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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. T.S. Doabia
  • Advocate.
Judges
  • R.S.Narula
  • J.
Acts
  • clause (f) of sub-section (5) of Section 6 of the Gram Panchayat Act.
  • rule 4 of Appendix 24 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules
  • Section 6(5)(f) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act
  • Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934,
  • PUNJAB GRAM PANCHAYAT ACT
  • sub-rule (3) of rule 16.2
  • rule 16.2(3)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. T.S. Doabia
  • Advocate.
Judges
  • R.S.Narula
  • J.
Acts
  • clause (f) of sub-section (5) of Section 6 of the Gram Panchayat Act.
  • rule 4 of Appendix 24 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules
  • Section 6(5)(f) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act
  • Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934,
  • PUNJAB GRAM PANCHAYAT ACT
  • sub-rule (3) of rule 16.2
  • rule 16.2(3)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — R.S. Narula, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

An election for the office of Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat of village Pakka Khera Mashmula Sheikhupura Manchoori, Tehsil and District Karnal was held on 31 December 1963. Satwant Singh (the successful candidate at that election) was declared elected by a majority of 187 votes. Harbans Singh (respondent No. 3) secured the next highest number of votes and on 13 January 1964 filed an election petition to set aside Satwant Singh's election on the ground that Satwant Singh was disqualified under Section 6(5)(f) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act because he had been dismissed from Government service.

Satwant Singh defended on the ground that his removal was on medical grounds and therefore fell within the statutory exception. The prescribed authority (the Ilaqa Magistrate) framed two issues: (1) whether Satwant Singh had been dismissed from government service on medical grounds or for other reasons which debar him from future public employment, and (2) whether Satwant Singh had been "notified as disqualified for appointment in public service."

By judgment dated 2 April 1964 the Ilaqa Magistrate found that Satwant Singh had been dismissed for reasons other than medical grounds (answering issue 1 against him) and held on issue 2 that intimation of the order of dismissal to the person concerned amounted to the disqualification being "notified." On that basis the Magistrate set aside Satwant Singh's election and held him disqualified for appointment in public service.

Satwant Singh filed the present writ petition on 2 May 1964 challenging the legality of the Ilaqa Magistrate's order. The High Court proceeded to hear the matter and to examine the legal questions arising from the Ilaqa Magistrate's findings and conclusions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether dismissal from government service per se constitutes disqualification to stand for election under Section 6(5)(f) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, or whether the disqualification arises only if the person has been "notified as disqualified for appointment in public service."
  2. Whether mere intimation of an order of dismissal to the person concerned amounts to the disqualification having been "notified" under clause (f) of sub-section (5) of Section 6 of the Act, or whether a formal notification (for example in an official Gazette) is required.
  3. Whether the Ilaqa Magistrate had jurisdiction to set aside the election on the basis of dismissal alone, without having specifically found that the petitioner was disqualified for appointment in public service.
  4. Whether a fresh election held during the pendency of proceedings (in which the respondent was declared successful) operates to prevent relief to the original successful candidate if the original election had been set aside improperly.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Satwant Singh)

  • Counsel (Mr. Tejinder Singh Doabia) contended that dismissal from Government service is not by itself a ground for disqualification under the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act; the disqualification arises only if the person has been "notified as disqualified for appointment" in public service.
  • He further argued that mere intimation of an order of dismissal to the person concerned does not amount to the disqualification having been "notified."
  • He relied on the judgment of a Single Judge (Shamsher Bahadur J.) in Balak Ram v. State of Punjab, 1965 P.L.R. 213, which was cited for the proposition that disqualification has to be notified before the disablement becomes effective and the mere order of removal is not an automatic disqualification.

Respondent's Arguments (Harbans Singh)

  • Counsel (Mr. Y.P. Gandhi) relied on an earlier judgment of this Court (Bhandari, C.J.) in Gulab Singh v. Pritam Singh & others, which held that if the fact of punishment (or disqualification) is made known to the person by words or notice it is not necessary that it should also be published in the official Gazette; making the disqualification known to the person concerned is sufficient.
  • The respondents also argued that the writ petition should be dismissed because in the meantime a fresh election had been held and Harbans Singh had been declared successful in that election for the same period for which the petitioner had earlier been elected.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balak Ram v. The State of Punjab and others, 1965 P.L.R. 213 (Single Judge: Shamsher Bahadur J.) Held that disqualification to stand for election must be notified before the disablement is effective; mere order of removal from service is not automatically an order of disqualification. The Court considered this authority as supportive of the petitioner's contention that notification is required before disqualification becomes effective. The Court noted, however, that the Single Judge did not explicitly hold that mere intimation could never amount to notification.
Gulab Singh v. Pritam Singh and others (Judgment by Bhandari, C.J.) Held that if the fact of punishment (disqualification) is made known to the person by words or notice, it is not necessary that such fact should also be notified in the official Gazette; personal notice suffices. The Court regarded this decision as directly on point and binding. The Court accepted the interpretation that the word "notified" in clause (f) of sub-section (5) of Section 6 should be given its ordinary meaning and does not necessarily require publication in the official Gazette.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded step by step, starting from the unchallenged factual finding of the Ilaqa Magistrate that the petitioner (Satwant Singh) had been dismissed from service for reasons other than medical grounds (specifically for absence from duty and insubordination). The High Court did not disturb that finding of fact.

The Court then addressed the meaning of the word "notified" in clause (f) of sub-section (5) of Section 6 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act. Two authorities were placed before the Court with apparently divergent emphases:

  • Balak Ram: emphasises that disqualification must be notified before it becomes effective; mere order of removal is not automatically disqualification.
  • Gulab Singh: emphasises that notification need not be by Gazette publication; communication (words or notice) to the person concerned is sufficient to constitute "notification."

The Court held itself bound by the decision of Bhandari, C.J. in Gulab Singh and agreed with the proposition that "notified" should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning and does not necessarily require publication in an official Gazette. Thus, personal notice or making the disqualification known to the person can amount to notification for the purposes of clause (f).

Despite that conclusion, the Court identified a more fundamental legal error by the Ilaqa Magistrate. Clause (f) of Section 6(5) disqualifies a person who "has been notified as disqualified for appointment in public service, except on medical grounds." The Court emphasised that the disqualifying fact required by the statute is disqualification for appointment in public service, not dismissal per se. The Magistrate's order had treated dismissal itself as sufficient without making a requisite finding that the petitioner had been disqualified for future appointment in public service.

To determine whether a dismissal produces disqualification for future employment the Court examined relevant disciplinary rules. It noted that Appendix 24 rule 4 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules ordinarily describes dismissal as a punishment that disqualifies from future employment, but that this rule was not applicable to the petitioner (a Foot Constable). The relevant provision was held to be rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (quoted at length in the opinion).

Rule 16.2(3) distinguishes cases where dismissal following conviction for corrupt practices must be published in the Police Gazette from "other cases of dismissal" where, if the authority wishes to ensure non-reemployment, "a full descriptive roll, with particulars of the punishments, shall be sent for publication in the Police Gazette." The Court accordingly concluded that, because the petitioner was dismissed for absence and insubordination (i.e., an "other case of dismissal"), whether the dismissal produced disqualification for future employment depends on whether the punishing authority (a) expressly directed that the officer should not be re-employed, or (b) had the matter published in the Police Gazette in the manner required by the rule, or (c) whether the fact of disqualification was otherwise shown in a manner permitted by law.

The Court found that the Ilaqa Magistrate had not made any finding on this crucial question — whether the punishing authority had desired to ensure non-reemployment (by express words or publication) — and had therefore simply set aside the election on the basis of dismissal alone. That omission was an error of law and rendered the Magistrate's order unsustainable, since the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to set aside the election absent a finding that the petitioner had in fact been disqualified for appointment in public service.

Finally, the Court considered the respondents' argument that a fresh election had been held in the meantime and Harbans Singh had been declared successful. The Court observed that Harbans Singh had been elected for the same period for which the petitioner had been originally elected and that, had the election petition not been accepted, the petitioner would still be Sarpanch. Consequently, the holding of a fresh election during the pendency of the writ petition did not preclude the Court from granting relief. Nonetheless, since Harbans Singh was acting as Sarpanch, immediate reinstatement would not serve a useful purpose.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

  • The writ petition is allowed.
  • The High Court maintained the Ilaqa Magistrate's findings of fact on the two originally framed issues (that the petitioner was dismissed for reasons other than medical), but set aside the operative part of the Ilaqa Magistrate's order insofar as it granted the election petition and set aside the election of Satwant Singh.
  • The Ilaqa Magistrate (or any other Ilaqa Magistrate having jurisdiction) is directed to frame an additional issue: whether the petitioner was in fact disqualified for future employment in public service, to afford all parties an opportunity to produce evidence on that question, and thereafter to re-decide the election petition in light of its original findings (maintained) and the new finding on disqualification for appointment.
  • In the meantime, Harbans Singh shall continue to act as Sarpanch as an interim arrangement. The Ilaqa Magistrate is to dispose of the matter expeditiously. There will be no order as to costs.

Implications: The decision reverses the Ilaqa Magistrate's operative disposition for lack of jurisdictional basis (failure to determine statutory disqualification rather than mere dismissal). It directs further proceedings to ascertain whether the punishing authority in fact intended to disqualify the officer for future employment (by express order or by publication as required under the Police Rules). The opinion applies existing case law on the meaning of "notified" (accepting that personal notice can suffice) but does not purport to lay down any novel or general precedent beyond applying those authorities to the facts and the statutory scheme; the immediate effect is the setting aside of the impugned order and remand for the limited additional inquiry described above.

No other substantive relief or broader principle was newly declared; the Court required the prescribed authority to decide the precise statutory question (disqualification for appointment) before any election could be set aside on the ground of dismissal.

Show full summary ...

    Satwant Singh v. State Of Punjab And Others

    R.S. Narula, J. - In an election for the office of Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat of village Pakka Khera Mashmula Sheikhupura Manchoori, Tehsil and District Karnal held on December 31, 1963 the petitioner was elected by a majority of 187 votes. Amongst the other four persons, who contested the election with the petitioner was Harbans Singh, respondent No. 3 who secured the next highest number of votes. Harbans Singh, respondent filed an election petition for setting aside the election of the petitioner on 13th January, 1964 on the ground that the petitioner was disqualified from being elected as Sarpanch under Section 6(5)(f) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act as he had been dismissed from Government service. Satwant Singh contested the election petition on the ground that his removal from service was on medical grounds and, therefore, he fell within the exception to the disqualifying clause referred to above. The Ilaqa Magistrate, who was the prescribed authority under the Act, framed two issues for the trial of the election petition viz., - 1. Whether the respondent (petitioner in the writ petition) was dismissed from government service on medical grounds or he was dismissed for other reasons which debar him from any future employment in public service. 2. Whether the respondent is notified as disqualified government servant for such appointment. 2. By his judgment dated 2nd April, 1964 the prescribed authority held that the petitioner had in fact been dismissed from his service as a Foot Constable on grounds other than medical ones and on that basis answered issues No. 1 against Satwant Singh. On issue No. 2 he held as follows :- "As far as second question is concerned both the parties are agreed that the order of dismissal intimated to the respondent is an order 'notified' and that it was not necessary that the order should have been notified in some Gazette. If the order is conveyed to the person concerned it is deemed to have been notified". 3. On the above findings the election of Satwant Singh, petitioner was set aside by the impugned order of the Ilaqa Magistrate dated 2nd April, 1964. By the same order the petitioner was held to be disqualified for appointment in public service. 4. On May 2, 1964 this writ petition was filed challenging the legality of the above-said order of the prescribed authority. 5. On behalf of the petitioner only two points have been urged in this case by Mr. Tejinder Singh Doabia, namely - (i) that dismissal of a person from the Government service is per se no ground for disqualifying him from contesting as election under the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act and that the relevant disqualifying invoked by the other side is incurred only if a person, who is not a member of a Sabha, has been "notified" as "disqualified for appointment in the public service", and (ii) that mere intimation of the order of dismissal to the person concerned does not amount to the disqualification having been "notified". 6. The finding of fact on the question of the petitioner having been dismissed from service on medical grounds or otherwise arrived at by the prescribed authority cannot and indeed has not been questioned in these proceedings. The learned counsel for the petitioner has however, contended that mere furnishing of the order of dismissal does not amount to notifying the same. In this connection he has relied on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Shamsher Bahadur J.) in Balak Ram v. The State of Punjab and others, 1965 P.L.R. 213, wherein it was held that disqualification to stand for election has to be notified before the disablement of the candidate is effective and that the mere order of removal from service could not be regarded as an automatic order of disqualification as required in clause (f) of sub-section (5) of Section 6 of the Gram Panchayat Act. In that case the learned Judge only held that it was necessary that the disqualification should be notified and does not appear to have anywhere said that the mere intimating of the order of disqualification of the person concerned does not amount to the disqualification being notified. Mr. Y.P. Gandhi, the learned counsel for Harbans Singh respondent, has in this connection relied on an earlier judgment of this Court (Bhandari, C.J.) in Gulab Singh v. Pritam Singh and others, wherein it was clearly held that if the factum of punishment is made known to a person by words or notice it is not necessary that this fact should also be made known by means of a notification in the official gazette and that the disqualification being made known the person concerned is sufficient for the purposes of disqualifying a person under the above said provision of law. I am bound by the judgment of Bhandari. C.J. which is directly on the point. Even otherwise I am in respectful agreement with the law laid down therein and I hold that the word "notified" in clause (f) of sub-section (5) of Section 6 of the Act merely conveys the usual dictionary meaning of that word and does not amount to require notification of the disqualification in an official gazette or by means of a proclamation. 7. There is, however, greater force in the second contention of Mr. Doabia, Relevant part of Section 6(5)(f) of the Act reads as follows :- "(5) No person who is not a member of the Sabha and who - (f) has been "notified as disqualified for appointment" in public service, except on medical grounds; - shall be entitled to stand for elections as, or continue to be, a Sarpanch or Panch". 8. The second issue framed by the prescribed authority related to the meaning and effect of the word "notified" in the above-mentioned provision of law. The only other issue framed by the learned Magistrate was in respect of the factum of the dismissal of the petitioner being on medical grounds or other grounds. A mere glance at the disqualifying provision reproduced above, however, shows that it is not dismissal itself which is a ground for disqualifying a person for being elected as a Sarpanch but it is the disqualification for appointment in public service which is the ground on which a person may be removed from the office of a Sarpanch even after he is elected as such. The Tribunal trying the election petition does not appear to have applied his mind at all to this aspect of the matter. An error of law in his order is thus apparent on the fact of the record. What he was required to decide in order to grant the election petition was whether the petitioner had been disqualified for appointment in public service and not whether he had been merely dismissed from the public service. 9. Under rule 4 of Appendix 24 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules Vol. 1 one of the prescribed punishments is described as "dismissal from the civil service of the Government which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment". Even this rule leaves room for a punishing authority to give lesser punishment than that described therein i.e., a civil servant may be dismissed from government service with a specific direction to the effect that he shall not be disqualified from future employment. Be that as it may, the above-said rules has no application to this case. The petitioner was a Foot Constable and the relevant rule applicable to him is rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Vol. II which reads as follows :- "16. (1) Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. In making such an award regard shall be had to the length of service of the offender and his claim to pension. (2) An enroled police officer sentenced judicially to rigorous imprisonment exceeding one month or to any other punishment not less severe, shall, if such sentence is not quashed on appeal or revision, be dismissed. An enrolled police officer sentenced by a criminal Court to a punishment of fine or simple imprisonment, or both, or to rigorous imprisonment not exceeding one month, or who, having been proclaimed under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure fails to appear within the statutory period of thirty days may be dismissed or otherwise dealt with at the discretion of the officer empowered to appoint him. Final departmental orders in such cases shall be postponed until the appeal or revision proceedings have been decided, or until the period allowed for filing as appeal has lapsed without appellate or revisionary proceedings having been instituted. Departmental punishments under this rule shall be awarded in accordance with the powers conferred by rule 16.1. (3) When a police officer is convicted judicially and dismissed, or dismissed as a result of a departmental inquiry, in consequence of corrupt practices, the conviction and dismissal and its cause shall be published in the Police Gazette . In other cases of dismissal when it is desired to ensure that the officer dismissed shall not be re-employed elsewhere, a full descriptive roll, with particulars of the punishments, shall be sent for publication in the Police Gazette". 10. It is admitted by all the learned counsel appearing before me that the finding recorded by the prescribed authority is that the petitioner was not dismissed from his service as a Foot Constable in consequence of any corrupt practice but was dismissed on account of being absent from duty and for insubordination. That being so, his case falls in the last sentence of sub-rule (3) of rule 16.2 quoted above. His is a case falling in the category described in rule 16.2(3) as "other cases of dismissal". It would, therefore, be necessary to find out whether the punishing authority, who dismissed him, desired to ensure that the petitioner shall not be re-employed or not. This would depend either on the express wording of the order of dismissal or on the fact whether the prescribed or the competent authority had published a full descriptive roll with particulars of the punishment in the police Gazette as required by the last portion of the above-said rule. It may also be proved or disproved by the contesting parties before the prescribed authority in any other manner prescribed by law. The prescribed authority had no jurisdiction to set aside the election of the petitioner without giving had no jurisdiction to set aside the election of the petitioner without giving a finding to the effect that the petitioner was in fact disqualified for appointment in public service. No such finding has been given by the Magistrate. It is, therefore, impossible to sustain the impugned order in this case. Setting aside the election without giving he requisite of finding is wholly without jurisdiction. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents have argued that the petition should be dismissed on the additional ground that in the meantime a fresh election to the office of Sarpanch has been held and that Harbans Singh, respondent No. 3 has been declared successful therein. But it is not disputed that Harbans Singh has been elected in place of the petitioner for the same period for which the petitioner had been elected and that if this election petition had not been accepted it is the petitioner who would have been the Sarpanch today and not Harbans Singh. That being so, the election held during the pendency of the writ petition cannot stand in the way of relief being granted to the petitioner. At the time it would serve no useful purpose to re-instate the petitioner before the election petition is decided when Harbans Singh has already been elected and is acting as Sarpanch. In this view of the matter I would allow this writ petition and while maintaining the findings of fact arrived at by the prescribed authority on the two issues framed by him set aside the operative part of his order by which the election petition was granted and the election of the petitioner was set aside, and direct the prescribed authority (or any other Ilaqa Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the election petition) to frame an additional issue about the petitioner being disqualified for future employment in public service or not and to decide the same after giving all the parties interested an adequate apportunity for producing evidence on that short question and to redecide the election petition in the light of his two findings which are maintained and the finding which he might arrive at on the above-said crucial question. In the meantime Harbans Singh, petitioner shall continue to act as Sarpanch as an interim arrangement. The Ilaqa Magistrate may dispose of the election petition in the light of the above observations as expeditiously as possible. There will be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Satwant Singh v. State Of Punjab And Others
    (Oct 12, 1965)