Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Bail Appeal under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

Factual and Procedural Background

(All information below is taken directly from the provided opinion.)

The appellant challenged an order dated 1.4.2011 of the Special Judge, NLA, Assam, Guwahati (Misc. Bail Application No. 17/2011) which had declined bail. The appellant had been in custody since 18.8.2010 (noted elsewhere as custody since 19.8.2010 for about ten months) and was accused under sections 120(B), 121, 121(A) and 122 of the Indian Penal Code read with sections 16, 17, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (the Act). A charge sheet was filed on 14.2.2011 in which the appellant is designated Accused No. 14.

The charge sheet contains allegations against the appellant primarily in paragraph 17.28, asserting (in summary) that she was an active member of the proscribed organisation UNLF, coordinated and organised its activities, used mobile phones in assumed names, and that UNLF had attempted to secure her bail in order to continue its conspiracy to wage war against India. The court examined witness statements (notably PW 6 and PW 40), statements attributed to the appellant's husband and other individuals recorded during investigation, and certain computer printouts showing payments to the appellant by the UNLF. The appellant's bail application was initially declined by the Special Judge, and this appeal directed to the higher court urged that bail should have been granted.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on a perusal of the charge sheet and available materials (including case diary and witness statements), there is a prima facie case to deny bail to the appellant under the proviso to section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.
  2. Whether the materials on record (allegations, witness statements, documents) establish commission of offences under the relevant provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (in particular sections 16, 17, 18 and 20) or under the IPC as alleged.
  3. How the legal position on mere membership of a banned/terrorist organisation (as discussed in precedent and statutory context) affects the grant or denial of bail in this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant relied on the thin and general nature of allegations in the charge sheet (primarily paragraph 17.28) and the lack of any specific act attributed to her.
  • Counsel for the appellant placed before the court the statements that referred to the appellant (including copies of statements that the prosecution had promised but did not supply), relying on those statements to show there was no prima facie case to continue incarceration.
  • The appellant emphasised family circumstances: she is the mother of two young school-going children (aged about 7 and 4 years), a factor relevant to the consideration of bail given the limited allegations.

Respondent / NIA / Additional Solicitor General's Arguments

  • The Additional Solicitor General (ASG) advanced submissions primarily under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act; he did not advance submissions in support of the IPC charges alleged against the appellant.
  • The ASG sought to present statements of several persons (including the appellant's husband Jeeten Singh, R.K. Meghen @ Sanayaima, and Maibam Sarat Singh @ Chaoren @ Naba Kumar) and other investigation materials; he indicated copies would be supplied but ultimately failed to provide them to the court (the appellant supplied copies instead).
  • The ASG emphasised the appellant's alleged membership and active role in UNLF and advanced the contention that, particularly under section 43D(5) of the Act, once a prima facie case is shown the court should not grant bail. He also sought to distinguish between a “banned organisation” and a “terrorist organisation,” arguing that mere membership of a terrorist organisation could attract penal provisions (section 20).
  • The prosecution relied on certain computer printouts showing payments to the appellant from UNLF-related computers to suggest financial dealings with the organisation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam (Criminal Appeal No. 889/2007), decided 3.2.2011 Held that “mere membership of a banned organisation will not make a person a criminal unless he resorts to violence or incites people to violence or creates public disorder by violence or incitement to violence”. The court applied this rationale to the appellant's alleged membership of UNLF to conclude that mere membership, without evidence of violent conduct or incitement, does not make the appellant a criminal such as to warrant denial of bail.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a step-by-step analysis grounded in the materials placed before it:

  1. Examination of charge-sheet (paragraph 17.28): The court observed that the allegations against the appellant are extremely general and that paragraph 17.28 is the only paragraph specifically mentioning her. No single specific act was attributed to her in that paragraph.
  2. Review of witness statements: The court considered (a) PW 6 (Phanidhar Das) who only recorded that Jeeten Singh (the appellant's husband) had confessed that he and the appellant were members of UNLF; and (b) PW 40 (Ms. Wangkheimayum Amusana) who said the appellant and her husband were active members of UNLF but did not describe any role or activity of the appellant. The court found these statements to be general and not specifying actionable conduct.
  3. Statements recorded during investigation: The court noted statements of Jeeten Singh, R.K. Meghen @ Sanayaima and Maibam Sarat Singh which were referred to by the ASG. Jeeten Singh's statement attributed to him that he and his wife were active members involved in fund raising, mobilising and arranging hideouts. R.K. Meghen's statement referred to historical involvement (political classes in 1986) and family connections. Maibam Sarat Singh's statement largely echoed Jeeten Singh. The court regarded the latter two statements as parrot-like and of limited evidentiary value against the appellant.
  4. Documentary evidence: The prosecution pointed to computer printouts showing payments to the appellant for reasons like medical reimbursement, house construction loan and travelling allowance. The court observed these documents, if anything, showed receipt of funds by the appellant (not that she raised or provided funds), undermining any charge under section 17 (raising funds).
  5. Statutory and temporal context (Article 20(1) and UAPA amendments): The court emphasised that the UAPA, as originally enacted in 1967, dealt with unlawful associations but did not categorise terrorist organisations; the UNLF's activities in 1986, even if unlawful then, would not automatically make the appellant a terrorist under the law as it stands today because of constitutional protection (article 20(1)) and changes to the Act. The court proceeded on the assumption (for analysis) that UNLF may have been an unlawful association in 1986, but noted the Act was amended in 2004 to include terrorist organisations and listed UNLF only from 2004 onwards.
  6. Application of specific UAPA provisions (sections 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20): The court annotated the text of sections 15 (definition of terrorist act), 16 (punishment for terrorist act), 17 (raising funds), 18 (conspiracy etc.), and 20 (membership). It concluded:
    • No terrorist act (as per section 15) was attributed to the appellant, and no act causing death or injury was alleged; thus section 16 did not apply.
    • There was no material to show the appellant raised or collected funds (section 17); the prosecution's own material suggested she received payments.
    • Section 18 (conspiracy etc.) was tied to terrorist acts; absent any terrorist act, it did not apply to her case.
    • Section 20 penalises membership of a terrorist gang/organisation involved in a terrorist act, and allows a wide sentencing range — from minimal sentence to life — depending on the extent of involvement.
  7. On the sentencing latitude under section 20 the court reasoned that Parliament's wide discretion to the trial judge indicates that mere membership does not per se mandate the severest penalties; rather sentencing depends on degree of involvement.
  8. Reliance on precedent: The court relied on Arup Bhuyan to reinforce the position that mere membership of a banned/terrorist organisation, without resort to violence or incitement, does not necessarily render a person criminal.
  9. Application of section 43D(5) proviso and prima facie assessment: The court specifically considered the proviso to section 43D(5) requiring the court, on perusal of the case diary or section 173 report, to be of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusation is prima facie true before denying bail. The court perused the charge sheet and the statements that were supplied (including the “privileged” statements the ASG failed to provide) and concluded that there was no prima facie material to justify continued incarceration.
  10. Procedural observations: The court noted the ASG made no submissions supporting IPC charges (waging war against India) and failed to provide promised materials; the court expressly recorded that the prosecution had not shown materials proving the appellant waged war against India.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The appeal is allowed and the appellant is granted bail.

Immediate Consequences / Directions

  • The appellant must make herself available to the NIA whenever required.
  • If the appellant is in possession of a valid passport she shall surrender it to the NIA.
  • The appellant shall not leave Imphal (her place of residence) without the permission of the Investigating Officer of the NIA.
  • The appellant will be released on production of two sureties of Rs. 50,000 each to the satisfaction of the Trial Judge.
  • The appellant shall not contact any witnesses or any member of the UNLF during the period she is on bail.

Broader Implications and Limits of the Opinion

  • The court found no prima facie case on the materials before it to hold the appellant guilty under the provisions of the UAPA for which she was charge-sheeted.
  • The court emphasised that its observations are confined to deciding this bail appeal and expressly directed that the observations are not to be used by the appellant at trial or by other accused in any bail application before the Trial Judge.
  • No new precedent beyond application of existing statutory provisions and the cited Supreme Court authority was created; the decision effects the immediate release of the appellant on the stated terms and imposes conditions oriented to availability and non-interference with the investigation and witnesses.

Disposition: The appeal was disposed of on the terms stated above.

    M. Londhoni Devi… v. National Investigation Agency….

    Madan B. Lokur, C.J:— The appellant has preferred this appeal against an order dated 1.4.2011 passed by the Special Judge, NLA, Assam, Guwahati in Misc. Bail Application No. 17/2011 declining bail to the appellant. In our opinion, bail ought to have been granted to the appellant.

    2. The appellant has been in custody since 18.8.2010 and is accused of offences under sections 120(B), 121, 121(A) and 122 of the IPC read with sections 16, 17, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. A charge sheet has been filed on 14.2.2011 against the appellant in respect of these offences, in which she is Accused No. 14.

    3. While the offences appear to be rather serious, the allegations against Page: 121the appellant are completely innocuous and belie the provisions of the statutes concerned.

    4. The allegations contained in the charge sheet against the appellant are mentioned only in paragraph 17.28 thereof. This paragraph reads as follows:—

    “17.28 In pursuance of the said conspiracy accused Mrs. Londhoni Devi (A-14) as an active member of the proscribed terrorist organisation, UNLF had remained associated with every act of commission and omission of UNLF carried out inside and outside India. The accused as a member of UNLF in pursuance of the conspiracy as investigated had coordinated and organised activities of UNLF. In furtherance of such conspiracy, Mrs. Londhoni Devi (A-14) had used different mobile phones in assumed names and identities. UNLF, upon her arrest had made desperate attempts to bail her out so as to continue the ongoing conspiracy of waging war against India.”

    5. The conspiracy referred to above in paragraph 17.28 of the charge sheet is stated to be a conspiracy of waging war against India. Not an iota of evidence, or even a suggestion, has been pointed out to us that the appellant is a conspirator in waging war against India.

    6. The substantive allegations made against the appellant suggest:

    (i) That she is an active member of a terrorist organisation called the United National Liberation Front (UNLF);

    (ii) That she is associated with every act of commission of the UNLF carried out inside and outside India;

    (iii) That she, in pursuance of the conspiracy of waging war against India had coordinated and organised activities of the UNLF;

    (iv) That she had used different mobile phones in assumed names and identities;

    (v) That she was sought to be released on bail at the instance of the UNLF so as to continue the conspiracy of waging war against India.

    7. As can be seen from the allegations made against the appellant, they are extremely general in nature. Not a single specific act has been attributed to her.

    8. During the course of submissions before us, learned counsel for the appellant referred to the statements made by two witnesses who are the only persons to have even mentioned the appellant.

    9. To appreciate the allegations, it is necessary to rephrase the statements of these two witnesses. The first witness is PW 6, that is, Phanidhar Das. This witness is the landlord of the appellant's husband in Page: 122Guwahati. The only thing that he says in his statement is that Jeeten Singh (husband of the appellant) had confessed before the police that he and the accused are members of a banned organisation, that is, UNLF in Manipur. This witness does not say anything more than what we have mentioned above.

    10. The second witness is PW 40, that is, Ms. Wangkheimayum Amusana. This witness appears to be all old friend of the appellant. All that she says is that the appellant and her husband were active members of the UNLF. Even though she was aware of this, she nevertheless continued her friendship with them because the appellant was her close friend since childhood. The witness does not say anything with regard to the role of the appellant in the activities of the UNLF.

    11. The above is the only evidence brought on record to suggest that the appellant is waging war against India and that she has violated the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (‘the Act’).

    12. At this stage we may mention that the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the NIA had shown us the statements of the appellant's husband Jeeten Singh, the statement of R.K Meghen @ Sanayaima and the statement of Maibam Sarat Singh @ Chaoren @ Naba Kumar recorded during the course of investigations. He promised to supply us copies of the statements but unfortunately did not do so. His instructing counsel was also at a complete loss in this regard and even he did not give us copies of the statements referred to by the learned Additional Solicitor General. Ironically, learned counsel for the appellant has provided us with copies of the statements.

    13. All that Jeeten Singh says in his statement to the Additional Superintendent of Police is that he and his wife (the appellant) are active members of the UNLF. They are involved in Various activities for strengthening the outfit like fund raising, mobilizing the public and arranging hide outs for its senior leaders and cadres.

    R.K Meghen @ Sanayaima says in his statement that he knows the appellant for a long time as her brother Jayanta was a senior member of the UNLF. The UNLF had organized its political classes secretly for newly recruited cadres in her house for three months in 1986. Jayanta gave lectures in those classes and that Jeeten Singh is the Chief Revenue Officer of the UNLF.

    Maibam Sarat Singh @ Chaoren @ Naba Kumar says in his statement that the appellant is an active member of the UNLF. She is involved in various activities for strengthening the outfit like fund raising, mobilizing the public and arranging hide outs for its senior leaders Page: 123and cadres. His statement in this regard is a reproduction of the statement of Jeeten Singh.

    14. So far as the documentary evidence relied on by the NIA is concerned, what has been pointed out to us are a few documents apparently taken from some computers belonging to members of the UNLF. These print-outs show that some payments were made to the appellant by the UNLF for various reasons, such as, reimbursement of medical bills, house construction loan, travelling allowance etc. From these transactions, it is sought to be contended on behalf of the NIA that the appellant had financial dealings with the UNLF which show that she is an active member of the UNLF.

    15. We have considered the submissions made by the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the NIA and find that this is an appropriate case for the grant of bail to the appellant.

    16. At the outset we must state that absolutely no submissions were made by the learned Additional Solicitor General whatsoever to support the charge that the appellant was waging war against India. In other words, absolutely no contention whatsoever was raised by the learned Additional Solicitor General to suggest that the appellant had committed any offence under the IPC. The only submissions of the learned Additional Solicitor General were with reference to the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and nothing else.

    17. At this stage it is important to note that when the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act was first enacted in 1967, the UNLF was not described as a terrorist organisation. Indeed, the said Act did not deal with terrorism or any terrorist organization. The said Act only dealt with associations carrying out unlawful activities which touched upon the sovereignty and integrity of India, including cession of a part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the territory of India from the Union.

    18. There were, of course, penal consequences attached to an unlawful association and to its members. At this stage it must be stated that it is not clear whether the UNLF was declared as an unlawful association in 1986 or not, but we are proceeding on the basis that it was so. At best, therefore, it can be said that even in 1986 the UNLF was an unlawful association and the appellant was an active member of such an unlawful association. But the unlawful activities of the UNLF or the appellant in 1986 do not make her a terrorist under the law as it stands today and she certainly cannot be punished for those unlawful activities under the statute as it exists today. There is a bar provided, by article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, reliance placed by Page: 124the learned Additional Solicitor General on the statement of R.K Meghen @ Sanayaima to contend that the appellant has been a terrorist all along is completely misplaced. The only relevance of that statement would be to show the association of the appellant with the UNLF since 1986.

    19. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act underwent drastic amendments in 2004. By the amendments made in 2004, terrorist organisations were brought within the fold of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. A terrorist organisation was defined to mean an organisation listed in the Schedule of the Act or an organisation operating in the same name as an organisation so listed. The amendment listed the UNLF as a terrorist organisation and, therefore, it is only from 2004 onwards that the UNLF can be described as a terrorist organisation. The activities of the members of the UNLF prior to 2004 were not the activities of a terrorist organisation for the purposes of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act but were the activities of an unlawful association.

    20. The amendment brought about in 2004 also included a chapter on punishment for terrorist activities. We are really concerned with some of the Sections with which the appellant has been charged, namely, sections 16, 17, 18 and 20. These sections (and section 15 which is equally important) as they stand today (after amendments in 2004 and 2008) read as follows:

    “15. Terrorist act.— Whoever does any act with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country,—

    (a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause—

    (i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or

    (ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or

    (iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country; or

    (iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies; or

    (b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public functionary; or

    (c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the Government of India, any State Government or the Government of a foreign country or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act.

    Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, public functionary means the constitutional authorities and any other functionary notified in the Official Gazette by the Central Government as a public functionary.

    16. Punishment for terrorist act.— (1) Whoever commits a terrorist act shall,—

    (a) if such act has resulted in the death of any person, be punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine;

    (b) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

    17. Punishment for raising funds for terrorist act.— Whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or indirectly, raises or collects funds or provides funds to any person or persons or attempts to provide funds to any person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be used by such person or persons to commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such funds were actually used or not for commission of such act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

    18. Punishment for conspiracy, etc. — Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directs or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

    20. Punishment for being member of terrorist gang or organisation.— Any person, who is a member of a terrorist gang or a terrorist organisation, which is involved in terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

    21. A terrorist act has been defined under section 15 of the said Act as above. The admitted position is that no terrorist act has been attributed to the appellant. It is nobody's case that the appellant has committed Page: 126any act which has resulted in the death of any person or caused any injury to anybody at any point of time. Therefore, prima facie, on the materials presently made available to us it is quite clear that the appellant has not committed any offence punishable under section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.

    22. Insofar as section 17 of the said Act and the allegation of raising funds for terrorist acts are concerned, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that the appellant directly or indirectly raised or collected funds for any activity of the UNLF let alone for the commission of any terrorist act. On the contrary; according to the learned Additional Solicitor General, the appellant was the recipient of funds from the UNLF. Ex facie, therefore, even assuming the computer printouts indicated financial transactions between the UNLF and the appellant, those financial transactions relate to funds received by the appellant for medical reimbursement, house loan, travelling allowances etc. and they do not relate to funds collected or raised by her of provided by her to any person for the commission of any terrorist act.

    23. As regards section 18 of the Act, again this is relatable to a terrorist act. But, as we have mentioned above no terrorist activity has been attributed to or even suggested against the appellant. Section 18 of the said Act also does not apply to the facts of the present case.

    24. The main thrust of the contentions of the learned Additional Solicitor General were directed towards showing that the appellant was liable to punished under section 20 of the Act which provides for punishment to a member of a terrorist gang or organisation which is involved in a terrorist act.

    25. Significantly, section 20 of the said Act provides for great latitude in the imposition of a sentence. The Section provides for sentence from the rising of the court to imprisonment for life. What is the reason for this wide margin? The reason for this is quite obvious, namely, that it caters to the extent of involvement in the activities of the terrorist organization or terrorist gang — if the involvement is superficial, minimal sentence may be imposed by the Trial Judge, but if the involvement is overwhelming, life imprisonment may be imposed.

    26. As far as the appellant is concerned, only PW 40 has stated that the appellant was an active member of the UNLF. Additionally, Jeeten Singh and Maibam Sarat Singh @ Chaoren @ Naba Kumar have stated before the Investigating Officer, parrot-like, that the appellant is an active member of the UNLF without specifying anything. The latter two statements can hardly be used as evidence against the appellant. The statement of PW 40 is only general and even if were true, it would be inadequate to sentence the appellant to life imprisonment.

    27. Recently, the Supreme Court held in Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam (Criminal Appeal No. 889/2007) decided on 3.2.2011 that “mere membership of a banned organisation will not make a person a criminal unless he resorts to violence or incites people to violence or creates public disorder by violence or incitement to violence”. Applying the same rationale to the membership of the appellant to the UNLF, it can be said that her mere membership of the UNLF will not make her a criminal.

    28. However, it must be noted that the learned Additional Solicitor General sought to make a distinction between a “banned organisation” and a “terrorist organisation”. Pie contended that even mere membership of a terrorist organisation would attract the penal provisions of section 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. While he may be correct, it cannot be forgotten that Parliament has provided a huge margin in the quantum of punishment for membership of a terrorist organization. If mere membership of a terrorist organisation is expected to invite serious penal consequences, the Legislature would not have given such a wide discretion to the Trial Judge in the matter of sentencing. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the very fact that Parliament has given a wide discretion to the Trial Judge is a pointer to the view that membership of a terrorist organisation does not, per se, attract severe penalty and that it can even attract the minimal penalty. The learned Additional Solicitor General is not right in arguing for denial of bail to the appellant only because she is a member of a terrorist organisation.

    29. Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is an active member of a terrorist organisation, even then the nature of active involvement would depend on the evidence led by the prosecution. On a given set of facts, even an active member may be sentenced to imprisonment only for a short while — every active member need not be sentenced to imprisonment for life. Therefore, merely because an allegation has been made that the appellant is an active member of a terrorist organisation such as the UNLF would not ipso facto attract the severest penalty under the statute. If we go by the statement of PW 40, it appears to us that apart from merely stating that the appellant is an active member of the UNLF, no other allegation has been made against her which would warrant denial of bail.

    30. The final submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General was that the NIA has only to show that there is a prima facie case against the appellant and if that prima facie case is shown, then bail should automatically be denied to her. The learned Additional Solicitor General relied upon section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act which reads as follows:—

    “43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.— ……………… (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release:

    Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.”

    31. As required by the proviso to section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, we have gone through the charge sheet against the appellant. On a perusal thereof, we find that apart from a general statement made in paragraph 17.28 thereof, no specific allegation has been made against the appellant to suggest that her activities were such as to warrant her continued incarceration. In fact, no prima facie case is made out against the appellant for violation of any of the provisions for which she has been charge sheeted.

    32. Insofar as the contents of the case diary are concerned, we have already noted that the learned Additional Solicitor General had promised that he would show us the materials on the basis of which such serious charges have been made against the appellant, but he failed to do so. Ironically, it is the appellant who has placed before us the statements sought to be relied upon by the learned Additional Solicitor General. We have perused the statements and have discussed them above and do not feel the necessity of repeating what has already been said. Suffice it to say, the “privileged” statements also do not show any prima facie having been made out for the continued incarceration of the appellant.

    33. To conclude, in our opinion, there is no prima facie material to hold that the appellant has committed any offence under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the appellant has committed an offence, that offence is punishable under section 20 of the said Act, which gives a very wide discretion to the Trial Judge in the matter of sentencing the appellant. We do not know what material the NIA will produce before the learned Trial Judge nor we know what sentence the learned Trial Judge will impose upon the appellant (in case she is found guilty) but it is quite possible that the sentence might be minimal. Therefore, we feel that it will not be appropriate to keep the appellant in custody any further, considering that she has already been in custody since 19.8.2010, that is, for a period of about 10 months.

    34. We may again note that no submissions were made before us with regard to any violation of the provisions of the IPC stated to have been committed by the appellant.

    35. For the purposes of grant of bail, we cannot overlook the fact that the appellant is stated to be the mother of two young school going children, aged about 7 years and 4 years. On the basis of the very thin allegations made against her in the charge sheet filed by the NIA, we do not see any reason to separate the appellant from her family for an indefinite period.

    36. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the appellant should be granted bail and that the learned Trial Judge was in error in declining bail to the appellant.

    37. While granting bail to the appellant in this case, we direct the following:

    (i) The appellant should make herself available to the NIA whenever required;

    (ii) If the appellant is in possession of a valid passport she should surrender it to the NIA;

    (iii) The appellant will not leave Imphal where she resides, without the permission of the Investigating Officer of the NIA.

    (iv) The appellant will be released on the production two sureties of an amount of Rs. 50,000, each to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Judge;

    (v) The appellant will not make any contact with any of the witnesses or any member of the UNLF during the period she is on bail.

    38. The appeal is disposed of on the above terms.

    39. The terms of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act compel a somewhat detailed discussion. Therefore, we wish to make it abundantly clear that the observations made by us are only for the purpose of deciding the bail appeal of the appellant. Our observations are not to be used by the appellant during the course of the trial or by any other accused for moving any bail application before the learned Trial Judge. Our observations are only confined to this bail appeal and nothing else.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    M. Londhoni Devi… v. National Investigation Agency….
    (Jul 1, 2011)