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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Acts
  • SECTION 7 PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT 1954
  • provisions of Sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code
  • Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955
  • sub-section (1) of Section 16
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 7 PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT 1954
  • provisions of Sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code
  • Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955
  • sub-section (1) of Section 16
Smart Summary

Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 31.8.1983 a sample of milk was drawn by a competent officer and sent for chemical examination. The chemical report (Ex. PE) indicated the milk was adulterated because the milk solids not fat (MSNF) were deficient by 6% of the minimum prescribed standards. A complaint was filed and the trial Magistrate treated the matter as a warrant case and, after recording necessary evidence, on 12.8.1985 found the petitioner guilty and convicted him.

The petitioner appealed and the appeal was allowed; the matter was remitted for retrial. A revision petition at one stage was dismissed by the High Court. On retrial the petitioner was again found guilty and, by order dated 31.10.1990, was convicted and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) and ordered to pay a further fine of Rs. 50/- for an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(ii) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

The petitioner again appealed. The appellate court, by order dated 30.7.1991, allowed the appeal on the ground that the complaint should have been tried as a summons case in a summary manner rather than as a warrant case; it set aside the conviction and sentence and sent the matter for retrial. The petitioner filed the present revision petition against that appellate court order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellate court was correct in holding that the complaint was required to be tried as a summons case in a summary manner under Section 16-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and in setting aside the Magistrate's order converting the case to a warrant trial.
  2. Whether, having regard to the factual matrix (chemical examiner's report) and the protracted delay (about 20 years), it was appropriate to remit the case for retrial or whether the revision court should quash the conviction and acquit the petitioner.
  3. Whether the Trial Magistrate's order dated 13.9.1986 converting the trial from summary to warrant procedure was legally justified under Section 16-A of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Counsel argued that remitting the matter back to the appellate court for rehearing would cause further mental agony and financial loss to the petitioner, noting the occurrence dated some twenty years earlier and that the petitioner had since reformed and was living peacefully.
  • Counsel challenged the merits of the trial court's conviction, relying on the chemical examiner's report (Ex. PE) produced at the hearing. He asserted that the report showed milk fat at 5.4% and milk solids not fat at 8.0%, arguing that milk fat exceeded the required standard and only a small deficiency existed in MSNF — facts which, he contended, made the conviction and sentence unjustified.
  • Counsel relied on earlier decisions of this Court (Hans Raj v. State of Haryana and Om Parkash v. State of Haryana) to support the contention that the evidence did not justify conviction in circumstances where milk fat was high and only MSNF showed slight deficiency.

State's Arguments

  • The Additional Advocate General for Haryana opposed the petitioner's prayer for quashing and acquittal, but according to the opinion failed to demonstrate that the averments by the petitioner's counsel (concerning the chemical report and the consequences thereof) were unjustified.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hans Raj v. State of Haryana, 2000 (1) RCR (Crl.) 743 The court observed that when sample analysis shows a relatively high milk fat with only a minor deficiency in milk solids not fat, such a pattern suggests improper sampling or imperfect analysis rather than adulteration by addition of water; conformity to prescribed standards must be examined (reference to PFA Rules, 1955 standards). The present Court relied on the reasoning in Hans Raj to support the view that no inference of addition of water could be drawn where milk fat was high and only MSNF showed slight deficiency; this influenced the Court's conclusion that retrial would be a futile exercise.
Om Parkash v. State of Haryana, 2000 (1) RCR (Crl.) 121 Similar ratio to Hans Raj — supports the view that discrepancies confined to MSNF with higher milk fat point away from adulteration by water. The Court noted that Om Parkash is to the same effect as Hans Raj and relied upon it in concluding that the chemical evidence did not necessarily support conviction for adulteration by dilution.
Subhash Chand v. The State of Haryana, 1989 (1) RCR 602 Where proceedings have dragged on for a very long period (about ten years in that case), the Court elected to set aside conviction and sentence as the harassment and strain suffered by the accused constituted sufficient punishment; the Court refused to send the matter for retrial. The present Court relied on this authority to justify not ordering another retrial given the protracted duration of proceedings in the instant matter (about twenty years) and as a factor supporting quashing of conviction.
State of Haryana v. Ram Kishan, 2003 (3) RCR (Crl.) 201 The Court observed that even if the trial court view was erroneous, having regard to the long passage of time (occurrence in 1985) and the age of the accused, it was not necessary to reverse an acquittal; the State's interest was confined to clarification of law rather than securing a substantive remedy in the particular delayed case. The Court cited this decision to show that where delay is substantial, it may be unnecessary or futile to reverse conclusions or order retrials merely in the interest of legal correctness; this supported the decision to acquit in the present matter rather than remand for further litigation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began its analysis by quoting and interpreting Section 16-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Section 16-A authorizes summary trial of offences under Section 16(1) by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class or a Metropolitan Magistrate empowered by the State Government, applying Sections 262 to 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "as far as may be". Importantly, Section 16-A contains provisos permitting the Magistrate to impose imprisonment up to one year in summary convictions, and further permits the Magistrate, at the commencement or during a summary trial, to convert a summary trial into a warrant trial if it appears that the nature of the case is such that a sentence exceeding one year may be required or it is otherwise undesirable to try the case summarily; the Magistrate must hear the parties and record an order to that effect.

Applying Section 16-A to the facts, the Court noted that although an earlier appellate order had remitted the case for summary trial, the Trial Magistrate (by order dated 13.9.1986) legitimately exercised the statutory discretion under Section 16-A to direct that the matter be tried as a warrant case. The Magistrate's order records that the accused himself requested not to be tried summarily, the Government Food Inspector (G.F.I.) had no objection, and the Magistrate opined that the facts suggested the possibility of a sentence exceeding one year, making summary trial undesirable. The Court held that the Magistrate's order was "perfectly justified" and legal under Section 16-A.

The Court found fault with the appellate court below for taking a "technical view" and setting aside the Trial Magistrate's conversion order solely on the ground that the earlier remand directed summary trial; the High Court held that the appellate court had erred in upsetting the magistrate's order on that ground alone.

Turning to the merits and remedy, the Court considered the petitioner's submission that the chemical report (Ex. PE) indicated milk fat of 5.4% and MSNF of 8.0% (as pointed out by petitioner's counsel) and observed from the record that deficiency was confined to MSNF while milk fat was above required standards. The Court relied on Hans Raj and Om Parkash, which reasoned that the presence of a comparatively high milk fat together with a slight deficiency in MSNF tends to suggest improper sampling or imperfect analysis rather than addition of water to the milk.

The Court also relied on precedents (Subhash Chand and State of Haryana v. Ram Kishan) that sanctioned quashing convictions or refraining from remanding matters where proceedings had dragged on for very long periods and where continued litigation would be futile or oppressive. Given that the occurrence dated some twenty years earlier and the petitioner had endured prolonged litigation, the Court concluded that sending the matter back for further appellate consideration would be a futile exercise.

On these combined bases — the legality of the Magistrate's conversion order, the evidential picture from the chemical report suggesting sampling/analysis issues rather than clear-cut adulteration, and the extremely protracted duration of the proceedings — the Court determined that the appropriate course was to allow the revision petition and acquit the petitioner rather than remit for further proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: REVISION ALLOWED; PETITIONER ACQUITTED.

Direct consequence for the parties: The revision petition was allowed and the petitioner was acquitted of the charges framed against him. The Court set aside the appellate court's order that had remanded the matter for retrial on the ground that the trial ought to have been summary.

Broader implications: The Court relied on its interpretation of Section 16-A (permitting a Magistrate, at commencement or during summary trial, to convert to a warrant trial when appropriate), on established precedents regarding evidential inferences from chemical reports (Hans Raj and Om Parkash), and on authorities recognizing that excessive delay can justify quashing convictions or refusing further retrial (Subhash Chand; State of Haryana v. Ram Kishan). The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond applying these existing authorities; rather, it applies them to the present facts to decline to order a further retrial and to acquit the petitioner.

No further retrial was ordered; the acquittal is the immediate effect on the parties and the Court indicated that remanding for further proceedings would be futile given the evidentiary circumstances and the lengthy delay.


Note: This summary is strictly limited to and based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions have been added beyond what appears in the source text.

    Bagga Singh Petitioner v. State Of Haryana

    Jasbir Singh, J. — Vide order dated 31.10.1990, petitioner was found guilty, convicted and sentenced for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) and ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- for committing an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(ii) read with Section 7 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (in short the Act).

    2. It is essential to mention here that sample of milk was drawn by the competent officer on 31.8.1983 Sample was sent for chemical examination. Vide report Ex. PE. it was found to be adulterated as the milk solids not fat was deficient by 6% of the minimum prescribed standards. On filing of complaint, trial Magistrate ordered that the trial be commenced treating it as a warrant case. After recording necessary evidence, trial court, vide order dated 12.8.1985, found him guilty, convicted and contented him accordingly. He went in appeal, which was allowed and the matter was sent for retrial. His revision petition was dismissed by the High Court. On retrial, he was again found guilty, convicted and sentenced as found mentioned in para 1 of this order.

    3. He went in appeal. Appellate court below, vide order dated 30.7.1991, allowed his appeal, sent the matter for re-trial, by opining that the complaint was required to be tried by treating it as summons case in summery manner. However, since it was tried as warrant case, procedure adopted was not justified. Accordingly, conviction and sentence was set aside and the matter was sent for re-trial. Hence, this revision petition.

    4. Counsel for the parties heard.

    This Court feels that the opinion arrived at by the appellate Court below was not correct. Section 16A of the Act reads as under :—

    “16-A. Power of court to try cases summarily :—Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under sub-section (1) of Section 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may been, apply to such trial :

    Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year :

    Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of, a summary trial under this Section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code.”

    5. A reading of the above provisions clearly indicates that, if at the commencemnt of the trial or during trial, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate may after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect.

    6. It is apparent from the record that in this case, earlier also, the matter came before the appellate court below and it was remitted back with a direction that the trial be proceeded in a summary manner. Trial Magistrate, vide order dated 16.5.1986, passed the following order :—

    “This case has been remanded to this court back by the learned appellate court by order dated 2.1.1986 with the direction that it shall be tried in a summary manner as provided u/s 16(A) of the Act, 1954. The charge has already been framed against the accused on 1.6.84 Now entire evidence of the prosecution be summoned for 7.8.1986”

    7. However, during proceedings of the trial, Trial Magistrate chosen to pass order dated 13.9.1986, which reads as under :—

    “Accused has given his statement requesting and praying that he be not tried summarily but his case be tried as a warrant case. Ld. G.F.I has also no objection. In my opinion, as well, in the facts and circumstances of the case, when the accused can be sentenced for imprisonment for a period more than one year, it is not desirable that the case be tried summarily. Accordingly I hereby order that the case be tried as a warrant case. Let pre-charge evidence be recorded.”

    8. Order passed by the Trial Magistrate, referred to above, dated 13.9.1986, was perfectly justified. However, appellate court below, by taking a technical view of the entire matter, allowed the appeal filed by the petitioner, set aside the order of conviction and ordered the matter to be retried. This Court feels that in view of provisions of Section 16-A of the Act, order of the Magistrate was legal and the appellate court below had gone wrong while upsetting the same on this ground alone. Under these circumstances, no option is left except to set aside the order passed by the appellate court below and refer the matter to the appellate court below to decide it no merits.

    9. At this stage, Shri Lakhanpal, has argued that by asking the appellate court below to hear the appeal again, it will cause further mental agony and financial loss to the petitioner. Occurrence is 20 years old. Petitioner was not a previous convict and after his conviction in this case, he had disciplined himself and now residing in a very peaceful manner. Counsel further contended that even on merits, order passed by the trial court was not justified. He brought to the notice of this Court that as per chemical examiner's report Ex. PE (copy of the same was supplied to the court at the time of arguments), milk fat was found to be 5.4% and milk solids not fat was found to be 8.0%. By showing this fact, he contended that the milk fat was more than the required standards, only there was a small deficiency so far as the milk solids not fat was concerned. He placed reliance upon two judgments of this Court in Hans Raj… v. State Of Haryana…., 2000 (1) RCR (Crl.) 743 and Om Parkash v. State of Haryana, 2000 (1) RCR (Crl.) 121 to state that in such like situation, conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner was not justified. He prayed that order passed by the trial court be also set aside, as he has laid challenge to the same in this revision petition also.

    10. Mr. Amol Rattan Singh, AAG Haryana, appearing for the State has opposed this prayer of the counsel but he has failed to show anything that the averments made by the counsel for the petitioner are not justified.

    11. It is apparent from the record that the matter is 20 years old and as per chemical examiner's report, deficiency was found only of milk solids not fat and not fat, milk fat was found to be more than the required standard.

    A Single Bench of this Court in Hans Raj's case (supra), in paras 8 and 12 opined as unden :—

    “8. Unindicated milk has to conform to the standards of buffalo milk. In Haryana, buffalo milk should contain 6% milk fat content and 9.1% milk solids not fat content while cow milk should contain milk fat content to the extent of 4.0% and milk solids not fat content to the extent of 8.5%. It was quite apparent that the sample milk was not conforming to the standards of purity as laid down in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 so far as milk solids not fat content was concerned if we take it to be buffalo milk. The Public Analyst found milk fat content to the extent of 8.4% in the sample milk. He found milk solids not fat content to the extent of 8.6%. He found the sample milk to be deficient in milk solids not fat content to the extent of 4% of the minimum prescribed standard. Director, Central Food Laboratory found milk fat content to the extent of 10.6% and he found milk solids not fat content to the extent of 7.8% in the sample milk. He found the sample milk deficient in milk solids not fat content being below the minimum prescribed limit. Assuming that it was cow milk it was not conforming to the milk solids not fat content as per the report of Director, Central Food Laboratory.”

    12. In this case, thus, no inference can be drawn that milk had been adultered with water. Presence of much higher percentage of milk fat content in the milk and little deficiency in milk solids not fat content will suggest that there was either improper sampling by the Food Inspector or imperfect analysis of the sample but not that there had been addition of water to the milk.”

    To the same effect is the ratio of judgment of a Single Bench of this Court in Om Parkash's case (supra). This Court, in Subhash Chand v. The State of Haryana, 1989 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 602, in a case where conviction and sentence of the petitioner therein, was set aside on technical grounds, chosen not to send the case for re-trial in view of the fact that matter was pending before the courts for the last about 10 years. In that case, it was observed as under :—

    “The petitioner was convicted under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default of payment of fine the petitioner was to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. The petitioner's appeal was dismissed on 29.7.1985 and he could be released on bail vide order dated 8.8.1985 From the date of taking of sample more than ten years have elapsed. Harassment and strain of this period is sufficient for quashing the proceedings in this case. This leads me to hold that the petitioner has undergone sufficient harassment and strain. This petition is accepted and the conviction and sentence are set aside.”

    13. Similarly, in State Of Haryana… v. Ram Kishan…, 2003 (3) RCR (Crl.) 201 this Court opined as under :—

    “For the above reasons, the view taken by the trial Court is held to be erroneous. However, having regard to the fact that occurrence is of the year 1985, when the accused was 64 years of age, it is not necessary to reverse the acquittal of the respondent. Learned counsel for the State has very fairly stated that the State was interested only in clarification of the law on the point even if acquittal is not reversed in this particular case at this discussion of time. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.”

    14. After hearing counsel for the parties, this Court is convinced that even if, matter is sent back for decision by the appellate court below in view of ratio of judgments referred to above, it will only be a futile exercise. It is apparent from the record that deficiency was found only in milk solids not fat whereas milk fat was more than the required standard. Petitioner had been undergoing the agony of protracted trial for the last about 20 years, which, this court feels, was a sufficient punishment to him. Accordingly, revision petition is allowed and the petitioner is acquitted of the charges framed against him.

    Revision allowed.

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    Bagga Singh Petitioner v. State Of Haryana
    (Dec 6, 2003)