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  • Tripura Forest Act was repealed. Section 41 (1) of the former Act
  • SECTION 2 INDIAN FOREST ACT
  • Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act
  • Tripura Forest Act and Forest Rules
  • clause (c) of sub-section (1),
  • (b) of Section 99 (1)
  • INDIAN FOREST ACT
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • Tripura Forest Act was repealed. Section 41 (1) of the former Act
  • SECTION 2 INDIAN FOREST ACT
  • Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act
  • Tripura Forest Act and Forest Rules
  • clause (c) of sub-section (1),
  • (b) of Section 99 (1)
  • INDIAN FOREST ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners, described as jotedars (identified with the statutory term "raiyat"), allege ownership and occupation of certain lands in the villages of Charilam and Chasrimai. Numerous trees of various varieties stand on those lands. The petitioners complain that local forest officials at Charilam object to their felling and use of those trees for personal requirements, demand payment of royalty, and insist on a transit pass before removal. They made representations, including one dated 30 March 1963, which the Chief Forest Officer rejected by order dated 24 April 1963 (the rejection is challenged). The petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking (a) a mandamus restraining respondents from claiming royalty and from insisting on a transit pass, (b) a declaration that Notification No. 12 under the Tripura Forest Act is illegal, and (c) quashing of the Chief Forest Officer's order dated 24-4-1963.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioners, as jotedars/raiyats under the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (particularly Section 99(1)(c)), are owners of the trees on their lands and therefore not liable to pay royalty to the Government in respect of those trees.
  2. Whether forest officials are legally entitled to insist that the petitioners secure a transit pass (under Notification No. 12 dated 29-4-1952) before removing timber from trees felled on their lands, and whether that Notification (issued under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act) is ultra vires.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Shri M. R. Choudhury)

  • The petitioners, being jotedars (raiyats), are owners of the lands and of the trees standing on those lands under clause (c) of Section 99(1) of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960, which entitles a raiyat "to plant trees on his land, to enjoy the products thereof and to fell, utilise or dispose of the timber of any trees on his land."
  • Because the trees are their property, the Government has no claim to the trees and therefore cannot demand royalty in respect of them.
  • The Notification dated 29-4-1952 (Notification No. 12) prescribing Transit Rules under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act — particularly paragraph 11 concerning removal of forest produce from private lands — is ultra vires and cannot be validly used to insist on transit passes for timber from the petitioners' lands.
  • The petitioners sought the court to define "transit" as used in the rules (arguing hardships given that their lands adjoin homesteads), though the court was asked to leave that point open if appropriate.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by the Government Advocate Shri H. C. Nath and respondents)

  • The forest officials are within their rights to demand royalty because the Government owns the trees and other forest produce under applicable provisions.
  • The respondents are entitled to insist on production of a transit pass before timber is moved, pursuant to Notification No. 12 dated 29-4-1952 issued under the Tripura Forest Act (and, more generally, rules made under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act).
  • It is denied that Notification No. 12 or any part of it is illegal; the Chief Forest Officer's order dated 24-4-1963 rejecting the petitioners' representation is asserted to be valid in law and principle.
  • The Government Advocate conceded that the petitioners are jotedars of the lands in question but did not concede that they have an absolute right to use the trees or that they are necessarily not liable to pay royalty.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning follows two main strands corresponding to the issues raised.

1. On ownership and royalty (statutory interpretation and effect of commencement notification):

  • The court examined the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960. It noted that the term "raiyat" (used in clause (s) of Section 2) includes persons who own land for agricultural purposes and pay land revenue, and observed that "jotedar" is commonly synonymous with "raiyat."
  • The court reproduced Section 99(1), especially clause (c), which expressly entitles a raiyat "to plant trees on his land, to enjoy the products thereof and to fell, utilise or dispose of the timber of any trees on his land." The court treated this clause as conferring the right to use and dispose of trees on the raiyat's land.
  • The court traced the vesting of rights: under Section 134(1) and Section 135(d) (as set out in the opinion), tenants holding land under intermediaries became raiyats holding directly under the Government, and thereby acquired the bundle of rights detailed in Section 99. The court characterized those rights as "virtually the plenary rights of ownership."
  • Whether clause (c) of Section 99(1) applied depended on the date when that clause was brought into force for the relevant area. The Administrator issued Notification No. IF.39(60)-Rev/63 appointing 15 May 1966 as the date on which clause (c) would come into force, inter alia, in Bishalgarh Police Station. The land in dispute was admitted to be situate in Bishalgarh Police Station and that factual allegation was not challenged by the Government.
  • Although clause (c) was not in operation at the time the writ petition was filed (28 June 1963), the court noted the settled principle that courts may take notice of developments pendente lite and accepted the Government Advocate's concession on this point. Because clause (c) had come into force for the area in question, the petitioners were, at the present time, full-fledged owners of the trees and entitled to fell, utilize or dispose of them.
  • On that basis, the court concluded the demand of royalty by respondents in respect of the trees on the petitioners' lands could not be sustained.

2. On the transit pass requirement and validity of the Notification (statutory rule-making power and scope):

  • The court considered the Notification dated 29 April 1952 (Notification No. 12) made under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act. Section 41(1) empowers the State Government to make rules to regulate the transit of timber and other forest produce; Section 42 empowers it to provide penalties in those rules.
  • The court noted that the definition of "forest produce" in clause (4) of Section 2 of the Indian Forest Act includes "timber whether found in, or brought from, a forest or not." On that textual basis the court concluded that the Chief Commissioner had authority to make rules relating to transit of timber and forest produce from private lands as well as reserved forests.
  • Consequently, the court rejected the argument that the Notification was ultra vires; the court held the Government's position that the Notification is valid "can withstand legal scrutiny and so must prevail."
  • The court declined to give a general definition of "transit" in the abstract because (a) the exact question whether a movement constituted "transit" did not arise pointedly in this case, and (b) the petitioner's counsel raised the point during reply leaving the Government Advocate without an opportunity to respond fully; for reasons of fairness the court left that issue open.
  • The court also noted the petitioners' practical concern about hardship if required to secure transit passes for moving timber from lands adjacent to homesteads, but left the substantive question of what constitutes "transit" unresolved in this proceeding.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court partly allowed the writ petition. Specifically:

  • The respondents are restrained from claiming royalty from the petitioners in respect of the trees standing on the lands mentioned in paragraph 1 of the writ petition (i.e., the trees are treated as the petitioners' property in the present circumstances).
  • The petitioners' prayer to restrain the respondents from insisting on their securing a transit pass in connection with the transfer of the timber of trees standing on those lands was rejected; the respondents may continue to insist on a transit pass under the applicable Notification and rules.
  • The petition was allowed in part; the parties were directed to bear their own costs. Advocate's fee was fixed at Rs. 50/-. The order concludes "Petition partly allowed."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the petitioners are entitled, by reason of clause (c) of Section 99(1) being in force for the area, to be treated as owners of the trees on their lands and are protected from demands for royalty in respect of those trees by the respondents. At the same time, the administrative regime regulating transit of timber (as embodied in the Notification and rules under the Indian Forest Act) remains applicable; the respondents retain the power to require production of transit passes when timber is moved.
  • No broader legal pronouncement was made on the definition of "transit" or on other potential disputes about the interaction of ownership and regulatory transit rules; the court expressly left the definition of "transit" open and did not make a general ruling on that subject.
  • The opinion does not assert that it has established a new, general precedent beyond the application of the statutes and the particular commencement notification to the facts of this case; the decision addresses the rights and obligations between these parties in light of the statutory provisions and the relevant notification putting Section 99(1)(c) into force in the locality.

Note: This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. Sections of the statutes, notification numbers, and factual concessions are included only as they appear in the opinion.

    Nripendra Chandra Dutta Majumder v. Administration Of Tripura

    In this writ petition, under Arti cle 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners allege that they are owners and in occupa tion, as jotedars, of certain lands situate in the villages of Charilam and Chasrimai and that a large number of trees of various varie ties are standing on those lands. It is com plained that though the Government has no claim or right to those trees, yet the forest officials at Charilam object to the petitioners' felling the trees and utilizing them for their personal requirements. The forest officials, it is alleged further, demand royalty from the petitioners respecting those trees and threaten them with dire consequences in case the trees are felled and removed without transit pass secured from them or without payment of royalty. Aggrieved by such illegal demands made by the local forest officials, it is stated, the petitioners address ed a number of representations, including the one dated 30th of March, 1963, to the Chief Forest Officer of the Union Territory of Tripura, but the latter without giving any hearing to them rejected the last one on 24-4-1963. The prayer made by the petitioners is for issuance of a Writ of mandamus direct ing the respondents to desist from claiming royalty from them and not to insist on their securing the transit pass before removing from their lands the trees after they are felled. Another prayer made is that the respondents be directed not to act upon Notification No. 12 issued under the Tripura Forest Act and Forest Rules as that Notifi cation, it is pleaded, has no sanction behind it and so is illegal. It is also prayed that the aforementioned order dated 24-4-1964 of the Chief Forest Officer rejecting the re presentation dated 30th of March, 1963, of the petitioners should be quashed.

    2. The respondents resist the prayers made by the petitioners on the assertions that the forest officials are within their rights in demanding the royalty from the petitioners, the trees being in the ownership of the Gov ernment, and also in insisting that the peti tioners must arm themselves with the transit pass before removing the trees from the place at which they are felled, this being in accordance with Notification No. 12, dated 29-4-1952, issued by the Government under the Tripura Forest Act. It is vehemently denied that the Notification or any part of it is illegal. The correctness of the stand taken by the Chief Forest Officer in his order dated 24-4-1963, it is urged, is perfectly valid in law and sound in principle.

    3. The first point canvassed by Shri M. R. Choudhury, representing the petitioners, is that the officials of the forest department are not justified in law in claiming royalty from the petitioners respecting the trees standing on the lands of which they happen to be jotedars. Shri H. C. Nath, the learned Gov ernment Advocate, does not challenge the-fact that the petitioners are jotedars of the lands mentioned in the writ petition, though he did not concede that the petitioners have absolute right to the user of the trees stand ing on those lands or that they are not liable to pay the royalty claimed by the forest offi cials. The expression "jotedar", it is com-monlv admitted, is synonymous with the ex pression "raiyat" used in the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act of 1960 (hereinafter called the Act). In clause (s) of Section 2 of the Act, "raiyat" is defined to mean "a person, who owns land for purposes of agriculture paying land revenue to the Government and includes the successors-in-interest of such person". The rights which "raiyats" hold in the land are precisely de fined in Section 99 of the Act which runs as under!-

    "99. (1) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that subject to the other pro visions of this Act.-

    (a) the rights of a raiyat in. his land shall be permanent, heritable and transferable;

    (b) the raiyat shall be entitled by himself, his servants, under-raiyats, agents or other representatives to erect farm buildings, construct wells or tanks or make other improve ments thereon for the better cultivation of the land or its convenient or profitable use;

    (c) the raiyat is entitled to plant trees on his land, to enjoy the products thereof and to fell, utilise or dispose of the timber of any trees on his land.

    (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall entitle a raiyat to use his land to the detriment of any adjofning land which is not his or in con travention of the provisions of any other law for the time being in-force applicable to such lands."

    According to clause (c) of sub-section (1), the raiyat is given the right to fell and utilize or dispose of the timber of any tree on his land. Hence, if clause (c) has been enforced in the region in which the petitioners' lands are situ ate, then the petitioners are justified, in my opinion, in advancing the contention that thev are net liable to pay any royalty to the Gov ernment. From the definition clause (s) of Section 2 of the Act it can be safely spelled out that the Parliament has given the status of owner to the raiyat respecting the land in his occupation for purposes of agriculture. The only obligation imposed on him respect ing such land is that he shall have to pay the land revenue to the Government. By cls. (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 of the Act, it is declared that the rights of raiyat in his land shall be permanent, heritable and transferable, and that the raiyat shall be enti tled by himself, his servants, under-raiyats, agents or other representatives to erect farm buildings, construct wells or tanks or make other improvements thereon for the better cultivation of the land or its convenient or profitable use. How a person is clothed with the title of raiyat, as defined in cl. (s) of section 2, is made clear by clause (d) of Section 135 of the Act.

    It is stated therein that notwithstanding anything contained in anv law for the time being in force or in any agreement or con tract, express or implied, with effect from the vesting date (specified by the Administrator by a Notification issued under Section 134 (1) of the Act) but subject to the other provisions of the Act, "every tenant holding any land under an intermediary shall hold the same , directly under the Government as a raiyat thereof and shall be liable to pay to the Government land revenue equal to the rent pay able by him to the intermediary on the vest ing date". The expression "tenant" is defined in clause (d) of Section 133 of the Act to mean "a person who cultivates or holds the land of an intermediary under an agreement, express or implied, on condition of paying therefor rent in cash or in kind or deliver ing a share of the produce and includes a person who cultivates or holds land of an intermediary under the system generally known as "bhag," "adhi" or "barga."

    It clearly follows from these statutory pro visions that after the Government had acquir ed the rights, tittle and interest of interme diaries in the estates in terms of Section 134 (1) of the Act, it (the Government) passed on all the rights in the lands to the tenants of those lands and such tenants were given the nomenclature of raiyats. The bundle of rights given to raiyats, as gathered from cla'uses (a) and (b) of Section 99 (1) of the-Act, are virtually the plenary rights of owner ship and what detracts, if at all, from their ownership is the designation "raiyat". Other wise, the raiyats have all the attributes of ownership, e.g., their rights in the land are ' permanent and those rights are heritable and transferable. The raiyats are referred to as owners in clause (s) of Section (2) of the Act and they are liable to pay, like an ordi nary owner, only land revenue to the Gov ernment and nothing more.

    4. In Section 12 (1) of the Act, it is-stated that the right to all trees, jungles or other natural products growing on land set apart for forest reserves, and to all trees, brush wood, jungle or other natural pro duct, wherever growing, 'except in so far as-the same may be the property of any person,' vests in the Government, and such trees, brush wood, jungle or other natural product shall be preserved or disposed of in such manner as may be prescribed, keeping in view the interests of the people in the area with regard to the user of the natural pro ducts. The underlined (here in ' ') words indi cate unmistakably that the trees and other natural products do not vest in the Govern ment if they happen to be the property of any individual. Clause (c) of S. 99 (1), as re produced above, enacts that the raiyat is en titled to fell, utilize or dispose of the timber of any tree standing on his land. It is ob vious that if the petitioners can take benefit of this clause, then the trees standing on their jote lands shall be their property and in such an event the question of payment of royalty respecting those trees would not arise. The concept of ownership militates against the claim of royalty respecting the property own ed. Hence, if the petitioners are owners of the lands as also of the trees standing there on, it would be fantastic to suggest that the Government can claim royalty respecting those trees.

    5. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act provides that the Act shall come into force on such date as the Administrator may, by notification in the Official Gazette, ap point; and different dates may be appointed for different areas and for different provi sions of the Act. On 12th of May, 1966, the Administrator issued the Notification No. IF.39(60)-Rev/63 stating that in exercise of the power conferred on him by sub-sec. (3) of Section 1 of the Act, he had appointed 15th of May, 1966, as the date on which clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 of the Act shall come into force, inter alia, in Bishalgarh Police Station of Sadar Sub division. Shri H. C. Nath, the learned Gov ernment Advocate, was fair in admitting that the land in dispute is situate in the Bishal garh Police Station as mentioned in Para 1 ,of the writ petition.

    In fact, the allegation made in that para tiad not been challenged by the Government in the counter-affidavit. Therefore, cl. (c) of Section 99 (1) of the Act is very much in force respecting the lands in dispute with the result that the petitioners are at present the full-fledged owners of the trees standing on their lands with the right to fell, utilize or dispose of them in the manner desired. Hence, the petitioners can legitimately con tend, as at present, that the respondents be restrained by suitable writ or direction from claiming royalty respecting the trees stand ing on the lands mentioned in the petition. It is correct that clause (c) was not in opera tion on 28th of June, 1963, when the writ petition was filed. However, it is well set tled that the Courts can take notice of the developments which take place pendente lite. Here, again, Shri H. C. Nath did not contest the validity of this proposition of law. I would therefore hold that the petitioners be ing the owners of the trees as also of the land on which those trees stand, the demand of royalty from them respecting those trees cannot be countenanced and so the respon dents have to be restrained from making such a claim.

    6. This brings us to the consideration of the second contention raised by Shri Chou dhury on behalf of the petitioners. He sub mitted that the forest officials have no autho rity to insist that the petitioners cannot re move the timber of the trees standing on their lands without a transit pass. It was vehe mently urged by Shri Choudhury that the Notification dated 29th of April, 1952, issu ed by the Chief Commissioner, Tripura, under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act prescribing Transit Rules respect-ing timber and other forest produce is ultra vires. He was particularly critical of para 11 of the Notification which bears the heading "Removal of forest produce of private forests and lands". Shri H. C. Nath contended, on the other hand, that the Chief Commissioner is possessed of a statutory authority to issue such a Notification and in consequence the contention put forth by Shri Choudhury is without any merit or substance. I think the stand taken by Shri H. C. Nath can withstand legal scrutiny and so must prevail. The Indian Forest Act came into force in the Union Territory of Tripura on 16-4-1950 when simultaneously the Tripura Forest Act was repealed. Section 41 (1) of the former Act gives power to the State Government to make rules to regulate the transit of all tim ber and other forest produce, while Sec. 42 arms the State Government with authority to provide in the rules formulated under Sec tion 41 the penalties to which the person con travening the provisions of the rules shall be subject to.

    The expression "forest produce" is defin ed in clause (4) of Section 2 of the Indian Forest Act to include timber whether found in, or brought from, a forest or not. Hence, it can be stated without demur that the Chief Commissioner is possessed of ample powers to make rules relating to the transit of all timber and other forest produce whether found in or brought from reserved forests or private lands. Hence, the proposition can vassed by Shri Chaudhury has to be nega tived. Towards the close of his argument, I may mention, Shri Chaudhury realised that there was no substance in the submission made by him and so he did not seriously press it. However, he wanted this Court to give the definition of the expression "transit". I am not inclined to do so because the ques tion what constitutes transit in terms of the rules formulated by the Chief Commissioner does not arise in a pointed manner in the instant case. Moreover, this point was em phasised by Shri Choudhury during the course of his reply to the arguments address ed by Shri H. C. Nath and so the latter had no opportunity to make his submissions res pecting that point. It would, therefore, be unfair to the Government Advocate if I were to express my opinion on what constitutes "transit". Shri Choudhury had some justifi cation for making the request. He repre sented that the lands of his clients are ad-jacerft to their homesteads and so it would mean real hardship to them if the forest offi cials were to insist on their securing a transit pass before they can move the trees felled on their lands even to their homesteads. For reasons already stated, I leave the matter open.

    7. As a result of the conclusions record ed above, I allow the writ petition in part and direct the respondents not to claim royalty from the petitioners respecting the trees standing on the lands mentioned in para 1 of the writ petition. However, I re ject the petitioners' prayer that the respon dents should be restrained from insisting on their securing a transit pass in connection with the transfer of the timber of trees stand ing on those lands. In view of the partial success of i the parties I leave them to bear their own costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 50/.

    Petition partly allowed.

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    Nripendra Chandra Dutta Majumder v. Administration Of Tripura
    (Jul 21, 1969)