Khosla, J.:— In this reference we have been called upon to consider the question of privilage in respect of “evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State”; in other words we have to interpret and explain the provisions of section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act.
2. The facts giving rise to the reference may be briefly stated. Haji Peer Mohammad Khuda Bakhsh, the respondent before us, entered into a contract with the Governor General-in-Council for the supply of 300,000 pairs of shoe laces. The terms of the contract are immaterial for the purposes Page: 157of out enquiry and suffice it to say that the goods were to be delivered on certain specified dates and that the contract contained an arbitration clause whereby any dispute arising out of the transaction could be referred to arbitration. A second contract for the supply of 600,000 pairs of shoe laces was subsequently entered into on somewhat similar, terms. Both these contracts were cancelled by Government on the ground that the respondent has failed ta supply the goods on the dates specified in the contract. The respondent on this invoked the arbitration clause and called upon the Governor-General to appoint an arbitrator, intimating at the same time that he (the respondent) had nominated his own arbitrator. The Governor-General contended that there was no valid or concluded agreement between the parties and made an application under section 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act to the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi. In the course of the enquiry before the Senior Subordinate Judge the respondent summoned Mr. Kureshi, Assistant Director of Supplies, with certain documents. Mr. Kureshi appeared in Court with these documents but claimed privilege under sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act in respect of two letters which had been written by one departmental official to another. It was claimed that these letters constituted “evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to affairs of State” and that, therefore, they could not by virtue of the provisions of section 123, Indian Evidence Act, be admitted in evidence without the permission of the head of the department. Mr. Kureshi at the same time produced an order recorded by Mr. A.G Khan, Director-General Industries and Supplies, which is in the following terms:—
“Summons from the Court of the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi, for the attendance of Mr. N.N.A Kureshi, Assistant Director Supplies, for giving evidence on behalf of the defendant (H. Peer Mohammad Khuda Buksh) and for production of office files and documents relating to Peer Mohammad Khuda Buksh, Jullundur (Punjab) against A/Ts No. SY/17786.L-2/1039 dated 27-11-1943 and SY/LM-2.L-2/984 dated 23-9-1943.
(a) I direct Mr. N.N.A Kureshi, Assistant Director Supplies, Directorate-General of Industries and Supplies, New Delhi, to appear with the files and the documents mentioned in the list attached with the summons. I claim privilege for the following papers under sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act:—
(1) File pertaining to A/T No. SY/17786.L-2/1939 dated 27-11-1943 and A/T No. SY/LM-2 (Split)/L-2/984 dated 23-9-1943.
(2) Letter dated 5-4-1945 from D.I.S.C Lahore Cantt. to C.C.P (S) copy endorsed to O.I.D Jullundur.
(3) Letter No. S/68/59/10 dated 18-7-1945 from the Officer-in-charge O.I.D Jullundur to C.C.P (S), New Delhi.
(b) No evidence derived from the files and documents for which privilege is claimed can be given as these files and documents contain unpublished official records relating to affairs of State for the purpose of sections 123 and 124 of the said Act and disclosure of such files would be detrimental to public interests. I further state that in view of section 162 of the said Act, the files and these documents are not open to inspection of the Court.
(c) I direct that the letter received from the firm (shown at SI. No. 2 of the list attached to the summons) may be produced by Mr. N.N.A Kureshi before the Court. Regarding Sl. Nos. 3 and 4, these were not received in this Directorate General.”
3. Mr. Khan as Head of Department had thus with held his permission to produce these letters. Privilege was also claimed in respect of the contents of Exhibit D. 14, a copy of similar letter which was produced by the respondent in Court. The learned Senior Subordinate. Judge bearing the case inspected the documents (notwithstanding an objection on this score raised by the petitioner's counsel) and disallowed the privilege claimed on the ground that the letters in question related to commercial matters and not to affairs of State. The letters were then admitted in evidence and the Court in due course dismissed the Governor-General's application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act. A revision petition against the order of dismissal was filed in this Court and when the matter came up before my learned brother Kapur sitting in single Bench the question of privilege under sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act was again agitated. My learned brother, being of the opinion that the provisions of section 123 require a more authoritative interpretation, referred the matter to my Lord the Chief Justice who thereupon constituted the present Bench of three Judges to hear and determine the whole question of privilege under section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act.
4. section 123, Indian Evidence Act, is in the following terms:—
“No one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withheld such permission as be thinks fit.”
5. It is also necessary to refer to section 162 of the Evidence Act, the relevant portion of which reads:—
“A witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility. The validity, of any such objection shall be decided on by the Court. The Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility. * * *”
6. It is, therefore, clear that the Court may (on the application of a party or otherwise) summon a witness and call upon him to produce any document in his possession. The witness is bound to attend Court and bring with him the documents required. He may, however, take objection to their production or their admissibility and claim privilege in respect of any of the documents he is required to produce. It well be for the Court to decide the validity of such objection and in order to arrive at a decision the Court may (i) look at the document or (ii) take other evidence. An exception has, however, been made in the case of documents relating to affairs of State, for the inspection of such documents by the Court is categorically prohibited. The Court can neither look at the documents nor allow evidence derived from them to be adduced in Court without the permission of the head of the department. The questions which arise and which must be answered before a correct interpretation of section 123, Indian Evidence Act, can be given are thus these:—
(1) What are affairs of State?
(2) Who is to determine the validity of an objection based on the ground that the document relates to affairs of State and cannot, therefore, be produced in evidence? Is it for the Court to adjudicate upon the validity or otherwise of the objection or for the head of the department whose decision is conclusive and binding upon the Court?
(3) If it is for the Court to consider and decide this matter, what is the procedure to be adopted and in what form must the objection be taken?
(4) Who is to be considered the had of any particular department?
7. Mr. Bishan Narain who appeared on behalf of the Governor-General in Council argued that the Court is debarred from making an enquiry into the question whether the document relates to affairs of State, for the Court must accept the dictum of the heal of the department on this point and must also respect his decision to give or withhold permission to the document being produced or evidence derived from it to be tendered in Court. All that the Court can do is to satisfy itself that the head of the department (1) had pronounced the document as one relating to affairs of State and (2) had withheld or accorded his permission. If permission has been withheld the Court cannot proceed further in the matter and cannot launch into an enquiry whether the document does in fact relate to affairs of State and whether the assertion of fact made by the head of the department is or is not true. Indeed, even the question, what are affairs of State would not are, for the head of the department could, by using these magic words, close all avenues of enquiry open to the Court. In other words, according to Mr. Bishan Naain, when the head of the department says, “this document relates to affairs of State and I withhold permission to its being produced in Court” the matter is closed for ever. This bald assertion or ipse dixit of the bead of the department is sufficient to deprive the Court of its right to determine the validity of the objection which is conferred by the provisions of section 162, Indian Evidence Act.
8. It is scarcely necessary to recall that the Indian Evidence Act was drawn up in 1870–1871 by Sir James Stephen and was based entirely on the English Law of Evidence as then in force. It is, however, interesting to remember that Sir James Stephen drew up a similar Code fir England. This draft did not attain the dignity or the authority of a statute but it is a text-book founded upon the then existing English Law of Evidence and is accepted as a correct statement of that law. Article 112 of this book (A Digest of the Law of Evidence by Stephen) deals with the question under our consideration. It is in the following terms:—
“No one can be compelled to give evidence, relating to any affairs of State, or as to official communications between public officers upon public affairs, unless the officer at the head of the department concerned permits him to do so, * * * *”
9. This Article is in terms analogous to the provisions of sections 123 and 124, Indian Evidence Act. There is a reference in the footnote to Beatson v. Skene (1860) 2 L.T 378 , 29 L.J Ex. 430 , 120 R.R 839. There is one important point to be noted, namely, the expression “affairs of State” was used by Stephen both in the Indian Evidence Act and in the draft bill containing a statement of the English Law of Evidence. As far as I am aware this expression has not been defined anywhere, but it is clear that it cannot mean any and every matter in which the State is concerned. Otherwise the privilege contemplated by section 123, Indian Evidence Act would attach to every communication made by every officer of Government upon every subject. That, however, is not the law either in England or in India as is manifest from a number of authorities on the subject. “Affairs of State” has always been interpreted in a somewhat narrow sonse. In Beatson v. Skene A.I.R 1944 Lah. 209 the Secretary for Page: 160war was asked to produce certain documents. He attended at the trial but objected to the production of documents on the ground that his doing so would be injurious to the public service. Pollock, C.B, who delivered the judgment in the case observed:—
“It is manifest (we think) that there must be a limit to the duty or the power of compelling the production of papers which are connected with acts of State.” And again,—
“We are of opinion that, if the production of a State paper would be injurious to the public service, the general public interest must be considered paramount to the individual interest of a suitor in a court of justice.”
10. Martin, B., took a somewhat different view. According to him “whenever the Judge is satisfied that the document may be made public without prejudice to the public service, the judge ought to compel its production, notwithstanding the reluctance of the head of the department to produce it.” Viscount Simon, L.C, delivering the judgment in Duncan v. Cammell Laird and Co. Ltd. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587 while considering the question of privilege observed:—
“It is not sufficient ground that the documents are ‘state documents’ or ‘official’ or are marked ‘confidential’. It would not be a good ground that, if they were produced, the consequences might involve the department or the government in Parliamentary discussion or in public criticism or might necessitate the attendance as witnesses or otherwise of officials who have pressing duties elsewhere. Neither would it be a good ground that production might teed to expose a want of efficiency in the administration or tend to lay the department open to claims for compensation. In a word, it is not enough that the minister or the department does not want to have the documents produced. The minister, in deciding whether it is, his duty to object, should bear these considerations in mind, for he ought not to take the responsibility of withholding production except in cases where the public interest would otherwise be damnified, e.g where disclosure would be injurious to national defence, or to good diplomatic relations, or where the practice of keeping a class of documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning of the public service.”
11. I have quoted this passage at length as the pronouncement of Viscount Simon in the House of Lords contains a declaration of the law with regard to privilege as obtaining in England and according to English law it is not contemplated that every document relating to any matter concerning the Government or State is a privileged document. Viscount Simon envisaged documents of many types which would be ordered to be produced in Court although technically speaking they would relate to matters of State. It is, therefore, clear that the expression “affairs of State” as used by Sir James Stephen in Article 112 of the Digest of the Law of Evidence and as used by him in section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act was intended to have a restricted meaning. In this connection it is instructive to refer to certain observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Robinson v. State of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254. In this case Robinson made a claim against the State of South Australia arising out of the negligence of the servant and agents of the State in execution of duties of Government under the wheat Harvest Acts. The State claimed Protection or privilege in respect of certain documents which the plaintiff had called for. Lord Blanesburgh in delivering the judgment recosnised that the “State documents are frequently absolutely privileged from production” and it is the “supreme duty of the Court to protect the privilege where it exists” He however, observed:—
“It is, their Lordships think, now recognised that the privilege is a narrow one, most sparingly to be exercised.”
12. Reference was then made to the following passage in section 939 of Taylor's Law of Evidence—
“The principle of the rule is concerned for public interest and the rule will accordingly be applied no further than the attainment of that object requires.”
13. A little later Lord Blanesburgh observed:—
“As the protection is claimed on the broad principle of State policy and public convenience, the papers protected, as might have been expected, have usually been public official documents of a political or administrative character. Yet the rule is not limited to these documents. Its foundation is that the information cannot be disclosed without injury to the public interests and not that the documents are confidential or official, which alone is no reason for their non-production: (see Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Anglo Persian Oil Co. (1916) 1 K.B 822 and Smith v. East India Co.6).”
14. The same principle has been recognised in a number of Indian rulings. The diary of a foot-constable who was shadowing the movements of a suspect was held not to be a document relating to affairs of State (Mohan Singh v. Emperor. A.I.R 1940 Lah. 217) Statements made by witnesses in the course of a departmental enquiry into the conduct of public officers were held not to be privileged, Harbans v. R.8. Records evidencing Government intervention unauthorised by law in a pending judicial or quasi judicial matter were held not to relate to affairs of State (Croun v. Rasulbaksh A.I.R 1944 Sind. 145). Statements made to and recorded by a Forest Range Officer in the course of an investigation were held not to relate to any affairs of State In re Kaliyappa Udayan A.I.R 1937 Mad. 492. An entry in the register of postings showing that certain Customs Preventive Officers were ordered to be at their stations at a particular hour were held not to be affairs of State in Rokun Ali v. Emperor11. The matter was considered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Re Mantubhai Mehta A.I.R 1945 Bom. 122 Wadia, J., in pronouncing judgment observed.—
“The Evidence Act does not say what documents are to be regarded as unpublished official records relating to affairs of State, or communications made to an officer in his official capacity. It is not every official record or register or every official communication which can be regarded as privileged.”
15. The learned Judge then referred to the observations of Viscount Simon in Duncan v. Cammell Laird and Co. Ltd. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587.
“The principle to be applied in every case is that documents otherwise relevant and liable to production must not be produced if the public interest requires that they should be withheld.”
16. It is, therefore, sufficiently clear that the expression “affairs of State” as used in section 123, Indian Evidence Act, has a restricted meaning and on the weight of authority both in England and in this country I Page: 162would define “affairs of State” as matters of a public nature in which the State is concerned and the disclosure of which will be prejudicial to the public interest or injurious to national defence, or detrimental to good diplomatic relations. Words very similar to these were by used by Viscount Simon in Duncan v. Cammell Laird and Co. Ltd. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587.
17. We can now undertake a consideration of the second question, namely, who is to determine the validity of the objection raised by the head of the department on the ground that the document relates to affairs of State. It was contended before us by Mr. Bishan Narain that the head of the department is the sole and the final judge of this matter and it is sufficient for him to say that the document relates to affairs of State and that he withholds its production. According to the provisions of section 162, Indian Evidence Act, it is for the Court to determine the validity of any objection to the production of a document. This section further provides that “the Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility.” It is thus clear that the Court can enquire into the validity of the objection by looking at the document and by taking other evidence. In the case of a document relating to affairs of State the course if inspecting the document is not open to the Court, but this does not mean that the Court's right to adjudicate upon the validity of the objection is completely taken away thereby. The Court has still the right to take other evidence and determine whether the objection taken by the witness who was ordered to produce the document or the head of the department is indeed a valid objection. In other words, the Court has a right to satisfy itself that the document does in fact relate to affairs of State. Mr. Tek Chand who appeared on behalf of the respondent drew our attention to Order: 1, rule 19, sub-rule (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and contended that as this provision was contained in a later statute it had the effect of repealing pro tanto the provisions of section 162, Indian Evidence Act. I am unable to accept this contention. Sub-rule (2) of rule 19 is a general provision of law and the general never abrogates the particular. Moreover, the prohibition with regard to the inspection of a State document arises out of the privilege of the Crown and is not a procedural matter with which alone Sub-rule (2) of rule 19 deals. Therefore, I am of the view that despite the provisions of Sub-rule (2) of rule 19 the prohibition to the inspection of State documents contained in section 162, Indian Evidence Act, holds good.
18. Courts of law have consistently recognised the right of a Court to adjudicate upon the validity of an objection although the powers of the Court in this respect are perhaps not so unfettered as in the matter of other enquiries. Viscount Simon in Duncan v. Cammell Laird and Co. Ltd. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587 observed:—
“Although an objection validly taken to production on the ground that this would be injurious to the public interest is conclusive, it is important to remember that the decision ruling out such documents is the decision of the judge.”
19. Viscount Simon went as far as he could in respecting the privilege relating to State documents. It is to be remembered that in England there is no right of discovery as against the Crown and where the Crown is a party to the proceedings he cannot be called upon to produce any documents whatsoever although the officers of the Crown in practice thrown no Page: 163difficulty in placing all relevant matters before a Court of justice. In India discovery can as a matter of right be claimed against the Crown and according to the provisions of section 162, Indian Evidence Act, it is for the Court to adjudicate upon the validity of any objection taken in respect of any document. In Robinson v. State of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 an officer of the State claimed privilege in respect of certain documents. The Supreme Court of Australia considered the validity of the objection and disallowed it. This decision was reversed by their Lordships of the Privy Council who went as far as to say that it was lawful for the Court to inspect the document for the purpose of deciding as to the validity of the claim of privilege. Viscount Simon in considering this case observed that the Privy Council was mistaken in the view that the Court could inspect the document. He, however, did not question the right of the Court to determine upon the validity of the claim for privilege. Indeed be conceded that the decision ruling out a State document was a decision of the Judge.
20. The matter was considered In re Mantubhai Mehta A.I.R 1945 Bom. 122 already referred to above and Wadia, J., observed:—
“The position therefore with regard to an official document is that the officer summoned to produce it is bound to produce it in Court. He must raise the objection in Court and the question whether that objection is well-founded is one for the Court to decide. But for this purpose the Court is not entitled to inspect the document if it refers to matters of State. It must decide the question without such inspection by examining the officer producing it or otherwise.” In Ijjatali Talukdar v. Emperor A.I.R 1943 Cal. 539 , I.L.R (1944) 1. Cal. 410 Das J., (now Chief Justice of this Court) observed:—
“Paragraph 1 (section 162, Indian Evidence Act) gives the Court power to decide the validity of the claim of privilege and para. 2 only provides the method or means by which the Court will be able to decide the questions, namely (1) by inspecting the document or (2) by taking other evidence. It is only in case of documents relating to affairs of State that the Court cannot inspect the document. It only means that in cases of such documents one of the methods or means by which the Court is to decide the question is not available to it. The duty of deciding the question is still on the Court under para. 1 of the section. In case of documents relating to affairs of State it may be difficult for the Court to decide the question, yet it need not be necessarily impossible for the Court to do it. * * The ultimate decision as to whether a claim of privilege is well-founded or not rests with the Court and the Court jealously guards its powers.”
21. That the Court has this power was recognised in Mohan Singh v. Emperor A.I.R 1940 Lah. 217 and indeed in every case where it was held that the document in question was not a document relating to affairs of State.
22. My attention was drawn to three cases of the Lahore High Court in which a contrary view appears to have been taken. In I.M Lall v. Secretary of State A.I.R 1944 Lah. 209, a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court held that the head of the department must swear an affidavit to the effect that the documents in question relate to affairs of State. It was not held in this case that the Court had no power to adjudicate upon the validity of the objection in Khawaja Nazir Ahmad v. The Crown A.I.R 1944 Lah. 434 , 46 P.L.R 273, Abdul Rehman. J., observed:—
“The decision that the document cannot be produced will certainly be a decision of the Court; but the Court can, if it is satisfied that the claim Page: 164has been made by or under instructions of the person who can put forward such a claim, pronounce no other order in my judgment but to allow the privilege.”
23. This proposition in my view goes a little beyond the provisions of section 162, Indian Evidence Act, although I feel bound to state that in a very large majority of cases the claim when made in the proper form will be upheld by a Court of law. The last case was Emperor v. Raghunath Singh A.I.R 1946 Lah. 459 , 48 P.L.R 41 which came up before me sitting singly. In deciding this case I felt compelled to follow the Division Bench decision in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad v. The Crown A.I.R 1944 Lah. 434 , 46 P.L.R 273. I pointed out in that case that the head of the department could capriciously and falsely claim that a certain document related to affairs of State. This, however, only means that a Court may be driven to a wrong conclusion by accepting false evidence. The danger pregnant in accepting a procedure where by the Court is barred from examining the document if no doubt present, but there is no reason for presuming that the head of the department will swear a false affidavit or act capriciously. The law entitles the Court to examine the head of the department and put such questions to him as would satisfy the Court that the privilege is being claimed validly.
24. Mr. Bishan Narain agrued that to give to the Courts the power of determining the validity of an objection regarding Crown privilege would be a most dangerous concession as it would defeat the very object for which section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act was enacted. A Court may decline to allow the objection raised in respect of a document containing an important official secret, the publication of which might cause the greatest injury to the State and this might happen even in the case of commercial transactions, particularly transactions taking place during war time. There can be no doubt that a wrong decision or this point might cause great mischief. The desireability of avoiding a possible danger is, however beyond the province of this Court and all that we are called upon to do is to interpret the law as it exists and on this point the words of section 162, Indian Evidence Act, are susceptible of only one interpretation, namely, that it is for the Court to decide the validity of the objection. But a moment's consideration will prove that there is nothing wrong in the Courts being granted a power of this nature. It is preposterous to assume that a Court of law will act more capriciously than the head of the department in a matter of this nature. There is no justification for believing that every time privilege in respect of an important State secret is claimed the department would choose to disregard the opinion of the head of the department of his evidence on oath and compel the document to be produced in Court. There is on the other band a danger that in commercial transactions the head of a particular department may choose to withhold evidence merely in order to defeat the claims of a private individual against his department even though the evidence, if revealed, would not cause the slightest injury to the State or the public. I may refer in this connection to some observations of Lord Blanesburgh in Robinson v. State of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254:—
“In view of the increasing extension of State activities into the spheres of trading business and commerce and of the claim of privilege in relation to liabilities arising therefrom now apparently freely put forward, his observations stand on record to remind the Courts, that while they must duly safeguard genuine public interests they must see to it that the scope of the admitted privilege is not in such litigation, extended. Particularly Page: 165must it be remembered in this connection that the fact that production of documents might in the particular litigation prejudice the Crown's own case or assist that of the other side is not such ‘plain overruling principle of public interest’ as to justify any claim of privileged. The zealous champion of Crown rights may frequently be tempted to take the opposite view, particularly in cases where the claim against the Crown seems to him to be harsh or unfair. But such an opposite view is Without justification. In truth the fact that the documents, if produced, might have any such effect upon the fortunes of the litigation is of itself a compelling reason for their production—one only to be overborne by the gravest considerations of State policy or security. (Robinson v. State of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254, at pp. 715 and 716).
25. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the Court can hold no enquiry in to the validity of the objection the moment privilege is claimed by the head of the department. It is nevertheless true that once the Court comes to the conclusion that the documents relates to affairs of State the decision of the head of the department to give or withhold permission to its production must be accented as final. On this point the Court cannot question the discretion of the head of the department.
26. The next question for consideration is in what manner can the Court hold the enquiry when the inspection of the document is barred and further in what form must objection be taken. These questions do not present much difficulty. The previsions of section 162, Indian Evidence Act, are sufficiently clear. The witness called upon to produce certain documents must appear in Court and bring the documents with him he can then claim privilege. Viscount Simon in Duncan v. Cammell Laird and Co. Ltd. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587 and Lord Blanesburgh in Robinson v. Stater of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 have clearly indicated the manner in which this privilege must be claimed or the objection raised. Lordt Blanesburgh observed:—
“In such a case it seems to their Lordships clear that this particular privilege should normally, like any other, be claimed under the sanction of an oath, the oath being that of a responsible Minister of State whose mind has been directed to the question. Their Lordships, in saying this, do not of course mean to suggest that this requirement has come to be called for as a protection against imposition. Nothing of the sort. But it is required as a guarantee that the statement and opinion of the Minister, which the Court is asked to accept, is one that has not been expressed inadvisedly or lightly or as a matter of mere departmental routine, but is one put forward with the solemnity necessarily attaching to a sworn statement.”
27. Viscount Simon observed:—
“The essential matter is that the decision to object should be taken by the minister who is the political head of the department and that he should have seen and considered the contents of the documents and himself have formed the view that on grounds of public interest they ought not to be produced, either because of their actual contents or because of the class of documents e.g, departmental minutes—to which they belong. Instances may arise where it is not convenient or practicable for the political minister to act (e.g, he may be out of reach, or ill, or the department may be one where the effective head is a permanent official) and in such cases it would be reasonable for the objection to be taken, as it has often been taken in the past, by the permanent head. * * * It is not uncommon Page: 166in modern practice for the minister's objection to be conveyed to the Court at any rate in the first instance, by an official of the department who produces a certificate which the minister has signed, stating what is necessary. I see no harm in that procedure, provided it is understood that this is only for convenience and that, if the Court is not satisfied by this method, it can request the minister's personal attendance.”
28. Das, J., made similar observations in Ijjatali Talukdar v. Emperor A.I.R 1943 Cal. 539 , I.L.R (1944) 1. Cal. 410. A reference may also be made to Bhaiya Saheb v. Ramnath A.I.R 1938 Nag. 358. The terms of section 162, Indian Evidence Act and the English and Indian authorities dealing with the matter thus require that the form in which the objection should be taken is this. The head of the department must examine the documents and consider whether privilege should or should not be claimed in respect of them. He may then either appear in person before the Court to raise the objection or direct one of his subordinates to do so on his behalf with a certificate signed by him stating that he had examined the documents and adding what is necessary. But where the latter course is followed the head of the department will not be absolved from the obligation of appearing in person and satisfying the Court that the objection taken by him is valid. The Court may require him to give an affidavit or make a statement on oath and may put any question to him for satisfying itself that the privilege has been validly claimed. The Court, is, however, not entitled to inspect the documents nor put such questions to the head of the department or any other witness as would directly or indirectly reveal its contents. The scope of the enquiry that the Court can hold, therefore, is extremely limited but nevertheless within these narrow limits the Court has a right to hold an enquity and pronounce upon the validity or otherwise of the objection. That this course is not impracticable will be obvious to anyone who considers the matter. The head of the department may, for instance, be asked whether the document relates to a purely commercial transaction such as in the case before us. The answer to this question will not in any way prove injurious to the public interest. The right of the Court to enquire into the nature of the document for which protection is sought are to require some indication of the nature of the injury to the State which would follow its production was recognised by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Robinson v. State of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254. This enquiry will not entail disclosure of the contents of the document and it cannot be said that such an enquiry would defeat the very objects of section 123, Indian Evidence Act. “The Court is entitled to prescribe in any particular case the manner in which the clam of privilege shall be made if the claim is to be allowed.” It is precisely this type of enquiry which is contemplated by section 162, Indian Evidence Act. At our request a blank form which is in use in the East Punjab was produced before us. I can see no objection to the claim for privilege being made on a form of this type provided it is supported by an affidavit sworn by the head of the department.
29. The last question, namely, who is the head of the department will in very few cases present any difficulty. Ordinarily, the head of the department will mean the officer who is in control of the department and in whose custody records of that department remain. It will usually be the Secretary to the Provincial Government in Provincial Departments or the Secretary to the Government of India in the Departments of the Government of India. In England it is the political head or the Minister who has been held to be the head of the department, but under the Indian Page: 167Evidence Act it is either the Minister or the permanent head of department who has the right to grant or withhold permission to the production of a document relating to affairs of State. In a very large majority of cases their will be no disputes as to who is the head of the department, but if the authority of the person claiming privilege is called into question the matter can always be proved by evidence. In the present case it appears to me that the Director-General of Industries and Supplies correctly described himself as the head of the department we can now consider the documents in respect of which privilege was claimed in the present case. I have quoted above the order of the Director General of Industries and Supplies on the basis of which privilege was claimed. This order does not follow the form produced by Mr. Bishan Narain nor does it give any indication of the nature of the documents or the nature of the injury to the State which would have followed their production. Nor was the claim supported by any affidavit. The contention of the respondent was that the documents or letters did not contain any State secrets but related to commercial matters only. An examination of the documents fully proves this contention and I must uphold the view of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge that the documents did not relate to matters of State and no privilege in respect of them could be validly claimed. This revision petition must, therefore, be dismissed and I would order accordingly. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.
30. Kapur, J.:— I have had the privilege of reading the judgment prepared by my learned brother Khosla, J. and I agree generally with his conclusions and the reasons therefor and I would like to add my opinion to that given by my learned brother and this would also indicate the points where I have respectfully differed from him.
31. What is called “Crown privilege” with regard to the State documents is not a very happy expression. The withholding of documents on the ground that their publication would be contrary to public interest is not really a branch of Law of Privilege but is a question as was observed by Lord Simon L.C in Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587 of very great constitutional importance. In India this branch of law has been codified and is contained in three sections of the Indian Evidence Act Section 125 runs:—
“No one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit.”
32. Now, this section deals with the evidence derived from unpublished public records relating to any affairs of State; and the next section 124 which runs as follows, “No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interests would suffer by the disclosure” applies to all communications made in official confidence, whether such communications are in waiting or not and whether they relate to any affair of State or not.
33. The third section deals with this matter is 162 which relates to production of documents and is as follows:—
“A witness summoned to produce document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility. The validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the Court.
“The Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or takes other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility.”
34. The questions which require decision are:—
1. When can privilege be claimed and what are affairs of State?
2. The manner in which the privilege can be claimed
3. Who is to decide as to the availability of the privilege and what are the powers of the court in this matter?
35. I shall first take up the question as to when the privilege can be claimed. In Indian Law this is contained in sections 123 and 134 of the Indian Evidence Act. The question becomes a matter of some importance at a time when the State has embarked on a large number of undertakings of a commercial and Industrial nature and if, has become necessary for the Courts to carefully adjudicate upon the rights of the citizen as against the State. Section 123 was enacted at a time when the ‘State’ in India at any rate was mostly concerned with political and administrative matters and when the set up of the Government was a bureaucratic one.
36. I may state at the very beginning that unless he law is administered with due regard to the rights of the citizen as also to the security of the State it will be difficult to draw a line as to how far the Grown privilege extends in India. I am not mindful of what was said by their Lordships of the Privy Counsel in Robinson v. State of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 (at page 256) where it was stated that “no action to establish the liability of the State in this matter stands any real change of success, unless, like any other litigant under alleged liability in respect of trading operations, the State can be required to make full discovery of all documents in its possession or power relative to the matters in controversy.” Indeed, the law of discovery in India which is contained in Order 11 does not make any distinction between the right of one litigant to get a full discovery of documents from another litigant and the right of such a litigant against the State, where the State is a party to the action, but I shall discuss the question of discovery a little later.
37. The law to my mind is clear that State documents are absolutely privileged from production and it is the supreme duty of the Court to protect the privilege wherever it exists, but in this case, as indeed in every other case where the State is a party to the litigation, we have to define the limits of that privilege and we have to enquire into the character and quality thereof. As was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Robinson v. State of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 (at p. 25.) “It is, their Lordships think, now recognized that the privilege is a narrow one, most sparingly to be exercised” and reference was made by their Lordships to a passage from Taylor's work on Evidence (Section 939):—
“The principle of the rule is concern for public interest and the rule will accordingly be applied no further than the attainment of that object requires.”
38. Their Lordships also refered to a judgment of Rigby, L.J, in Attorney General v. Newcastle-upon Tyne Corporation (1897) 2 Q.B 325 for the purpose of explaining as to why cases illustrating the limitations upon this rule are not so numerous. The learned Lord Justice there observed:—
“I know that there has always been the utmost care to give a defendant that discovery which Crown would have been compelled to give it in the Page: 169position of a subject, unless there be some plain overruling principle of public interest concerned which cannot be disregarded.”
39. As a rule this protection is claimed on the principle of State policy and public convenience and the papers protected have usually been those which are public official documents of a political or administrative character, but it is not inconceivable that even in connection with the production of documents which relate to the trading commercial or contractual activities of a State there may be “some plain overruling principle of public interest concerned which cannot be disregarded.” But again I should like to emphasize as did their Lordships of the Privy Council that the cases in which this is so must, in view of the sole object of the privilege and specially in time of peace, be rare indeed and the distinction drawn by the Lord Justice remains instructive and illuminating and in view of the increasing extension of State activities into the spheres of trading business and commerce and of the claim of privilege in relation to liabilities arising therefrom now apparently freely put forward his observations stand on record to remind the Courts, that while they must duly safeguard genuine public interests they must see to it that the scope of the admitted privilege is not in such litigation extended. Particularly must it be remembered in this connection that the fact that production of the documents might in the particular litigation prejudice the Crown's own case or assist that of the other side is no such “plain overriding principle of public interest” as to justify any claim of privilege.
40. Their Lordships have further observed:—
“The zealous champion of Crown rights may frequently be tempted to take the opposite view, particularly in cases where the claim against the Crown seems to him to be harsh or unfair. But such an opposite view is without justification. In truth the fact that the documents, if produced, might have any such effect upon the fortunes of the litigation is of itself a compelling reason for their production one only to be overborne by the gravest considerations of State policy or security.”
41. The foundation of this Crown privilege is that the information cannot be disclosed without injury to the public interest and not that the documents are confidential or official, which alone is no reason for their non-production see Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Anglo Persian Oil Co. (1916) 1 K.B 822 and Smith v. East India Company36.
42. In Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587 (at p. 595) if was stated by Viscount Simon L.C “The rule that the interest of the State must not be put in jeopardy by producing documents which would injure it is a principle to be observed in administering justice, quite unconnected with the interest or claims of the particular parties in litigation and, indeed, is a rule upon which the Judge should, if necessary, insist, even though no objection is taken at all. This has been pointed out in several cases, e.g, in Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India (1825) 2 Q.B 189 per A.L Smith, L.J, at page 195.”
43. The Lord Chancellor continuing says:—
“In this connection, I do not think it is out of place to indicate the sort of grounds which would not afford to the minister adequate justification for objecting to production. It is not a sufficient ground that the documents are “state documents” or “Official” “or are marked confidential”. It would Page: 170not be a good ground that, if they were produced, the consequences might involve the department or the government in Parliamentary discussion or in public criticism, or might necessitate the attendance as witnesses or otherwise of officials who have pressing duties elsewhere. Neither would it be a good ground that production might tend to expose a want of efficiency in the administration or tend to lay the department open to claims for compensation. In a word, it is not enough that the minister or the department does not want to have the documents produced. The minister, in deciding whether it is his duty to object, should bear these considerations in mind, for he ought not to take the responsibility of withholding production except in cases where the public interest would otherwise be damnified, e.g, where disclosure would be injurious to national defence, or to good diplomatic relations, or where the practice of keeping a class of documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning of the public service.”
44. In Home v. Lord F.C Bentick39 the minutes of a Court of inquiry which were offered in evidence at the trial of an action by one Military Officer against another for trial were rejected and the question was whether the rejection was proper. It was observed by Dallas Ch. J:
“It seems to me therefore that the reception of the minutes would tend directly to disclose that which is not permitted to be disclosed and therefore independently of the character of the Court, I would say on the broad principle of public policy and convenience that in these matters, secret in their nature and involving delicate inquiry the names of persons stand protected.” In Beatson v. Skene (1860) 2 L.T 378 , 29 L.J Ex. 430 , 120 R.R 839 Pollock C.B observed:—
“We are all of opinion that it cannot be laid down that all public documents, including treaties with foreign powers and all the correspondence that may precede or accompany them and all communications to the heads of departments, are to be produced and made public whenever a suitor in a Court of justice thinks that his case requires such production. It is manifest (we think) that there must be a limit to the duty or the power of compelling the production of papers which are connected with acts of State. As an instance, we would put the case of a British minister at a foreign Court writing in that capacity a letter to the Secretary of State for foreign affairs in this country, containing matter injurious to the reputation of a foreigner of a British subject. Can it be contended that the person referred to would have a right to compel the production of the letter in order to take the opinion of a jury whether the injurious matter was written maliciously or not. We are of opinion that, if the production of a State paper would be injurious to the public service, the general public interest must be considered paramount to the individual interest of a suitor in a Court of Justice.”
45. The raison d'etre has been put by Viscount Simon L.C as follows:—
“After all the public interest is also the interest of every subject of the realm and while, in these exceptional cases, the private citizen may seem to be denied what is to his immediate advantage, be, like the rest of us, would suffer if the needs of protecting the interests of the country as a whole were not ranked as prior obligation.”
46. The law, if one may sum up, appears to be:—
(1) Ordinarily the privilege is attached to State papers which are of a political or administrative character, but there can be documents relating Page: 171to trade or commercial or contractual activities of a State with regard to which privilege may be claimed.
(2) This privilege is a necessary one and must most sparingly be exercised and in time of peace the sole object of the privilege being security of the State the occasion to use this privilege may indeed be rare and in view of the increasing extension of State activities into the realm of trade business, commerce and industry, the Courts would have to be particularly careful in giving effect to this privilege.
(3) Privilege is not to be claimed on the mere ground that the documents are State documents or are official or are marked confidential or, if produced, it would result in Parliamentary discussion or public criticism or it will expose a want of efficiency in the administration or tend to lay a particular department of Government open to claim for compensation. Indeed, it is not sufficient that the minister of the department concerned does not want to have the document produced. But the sole object of this privilege—and I have no doubt that it would be claimed in those circumstances—is that the disclosure would be injurious to national defence or to good diplomatic relations or for the proper functioning of the public service and it is necessary to keep that document or that class of document secret.
47. The next point is the manner in which this claim is to be exercised and by whom. In England tee claim has usually been made by the Secretary of State himself and occasionally by the permanent under Secretary of State. In Beatson v. Skene (1860) 2 L.T 378 , 29 L.J Ex. 430 , 120 R.R 839 the Secretary of State for war appeared in Court and objected. In H.M.S Ballarphone (1874) 44 L.J Adm. 5 the privilege was claimed by the Secretary to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty. In Robinson v. State of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 (at page 259) it was observed by their Lordships:—
“In such a case it seems to their Lordships clear that this particular privilege should normally like any other be claimed under the sanction of an oath, the oath being that of a responsible Minister of State whose mind has been directed to the question.”
48. Their Lordships go on to add:—
“It is required as a guarantee that the statement and opinion of the Minister, which the Court is asked to accept, is one that has not been expressed inadvisedly or lightly or as a matter of mere departmental routine but is one put forward with the solemnity necessarily attaching to a sworn statement.”
49. In Kain v. Farrar44 the Court required a responsible Minister's oath. In Hennessy v. Wright (1888) 21 Q.B.D 509, the matter was considered by Field and Wills JJ. and it was observed by Wills J.:—
“I think it ought to appear that the Secretary of State has seen and considered the documents and has formed a real judgment as to the propriety of their being produced………… In such a case therefore should, in my opinion, be a statement on oath, either by the Secretary of State himself, or by some person duly commissioned by him to make on his behalf such a statement, that the matter has been considered by the Secretary of State and that he assures the Court in one of these ways that the production would, in his opinion, be prejudicial to the public service.”
50. In Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587 (at page 593), Viscount Simon, L.C said:—
“The essential matter is that the decision to object should be taken by the Minister who is the political head of the department and that he should have seen and considered the contents of the documents and himself have formed the view that on grounds of public interest they ought not to be produced, either because of their actual contents or became of the class of document e.g departmental minutes—to which they belong. Instances may arise where it is not convenient or practicable for the political minister to act (e.g he may be out of reach or ill or the department may be one where the effective head is a permanent official) and in such cases it would be reasonable for the objection to be taken, as it has often been taken in the past, by the permanent head. If the question arises before trial, the objection would ordinarily be taken by affidavit…… … If the question arises on subpoena at the hearing, it is not uncommon in modern practice for the minister's objection to be conveyed to the Court, at any rate in the first instance, by an official of the department who produces a certificate which the minister has signed, stating what is necessary. I see no harm in that procedure, provided it is understood that this is only for convenience and that, if the Court is not satisfied by this method, it can request the minister's personal attendance”
51. In India this matter has been the subject matter of decision by the Courts in some cases. In I.M Lall v. Secretary of State A.I.R 1944 Lah. 209, Abdul Rashid, J. as he then was, held that affidavits could be sworn by the Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government and by the Home Secretary of the Central Government and not by a minister or a member of the Executive Council. Reliance was placed in that case on a passage from Taylor on Evidence, Vol. 1, page 601, which is in the following terms:—
“The objection that a document is protected from production as being a State document cannot, however, be given effect to unless it be taken by the proper officer of the Government himself, i.e a Minister or head of a department”
52. In Emperor v. Rasul Bakhsh A.I.R 1944 Sind. 145 it was held that the ground on which a privilege is claimed should be set out in an affidavit by a Minister or a Secretary to Government.
53. In my opinion, ordinarily it should be the Minister who should claim this privilege through an affidavit and I say “a minister” because a claim to withhold document or to give oral evidence because of the existence of section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act is a matter of constitutional importance and in the present set-up of Government it is necessary that the political head of the department should consider the question of privilege and then, if satisfied, should claim it. I do not say that is an invariable rule. It may be that in a particular case a permanent head of the department may have to claim the privilege, but as claims of this kind are very frequently raised, it is necessary for the protection of the rights of the citizen as against the State itself that the claim should be made by a responsible political head, because I feel that is a safeguard against claim being raised in an irresponsible manner.
54. In Liversidge v. Anderson (1941) 3 A.E.R 338 at p. 345 where the question was one of detention under the orders of the Secretary of State it was observed by viscount Maugham:—
“The only safeguards, if they be safeguards, are that detention “appears to the Secretary of the State to be expedient in the interests of the public safety or the defence of the realm,” and that he himself is subject to the control of Parliament.”
55. A responsible political head of the department is not likely to act in a capricious manner and if he did, Parliamentary control over him would be a sufficient safeguard.
56. In Beatson v. Skene (1860) 2 L.T 378 , 29 L.J Ex. 430 , 120 R.R 839 Pollock C.B was of the opinion that if a subordinate of the minister is sent with the documents with instructions to object but nothing more the case may be different.
57. The result of the above cases leads me to the conclusion that privilege should ordinarily be claimed by a minister, but it may be claimed in Certain cases by a permanent head of the department which in the case of Provincial Government may be a Secretary of the department and in the case of the Central Government may be the Secretary, the Additional Secretary or the Joint Secretary who may be the official permanent bead of that department.
58. The privilege should ordinarily be claimed under an affidavit which should show that the document has been considered by the minister of the State or the head of the department and after taking all matters into consideration he has formed the opinion that it would be injurious to public interest that such a document should be produced into Court or evidence given with regard to it.
59. The next point to be determined is, who is to determine as to whether a document is or is not one which relates to affairs or matters of State. In Beatson v. Skene (1860) 2 L.T 378 , 29 L.J Ex. 430 , 120 R.R 839, Pollock C.B held that it is for the executive or the bead of the department having the custody of the paper to determine whether the claim is to be made and when once it is made the Court is not to interfere with it. It was observed at page 849:—
“It is manifest it must be determined either by the presiding Judge, or by the responsible servant of the Crown in whose custody the paper is. The judge would be unable to determine it without ascertaining what the document was and why the publication of it would be injurious to the public service an inquiry which cannot take place in private and which by taking place in public may do all the mischief which it is proposed to guard against.
“It appears to us, therefore that the question whether the production of the documents would be injurious to the public service, must be determined, not by the Judge but by the head of the department having the custody of the paper; and if he is in attendance and states that in his opinion the production of the document would be injurious to the public service, we think the Judge ought not to compel the production of it. The administration of justice is only a part of the general conduct of the affairs of any State or nation and we think is (with respect to the production or non-production of a State paper in a Court of justice) subordinate to the general welfare of the community.”
60. In Hennessy v. Wright (1888) 21 Q.B.D 509, at page 515, Field J. said:—
“I should consider myself entitled to examine privately the documents to the production of which he (the head of the department) objected and to endeavour by this means and that of question addressed to him, to Page: 174ascertain whether the fear of injury to the public service was his real motive in objecting.
61. In Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Anglo Persian Oil Co. Ltd. (1916) 1 K.B 822 Scrutton, J., sitting in chambers, looked at the documents and so did Macnaghten, J., in Spigelman v. Hocken54, but as has been said before, the opposite view was taken by Pollock C.B in Beatson v. Skene (1860) 2 L.T 378 , 29 L.J Ex. 430 , 120 R.R 839. Viscount Simon in his judgment in Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587., (at page 594), has mentioned that the same principle is recognized and applied in Scotland. Lord Thankerton seemed to be of the same opinion in Robinson v. State of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 at page 708 (arguments) and the Lord Chancellor in Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587 at page 595 has observed:—
“Although an objection validly taken to production on the ground that this would be injurious to the public interest is conclusive, it is important to remember that the decision ruling out such document is the decision of the Judge……… It is the Judge who is in control of the trial, not the executive, but the proper ruling for the Judge to give is as above expressed.”
62. Section 162 also implies that objection when taken to the production or to the admissibility of a document has to be “decided on by the Court.” The correct interpretation of this section, in my opinion, is that when an objection is taken to the admissibility of a document the Court in order to decide the validity or otherwise of the said section has power to take evidence and to inspect the document unless it be a document relating to matters of State. Indeed, the judgment of Viscount Simon gives indication of the facts which have to be taken into consideration. No doubt according to the Lord Chancellor those are matters which have to be taken into consideration by the minister himself, but the wording of the section (s. 162) leaves to the Court the decision of the validity of the objection and properly construed it would mean that it is the Courts which have the power to decide as to the validity of the objection. But I would like to add that according to section 162 when after considering the question on the evidence produced before the Court the Court is satisfied that the document relates to a matter of State or an affair of State the Court is not entitled to inspect the document and combined effect of sections 123, 124 and 162 is that the document has to be brought to the Court and if an objection is taken the Court can ask for evidence, oral or otherwise, to be produced in favour of the document, but it will not be entitled to look at the document itself and after it has come to the conclusion that the document is one which relates to affairs or matters of State it shall hold its bands and shall not allow any evidence to be given unless permission is given by the head of the department having the custody of the document. The sole Judge as to whether evidence should or should not be allowed to be given is then the head of the department and not the Court, as was observed by the Lord Chancellor (Viscount Simon) in Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587 (at page 595):—
“When these conditions are satisfied and the minister feels it is his duty to deny access to material which would otherwise be available, there is no question but that the public interest must be preferred to any private consideration…………… It seems to me that the same principle must also apply to the exclusion of verbal evidence, which, if given, would jeopardise the interests of the community.”
63. Cases may arise which are not covered by section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act but come under section 124 of that Act which deals with communication made in official confidence whether orally or in writing.
64. Monir in his Law of Evidence at page 103 has thus described the principle of section 124 that the section gives the discretion of disclosing communications made in official confidence to the public officer to whom the communication was made, whether he is or is not the head of the department and whereas under section 123 no evidence derived from unpublished official records is admissible without the permission from the head of the department. Under section 124 the public officer to whom communication has been made may waive the privilege without reference to the head of the department. This section is based on the same principle as section 123, the object being to prevent disclosure to the detriment of the public interest and the test to be applied under section 124 is that the communication was made to such public officer in official confidence and, therefore, the privilege cannot be claimed in respect of communications merely on the ground that its disclosure would cause a scandal in the office. The basis of this rule was given by Lord Lyndhurst, L.G, in Smith v. East India Co.60 where he said at page 330:
“Now it is quite obvious that public policy requires and looking to the Act of Parliament, it is quite clear that the Legislature intended, that the moat unreserved communication should take place between the East India Company and the Board of Control, that it should be subject to no restraints or limitation but it is also quite obvious, that if, at the suit of a particular individual, those communications should be subject to be produced in a Court of justice, the effect of that would be to restrain the freedom of the communications and to render them more cautious, guarded and reserved, I think, therefore, that these communications come within that class of official communications which are privileged, inasmuch as they cannot be subject to be communicated, without infringing the policy of the Act of Parliament and without injury to the public interests.”
65. That disclosure of communications made in official confidence are privileged as has been the law in England since a very long time. Eyre C.J said in one case “There is a rule which has universally obtained on account of its importance to the public for the detection of crimes, that those persons who are the channel by means of which that detection is made should not be unnecessarily disclosed: and much to the same effect was the statement made by Abbott, J. and this, law was confirmed by Lord Ellenborough at the Trial of James Watson (1817) 32 State Trial 101.
66. In the case that I have referred to above Home v. Lord William Bentick62 where an inquiry had been directed to be made by the Commander-in-Chief with a view to investigate the conduct of an individual in the course of which a number of persons had been called before the inquiring Court to give information as witnesses who might not choose to have their names disclosed, the minutes of enquiry were not allowed to be given in evidence by Dallas, C.J and it was observed by him:—
“It is clear, therefore, that the admission of these minutes in evidence must tend directly to disclose that which is not permitted to be disclosed * * * on the broad rule of public policy and convenience, that the disclosure of these proceedings, secret in their nature and involving matter of delicate enquiry and the names of persons giving information as in all cases to be prohibited.”
67. As Viscount Simon put in Duncan's case (1942) 1 All. E.R 587 (supra) “the objection is Page: 176sometimes based upon the view that the public interest requires a particular class of communication with, or within, a public department to be protected from production on the ground that the candour and completeness of such communications might be prejudiced if they were ever liable to be disclosed in subsequent litigation, rather than upon the contents of the particular document itself. He relied on Smith v. East India Co.64 (Supra) and Wadeer v. East India Company (1856) 8 De. G.M & G. 182 and quoted the passage of Lord Lyndhurst, L.C, which I have referred to above.
68. In H.M.S Bellerphon (1874) 44 L.J Adm. 5 where a collusion which occurred between a ship of the Royal Navy and a ship of a private owner, the Admirality was called upon to produce the report made by the officer who was in command J of the ship of the Royal Navy, it was held that the report could not be produced as it would be prejudicial to public interest to allow such reports to be inspected. In England a practice has grown up that reports made by a police officer to his superior as to a street accident are protected from production though asked for by a party to a subsequent litigation for fixing liability between private individuals.
69. The question whether a communication was made in official confidence is also for the Court to decide but the public officer alone is the sole judge whether he should or should not disclose the communication and he cannot be compelled by the Court to disclose it. The law with regard to this matter is the same as it would be under section 123, read with section 162, of the Indian Evidence Act.
70. The above mentioned authorities will show that section 124(1) applies to communications made in official confidence to a public officer and be need not be a head of the department who cannot be compelled to give evidence but is at liberty to waive the objection.
2. The basis of the prohibition is that it would restrain the freedom of communications made to public officers or by one public officer to another and would thereby injure public interest.
3. If such communications were compelled there will be a danger that the usual channels of detection of crime or of evasion of taxes would get blocked up.
4. It is for the Court to decide as to whether such communication was in official confidence or not.
71. A point which was pressed to our attention was the effect of Order 11, rule 19(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure which runs as fellows:—
“Where on an application for an order for inspection privilege is claimed for any document, it shall be lawful for the Court to inspect the document for the purpose of deciding as to the validity of the claim of privilege.
72. It was submitted that because of this subsequent enactment section 162 of the Indian Evidence Act had been repealed pro tanto and reliance was very strongly placed on a corresponding provision of section 194 of the Criminal Procedure Code which deals with summons to produce document or other things. In sub-section 3 of this section it is expressly provided that “nothing in this section shall be deemed to effect the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, sections 123 and 124” and no such exception has been made in the corresponding provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. It was Submitted that this would by implication result in the repealing of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Reliance was placed in this connection also on the observations of Tek Chand, J., in Hakim Khuda Yar v. Page: 177Emperor A.I.R 1940 Lah. 129 at page 134 where it was said:—
“But if the later statute is so worded that the repeal flows from it as a necessary consequence, it is the duty of the Courts to give effect to it. A well known instance of the repeal by implication of an earlier “special law” by a later “general law” will be found in “The Dart (1893) L.R.P 33.”
73. The following passage in Craies in his Statute Law (Edn. 3, P. 307) was also relied upon:—
“Where the terms of a later enactment taken in their primary meaning are wide enough to abrogate a prior enactment, they will be read as repealing it, unless it is fairly open to hold on the word of the later Act that an intention is manifested to cut down or restrict the primary meaning.”
74. In Ijjat Ali v. Emperor A.I.R 1943 Cal. 539 , I.L.R (1944) 1. Cal. 410 at page 422 Das, J., as he then was, referred to the abrogation or modification of section 162 by O. XI, rule 19(2), Civil Procedure Code, but he gave no decision on this point. It may be stated that in Robinson v. South Australia State 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 (supra) it was held by their Lordships that it was lawful for a Judge to inspect a document for which discovery has been applied for and then to exercise his powers under Order rule 14(3) of the South Australia Rules of Court which correspond to the rules of the Engish Supreme Court and also the provisions of Order 11, rule 19(2) of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure. Baron Atkyns's observations in Pawlett v. Attorney General71 (Hardras 455) which is quoted by their Lordships in Robinson v. South Australia State 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 (supra), may usefully be referred to here. There it was observed:—
“The party ought in this case to be relieved against the King because the King is the fountain and head of justice and equity and it shall not be presumed that be will be defective in either and it would derogate from the King's honour to imagine that what is equity against a common person should not be equity against him.”
75. Viscount Simon, L.C in Duncan's case (supra) was of the opinion that no discovery can be given against the Crown. He observed:—
“When the Crown is a party to a suit, it cannot be required to give discovery of documents at all. No special ground of objection is needed. The common law principle is well established.”
76. He relied on the authority of Abinger, L.C.B for the view that the former process in equity of a bill of discovery was not regarded as available against the Crown. But these observations are based on the fact that under the common law rule discovery against the Crown is not allowed. Where the law is, as it is in India, whether the observations of Viscount Simon apply may be to a certain extent doubtful.
77. The reason given by Viscount Simon, L.C was that the interests of the State must not be put in jeopardy by producing documents which would injure it; and this, as I have said, was the reason for his not allowing discovery against the Crown. But even in England in some cases there are observations to show that the officers of the Crown would ordinarily throw no difficulties in the way of production of documents.
78. In Deare v. Attorney General (1835) 1 Y. & C. Ex. 197, it was observed by the learned Judge:—
“At the same time it has been the practice, which 1 hope never will Page: 178be discontinued, for the officers of the Crown to throw no difficulty in the way of any proceeding for the purpose of bringing matters before a court of Justice where any real point of difficulty that requires judicial decision has occurred.”
79. In Attorney General v. Newcastle-upon-Tyne Corporation (1897) 2 Q.B 384 Rigby, L.J, has observed, as it has been said before, that ordinarily discovery would not be denied to a subject against the Crown. Now, these observations show that in spite of the fact that as a matter of right a subject cannot get discovery against the Crown it would ordinarily not be refused, in India Crown is placed in exactly the same position as any other litigant. Whether under order 11, rule 19(2), Civil Procedure Code, the Crown will be entitled to the protection of section 123 and section 124, Indian Evidence Act and to what extent, I am not in this case called upon to decide and should a proper case arise this Court may have to consider that point. But I would like to add that if this rule is read with sections 123, 124 and 162 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is not likely that any different rule will emerge.
80. Soni, J.:— The point referred by our learned brother Jewan Lal Kapur J. raises a point of great constitutional importance. There cannot be any doubt that the State is entitled that its secrets should not be made public as the publication of those secrets might be of the gravest consequences to the country. The question, however, is how is the matter to be decided. The law on this point is given in section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act. It says:—
“No one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit.”
81. In section 162 of the same Act it is provided:—
“a witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility. The validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the Court.”
The Court, if it sees fit may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility.”
82. It goes without saying that when a document is asked to be brought before the Court it is the Court who has to give its decision on the point whether the document can or cannot be produced and made public. It is the Court which is in charge of the case and its duty is to exercise judicial authority on the subject coming up before it. But the judicial authority to be exercised must be within limits given by the law and nor beyond it. The Court can, however, define the subject before it by the elements composing it and by reference to prescribed or intended external conditions. It is the business of the Court to exact obedience to law regarding the matter before it and in giving effect to it. It is no part of the functions of the Court to substitute its opinion on matters where the law says that the opinion of somebody else is to prevail, but within the circumscribed limits the Court can exercise and it is its duty to exercise its functions and see that the matter has been properly dealt with.
83. Let us see what the Court has got to do. The witness must appear before the Court with the document and must make an objection. It is Page: 179the duty of the Court and of the Court alone to decide on that objection. The person raising the objection must be the head of the department and it is the business of the Court to see that it is the head of the department who has raised the objection, that it is not a Subordinate officer or a subordinate official who does so, however high the position of that subordinate officer or official may be. It is the duty of the Court to see that head of department raises his objection in a proper manner and that be really gives his attention to the matter and does not sign a certificate as a matter of routine because of certain noting on a file. It is the duty of the head of the department to inspect the document and after inspecting the document form an opinion as to whether the document relates to affairs of State. If he has inspected the document and has formed his opinion that it relates to affairs of State it is only then that he is entitled to give a certificate. Under the provisions of section 162 the Court may not inspect the document if the document relates to affairs of State. Nor can it take any evidence regarding the contents of that document in such a case. But short of this it can make enquiry from the head of the department himself or from other sources as to whether the matter really concerns affairs of State. Lord Simon L.C in Duncan v. Cammell Laird and Company Ltd. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587 states at page 642:—
“It is not a sufficient ground that the documents are State documents or ‘official’ or are marked ‘confidential’. It would not be a good ground that if they were produced, the consequences might involve the department or the government in parliamentary discussion or in public criticism, or might necessitate the attendance as witnesses or otherwise of officials who have pressing duties elsewhere. Neither would it be a good ground that production might tend to expose a want of efficiency in the administration or tend to lay the department open to claims for compensation. In a word, it is not enough that the minister of the department does not want to have the documents produced. The minister, in deciding whether it is his duty to object, should bear these considerations in mind, for he ought not to take the responsibility of withholding production except in cases were the public interest would otherwise be damnified, for example, where disclosure would be injurious to national defence, or to geod diplomatic relations, or where the practice of keeping a class of documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning of the public service.”
84. It would be the Court's duty to find out whether the head of the department has borne these considerations in mind. It would be the Court's duty to find out whether it is the head of the department who is taking the objection. Lord Simon in the case quoted says at page 638:—
“The essential matter is that the decision to object should be taken by the minister who is the political head of the department and that he should have seen and considered the contents of the documents and himself have formed the view that on grounds of public interest they ought not to be produced, either because of their actual contents or because of the class of documents, e.g departmental minutes, to which they belong. Instances may arise where it is not convenient or practicable for the political minister to act (e.g he may be out of reach, or ill, or the department may be one where the effective head is a permanent official) and in such cases it would be reasonable for the objection to be taken, as it has often been taken in the past, by the permanent head. If the question arises before trial, the objection would ordinarily be taken by affidavit and a good example is provided by the affidavit of the First Lord of the Admiralty in the present Page: 180case. If the question arises on subpoena at the beating it is not uncommon in modern practice for the minister's objection to be conveyed to the Court at any rate in the first instance, by an official of the department who produces a certificate which the minister has signed, stating what is necessary. I see no harm in that procedure, provided it is understood that this is only for convenience and that if the court is not satisfied by this method, it can request the minister's personal attendance.”
85. It will thus be seen that the Court and the Court alone has to decide this matter and it has very essential duties to perform. It has to exact a real endeavour in good faith by the proper official to apply the law. If not satisfied by a certificate it has the right to call the bead of the department in witness-box and to examine him. It has to satisfy itself whether the head of the department could or could not legally deal with the matter in question, whether his mode of enquiry or action has or has not been in contradiction rather than in obedience to the principles. If the Court finds that these external conditions of jurisdiction and investigation have been satisfied by the head of the department it cannot then substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the head of the department. Lord Simon in the case quoted said at page 642:—
“Although an objection validly taken to production, on the ground that this would be injurious to the public interest, is conclusive, it is important to remember that the decision ruling out such documents is the decision of the judge. Thus, in the present case, the objection raised in the respondents' affidavit is properly expressed to be an objection to produce except under the order of this honourable Court.” It is the Judge who is in control of the trial, not the executive, but the proper ruling for the judge to give is as above expressed. Closely allied to section 123 is section 124 of the Evidence Act which reads thus:—
“No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence when he considers that the public interests would suffer by the disclosure.”
86. There is a great deal of difference between section 123 and section 124 though they resemble each other in a number of points. There may be cases in which the two sections overlap Communications may have been made to a public officer which may relate to affairs of State in which case it would be section 123 which would apply and not section 124 but there may be cases in which the communication made in official confidence is not made in a case where affairs of State are involved, but where public interests would otherwise suffer by the disclosure. That might be a case, for example, relating to some departmental letter. It may relate to commission of an offence. In such a case unless it is covered by section 123 the Court may inspect the document or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility but otherwise the duties of the Court are the same. The Court cannot substitute its opinion for the head of the department in case of section 123 or the opinion for the public officer in case of section 124.
87. One further point remains to be noticed. It was argued that under the provisions of Order it rule 19(2), Civil Procedure Code, “Where on an application for an order for inspection privilege is claimed for any document, it shall be lawful for the Court to inspect the document for the purpose of deciding as to the validity of the claim of privilege. It is argued that there is no bar to the Court having a look at the document in any case under the provisions of this rule. I do not agree. This Page: 181is a rule of procedure given in the Code of Civil Procedure. In section 4 of the Code it is stated:—“In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, no thing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force”. The matter of State privilege is a matter of constitutional law and is dealt with specifically under sections 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act. Where this particular matter is specially provided for. Section 4 says that nothing in the Code would affect such special law or special form of procedure prescribed. It is clear, therefore, that when privilege is claimed on the ground that the document relates to affairs of State its inspection cannot he had by the Court and its production can only be ordered if the head of the department gives his permission. Nor can any evidence be taken regarding its contents. It is only when the Court finds after going into the external conditions of jurisdiction and investigation by the head of the department whose opinion it will not lightly ignore that he is not dealing with affairs of State that the document can be inspected. The point arose in Robinson v. State of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 where the rule which the judicial Committee had to interpret was the rule worded in similar language to Order 11 rule 19(2) of our Civil Procedure Code. The Judicial Committee re-versed the decision of the Supreme Court of Australia which had refused to order the inspection of documents which the minister in charge of the department objected to produce on grounds of public policy and remitted the case to the Supreme Court with the direction that it was one proper for the exercise of the Court's power of inspecting documents to determine whether their production would be prejudicial to the public welfare. This case was cited before the House of Lords in Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. (1942) 1 All. E.R 587 a case which I have already referred to. Lord Simon at page 641 said:—
“The practice in Scotland, as in England may have varied, but the approved practice in both countries is to treat a ministerial objection taken in proper form as conclusive. The reasons given by Pollock C.B, by Lord Dunedin and by Lord Kinnear cannot be gainsaid. As Lord Parker said in another connection. ‘Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole judges of what the national security require’: The Zamora (1916) 2 A.C 77, 107.”
88. Lord Simon then notices the case of Robinson v. State of South Australia 1931 A.C 704 , A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 in which the Judicial Committee had directed the Supreme Court to inspect the document and said:—
“I cannot agree with this view. * * * * In my opinion the Privy Council was mistaken in regarding such a rule as having any application to the subject matter. * * * The withholding of documents on the ground that their publication would be contrary to the public interest, is not properly to be regarded as a branch of the law of privilege connected with discovery. ‘Crown privilege’ is for this reason not a happy expression. Privilege, in relation to discovery, is for the protection of the litigant and could be waived by him, but the rule that the interest of the State must not be put in jeopardy by producing documents which would injure it is a principle to be observed in administering justice, quite unconnected with the interests or claims of the particular parties in litigation and, Page: 182indeed is a rule on which the judge should, if necessary, insist even though no objection is taken at all.”
89. He concluded his speech in the House of Lords in these words:—
“After all, the public interest is also the interest of every subject of the realm and while, in these exceptional cases, the private citizen may seem to be denied what is to his immediate advantage, he, like the rest of us, would suffer if the needs of protecting the interests of the country as a whole were not ranked as a prior obligation.”
90. The case in which the present revision arose was an ordinary commercial transaction in which it appears the officer gave the certificate on insufficient grounds. The document did not appear to be one which related to affairs of State. Its production merely tended to lay the department open to claims for compensation. Mr. Bishen Narian, at our request, produced a form which is in use in East Punjab when privilege is being claimed. The certificate which was given by the officer in this case did not comply with that form. In the circumstances, I have no doubt that the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the privilege was neither properly claimed nor could be claimed on the ground that the document related to affairs of State and he rightly held the document not to be privileged. My learned brother Mr. Justice Khosla has dealt with the matter at great length. I agree in the answers he proposes to give to the questions, propounded by him.
91. Petition dismissed.