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  • provisions contained in section 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act and section 26 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act
  • SECTION 13 EAST PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION ACT
  • section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act,
  • provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of Order 41, rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Order 41 rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rent Restriction Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions contained in section 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act and section 26 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act
  • SECTION 13 EAST PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION ACT
  • section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act,
  • provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of Order 41, rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Order 41 rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rent Restriction Act
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — S.P. Goyal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent landlord filed a petition under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act for the ejectment of the petitioner, Rattan Chand, from premises in Chandigarh on grounds of non-payment of rent arrears and personal necessity. The tenant tendered the arrears with interest, which were accepted by the landlord, leaving personal requirement as the only remaining issue. The Rent Controller rejected the landlord's plea of personal necessity and dismissed the petition. On appeal the Appellate Authority recalled the landlord to record a detailed supplementary statement, reversed the Rent Controller's finding and ordered ejectment. The tenant then filed a petition under section 15(5) of the Act challenging the Appellate Authority's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Appellate Authority was legally entitled to recall the landlord and record a supplementary statement under section 15(3) of the Act in order to fill gaps in the landlord's evidence.
  2. Whether the Appellate Authority erred in relying on facts that were not pleaded but were introduced at the stage of evidence when determining the landlord's personal necessity.
  3. What is the proper legal meaning of the word "requires" in the phrase "requires for his own occupation" under section 13 (in the context of personal necessity) — specifically whether it denotes mere desire or a true element of need.
  4. Whether the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under section 15(5) of the Act may examine and set aside the Appellate Authority's order on grounds of illegality or impropriety, including errors of law affecting findings of fact.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Tenant) Arguments

  • The Appellate Authority's recalling of the landlord and recording of a supplementary statement was improper and legally unjustified; section 15(3) cannot be invoked to fill gaps in the landlord's evidence.
  • Principles similar to those embodied in Order 41, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure should guide any grant of additional evidence, even if the CPC provision is not strictly applicable to matters under the Act; reliance was placed on Bishan Dass & others v. Kehar Singh & another (A.I.R. 1972 Pb. & Haryana 263).
  • The landlord's asserted reasons for personal necessity (ill-health and better medical facilities in Chandigarh) were insufficient on the facts; the landlord in reality sought higher rent or eviction to circumvent rent control.
  • The Appellate Authority considered matters (such as the purported need of grandchildren or educational facilities) that were not pleaded by the landlord and so erred in law.

Respondent's (Landlord) Arguments

  • Implicit in the Appellate Authority's action was the contention that it could make further inquiry under section 15(3) and accept the landlord's supplementary statement to clarify his personal requirement.
  • When the High Court reviews the Appellate Authority's order under section 15(5), it should not ordinarily disturb a pure finding of fact; reliance was placed on Supreme Court decisions (including Phiroze Bamanji Deasi's case (supra) and Shaik Jaffar Shaikh Mohamd v. Mohd. Pasha Rakkani Saheb (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 794)) to contend that revisional power is limited and that the Court should not interfere with factual findings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bishan Dass and others v. Kehar Singh & another, A.I.R. 1972 Pb. & Haryana 263 That an appellate authority will not be entitled to allow additional evidence except on principles similar to those contained in Order 41, rule 27, CPC. The Court relied on this authority to hold that the Appellate Authority should not have recorded a supplementary statement merely to fill gaps in the landlord's evidence, since the landlord had had full opportunity to lead his evidence earlier.
Phiroze Ramanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and others, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1059 Established that the word "requires" (in the context of a landlord's claim to occupy premises) denotes an element of need and not mere desire. The Court applied this principle to interpret "requires" under the Act and concluded that the landlord had not shown a bona fide need to occupy the premises; his illness and circumstances did not amount to the necessary element of need.
Shaik Jaffar Shaikh Mohamd and others v. Mohd. Pasha Rakkani Saheb and others, 1975 RCR 332 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 794 Addressed limits on revisional power of High Courts under provisions analogous to Section 15(5) (in other statutory schemes) and held such revisional powers are not wider than section 115 CPC. The Court considered the reliance placed on this decision by the landlord but distinguished it as inapposite because it dealt with different statutory provisions; the Court held that Section 15(5) of the Act authorises the High Court to examine both the legality and propriety of the impugned order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a step-by-step analysis confined to the materials and arguments before it:

  1. On the Appellate Authority's power to recall and record supplementary evidence: the Court acknowledged that section 15(3) permits the Appellate Authority to make further inquiry, but held that this power could not be used to "fill gaps" in the landlord's case after the landlord had been granted full opportunity to lead evidence. Relying on Bishan Dass (supra) and the principles analogous to Order 41, rule 27 CPC, the Court found no justifiable ground for recording the supplementary statement since it was used to cure deficiencies in the landlord's original evidence.
  2. On reliance upon facts not pleaded: the Court found that the Appellate Authority admitted being influenced by facts (for example, the presence and educational needs of grandchildren in the village) which were never pleaded by the landlord. The Court reiterated the well-established principle that evidence cannot be relied upon to establish matters for which no foundation is laid in the pleadings, and concluded that considering such unpleaded matters was an error of law.
  3. On the meaning of "requires" and sufficiency of landlord's medical claims: the Court invoked the Supreme Court's ruling in Phiroze Ramanji Desai (supra) to hold that "requires" implies an element of need, not mere desire. Applying that test to the landlord's complaints (difficulty in walking due to old age and occasional chest pain), the Court concluded that the landlord did not demonstrate the necessary bona fide need to occupy the premises for health or medical reasons. The Court regarded the landlord's medical claim as inadequate and likely an excuse to evict the tenant.
  4. On corroborating factual indicia and landlord's conduct: the Court noted the landlord's conduct undermined his professed need: he had accommodation on the ground floor (suitable for an elderly person) and had relet a room that became vacant in 1974 instead of occupying it. Also, the timing and conduct suggested the landlord might have sought higher rent (an earlier increase from Rs. 100 to Rs. 130 in 1970 was admitted; an allegation that he demanded Rs. 200 per mensem was said to be consonant with his conduct). The Court found these facts inconsistent with a bona fide requirement to occupy the disputed premises.
  5. On the scope of the High Court's revisional power under section 15(5): the Court rejected the landlord's argument that the High Court could not interfere as the Appellate Authority's finding was a pure finding of fact. The Court distinguished the authorities relied upon by the landlord as relating to different statutory schemes and concluded that section 15(5) authorises the High Court to examine both legality and propriety of the impugned order; given the legal infirmities identified (improper reception of supplementary evidence, reliance on unpleaded facts, and misapplication of the test for "requires"), interference was justified.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petition under section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act is allowed. The order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and the decision of the Rent Controller (which had dismissed the landlord's petition) is restored.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the tenant's position as to continuation in the premises is preserved by restoration of the Rent Controller's order; the ejectment order previously made by the Appellate Authority no longer stands.
  • The Court found legal infirmities in the Appellate Authority's approach: (a) improper use of section 15(3) to fill evidential gaps despite the landlord having a full opportunity to adduce evidence; (b) consideration of matters not pleaded; and (c) misinterpretation of "requires" so as to ignore the requirement of bona fide need. These findings led to reversal but the opinion does not purport to lay down a new binding precedent beyond application of the cited authorities.
  • Costs: the parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Disposition: Petition allowed; Appellate Authority's order set aside; Rent Controller's order restored; parties to bear their own costs.

    Rattan Chand Jain v. Charan Singh

    S.P. Goyal, J. - The respondent landlord filed a petition under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter called the Act) for ejectment of Rattan Chand petitioner from the house in dispute situate at Chandigarh on the grounds on non-payment of arrears of rent and personal necessity. The petitioner contested the petition and tendered arrears of rent together with interest which were duly accepted by the landlord. Thereafter the only dispute which subsisted between the parties was the alleged personal requirement of the landlord. The Rent Controller, after going through the evidence produced the parties, negatived the plea of personal necessity and dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Appellate Authority, recalled the landlord, recorded this detailed statement to clarify certain averments concerning his personal requirement to occupy the demised premises and reversed the finding of the trial Court. Consequently, the plea of the landlord was upheld and the ejectment of the petitioner ordered. Aggrieved by that Judgment, the tenant has filed this petition under section 15(5) of the Act. 2. At the outset, the learned counsel for the petitioner, challenged the propriety and legality of the order recalling the landlord for recording his statement by the Appellate Authority. No doubt, sub section (3) of Section 15 of the Act, the Appellate Authority to make such further enquiry as it thinks fit, yet according to the learned counsel this provision cannot be invoked to fill the gaps in the evidence produced by the landlord to substantiate his plea of personal necessity. It was further contended that though the provisions of Order 41, rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure, may not be strictly applicable to cases under the Act but still while granting a prayer of this kind, the principles which guide the Courts in accepting an application of that nature have to be borne in mind by the Appellate Authority. Reliance for this contention was placed on a decision of this Court in Bishan Dass and others v. Kehar Singh & another A.I.R. 1972 Pb. & Haryana 263. The contention of the learned counsel appears to be well merited. The Appellate Authority, on perusal of the statement of the landlord, found that it was vague as he did not explain as to when the Panchayat elections were held; how his family consisted of nine members; what was the nature of his represented illness and what were the portions of his house which had been admitted by him to have fallen vacant and relet by him when those portions fell vacant. For proper decision and doing justice between the parties, it was though proper by the Appellate Authority to record the supplementary statement of the landlord. I am afraid if it the power under section 15(3) of the Act can be invoked to fill in gaps in the evidence of the landlord so as to make out a case for his personal necessity. The landlord having been afforded full opportunity to lead his evidence, the Appellate Authority, as held in Bishan Dass's case (supra) will not be entitled to allow the additional evidence except on principles similar to those contained in Order 41 rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Supplementary by the statement of the landlord was recorded Appellate Authority in this case for a proper decision and doing justice between the parties but as a matter of fact this was done only to fill in gaps in the evidence of the landlord as is evident from its observations noticed above. There was, therefore, no justifiable ground for recording supplementary statement of the landlord in this case. 3. Apart from the legal infirmity noticed above, the finding of the lower Appellate Court is liable to be reversed on two other grounds also, namely, that the finding is based on facts which were never pleaded in the application and were only introduced at the stage of evidence and that the lower Appellate Court failed to instruct itself properly as to the meaning of the words, "requires for his own occupation". As regards the first ground, the only averment made in this respect by the landlord was that he required medical aid in Chandigarh and had been advised to live in an open locality. There was no averment that some of his grandchildren were residing with him in the village and he intended to shift to Chandigarh as it provided better educational facilities, whereas, the Appellate Authority was impressed to a large extent by this fact while determining bona fide needs of the landlord to occupy the demised premises. Rule of law is well established that no amount of evidence can be looked into on a matter, the foundation for which has not been laid first in the pleadings. The Appellate Authority, therefore, fell into error of law in taking into consideration the requirement of the alleged members of the family of the landlord while determining his personal necessity. The words "his own occupation" no doubt have been consistently interpreted to mean occupation by the landlord and his dependents but the grand-children of the landlord in this case can hardly be said to be members of his family dependant upon him. Their need, therefore, could not be taken into consideration while determining the personal necessity of the landlord to occupy the demises premises. 4. As regards the meaning of the word, "requires" in section 13(3)(a)(i)(a), the Appellate Authority though that the landlord's statement regarding his personal requirement must ordinarily be accepted unless it was shown to be not genuine and bona fide. This was, of course, the view of this Court since long which, however, cannot be said to be the correct view in view of the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Phiroze Ramanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and others, A.I.R. 1974, S.C. 1059 where in it was held that the word, requires" in section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, means that there must be an element of need and not mere desire before a landlord can be said to require the premises for his own use and occupation. There was, therefore, no ground for the landlord to make out a case of his personal necessity. To prove his bona fide intention to occupy the demised premises, he must further show that there was bona fide need to occupy the premises. The landlord in the present case pleaded that he required the demised premises for his own occupation as he was not keeping a good health and better medical facilities were available at Chandigarh. The Appellate Authority however, opined that apart from the difficulty in walking because of old age and some time pain in his chest, he had no other ailment. On this finding alone, it is difficult to hold that he requires the demised premises because of his ill-health or for better medical facilities at Chandigarh. The need of the landlord based on the ground on ill health was therefore, nothing but an excuse to evict the tenant. 5. The case set up by the tenant, on the other hand, was that the landlord, in fact, wanted to increase the rent and if he had any intention to reside at Chandigarh, enough accommodation was available with the landlord on the ground floor for this purpose. The landlord admitted in his statement that the rent of the demised premises was Rs. 100/- and the same was increased to Rs. 130/- in the year 1970. A further suggestion by the tenant that he demanded rent at the rate of Rs. 200/- per mensem though denied by the landlord appears to be more in consonance with his prior conduct. The Rent Restriction Act was enforced in Chandigarh with effect from October 13, 1972 and it was, therefore, not possible for the landlord to enforce an increase in the rent thereafter. The only way by which he could, thereafter, achieve his purpose was the ejectment of the tenant to which he ultimately resorted to. 6. It was admitted by the landlord that he had one room in his occupation on the ground floor and that another room fell vacant in the year 1974 which he again let out to another tenant. If he landlord had bona fide intention and need to live at Chandigarh, he would have occupied those two rooms and thereafter moved an application for eviction of the tenant, if the accommodation was found insufficient for his need. The claim of the landlord that he had bona fide intention to occupy the premises in dispute is further falsified from that fact the ground floor is more suitable for his living, he being fairly an old person of more than 70 years, and even according to him it being difficult and painful for him to climb stairs to reach the first floor. 7. In view of the facts and circumstances discussed above, I am unable to sustain the finding of the lower Appellate Court that the landlord bona fide required the demised premises for his own occupation and the same has to be reversed. However, the learned counsel vehemently contended that the finding of the Appellate Authority being a pure finding of fact, this Court has no jurisdiction to set aside the same in the exercise of its powers under section 15(5) of the Act which only entitles this Court to examine the legality and propriety of the order. Reliance for this contention was placed on the two Supreme Court decisions (1) Phiroze Bamanji Deasi's case (supra) and (2) Shaik Jaffar Shaikh Mohamd and others v. Mohd. Pasha Rakkani Saheb and others, 1975 RCR 332 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 794. In both these decisions similar provisions contained in section 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act and section 26 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act were under consideration and it was held that the revisional power of the High Court were limited in terms of those sections and were not intended to be wider than the provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Both these decisions, therefore, have no bearing on the powers of this Court under Section 15(5) of the Act which authorises it to look into the legality as well as the propriety of the impugned order. Moreover, as already held above, the finding of the Appellate Court suffers from two legal infirmities inasmuch as the lower appellate Court failed to instruct itself properly with regard to the true meaning and import of the word, "requires" under section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) and also took into consideration the matters which were never pleaded by the landlord in his application for ejectment. 8. In the result, this petition is allowed, the order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and that of the Rent Controller is restored. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.

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    Rattan Chand Jain v. Charan Singh
    (Nov 18, 1977)