matter relating to the grant of a non-temporary stage carriage permit on Gangapur-Deogarh route including the application of the petitioner in respect thereof in accordance with law, within a period of three months. The order passed by the Tribunal setting aside the grant of a permit in favour of the petitioner on the aforesaid route is maintained. However, petitioner shall be permitted to ply his vehicle on the aforesaid route untill the decision of his application for grant of a permit on the route by the Regional Transport Authority Udaipur. In the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs.