Harnam Singh, J.:— On the 9th of December, 1949, Amin Chand, Sham Lal and Jaswaut Rai applied under section 13(3) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, for the ejectment of Khushi Ram from a shop situate in the abadi of Jullundur City, Bazar Boharwala. In the application it was stated that Khushi Ram was in arrears, that the landlords required the shop for their own use and that the landlords required the shop for the re-erection of that shop.
2. Khushi Ram resisted the application pleading inter alia that no valid notice of ejectment had been served by the applicants on the respondent, that the applicants had no locus standi to maintain the application and that the respondent was not liable to be ejected on the grounds mentioned in the application. In deciding the case, Shri Radha Kishan, Subordinate Judge, First Class, Jallundur, found that a valid notice of ejectment had not been served by the applicants on the respondent, that applicants Nos. 2 and 3 had no locus standi to file the application and that there was no ground for ordering the eviction of the respondent.
3. From the order passed by Shri Radha Kishan, Subordinate Judge, First Class, Jullundur, on the 26th of July, 1950, Amin Chand, Sham Lal and Jaswant Rai appealed in the Court of the District Judge, Jullundur, under section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
4. In deciding the appeal the District Judge has found that the notice given by the applicants to the respondent was valid, that the applicants had locus standi to file the application and that the grounds for the eviction of the respondent mentioned in the application had been proved. On these findings the appellate authority has set aside the order passed by Shri Radha Kishan, Subordinate Judge, First Class, Jullundur, and has ordered that Khushi Ram respondent shall put Amin Chand, Sham Lal and Jaswant Rai in possession of the shop within a period of three mouths beginning with the 20th of January, 1951.
5. Khushi Ram applies under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for the revision of the order passed by the appellate authority on the 20th of January, 1951.
6. Section 15(4) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, provides—
“The decision of the appellate authority and subject only to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding by way of appeal or revision”.
7. Article 227(1) of the Constitution of India reads:—
“227(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction”.
8. Now, the term “Superintendence” has a signification which was perfectly well known to the Constituent Assembly of India when enacting Article 227. Shortly put, the object of superintendence is to keep all inferior Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to Page: 266see that they do which their duty requires them to do and they do it in a legal manner.
9. Then it is settled law that powers of superintendence vested in the High Court are not merely administrative but are also judicial. For an authority on this point Firm Ganesh Das Shankar Lal v. Firm Asa Nand Radhe Sham A.I.R 1933 Lah. 259, may be seen.
10. Section 107(1) of the Government of India Act, 1915, corresponded to Article 227(1), Constitution of India. The exercise of the power is however, in the discretion of the High Court and the power being one in the nature of extraordinary jurisdiction, should be exercised sparingly and with caution.
11. In these proceedings the decision of the point raised depends upon the powers of the Court under Article 227, Constitution of India. That the point raised is one of practical importance is shown by the frequency with which it comes up in the Court. On this 29th day of May, 1951, three cases under Article 227 have been placed before me for decision.
12. Now, the words used in Article 227 impose no limit on the exercise of the power; but the Court has, in its discretion, consistently refused to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, except in cases which disclose some grave and patent errors not otherwise to be remedied. The best statement of the law on the point is to be found in Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath2. In that judgment West J. (Bayley, Acting Chief Justice, and Pinhey and Nanabhai Haridas, JJ. concurring) said:—
“(2) The Court, having called up the record or proceedings of a subordinate Court, will itself investigate the facts on which a jurisdiction has been assumed or declined; on which it depends whether the subordinate Court could, or could not, legally deal with the matter in question, either at all, or on the principle to which it has referred the case; or according to which its mode of inquiry, or of action, may, or may not have been in contradiction, rather than obedience, to the rules of procedure, or the principles implied in them, to such a material extent as to defeat the purpose of the law.
(3) If the Court finds that the external conditions of jurisdiction of investigation, and of command, have been satisfied by the inferior Court, it will not substitute its own appreciation of evidence, or its own judgment thereon, for the determination of the inferior Court, in any matter committed by the Legislature to the discretion of such Court, whether for the sake of promptness, or finality, or because the lower Court has been thought by the Legislature the best tribuna for dealing with the matter in question.
(4) Where an appeal is provided, the Court will not interfere by any peremptory order with the ordinary course of adjudication, save, in cases wherein a defeat of the law, and a great wrong, are manifest, and are irremediable by the regular procedure.
(5) Where a decree or order of a subordinate Court is declared by the law to be for its own purposes, final, or conclusive, though in its nature provisional, as subject to displacement by the decree in another more formal suit, the Court will have regard to the intention of the Legislature that promptness and certainty should, in such cases, be in some measure accepted instead of juridical perfection. It will rectify the proceedings of Page: 267the inferior Court where the extrinsic conditions of its legal activity have plainly been infringed: but where the alleged, or apparent, error consists in a misappreciation of evidence, or misconstruction of the law, intrinsic to the inquiry and decision it will respect the intended finality, and will intervene peremptorily only when it is manifest that, by the ordinary and prescribed method, an adequate remedy, or the intended remedy, cannot be had.
(6) The Court will, in all cases, regard its exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction as discretional, and subject to considerations of the importance of the particular case, or of the principle involved in it, of delay on the part of an applicant, and of his merits with respect to the case in which the interference of the Court is sought. Should other special causes appear for or against, the Court's intervention, due weight is to be given to them, regard being always had to the principles already enunciated.
(7) The Court will sedulously abstain from making any order, or refusing to make it, on grounds the appreciation of which is exclusively assigned by law to some other authority, provided the legal competence be exercised, in good faith on matters that may reasonably be understood as within its lawful range.
13. In Shivaji Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath2 the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court defined the “powers of superintendence” of that Court and I think that the tests laid down therein are good tests under Article 227 which enacts that every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.
14. In these proceedings Mr. N.L Wadehra urges that the Court had no jurisdiction to order ejection unless the body of landlords wanted the shop in suit for their own use or unless the landlords required the shop for the re-erection of that shop. Considering that the appellate authority has found that the landlords require the shop for the re-election of that shop, it was not necessary for the ejection of the tenant that the landlords wanted the shop for their own use.
15. Mr. N.L Wadehra then urges that the notice given by the Municipal Committee under section 144 of the Punjab Municipal Act requiring the demolition of the building does not relate to the shop in question. Be that as it may, there is evidence that the applicants had applied to the Municipal Committee for the sanction of a plan for the re-erection of the shop in question and that plan has been sanctioned. Amin Chand P.W 3, gave evidence in Court that the shop in question was a very old shop, that he had three-tenths share in the shop, that the landlords wanted to partition the shop and then to set up new building on the site. The evidence given by Amin Chand P.W 3, which has not been rebutted or shown to be false, brings the case within section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
16. Mr. N.L Wadehra also urges that the notice given by the landlords to the tenant was defective. On this point the appellate authority has found that the notice, Exhibit P. 9, given by the landlords to the tenant was good and sufficient notice.
17. Applying then the tests laid down in Shivaji Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath2 to the facts of the present case, I think that the circumstances of the present case are not such so as to justify action under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Khushi Ram will now gut Amin Chand, Sham Lal and Jaswant Rai Page: 268in possession of the shop in question within a period of two months from to-day.
18. Petition dismissed.