Kapur, J.:— This is a rule directed against an order of the appellate authority Mr. J.S Bedi, District Judge, Ambala, holding that the rent had been paid in accordance with the provisions of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act of 1949 and that the premises were not needed for the personal occupation of the landlord.
2. On the 4th of August 1949 the landlord gave notice to the tenants for vacating the premises and on the 5th August they made an application for reduction of rent which was later on reduced from Rs. 125 to Rs. 20 on the ground that Rs. 20 was the standard rent of the premises. On the 10th of August 1949 the landlord applied to the Rent Controller for the eviction of the tenants and the Rent Controller held that proper amount of rent had been tendered in accordance with the provisions of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act but the landlord did require the premises bona fide for his personal occupation and he ordered eviction.
3. An appeal was taken to the appellate authority in this case the District Judge, Ambala, who agreed with the Rent Controller on the first point but reversed the finding of the Rent Controller on the second ground holding that this part of the application of the landlord was not bona fide meaning thereby that the landlord did not require the premises for his personal occupation. The rule was issued on the 6th December, 1950 by my learned brother Khosla, J.
4. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court that this Court, cannot interfere with the orders of the appellate authority because the appellate authority is not a Court within the meaning of that word as used in the Code of Civil Procedure, but I am asked by Mr. Tek Chand to interfere with the order of the appellate authority under Article 227 of the Constitution. Besides relying on three judgments of the Madras High Court counsel for the petitioner strongly relied on a judgment of the Calcutta High Court Bimala Prosad Ray v. State of West Bengal A.I.R 1951 Cal. 258. The learned Chief Justice there defined the powers given under Article 227 of the Constitution in the following words:—
“The power of superintendence is again given to this Court and other High Courts by Article 227 of the Constitution and it is to be observed that the provisions in sub-section (2) of section 224 restricting the powers of this Court find no place in Article 227 of the Constitution. The powers of superintendence given to the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution are somewhat similar to the powers given to the High Courts by the Government of India Act, 1915, which were, as I have said, later restricted by sub-section (2) of section 224, Government of India Act, 1935. It seems to me that it was the intention of the Constituent Assembly to Page: 177restore the law to what it was before the Government of India Act, 1935 was enacted. That is the only inference which can be drawn from the omission of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 224, Government of India Act, 1935, from Article 227 of the Constitution. That being so, it appears to me that this Court is bound to hold that it has the same powers of judicial interference as it had before the Government of India Act, 1935, was enacted if not greater powers. It must be held therefore that Article 227 of the Constitution gives this Court a right in appropriate cases to interfere judicially with orders of Courts and tribunals made amenable to its jurisdiction by that Article.”
5. In a previous paragraph the learned Chief Justice said:—
“A power of superintendence would not normally involve a power of judicial interference, but I think it is too late to contend that the power of superintendence such as that given by Article 227 of the Constitution does not involve a power to interfere judicially in appropriate cases.”
6. The Calcutta High Court has in previous cases interpreted the word “superintendence”. In Sukh Lal Sheikh v. Tara Chand2 which was a Full Bench judgment it was observed by Maclean, C.J, at p. 77—
“The power of interference, which we possess in relation to cases under section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is only under section 15 of the Charter Act, which, in giving this Court a general power of Superintendence over the Subordinate Courts, vests in it a power some-what analogous to that of the King's Bench Division in the Supreme Court in England to interfere by mandamus, and in our opinion the power, which is discretionary, ought in relation to cases under section 145 to be exercised with every caution.”
7. In Manmatha Nath Biswas v. Emperor A.I.R 1933 Cal. 132 Rankin, C.J, observed at p. 134—
“An elaborate review of the decisions of this and other High Courts upon the subject is to be found in the Patna Case Parameswar v. Kailaspati A.I.R 1916 Pat. 292, a case which like most of the Calcutta cases arose out of proceedings under S. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, for which before 1923 ‘revision’ under that Code did not apply. In the Full Bench case of Sukh Lal v. Tara Chand2 Maclean, C.J, described the power of superintendence as somewhat analogous to that of the King's Bench Division to interfere by mandamus, and in Kedar Nath v. Khetra Nath (1907) 6 C.L.J 705 Mitra, J., said that it could only be exercised in cases of non-exercise or illegal exercise of jurisdiction. I agree with Roe, J., in the Patna case that superintendence is not a legal fiction whereby a High Court judge is vested with omnipotence but is as Norman, J., had said a term having a legal force and signification. The general superintendence which this Court has over all jurisdiction subject to appeal is a duty to keep them within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. It does not involve responsibility for the correctness of their decisions, either in fact or law.”
8. In a later judgment which is reported in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd.… v. Sukumar Mukherjee…Opposite Party. A.I.R 1951 Cal. 193, a case under the Payment of Wages Act, Harries, C.J, observed as follows:—
“The power of superintendence as pointed out by Rankin, C.J, in his judgment in this case is not a power given to this Court to correct errors, otherwise it would be tantamount to a right to entertain appeals on law and fact. The right should be exercised only in cases where the Courts have clearly done something which they were not entitled to do. The power must be used to keep the Courts below within the bounds prescribed by law for such Courts.”
9. In view of this my opinion is that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not the same as is exercise able by a Court of appeal but should be confined to keeping the subordinate Courts and other tribunals within the narrow limits which the law prescribes for them. It does not give this Court the power to interfere in every case but in cases, as was observed by Maclean, C.J, which would be proper for exercising the powers of issue of mandamus. This being a limited power given to this Court, I do not think any appropriate case has been made out for interference. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule, but the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
10. Petition dismissed.