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Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • N.L. Wadhera - for Appellant ; Asa Ram Aggarwal
Judges
  • Bhandari, J.
Acts
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Attorney(S)
  • N.L. Wadhera - for Appellant ; Asa Ram Aggarwal
Judges
  • Bhandari, J.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A shop in Ludhiana was let to Amar Nath (the tenant) on 22 February 1944. The owner, Nathu Ram, obtained an order for the tenant's ejectment from the Rent Controller on 11 August 1948 under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 (a Governor's Act made under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935). On 20 December 1948 the owner applied for execution of that order under Section 17 of the 1947 Act. While execution proceedings were pending, the Provincial Legislature enacted the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which re-enacted substantially the same provisions. The tenant objected in the executing court, relying on Section 13 of the 1949 Act, arguing that the executing court lacked competence to continue the ejectment proceedings. The executing court overruled the objection; the District Judge in appeal upheld that decision. The tenant pursued a second appeal to this Court challenging the correctness of the courts below on the legal point raised.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order passed by a Rent Controller exercising powers under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, can be regarded as a "decree" within the meaning of the expression as used in Section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
  2. Whether an order passed by a Controller under Sections 10 or 13 of the 1947 Act can be deemed to be an order passed under the powers conferred by the 1949 Act and, consequently, be executed by a civil Court as if it were a decree of that civil Court (having regard to Section 17 of the Act of 1949 and Section 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Tenant's) Arguments

  • Mr. Wadhera, appearing for the tenant, argued that an order of the Controller under the 1947 Act falls within the definition of "decree" as defined in Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), because it is a formal expression of an adjudication that conclusively determines the rights of the parties in relation to matters in dispute.
  • He further relied on the authority of Kishenchand & Co. v. Nur Mohammad (A.I.R. (36) 1949 Lah. 94; Pak. L.R. (1949) Lah. 139) for the proposition that the Controller under the 1947 Act exercised all the powers of a civil Court and therefore should be regarded as such.

The opinion does not set out in detail any separate or specific arguments advanced by the respondent (owner) or other parties beyond the procedural facts and the authorities considered by the Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kishenchand & Co. v. Nur Mohammad, A.I.R. (36) 1949 Lah. 94; Pak. L.R. (1949) Lah. 139 Supports the view that a Controller under the Rent Restriction Act exercises the powers of a civil Court and, by implication, that his adjudication may be treated as equivalent to a court's adjudication. The Court noted the authority but held that the latter part of the argument based on it could not be sustained in view of a contrary Full Bench decision; Kishenchand did not prevail to establish that an adjudication by the Controller is a "decree" for the purposes of Section 13 of the 1949 Act.
Pitman's Short Hand Academy v. Bhila Ram & Sons, C.R. No. 135 of 1949; A.I.R. (37) 1950 E.P. 181 (Full Bench) Establishes that the Rent Controller and the appellate authority appointed under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, cannot be regarded as civil Courts. The Court applied this Full Bench holding to reject the tenant's contention that a Controller's order is a "decree"; since the Controller is not a civil Court, an adjudication by him cannot be treated as a decree within the meaning of the CPC definition relied upon.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two analytical stages corresponding to the two questions posed.

First question — whether a Controller's order under the 1947 Act is a "decree":

  • The Court examined the CPC definition of "decree" in Section 2(2): a decree is the formal expression of an adjudication by a Court which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to matters in controversy in the suit.
  • The tenant's counsel argued that a Controller's order fits this definition because it conclusively determines rights; he relied on Kishenchand & Co. for the view that the Controller exercises all the powers of a civil Court.
  • The Court observed that the latter premise could not be sustained: a recent Full Bench decision in Pitman's Short Hand Academy held that the Rent Controller and the appellate authority under the 1947 Act cannot be regarded as civil Courts.
  • Because the Controller is not a civil Court, the Court concluded that an adjudication by such an authority cannot be a "decree" as contemplated by the CPC definition. Accordingly, the first question was answered in the negative.

Second question — whether an order passed under the 1947 Act can be deemed to have been issued under the 1949 Act and executed by a civil Court as if it were a decree:

  • The Court relied on Section 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act (1898), which provides that where a Punjab Act is repealed and re-enacted, any order issued under the repealed Act shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the re-enacted provisions, continue in force and be deemed to have been issued under the provisions so re-enacted.
  • Because the 1947 Act was repealed and its provisions re-enacted in substantially the same language in the 1949 Act, the Court held that the order issued by the Controller under the 1947 Act must be deemed to be an order issued under the 1949 Act, to the extent it is not inconsistent with the re-enacted provisions.
  • Section 17 of the Act provides that every order made under Sections 10 or 13 and every order on appeal under Section 15 shall be executed by a civil Court as if it were a decree of that Court. Thus an order deemed to have been issued under the 1949 Act falls within Section 17's execution mechanism.
  • The Court noted that Section 13 of the 1949 Act prescribes the circumstances and procedure for eviction; the Controller's order in the present case was admittedly passed in accordance with Section 13 of the 1947 Act and is not inconsistent with the re-enacted provisions. Therefore, by virtue of the General Clauses provision, it is to be treated as an order under Section 13 of the 1949 Act and is executable under Section 17 by a civil Court as if it were a decree.
  • The Court also reviewed legislative history (the 1941 Act, the Governor's 1947 measure, and the 1949 re-enactment) and concluded the Provincial Legislature did not intend that a fresh order of eviction should be required where an order had already been validly passed under the 1947 procedure; this historical context reinforced the statutory conclusion under Section 22 of the General Clauses Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court affirmed the decisions of the courts below and dismissed the appeal. The Court held that:

  • An order passed by the Controller under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 is not a "decree" within the meaning of the CPC definition because the Controller is not a civil Court (answering the first question in the negative).
  • Nevertheless, because the 1947 Act was repealed and re-enacted in substantially the same terms in the 1949 Act, Section 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act operates to deem the Controller's order under the 1947 Act to have been issued under the corresponding provisions of the 1949 Act; consequently, Section 17 of the Act requires execution by the civil Court as if it were a decree, and the executing Court had power to continue with the ejectment proceedings (answering the second question in the affirmative as to executability).
  • The order of the courts below was affirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the executing civil Court could proceed with execution of the Controller's ejectment order made under the 1947 Act because that order is deemed to operate under the re-enacted 1949 provisions and hence is executable under Section 17 as if it were a decree. The opinion does not purport to announce a broader new precedent beyond applying Section 22 of the General Clauses Act and existing authorities; it affirms the orders below and dismisses the appeal.

D.R.R

Disposition: Appeal dismissed.

Show full summary ...

    Amar Nath Judgment-Debtor v. Nathoo Ram, Decree-Holder And Another

    1. This petition raises a short point upon the construction of Section 13 of the Punjab Urban; Rent Restriction Act, 1949. It appears that a certain shop situate in the city of Ludhiana was let out on rent to—Amar Nath petitioner on 22-2-1944. On 11-8-1948 Nathu Ram, who is the owner of the shop-obtained an order from the Rent Controller for the ejectment of the tenant under the provisions-of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1947, which was enacted by the Governor of the Punjab under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935. On 20-12-1948, he filed an application for the execution of the said order under the provisions of S. 17 of the said Act. While this application was being dealt with by the executing. Court the Provincial Legislature enacted a new-measure entitled the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which re-enacted in substantially the same language the provisions of the-Act of 1947. The tenant immediately raised an; objection before the executing Court that by the provisions of S. 13 of the later Act it was-not within the competence of the executing Court to continue with the proceedings of ejectment. This contention was overruled by the executing Court and the decision of the executing Court was upheld by the learned District. Judge in appeal. The tenant has come to this Page: 330Court in second appeal and the question for this Court is whether the Courts below have come to a correct determination in point of law.

    2. Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Punjab Urban Bent Restriction Act, 1947, is in the following storms:

    “A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this section.”

    3. Section 17 provides that every order made under S. 10, or S. 13 and every order passed on appeal under S. 15 shall be executed by a civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court.

    4. Two questions require determination in the present case. The first is whether an order passed by a controller in exercise of the powers conferred by the Act of 1947 can be said to be a “decree” within the meaning of the expression as used in S. 13 of the Act of 1949 and the second whether an order passed by a Controller in exercise of the powers conferred by Ss. 10 or 13 of the Act of 1947 can be deemed to be an order passed in exercise of the power conferred by the Act of 1949, which can be executed by a civil Court as if it were a decree of that Court.

    5. The expression “decree” as defined in Section 2(2) of the CPC, means the formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determine the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. Mr. Wadhera who appears for the tenant contends that an order passed by a Controller in exercise of the powers conferred by the Act of 1947 falls clearly within the ambit of this definition because it is the formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties in regard to the matters in dispute and, as pointed out in Kishenchand & Co. v. Nur Mohammad, A.I.R(36) 1949 Lah. 94 : (Pak. L.R (1949) Lah. 139) because the Controller under the Act of 1947 exercises all the powers of a civil Court and must be regarded as such. Unfortunately the latter part of this argument cannot be sustained for a Full Bench of this Court held recently in Pitman's Short Hand Academy v. Bhila Ram & Sons, C.R No. 135 of 1949: (A.I.R(37) 1950 E.P 181 F.B) that the Rent Controller and the appellate authority appointed under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, cannot be regarded as civil Courts. It follows; as a consequence that an adjudication by an; authority which cannot be regarded as a Court cannot be said to be a decree. The first question must, therefore, be answered in the negative.

    6. The answer to the second question 13 furnished by the provisions of Section 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1998, which declares that

    “where any Punjab Act is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any order…., issued under the repealed Act, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force and be deemed to have been issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any order…. issued under the provisions sore-enacted.”

    7. As the Act of 1947 has been repealed and re-enacted it seems to me that the order issued by the Controller under the Act of 1947 must be deemed to have been issued under the Act of 1949. Section 17 imposes a statutory obligation on a civil Court to execute such an order as if it were a decree of that Court. Section 13 of the Act of 1949 provides merely that a tenant cannot be evicted from a building except in accordance with the provisions of sub-ss. (2) to (5) of that section. The order passed by the Controller in this case was passed admittedly in accordance with the provisions of S. 13 of the Act of 1947, and in view of the provisions of Section 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898, it must be deemed to have been passed under S. 13 of the Act of 1949. Section 17 provides that every such order shall be executed by the civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court. It seems to me, therefore, that it is clearly within the power of the executing Court to continue with the proceedings for the ejectment of the tenant.

    8. The history of the legislation leads me to the same conclusion. The earliest statute which was enacted in the pre-partition Punjab for the purpose of restricting rents was the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act of 1941. Under the provisions of that Act, a tenant could be ejected from the property let out to him if the property was required bona fide for the use of the landlord, or if he failed to pay the rent which was due in respect of the premises or if he used the premises in a manner which was not authorised by the terms of the contract or if the landlord had served six months' notice on the tenant to vacate the premises. The outbreak of the Second World War and the consequent pressure on accommodation enabled the landlords to reap a rich harvest. Some of the more unscrupulous landlords started evicting their tenants with no other object than that of letting their premises out to persons who were prepared to pay higher rents. In order to obviate the possibility of honest tenants being rendered homeless and thrown on to the streets, Page: 331the Governor of the Punjab enacted a measure to which a reference has already been made by which he imposed greater restrictions on the powers of a landlord to evict his tenant. A tenant could be required to vacate the premises occupied by him only in certain circumstances which were clearly set out in statute. He could be evicted if the Controller was satisfied that the tenant had not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord, or if the tenant had after the commencement of the Act without the written consent of the landlord transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building or rented land or any portion thereof, or used the building or rented land for a purpose other than that for which it was leased, or if the tenant had committed such acts as were likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land, or if the tenant had been guilty of such acts and conduct as were a nuisance to the occupiers of the buildings in the neighbourhood, or where the building was situated in a place other than a hill station, if the tenant had ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause, or in the case of a residential building if the landlord required it for his own occupation. This Act did not enable a landlord to evict a tenant by reason only of the fact that the landlord had served upon him a six months notice to vacate the premises. In view of the changes which were intended to be effected by the legislation of 1947 the Governor enacted that the decrees which had been passed by the civil Courts under the laws which were in force immediately before the commencement of the Act of 1947 should not be executed and that if a tenant was to be evicted, from the premises occupied by him he could be evicted only in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute, i.e, only by means of an application made to a controller appointed under the provisions of the Act of 1947. As stated above, this was a Governor's Act and it remained in force for a period of two years. As this Act could not continue in force for an indefinite period the Provincial Legislature enacted a new measure in the year 1949 in which the principal provisions of the earlier statute were re-enacted. The intention of the new measure was not to make any radical changes in the law concerning the eviction of tenants but only to provide the safeguard which had already been provided by the Governor's Act of 1947. If, therefore, a person was ordered to be evicted from the premises occupied by him in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Act of 1947 the Legislature could not have contemplated that a fresh order of eviction should be passed against him in accordance with the same procedure. This case is, in my opinion, governed clearly by the provisions of Section 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act of 1898. For these reasons I entertain no doubt whatever that the order passed by the Controller in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the Act of 1947 must be deemed to be an order passed by him in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the Act of 1949 and must be executed by the executing Court as if it were a decree of that Court. The order of the Courts below must be affirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs.

    D.R.R

    9. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Amar Nath Judgment-Debtor v. Nathoo Ram, Decree-Holder And Another
    (Nov 23, 1949)